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Joshua A. Bergamin 
 
In the Beginning was the Word:  
Concepts, Perception, and Human Being 
 
In this thesis, I argue that humans are differentiated from other animals through a 
faculty of linguistically-structured perception through which we directly perceive 
things in virtue of their higher-order, conceptually-articulated properties. Yet I also 
argue that we retain a non-conceptual form of awareness that we share with non-
human animals. Through an investigation of the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and 
John McDowell, I explore a phenomenology of expertise in order to defend a 
Dreyfusian view that argues that the experiential content of our practical dealings 
must undergo a translation if it is to become the content of conceptual capacities. 
However, although I agree with Dreyfus that our untranslated experience is of a kind 
that is shared with other animals, I also argue that he plays down the interdependence 
of conceptual and non-conceptual content in humans. I articulate this 
interdependence through a discussion of phronesis, 'practical wisdom,' as it is used in 
the debate, as well as by Heidegger. Drawing on McDowell's assertion that our 
conceptual capacities develop with our acquisition of a language and our initiation 
into a second-nature 'world,' I argue that our practical coping is better described not 
as non-conceptual but as post-conceptual; that is to say, human coping involves 
navigating our second-nature 'worlds' in the same, direct way that animals navigate 
their first nature environments. 
 
In the second part, I argue that this 'world' is ultimately linguistic in the sense that 
our conceptual experience is drawn from a grammatically-structured perception that 
Heidegger called vernehmen, 'apprehension,' which he identified with noesis. This 
structure creates the object-subject relationship through which we directly perceive 
entities as being objects. Through noesis, we experience concepts as things, and our 
capacity to cope post-conceptually with language and ideas powers the exponential 
creativity of human thought and action in our rich, second-nature ‘worlds.’ However, 
the cultural contingency of many concepts indicates a potential discordance between 
concepts and their experiential source. I conclude that while such discordances are 
not incommensurable, and that knowledge of reality is not inaccessible to us, we must 
be careful about the faith we put in language to describe it, for as soon as we 
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Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος ~ John 1:1 
 
Language is a virus from outer space ~ William S. Burroughs 
 
My thesis is that language forms our world. Over the course of the following chapters, 
I will examine our experience of the world with the aim of understanding the 
differences as well as the similarities between humans and other animals. I will argue 
that our acquisition of language and initiation into a 'second-natural' world arises with 
the development of a linguistically-structured form of perception– what I will call 
noûs– through which we directly perceive conceptual things in virtue of their higher-
order, conceptually-articulated properties. I will argue that this form of perception is 
exclusively human, and enables us both to understand entities as independent objects, 
as well as ourselves as self-conscious subjects. Yet I will also argue that we retain a 
non-conceptual awareness that we share with non-human animals, and that we 
demonstrate in our involved, practical dealings. The difference between these two 
forms of awareness, I will argue, suggests that there is a discordance between our 
different experiences of the world which raises questions about our knowledge of 
reality. 
 
In this enquiry into what is essentially human, I take my first lead from Aristotle, for 
whom the human being is the zoon logon echon, the 'animal with logos,' or– as it has 
most frequently been passed down us– the 'rational animal.' Whichever way we read 
it, this phrase identifies something particular about the human, some thing or 
capacity we have that sets us apart from other animals whose forms of life we share in 
so many ways. Aristotle's definition has heavily informed the work of two thinkers 
who will dominate this thesis, Martin Heidegger and John McDowell, and so it makes 
sense to situate our question in his terms. 
 
This thesis, we might say, is a search for the logos, for that which makes us human. 
We find a questioning of the logos exemplified today in the debates between John 
McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus. Here the question is translated as: What is rationality? 
What is a concept? What are the limits of our conceptual capacities? 
 




rational. What remains unclear is whether human beings retain a non-rational 
relation to the world. Dreyfus holds that we do. He argues that our everyday dealings 
and expert performances reveal a relation to the world that does not involve language 
or conceptual rationality. When we perform at our best, we do not think in a 
deliberative way– we just do. There is something animal-like in this description of 
expert performance. Just as a squirrel runs deftly along a branch, with no conception 
that it could fall, so we dance, play music or sports with seamless actions that a 
consciously thinking mind could only disrupt. Our zoon has the logos, yet the logos 
does not pervade our every action. 
 
McDowell, on the other hand, holds that the logos, in the form of conceptual 
understanding, entirely pervades the zoon. We cannot switch it off and on, acting now 
in an animal-like and now in a rational way. Being human means being a rational 
animal. Even similar actions performed by a human and by an animal differ, 
according to McDowell, as humans live in a world distinct from the animal's mere 
'environment,' and thus we at all times see the world through the lens of a conceptual 
schema into which any experience can be placed. 
 
Dreyfus' position draws deeply from his interpretation of the phenomenology of 
Martin Heidegger. Yet at first glance, McDowell's position appears to share more with 
Heidegger than Dreyfus' does. Heidegger reads Aristotle's zoon logon echon as an 
inseparable whole. Humans are not animals with something extra, but animals who 
embody and enact the logos. McDowell's distinction between 'world' and 
'environment' has, through Gadamer, Heideggerian roots, and McDowell's concept of 
human 'second nature'– the cultural world in which we experience things directly in 
the light of reason– has many parallels to Heidegger's 'world,' in his technical sense 
of the structural background through which Dasein– the human agent– encounters 
entities as meaningful. 
 
And yet, I will argue, Heidegger is not as conclusive as McDowell on the animal 
question. Heidegger does not make as much of the world/environment distinction as 
does his student Gadamer, and he describes the animal as 'world-poor' as opposed to 
'world-less.' I will argue that his crucial point is that animals lack the logos, a subtle 
difference that reopens Dreyfus' question about whether the logos need be present in 
all of our actions. As we have seen, Dreyfus thinks not, and I will offer a reading of 
Heidegger that supports this view, although perhaps not as far as Dreyfus would like, 
for I will maintain that what is essentially human remains tied to the logos. In 
3 
 
developing my case, I will use Heidegger principally as a source of concepts for 
describing the relation between language and human being, and as I develop his 
thought in dialogue with the thinkers and issues at the heart of this thesis, my reading 
will diverge from many orthodox interpretations of his work. It bears mentioning at 
the outset, then, that although I aim to provide a rigorous and coherent interpretation 
of Heidegger’s work, my principal goal here is not to give an exegesis, but to adapt and 
apply his thought so far as it can fruitfully contribute to the questions I am asking.1 
 
As is well-known, Heidegger distinguishes between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic'– or 
better, owned (eigentlich) and unowned (uneigentlich)– modes of being. Unowned 
actions typify our everyday dealings, and I will argue that there are many parallels 
between these and the ways animals get about in their 'poor' worlds, as well as in the 
forms of human 'everyday expertise' that provide the basis for Dreyfus' thesis. Yet the 
analytic of our everyday dealings that makes up Division One of Heidegger's Being 
and Time is merely a preliminary account. And if Heidegger's 'world' is not as close to 
McDowell's on the animal question as it first appears, he nevertheless builds a richer 
picture of the human in Division Two, where Dasein's individuation and the 
possibility of owning itself is made clear, opening the way to an experience that is 
qualitatively different from unowned everydayness.  
 
I will argue that this experience of action– when it is authentic– is only possible for 
beings who have a relation to the logos. As an expertise, it reflects what Aristotle 
described as phronesis, or 'practical wisdom.' Phronesis plays an important role in the 
Dreyfus-McDowell debate, with both thinkers drawing upon it as evidence for their 
respective positions. The question thus becomes, does the exercise of phronesis 
involve the logos? Yet the implications of this question will be more complex than a 
simple yes or no answer might suggest.  
 
I will argue that close attention to this question will reveal the debaters as respectively 
emphasising one of two related but separate issues. Dreyfus is wrong to think that the 
authentic coping which phronesis exemplifies does not involve the logos, even though 
he is right that our most basic everyday coping functions without explicitly invoking 
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis, when drawing upon Heidegger I refer for the most part to the 'early' Heidegger 
of Being and Time and associated lectures, not only because this is the most directly Aristotelian 
phase of his thought (cf. Kisiel 1993), but because it was primarily through engagement with these 
works that Dreyfus develops his theory. At any rate, I subscribe to the view of those, such as 
Gadamer, who hold that Heidegger's fundamental thinking did not change through his so-called 
'Kehre' into the 'later' Heidegger after the mid-1930s, although lack of space prevents me from 




it. Meanwhile, McDowell is right to argue that phronesis contains the logos, and yet 
wrong to deny the form of awareness that we share with animals, which has him 
implying that all of our dealings are phronesis-like all the way out. For if phronesis 
includes an unmediated perception of the logos, I argue that– as Dreyfus emphasises– 
its parallels with everyday expertise are significant, yet, pace Dreyfus, its invocation 
of concepts means that it should not properly be considered non-conceptual, but 
rather post-conceptual. Yet this conclusion requires that we re-understand the logos 
in terms of a linguistic faculty that is in a certain sense deeper than communicative 
speech, intimately tied to a grammatically-structured, minded mode of perception 
that Heidegger calls vernehmen. 
 
By following Heidegger's identification of vernehmen with Aristotle's noesis or noûs, 
I will argue that the central feature of language is the perception of objects as objects, 
which we relate to one another through a structure that is grammatical in the sense of 
Chomsky's Universal Grammar. That is, this mode of perception lets us carve up 
experiences into isolated elements. Such elements can then be recombined in the way 
that we merge and move elements of a sentence to create new meanings, a process I 
liken to the Aristotelian idea of synthesis and diairesis, in which Heidegger argues 
vernehmen is grounded. I will argue that this form of perception itself enacts the 
‘breakdown’ whereby we experience objects immediately as things, but in doing so, 
we take them from a particular perspective. While I will argue that this perspective is 
shared in virtue of our being embodied social beings within a linguistically-rooted 
culture, the sense of contingency that makes our conceptual faculty so creative also 
implies a disconnect between the concepts available to different cultural 
communities. 
 
Thus, I will argue that resolving the Dreyfus-McDowell debates will provide us with 
insights that should improve our understanding of human being-in-the-world. 
Crucially, I aim to show that our experience is comprised of both a linguistic or noetic 
layer pervaded by the logos, and a more primordial layer in which it is not operative. 
Dreyfus goes wrong by downplaying just how pervasive the logos is for us, while 
McDowell makes the error of focusing only on that sphere of our lives in which noûs 
is involved. In the latter part of this thesis, I will examine contemporary debates on 
the nature of mindedness and intentionality in the light of these conclusions, showing 
that McDowell is not alone in restricting his focus. As I will argue that noetic 
awareness implies self-consciousness, such a restriction therefore results in a 
privileging and therefore an identification of the human with the perceiving subject of 
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the logos. Understanding this layer as distinct from yet interdependent with our pre-
noetic awareness, I will suggest, offers an account of what makes our abstract and 
creative thought– indeed, our very perception of the world– possible. However, by 
understanding the movement of this abstraction, I will argue that this same capacity 
also implies a discordance with the source of our experience. 
 
Reaching this conclusion will involve an occasionally winding path, as I digress from 
the central debate to provide evidence for the layers I posit, before shifting my focus 
to the transition between layers, and the wider implications of this shift. At the 
beginnings and ends of each Chapter, I will give a recap that should help to put the 
Chapter’s themes into the overall context of the thesis, although the hurried reader 
may wish to skip over these summaries, my thesis should remain clear if we keep in 
mind that at each stage, however diverse, I am offering a questioning of the logos, and 
its influence on our experience of the world. 
 
Chapter One will introduce us to the Dreyfus-McDowell debate. As mentioned above, 
Dreyfus and McDowell epitomise two poles of thought about the relationship of the 
logos with the zoon, so I therefore take their positions as a starting point, contrasting 
them to all the better show what Aristotle's words have come to mean for us. Resolving 
the debate (which in part will mean dissolving it, for I will argue that the thinkers 
share more than they initially suggest) is therefore a preliminary step I take in order 
to clarify what the logos– what rationality, or conceptual capacities– is. 
 
I begin by showing where there is agreement between these thinkers over the 
phenomena that are at stake, arguing that only once we have this clear will it make 
sense to map on any meaning of concept, rationality, or logos. I will show how Dreyfus 
and McDowell largely agree about what it is that humans do, and both actively 
promote the idea that a great deal of our cognitive activity extends beyond what has 
traditionally been limited to 'thinking.' Their disagreement is laid out in terms of 
whether 'concepts' are employed in this wider understanding of cognition– 
particularly in that sphere of action that doesn't involve explicit use of linguistic 
concepts, which Dreyfus calls 'coping.'  
 
The biggest difficulty here is that neither Dreyfus nor McDowell entirely agree with 
what the other means by 'conceptual.' Dreyfus holds that concepts are not employed 
during coping, since they are for him by definition only available during restricted, 




indicates that an experience is already conceptual. Thus the bad news is that Dreyfus 
and McDowell cannot agree on what being conceptual– and more broadly, what being 
rational– means, and the worse news is that the wider literature contains even less 
agreement. But the good news, I will argue, is that we can at least find in their debates 
a starting point, for they share a general agreement over the phenomena that are 
present. I will argue that both Dreyfus and McDowell recognise two distinct forms of 
intentional content. Their debate, we will see, revolves around where we understand 
these differing forms of content to apply. But to begin with, I will elaborate a 
description of these two forms of content, as they appear in both Dreyfus and 
McDowell's work, and through accounts of expertise.  
 
A lively debate over the content involved expert action feeds directly into the Dreyfus-
McDowell debate by also questioning whether concepts are actively employed during 
expert performance– something Dreyfus considers an exemplar of 'coping.' In 
Chapter Two, I will argue that a careful examination of the phenomenology of 
expertise reveals the same two layers of experience that Dreyfus and McDowell 
described, which we can use as a basis for a distinction between forms of experiential 
content. I will furthermore mark a distinction between the phenomenology of 
'inauthentic,' unowned everyday expertise, and authentic, owned expertise that will 
later help reveal the place of concepts in motor intentional content. 
 
As mentioned above, the term 'concept' is used vaguely both in the Dreyfus-McDowell 
debates and in the wider literature, and rather than getting bogged down in traditional 
definitions of 'concept,' I will use the phenomenology established in the first two 
Chapters as a starting point. Based on the preceding discussion, I will propose a 
preliminary definition of 'concept' that can usefully anchor the debate, a definition 
which– although perhaps more Dreyfusian– captures the distinction McDowell also 
makes. Such concepts at its root the possibility of abstraction, of being understood as 
something, as– we will later say– the logos. 
 
However, while such a provisional definition may be acceptable to McDowell, he 
would emphasise his divergence from Dreyfus, since he nevertheless holds that this 
description of conceptuality is applicable to both layers, For McDowell, our being 
rational animals means that we already experience the lower layer differently than 
other animals. Thus, he conceives of that layer differently to the way Dreyfus does, 
claiming that he remains justified in calling it conceptual since the experience of 





The debate therefore becomes one of whether or not we share that layer with other 
animals, with zoa alogon. Dreyfus explicitly argues that we do, while McDowell– even 
as he distinguishes between two forms of content– maintains that even if the lower 
level is qualitatively distinct from the upper, it nevertheless contains the logos, proven 
by the possibility of its exploitation as the content of conceptual capacities. As 
mentioned, at the heart of McDowell's argument is the notion that something's being 
just potentially expressible as a concept by a rational animal is central to its being 
conceptual; in other words, the logos is already contained within that animal's 
perception. In order to show that we share one form of content with non-rational 
animals, Dreyfus must first show that we perform a form of translation on the content 
of coping in order to make it conceptual.  
 
In Chapter Three, therefore, I will focus on what I see as the essential difference 
between humans and non-rational animals. I will find parallels in the two layers 
identified in Chapter One with the two as-structures Heidegger describes in Being 
and Time. The upper layer, whose content all agree is conceptual, matches the content 
given by what Heidegger called the 'apophantic-as' that reveals something “as 
something,” and as present-at-hand. The lower layer I equate with the 'hermeneutic-
as' of the ready-to-hand. Building on an argument from McNeill, I will argue that this 
form of content ought also to be attributed to the intentional states of non-rational 
animals. 
 
In so doing, we also find in Heidegger's description of the transition between as-
structures an account of how reflection changes the content of experience, creating 
the logos, or as Heidegger would more precisely put it, the logos apophantikos. Thus 
we discover here that the logos– that is, conceptuality and experience of the as– is 
bound together with a reflective awareness that is distinctively human. I will thus 
argue that this reading of Heidegger's phenomenology gives us the resources to show 
that the two forms of content are different in kind. 
 
The main objection to this conclusion, and the basis of McDowell's reply, is that 
humans– inhabiting a 'world' or 'second nature'– experience even the hermeneutic 
content of their coping actions in a different way than other animals, for we are 
embedded in a network of cultural norms. This reply has many similarities to a more 




further refinement of those ideas– in which he makes explicit references to animal 
experience– that this has little bearing on our question of conceptuality. For what is 
primarily at issue, as has been established throughout the first and second chapters, 
is that the experience of acting involves non-conceptual content. 
 
In Chapter Four I will take this point further, and argue that from the contention that 
our human world is built through our acquisition and employment of conceptual 
capacities, it does not follow that those capacities are active in every sort of experience. 
I return to the Dreyfus-McDowell debate and its discussion of phronesis. It now 
becomes clear that a fundamental disagreement at the heart of the debate is how to 
understand this arete ('virtue'), taken from its context in Aristotelian ethics and 
applied more specifically by Heidegger. Heidegger's reading has played a large role in 
Dreyfus' attack on McDowell, whose own readings of Aristotle and Gadamer have 
given phronesis a central role in his work. 
 
Much has been written of the Aristotelian background of Being and Time, and one 
reading of that work sees Heidegger expanding Aristotle's ethics into the ontological 
sphere. In a similar way, Dreyfus expands Heidegger's ontological project into 
questions of conceptuality and mind. Each of these thinkers, therefore, interprets 
phronesis and other aretai according to their own projects. We must be careful, then, 
in assuming that these thinkers are discussing the same thing as McDowell, who 
applies Aristotle to his own post-Kantian project. All the same, I will suggest that the 
common lineage of these interpretations means that reflecting on phronesis offers a 
synthesis that can help us make sense of the place of the logos within coping. 
 
Discussing phronesis as it is used by Dreyfus and McDowell, as well as by Heidegger 
and Gadamer, I will follow Charles Taylor in suggesting that rather than describing 
purely non-conceptual coping, phronesis is better described as post-conceptual, 
which I will define as the navigation of our second-nature 'worlds' in a non-conceptual 
way. That is to say, while McDowell is right to emphasise that our Bildung– our 
initiation into a linguistic and cultural community– marks an irreversible change in 
how we come to know the world (and an exponential increase in the number and kind 
of entities available to our experience), it does not follow that our lived awareness of 
that world is entirely different. Having the logos means that we have richer worlds 





In Part Two, I will turn my attention to the logos, starting with a closer look at the 
distinction between layers in Chapter Five. In discussing the 'as-structure' in Chapter 
Three, I argued that we share the hermeneutic-as with non-rational animals, while 
the apophantic apprehension of something as something belongs only to rational 
animals. I introduce Heidegger's concept of Vernehmen as a form of perception that 
uncovers the apophantic, and is peculiar to humans. I will show how Heidegger 
equates this form of perception with noûs, and holds that it has a particular relation 
to Wahrnehmung– perception more broadly, but with a particular emphasis on truth 
(Wahrheit) in his special sense of aletheia as 'unconcealing.' Both Dreyfus and 
McDowell suggest that 'Naming' is crucial to the transition between one content of 
experience and the other, hinting at the peculiarly linguistic nature of concepts and 
rationality (although McDowell, I argued in Part One, is wrong to hold that language– 
as the bearer of our second-nature– is therefore present already in the 'lower' form 
of content). Thus vernehmen should be understood as a linguistic perception, where 
we directly experience the thing as inextricably bound to its associated 'concept' or 
'name.'  
 
In Chapter Six I will offer empirical support for this via Merleau-Ponty's analysis of 
the 'Schneider case' of visual agnosia, where he distinguishes between Greifen and 
Zeigen ('grasping' and 'pointing') modes of perception. This is further supported by 
more rigorous contemporary accounts of agnosics, as well as work by Tomasello on 
pointing (and its lack) in infants and apes. I will argue that this provides strong 
evidence that the vernommen perception of something apophantically-as something 
is intimately bound up with language. Reflecting back on Part One, the logos– 
conceptual rationality– reveals itself as language; however, language here must be 
understood not in the sense of a totality of words used for communication, but as that 
faculty of perception that lets the world be seen as the world.  
 
In Chapter Seven, I will argue that this perception should be understood as linguistic 
so far as its content is grammatically-structured, in the sense of Chomsky's Universal 
Grammar, wherein elements of an experience are organised such that they can be 
expressed as the moveable elements of natural language. 'Naming,' therefore, marks 
the experience of intentional content through linguistic (vernommen) perception, and 
therefore demonstrates the change in content that McDowell denies. I then argue that 
this form of perception, while logically prior to language, develops in tandem with it 
both on the species and the individual level. On the species level, I argue that human 




individual level, I argue that our initiation into a culture (our Bildung) triggers the 
development of noesis, which in turn facilitates the full acquisition of language. 
 
Our initiation into culture, however, means that to a certain degree the concepts we 
acquire will be vary according to the form of life we share with our cultural 
community. However, I will argue that this does not imply the degree of linguistic or 
cultural relativism of the sort attributed to a strong reading of the Whorfian 
hypothesis, firstly because even very culturally-specific concepts are never 
untranslatable in principle across cultures, and secondly because the greatest 
conceptual differences across communities have their source in the lexicon rather 
than the surface grammars of languages, and thus the entities in second natural 
worlds can differ as much within linguistic groups as across them. 
 
Nevertheless, our Bildung into a second natural world suggests a disconnect from the 
primordial world of our coping, since we experience the concepts we so acquire as 
entities. Furthermore, our capacity to experience such conceptual entities post-
conceptually– coping with them, so that we experience them invisibly as elements of 
a further task– drives our capacity to think and to deal with increasingly rich and 
abstract entities. Thus, while language is revealed as forming the rich, second-natural 
world of human being, it also represents a movement away from an unmediated 
immersion in the world into a different sphere of being, where our direct experience 
is of Named concepts rather than the things themselves. This, in turn, seems to imply 
a pessimism about the ability of language or conceptual structures to adequately 
reveal reality. 
 
It was against this conclusion that McDowell was motivated to argue in Mind and 
World that our conceptual understanding is not a 'frictionless spinning in the void' 
but provides us with direct access to the world. My thesis, on the other hand, reinserts 
an element of vagueness where McDowell claims certainty, although perhaps not the 
unbridgeable gulf that McDowell attributes to Davidson.2 For while I will have argued 
                                                 
2 Although it should be noted that Davidson’s actual view is more subtle than the cohrentism that 
McDowell attributes to him, for his claim that ‘nothing can be a reason for a belief except another 
belief’ hinges on his understanding of beliefs and reasons as propositional. Hence, while sensations 
may be part of the causal chain that leads us to have beliefs, they cannot be understood, in and of 
themselves, as reasons (see Davidson 1997, p. 22). Davidson’s extended defences of externalism 
and his concept of triangulation (e.g., Davidson 2001b, p. 200; 2001a, p.105. See also Rorty 2011, 
pp. 3-5) offer a detailed account of why we should not accept coherentist, much less sceptical, doubts 
over the external world. This view has many parallels to my own, although I will not have the space 
in this thesis for a detailed comparison. 
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that language tends to a disconnection from the world, I have identified in the process 
of Naming an anchor point where language connects to and arises from our direct 
experience of the world. Thus, I will argue that the world is not inaccessible to us, yet 
we must be careful about the faith we put in language to describe it, for as soon as we 
Name, we enter a sphere as much created as perceived.  
 
Thus I will conclude that to be human is to have language and to exist in the world 
that it builds. Yet we must take care not to identify ourselves with this essential 
element. For while the logos is the central and unifying element of human 
consciousness, we must not mistake it for the only element, nor the world it reveals 
















Chapter One  
The Dreyfus-McDowell Debate 
 
In this Chapter I will introduce the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John 
McDowell. After outlining their respective positions, I will outline their main point of 
agreement, which will better help us to frame their main disagreement. I will show 
how both thinkers agree in their rejection of a Cartesian body-mind dualism (even 
though each accuses the other of perpetuating just such thinking), and in extending 
their understanding of cognition beyond purely intellectual activities to cover 
embodied action as well. Their disagreement is over the nature of such embodied 
activity, what Dreyfus calls 'coping.' McDowell insists that this, like all human 
cognitive activity, is conceptual 'all the way out,' while Dreyfus argues that such 
activities involve a non-conceptual form of content. I will argue that a large part of 
their disagreement stems from different understandings of what it means for 
something to be 'conceptual,' with Dreyfus restricting the term to the content of 
reflective mental states, while McDowell applies the term to any content that could 
potentially form the content of such a state. However, both agree, in invoking a 
linguistic process that I call Naming, that conceptuality is tied to a linguistic 
understanding. I therefore try to put them onto the same page by leaving aside 
definitions of 'concept' and focusing more closely on what Dreyfus and McDowell say 
about content. I argue that both thinkers identify two forms of content and differ over 
how and when conceptualisation is experienced. 
 
1.1 – Background 
in which I present the debate, arguing that its core question is  
the presence of 'strong' conceptual capacities in smooth coping. 
 
First a little background. The debate began with Dreyfus criticising McDowell's 
(epistemological) thesis that our knowledge of and interactions with the world are 
always conceptual.1 McDowell means by this that the knowledge we gain through 
perception can immediately be used to form judgements. It is in this sense that he 
holds that we are 'pervaded' by rationality.2 The point is not that our perception 
involves making propositional judgements; it is rather that between perception and 
judgement there is no intermediate step, no translation in content from non-
conceptual to conceptual. Our rationality goes, as it were, 'all the way out', and as such 
                                                 
1 Dreyfus 2005, p. 47. 




McDowell can hold that conceptual capacities are involved even in our reflexive, 
bodily skills.3 Dreyfus, on the other hand, draws on phenomenological arguments to 
show that most of our everyday activities– including our most expertly performed 
skills– bypass those conceptual capacities that McDowell claims are pervasive. Our 
awareness during such activities has a content, to be sure, but this content is non-
conceptual, and Dreyfus holds it must somehow be translated into concepts if it is to 
be the content of thought. 
 
As Rietveld points out, McDowell and Dreyfus have many points in common, with 
both seeing themselves as resisting the old Cartesian duality of body and mind. Chief 
amongst these points is the agreement that unreflective activity is “pervasively 
bodily,” and that normativity is “always already” there.4 With these commonalities in 
mind, the disagreement between the two thinkers becomes more and more apparent. 
There is no debate over whether or not a baseball or a blitz-chess player's actions are 
embodied and reflexive, nor about whether explicit thinking is involved in such 
actions– both thinkers would agree in saying yes to the former and no to the latter. 
What is at issue is whether actors are employing concepts– in the strong, rational 
sense that I will detail below– during these unthought, reflexive actions. 
 
Thus the dispute boils down to the nature of what Dreyfus calls 'embodied coping'. 
Coping is Dreyfus' elaboration of what Heidegger called dealings with zuhanden or 
ready-to-hand equipment, which is our everyday way of being-in-the-world, distinct 
from the experience of oneself as a subject and the things we encounter as objects.5 
Although Dreyfus is fond of illustrating smooth-coping with the example of an athlete 
playing in the 'flow', some of the best examples come from our mundane, everyday 
tasks. Charles Taylor reminds us that something as basic as walking up a hill involves 
a great deal of cognitive work that doesn't fall under our ordinary conception of 
making judgements, or involving conscious, rational thought.6 In fact, while we climb 
the uneven steps, dodging the puddles and avoiding loose rocks, our conscious 
awareness can be entirely elsewhere– thinking about a difficult conversation, or 
perhaps even engaged in that conversation on a telephone.7 Thus the question at the 
                                                 
3 McDowell 2007a, p. 339. 
4 Rietveld 2010, p. 185. 
5 Heidegger 1962, p. 97-8. 
6 Taylor 2002, p. 111. 
7 'Conscious' may be a problematic term in this context, but despite its potential vagueness, I find it 
difficult to think of a more specific alternative. What I mean by 'conscious awareness' is the active 
awareness of the activity one is performing, where one directs one's attention as an agent. 
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centre of the debate is whether or not embodied coping can be understood entirely 
independently of conceptual rationality.8 
 
While Dreyfus defines embodied coping as “non-mental... non-conceptual, non-
propositional, non-rational and non-linguistic,”9 McDowell maintains that our basic 
experience is already conceptually articulated, in the sense that the content of our 
coping experience would undergo no transformation if we were to express it 
propositionally.10 For Dreyfus, there are two kinds of awareness going on between the 
hill-climbing and the phone conversation. For McDowell, there is only one, and the 
difference in experience lies rather in the directionality of the agent's attention. 
 
Two central terms need to be flagged up before we can make any progress in 
understanding the debates. The first term is ‘concept,’ for it is not immediately clear 
what sense of conceptuality is at stake in coping, particularly over the extent that 
concepts need to be general, public, and communicable. Taylor argues that we need 
some 'minimal sense' of conceptuality that is none of these things whenever we talk 
of an agent pursuing an activity, since coping “can't be understood in just inanimate-
causal terms.”11 We recognise the things we use as having a certain relevance, we 
'know our way about them.'12 So it would not seem a stretch to grant this minimal 
sense also to non-human animals. Dennett claims that all living things 'bring into the 
world their own good,' meaning that by their very make-up they are able to pick out 
certain features of their environment as relevant.13 We might therefore be tempted to 
say that they bring into the world their own concepts, in Taylor's most minimal sense. 
At a bare minimum, any animal's survival presupposes a capacity to 'pick out' what is 
relevant from what is not, although whether we ought to call it conceptual or not is a 
question of its own. 
 
At any rate, even if we were to call this minimal 'picking-out' conceptual, it would not 
be the form of conceptuality that is of real interest in the debate, what Rietveld calls 
“strong rationality,” which should be distinguished from anything we ascribe even to 
higher animals. 14  'Strong' conceptual capacities are “dependent on language-
                                                 
8 McDowell 2007a, pp. 344-5. 
9 Dreyfus 2007a, p. 352. 
10 McDowell 2007a, p. 338. 
11 Taylor 2002, p. 111. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Dennett 1991, pp. 173-4. 




acquisition” and belong to a “linguistic or reflective faculty.”15 For the present, this 
dependence will be unargued, although the connection of conceptuality to language 
will become clearer as we progress through the thesis. In the meantime, it is enough 
to note that both Dreyfus and McDowell are concerned with concepts in this 'strong' 
sense, which they understand as tied to language.16 The debate, then, can be seen as 
over the extent and the manner in which our smooth-coping draws upon these 
reflective or linguistic concepts. 
 
The second term is 'content.' As Crane notes, both Dreyfus and McDowell reject the 
idea of a 'bare Given,' and in this way their debate raises similar issues to those in 
contemporary debates over the content of perceptual experience. 17  However, like 
'concept,' 'content' is used by both Dreyfus and McDowell in ways that occasionally 
differ not only from each other, but from how that term is also used in the wider 
literature.  It is worth taking a moment then, before we get too deeply into their 
respective accounts, to take a brief look at some differing conceptions of content. 
 
1.1.1 – Content 
in which I summarise different understandings of ‘content’ and 
articulate the sense of content that is at stake in the debate. 
 
'Content,' Schellenberg notes, is a theoretical term that has been used to describe 
anything from basic informational states to cognitively-rich belief states.18 She notes 
that there are very few uncontroversial characteristics of content, but that there is a 
wide consensus that there is at least some kind of correspondence between content 
and accuracy conditions. On this view, content either “determines” accuracy 
conditions, because we can ask of any state (or thought, expression, perception, and 
so on) whether things are as they are represented to be, or it is “identified” with 
accuracy conditions, if the accuracy conditions specify the possible conditions that 
must be realised for the state (thought/expression/perception) to be accurate.19 
 
Content, understood this way, signifies “the conditions under which the experience is 
accurate.”20 Being assessable for accuracy, they are widely held to be propositional 
                                                 
15 Ibid, p. 190. 
16 McDowell 2007a, p. 348; Dreyfus 2007a, pp. 353-4. 
17 Crane 2013, p. 232. 
18 Schellenberg 2013, p. 273. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Siegel 2016, p. 6. 
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and representational, in the sense that they represent the world as being a certain way, 
and that way can be either true or false.21 Indeed, the “paradigm case” of a state with 
content is a propositional attitude, which describes a subject holding a particular 
attitude– for example, a belief or desire– toward a particular content, understood 
propositionally, and which is the condition under which the attitude is held accurate.22 
Thus, my belief that it is raining is true if and only if it is raining.23 
 
Byrne asserts that a dominant view in the philosophy of mind holds that perceiving is 
very much like a traditional propositional attitude, such as believing or intending, and 
that, since propositions are given in conceptual terms, conceptualism about content 
is the “default” view.24 Be that as it may, there are significant dissenting opinions over 
whether the content of experience is representational, propositional, and conceptual, 
and both Dreyfus and McDowell hold views on content that diverge– albeit with 
different emphases– from this 'default' view. I will now look at each of their views on 
content in turn, to set the scene for a fuller discussion, in the following sections, of 
their debate over the relationship of conceptuality to content. 
 
Dreyfus and McDowell share the view that experience is not representational, 
although they come to this from different angles. Nevertheless, they both argue that 
experience has a content, and Crane notes that this use of content still lines up with 
Siegel's broad definition of experiential content as “what is conveyed to the subject by 
her perceptual experience.”25 
 
In Mind and World, McDowell is sympathetic towards a propositional understanding 
of content, defining content broadly as “what is given by a 'that'-clause,” for example, 
a belief 'that it is raining.'26 McDowell argues that experience is likewise structured by 
a 'that'-clause– for example, a perception 'that it is raining.' “In experience,” argues 
McDowell “one takes in... that things are thus and so.”27 As I will discuss in more 
                                                 
21 Siegel 2016, p. 2; Byrne 2004, p. 232. 
22 Bermúdez & Macpherson 1998, 3. 
23 It should be noted that there remains some disagreement over the nature of propositional contents, 
and in what cases they could be held to be true. For example, under a Russellian view of content, 
'she desires to see Hesperus' would fulfilled by any sighting of the planet Venus, whereas on a 
Fregean view the 'mode of presentation' must also be taken into account, and so a sighting of 
'Phosphorus' in the evening sky would not fulfil the accuracy conditions. See Siegel 2016, pp. 9-16 
for discussion of these and other theories of propositional content. 
24 Byrne 2004, p. 245. 
25 Crane 2013, p. 233; cf. Siegel 2016, p. 2. Crane (op. cit.) suggests that we should be happy to read 
Siegel's definition as “what is given to the subject in that experience.” 
26 McDowell 1994, p. 3. 




detail below, McDowell believes such experiential content is conceptual, since in being 
given in this form, it is immediately available as the content of conceptual capacities, 
since– at least when we are not misled– 'that things are thus and so' can be the 
content of both an experience and a judgement.28 
 
'When we are not misled' is an important caveat for McDowell since, as a disjunctivist, 
he denies that the content of veridical perceptions is the same as the content of 
illusions or hallucinations. For disjunctivists,  
 
some experiences consist in [an object] being perceptually presented [note, not 
represented] to a subject, so that both the [object] and the perceptual relation between 
it and the subject are constituents of the experience. According to this view, when you 
see a lavender bush [for example], some of its properties are presented to you, and 
your experience consists in your being so related to the bush and those of its properties 
that are presenting themselves to you.29 
 
There is, however, a tension between this view, and the idea that content is 
propositional. As Crane notes, drawing an analogy to pictures, a picture “can have 
correctness conditions, but there is a difference between... having a correctness 
condition expressed by a proposition and its having a proposition as its content.”30 
There is therefore a difference between an experience 'that things are thus and so' (for 
example, 'that the pig is under the oak') and a judgement that this experience is true 
or false. “[T]he pig being under the oak is not something that can be true or false,” 
argues Crane. “It is just something that is there.”31 Travis therefore critiques the view 
that experiences have representational, propositional content– that is, that they are 
true or false. Rather, Travis makes an argument that “our senses confront us with 
what is there, they bring our surroundings into view, but there is nothing in a 
perceptual experience to make it count as having some one representational content 
as opposed to countless others.”32 
 
Under pressure from Travis, McDowell has come to accept that 'content' as he wants 
to use it– in a non-representationalist way– is non-propositional, although we will see 
below that he nevertheless maintains that it is conceptual, as he defines it, in that its 
                                                 
28 McDowell 1994, p. 26. 
29 Siegel 2016, p. 4. 
30 Crane 2013, p. 241. 
31 Ibid, p. 239. 
32 Soteriou 2014, 3.6. 
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form is 'suitable' for exploitation by conceptual capacities.33 The essential point here 
is that for McDowell, the immediate content of perception (an 'intuition') is a direct 
presentation of the things themselves, that they are 'thus and so.'34 
 
This understanding of content has some parallels with Dreyfus'. Where McDowell 
rejects representationalism on metaphysical grounds, a major theme of Dreyfus' work 
has been to build a non-representational account of agency based on his reading of 
the phenomenology of Heidegger, for whom he thinks that “all representational 
accounts are part of the problem.”35 Dreyfus nevertheless agrees that experience has 
an “intentional content,” in the sense that it has correctness conditions, being a 'take' 
on the world that can be mistaken.36 However, as well as rejecting the idea that such 
content is representational or propositional, Dreyfus also rejects the idea that it is 
conceptual. Part of this, we will see in more detail in the following sections, arises from 
a discordance in Dreyfus and McDowell's understandings of 'conceptual.' But before 
doing so, I will conclude this section by clarifying what Dreyfus means by 'non-
conceptual content.' 
 
Dreyfus' initial attack on McDowell was prompted in part by McDowell's lengthy 
rejection of non-conceptual content in Mind and World. 37  Yet there are some 
important differences between Dreyfus' phenomenological account of non-conceptual 
content, and the analytic accounts of non-conceptual content (largely inspired by 
Evans) that are the targets of McDowell's arguments.38 
 
This analytic understanding of non-conceptual content holds that experience has non-
conceptual content if it has accuracy conditions, and the subject of the experience 
need not possess the concepts used to specify such accuracy conditions. 39  For 
example, as Tye argues, experience is more fine-grained than conceptual judgement, 
citing studies that show that subjects struggle to re-identify specific shades, such as 
'red27' in the absence of the original sample.40 Or as Peacocke notes, discussing what 
he calls 'scenario content,' we can represent spatial properties such as 'to the left' or 
'three feet away' without possessing those concepts.41 
                                                 
33 Crane 2013, 234. 
34 Cf. McDowell 2007a, p. 348. 
35 Dreyfus 2009, p. 69. 
36 Dreyfus 2005, p. 55. 
37 McDowell 1994, pp. 46-65. 
38 Cf. Evans 1982. 
39 Siegel 2016, p. 32. 
40 Tye 2006, pp. 520-1. 




For Dreyfus, however, as we shall see in what follows, such content would already be 
related to a form of judgement. Indeed, in Dreyfus' view, McDowell's account of the 
non-intentional content of an intuition is already a kind of judgement, as it involves a 
step back from involved activity, or what he calls 'coping,' and which he accuses 
McDowell of overlooking.42 
 
Absorbed coping does not involve conceptual intentional content in McDowell's sense 
[i.e., to declare 'that things are thus and so,' and hence suitable to constitute content 
of conceptual capacities]; instead it involves motor intentional content.43 
 
Motor intentional content has correctness conditions of the same sort as McDowell's 
intuitional content mentioned above, insofar as we can (afterwards) judge that the 
action has succeeded or not, yet it likewise does not involve a judgement of truth or 
falsity. However, in addition to being non-propositional and non-representational, 
Dreyfus also argues that it is non-mental, non-rational, and non-linguistic.44 During 
coping, we are not presented with the world or with things, but find ourselves merged 
into the world. In leaving a room, Dreyfus argues, we do not ordinarily see the 
doorknob as a doorknob, and “least of all, that it affords opening the door.”45 Our 
hand automatically takes the shape of the doorknob as we approach it, and we simply 
go out.46 Similarly, when an experienced speaker enters a room to give a talk, they 
walk up to the lectern and place their notes upon it, thereby articulating it as a lectern 
without taking it as a lectern. This activity and its content, Dreyfus holds, differs from 
experience of it as something, with a content 'that' it is 'thus and so.' 
 
I will discuss these arguments in more detail below.47 For the present, it is important 
just to recognise the senses of 'content' that are used in the debate. For both Dreyfus 
and McDowell, conceptual content is not understood in representational or 
propositional terms, but as a description of the direct presentation to the subject of 
an object as a thing. However, Dreyfus posits a second form of content, that he calls 
non-conceptual, motor intentional content, which describes the experience of finding 
                                                 
darker/lighter and sweet/sour. 
42 For this reason, Malpas (2012b, p. 322) suggests that the question of 'conceptual versus non-
conceptual content' in this sense may be misleading, the same entities are presented to the subject 
regardless of whether they have a concept or not, in which case they simply 'grasp' the entity in a 
different way. 
43 Dreyfus 2007a, p. 359. 
44 Ibid, p. 360. 
45 Ibid, p. 361. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See especially Chapter Three. 
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oneself 'merged' with an object during absorbed coping. For the purposes of this 
thesis, then, I will adopt these two senses of 'content,' referring to them respectively 
as 'conceptual' and 'non-conceptual.' 
 
With this clearer idea of the subject matter, I will turn in the next two sections to look 
at Dreyfus and McDowell's respective positions on the presence of strong concepts in 
our embodied and unreflective action. 
 
1.2 – Dreyfus 
in which I explicate Dreyfus' position, that humans have two  
forms of mental content– non-conceptual and conceptual– which  
must undergo a translation to be experienced as the other. 
 
We have seen so far that the dispute boils down to the nature of our unreflective 
action, or 'coping,' and centres on the question of whether embodied coping can be 
understood entirely independently of conceptual rationality.48 Dreyfus answers in the 
negative, and most of his arguments are rooted in the observation that experts in 
various fields– baseball, chess, music– tend to perform at their best when they are not 
(reflectively) thinking about what they are doing. This shows, he argues, that strong 
concepts, which are evidently involved in thinking, must be absent in coping.49 One 
of Dreyfus' favourite arguments in favour of coping's non-conceptuality is the case of 
baseballer Chuck Knoblauch.50 Knoblauch was a major league second baseman who 
became (in)famous after falling into a curious pattern of throwing errors. He would 
repeatedly make mistakes with simple throws– throws over short distances when he 
had ample time ahead of him. Yet perhaps even more strangely, he was during the 
same period still capable of accomplishing very difficult throws under time-pressure 
with the high-level skill and accuracy that got him into the big leagues in the first 
place. 
 
Dreyfus concludes from this story that Knoblauch's problem was that, on the simple 
throws, he was thinking– that is, employing strong, abstract concepts. Rather than 
trusting his body to reflexively aim and complete the throw, Knoblauch became 
entangled in conceptual thought, facing the concept-heavy problem of calculating how 
hard and at what angle he should throw the ball he was holding, with the result that 
his throws were far less than perfect. During the high-pressure, complex throws– with 
                                                 
48 McDowell 2007a, p. 344-5. 





no time to think– Knoblauch simply reacted with the refined, smooth-coping that he 
had formerly employed even on his simpler throws. 
 
Extending this thought has many implications. Dreyfus' assertion is that both our 
most expert as well as our automatic, everyday actions occur without that linguistic, 
'strong' conceptual mode of cognition that modern philosophy has long taken to be 
the mark of the human (in Descartes' 'cogito' or Kant's 'Ich denke...,' for example). 
Our coping utilises cognitive capacities that we share with non-human animals.51 This 
is in sharp contrast to McDowell who, we shall see in a moment, emphasises the 
difference between rational and non-rational animals. For while it is tempting to 
equate our smooth-coping actions with the behaviour of animals– as a fielder chasing 
a ball seems to act with the same smoothness and immediacy as a cat chasing a 
mouse– humans nevertheless are the only animals that can play baseball, because 
they are the only animal capable of learning the concepts of the equipment and the 
rules.  
 
Of course, Dreyfus does not deny this. Rather, he wants to show not only the ways in 
which our experience parallels and diverges from that of animals, but more 
interestingly, how these two layers interact.52 Indeed, Dreyfus' account of embodied 
coping is tied to his account of skill acquisition, where (with his brother Stuart) he 
describes how any skill– from chess to baseball to riding a bike– consists of a learning 
period in which performance is clumsy and thought-out, only following which we get 
the absorbed, reflexive coping of the expert in action.53 From this, he argues that there 
is a change in intentional content as knowledge shifts from one layer to the other. 
 
                                                 
51 Somewhat problematically, few of the philosophers who discuss animality in this context– and 
especially Heidegger– make much distinction between different classes of animal, raising questions 
over whether the claims advanced here are applicable to all animals. Despite obvious problems, I 
will generally follow the convention of using 'animal' to refer to all non-human animals. It therefore 
bears mentioning early on that I have in mind principally the 'higher' animals, meaning birds, 
mammals and especially primates, since it is a fair assumption that any capacities for dealing with 
other entities that they lack will also be lacked by 'lower' animals (with the questionable exception 
of some cephalopods). 
 
 On a related note, I will throughout this thesis follow the convention of labelling animals 'lower' if 
their species has, in most basic respects, reached a fairly stable evolutionary form earlier in time 
than 'higher' animals. I am well aware that the evolutionary history of the animal kingdom is more 
of a hedge than a tree, and that every species is, in a sense, both complete in itself and in constant 
evolution. The term 'higher,' therefore, is not meant to imply a teleology. Nevertheless, the terms 
'lower' and 'higher' animals are a convenient shorthand in this context to denote the presence or 
absence of certain forms of behaviour. 
52 Dreyfus 2007a, pp. 354-5. 
53 Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986, pp. 19-36. 
25 
 
For example, most drivers will recall their awkward early attempts at trying to time 
pushing the clutch with shifting the gearstick, and the embarrassing stalls when this 
doesn't go to plan. Novice drivers are often taught to employ rules of thumb, such as 
changing gear at a certain rate of RPM, or to associate a certain gear number with a 
certain speed. Such rules are helpful, yet remain imperfect, and as the driver improves 
they learn through trial-and-error to adjust the rules to specific situations, such as 
climbing a steep hill. All the same, even as the driver becomes competent, the 
phenomenological experience of the task is as intellectually 'heavy.' The driver must 
concentrate their attention on what they are doing, and novel situations may require 
explicit decision-making, an inner dialogue saying, for example, 'this hill is really quite 
steep... I wonder if I should put it into second.' 
 
For Dreyfus and Dreyfus, this sort of experience is contrasted against the highest 
stages of skill acquisition, which they call proficiency and expertise, where such 
explicit thinking plays a far smaller role. We can drive the winding country road while 
arguing with our passenger about whether our destination is before or after the bridge. 
As we climb the hill, we shift downgear automatically, our attention is concerned with 
the amount of fuel left rather than the speed, RPM, or even the sound of the engine.  
 
The phenomenological observation that explicit concepts– 'thinking' and rules– fade 
as we become proficient at a skill is the other side of the observation that reflection, 
or the introduction of explicit thought, disrupts smooth coping.54 In essence, explicit 
thought reverts us back to the beginner level, just as seemed to happen with 
Knoblauch. In a similar way, we might be confidently and automatically shifting 
through the gears as we round corners and climb hills, yet if we're suddenly asked to 
draw our attention to just how hard we push the clutch or exactly when we pull the 
gearstick, it is more likely that we will make an awkward mistake. Just as, when 
learning to drive, we necessarily employ a great deal of strong, rational concepts to 
achieve a rather imperfect performance, so when we reflect, our otherwise smooth 
coping is 'disrupted,' and we no longer perform as an expert.55 
 
Dreyfus distinguishes between this kind of thinking during the task and reflection 
after the task, which, we will soon see, is crucial to McDowell's argument. McDowell 
might object that, while our expert gear-change might seem automatic, on attentive 
reflection we can attribute our downshift to an awareness of the car 'struggling.' But 
                                                 





Dreyfus emphasises that this is not how the coping is phenomenologically 
experienced. Despite how it appears in reflection, we were not thinking that in the 
moment of the task. The 'moment of the task'– or just moment for short, for I will 
frequently refer to it as we continue– indicates here not a mere instant of time, but 
rather the extended moment of the coping activity. As we prepare to hit a baseball, for 
example, the moment begins from the time we turn our attention to the task, and 
highlights all the entities that are relevant to that task– the pitcher, the ball, the 
positions of the fielders, and so on. As we hit the ball and enter the new moment of 
running, a different network of relevance is highlighted, including new elements like 
the bases, as well as former elements with a new significance, such as the ball and 
fielders. It should be stressed that the moment is not an enclosed moment in time that 
we cannot see beyond. Included in the significances of each moment are other possible 
moments that draw us towards or to avoid them. What is enclosed in each moment 
however is the significance objects hold to that moment, what they are seen as until 
the moment changes. The intimate connection of the 'moment of the task' with the 
'network of relevance' during coping will prove very important in the following 
Chapters. For now, it is enough to note that coping always occurs in such moments, 
and that these are defined by the task at hand. 
 
Dreyfus emphasises this point by invoking Sartre's famous example of his experience 
chasing down a streetcar. “When I run after a tram...” says Sartre, “there is no I... I am 
then plunged into the world of objects... which present themselves with values, 
attractive and repulsive values, but as for me, I have disappeared.”56 The street takes 
on a particular significance– the footpath, kerb, and other pedestrians appear 
differently and indeed have a different significance than they would if we were, for 
instance, trying to find the café where we are meeting a long-separated friend. 
However, Dreyfus points out with interest that in reflection, Sartre “can't help 
remembering himself” as the subject of his experience, when he actually does reflect 
backwards on it.57 
 
Dreyfus locates in reflection an active process, a transformation of the pre-
conceptual, embodied action into a strongly conceptual thought. 58  “Reflection 
rationalises” says Carman, emphasising that reflection is not a passive 'looking' at an 
already conceptual coping, but an active modification of the primordial, embodied 
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experience.59 When we reflect, we are not simply making a more explicit examination 
of the content of our involved smooth-coping. Rather, says Dreyfus, “reflection must 
introduce some other content.”60 Reflection doesn't just discover the implicit content; 
it creates it. 
 
Importantly, we are not usually aware of creating this content, since we experience it 
as though it was always there. For example, Dennett has made much of the way our 
conscious mind “confabulates” or creates a narrative to explain our actions, and notes 
that this narrative feels convincing even when it demonstrably false.61 Gazzaniga's 
work with split-brain patients suggests that rational explanations very frequently 
come after the fact, and can be completely and unconsciously fabricated.62 In one 
experiment, he tells the speech-less right brain hemisphere of a patient to 'take a 
walk.' As the patient stands up to go, he then asks the left-brain what it is doing. The 
left-brain replies with an explanation along the lines of 'oh, I need to get a drink,' or 
something similar, to rationalise the behaviour it has found itself performing.63 The 
relevant point of this experiment here is that the stories we tell ourselves and others 
to explain our actions don't necessarily line up with the chain of events that actually 
brought about those actions. The reflective mind imposes reason on its own embodied 
behaviour. 
 
We seem therefore to have an inbuilt tendency to construct and to believe very 
complex narratives that explain our actions, but that reasoning may be only 
incidentally or inferentially related to the reasons for why we do what we do.64 Sartre's 
observations show that the 'I,' the sense of being a subject, only appears on reflection, 
as the central peg on which the narrative is fixed. As Dreyfus puts it, only when I step 
back or reflect– either in remembering a past action, or when my smooth-coping is 
interrupted– can I “then retroactively attach an 'I think' to the coping and take 
responsibility for my actions.”65 
 
Thus at the heart of Dreyfus' account is the argument that there are two distinct forms 
of content: one– that he calls 'conceptual' (in the strong sense)– that is tied to explicit, 
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linguistic thought, and that is created through the process of reflection away from a 
second, more primordial intentionality. This second but prior form– the content of 
our embodied coping– is therefore contrasted as non-conceptual. In the following 
section, we will see that, while McDowell certainly doesn't want to restrict talk of 
content or intentionality (mindedness) to explicit thinking, he nevertheless insists 
that there is only one form of content involved across both– that is, the strongly 
conceptual. 
 
1.3 – McDowell 
in which I explicate McDowell's position– that coping shares a single form of  
mental content with reflective thought–  before arguing that he nonetheless  
admits of two layers of experience that correspond to Dreyfus' account. 
 
If concepts are not restricted to reflective 'thinking' in any traditional sense for 
McDowell, what exactly does he mean by conceptual capacities? In this section, I will 
unpack McDowell's 'normative' account of concepts to give us a clearer idea of what 
he means when he argues that they are active even in unreflective action. First of all, 
we must constantly remember that for McDowell concepts are intimately entwined 
with rationality, with a faculty of reason of a distinctly human sort. 
 
The idea of the conceptual that I mean to be invoking is to be understood in close 
connection with the idea of rationality, in the sense that is in play in the traditional 
separation of mature human beings, as rational animals, from the rest of the animal 
kingdom.66 
 
Concepts are things that we have that other animals do not. For the first part, 
McDowell leaves aside the question of animal minds to focus on what he considers a 
uniquely human form of mindedness, one he considers synonymous with 
rationality.67 
 
McDowell sees our conceptual capacities as bound to this distinctively rational, 
distinctively human, way of relating to the world. They give rise to our judgements 
and beliefs, insofar as it does not make sense to speak of the judgements and beliefs 
of a creature that is not capable of rationally relating to the world. Neither does it 
make sense to speak of conceptual capacities without relating them to the world, since 
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McDowell understands conceptual content as the “world-directedness” of concepts.68 
 
We shall see later on that McDowell's understanding of 'world' differs from Dreyfus', 
and that this difference is not without consequence. But what is important for the 
moment is we are beginning to see the epistemological issues at stake in McDowell's 
mind. Our concepts carry (or are) information about how we find the world to be, they 
'ground our judgements and beliefs.'69 It seems that for McDowell, the conceptual is 
our most basic way of relating to the world, as he understands it. As rational, minded 
animals, it does not make sense for him to speak of a relation to the world that does 
not involve these faculties; they are pervasive every way we turn. 
 
The concept, for McDowell, is relational. It exists between the rational animal and the 
world. We might not yet want to call it a medium, for that seems to objectify it where 
perhaps it will prove to be no more than an attitude taken by a rational animal with 
regard to its experience of a state of the world. Where Dreyfus attributes to McDowell 
the view that concepts are a “mediation” between subject and world, this still implies 
that for McDowell, conceptualisation is essentially an activity, and does not imply 
that he believes that concepts have some kind of object-hood in itself.70 McDowell 
might even prefer to say that the concept is the experience itself, hence with no 
implication of any distance between the subject and the world.71 
 
This is true of McDowell's stance at least so far as he holds that rationality is 
something performative. This picture of rationality is not the traditional one, and 
McDowell stresses that we– and especially Dreyfus– should not bring that view to his 
picture. His rationality is not simply a way of thinking, an abstraction away from the 
direct experience at hand. Such a conception of rationality as “detached and situation-
independent” is, he holds, “hopeless,” and, he believes, the source of Dreyfus' 
misunderstanding of his position.72 
 
To imagine concepts in an involved, undetached way, McDowell distinguishes two 
ways we can experience a concept– firstly, by articulating it in an explicit way, and 
secondly, by its direct experience in a situation-specific context. Both ways are to be 
seen as the employment of rational conceptual capacities, and the content– the world-
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directedness– of each is the same, and undergoes no change in the articulation away 
from experience. This is Dreyfus' key point of disagreement since, as we have seen, he 
feels that only the detached articulation can properly be called minded.  McDowell, 
however, holds that precisely this “idea that mindedness is detached is just what I 
mean to oppose.”73 
 
Since Dreyfus brings his own understanding of mindedness and conceptuality to his 
reading of McDowell, McDowell suggests that he and Dreyfus may be engaged in a 
false debate. Where for Dreyfus mindedness is defined by its detachment from 
involved action, McDowell insists that he means no such thing when he argues that 
mindedness or rationality is pervasive. Our experience just is the actualisation of our 
conceptual capacities; these capacities don't start up after some prior experiencing 
has provided raw or non-conceptual data.74 “The practical concepts realised in acting 
are concepts of things to do,” he writes. “Realising such a concept is doing the thing 
in question, not thinking about doing it.”  
 
And yet McDowell can't escape the phenomenon of detachment altogether, even as he 
takes pains to avoid it in his writing. He is rightly irked that Dreyfus locates it in his 
work via a misleading quotation from Mind and World. But although Dreyfus' 
selection distorts the sense of concept that McDowell wants to establish, we will see 
that the spirit of his criticism articulates a concern that McDowell does not fully 
answer. I present here the full quote– dealing with what McDowell believes is the 
immediately conceptual experience of colour– italicising the lines that Dreyfus picks 
out as representative of his understanding of McDowell's view: 
 
We can ensure that what we have in view is genuinely recognizable as a conceptual 
capacity if we insist that the very same capacity to embrace a colour in mind can in 
principle persist beyond the duration of the experience itself. In the presence of the 
original sample, 'that shade' can give expression to a concept of a shade; what ensures 
that it is a concept– [is] what ensures that thoughts that exploit it have the necessary 
distance from what would determine them to be true– is that the associated capacity 
can persist into the future, if only for a short time, and that, having persisted, it can be 
used also in thoughts about what is by then the past, if only the recent past.75 
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Taken in isolation, Dreyfus' selection sweeps away McDowell's careful subtlety. But 
the passage nonetheless reveals an important division in what McDowell maintains is 
a uniform use of the term 'concept.' We find firstly the concept, untraditionally read 
as the direct experience of the world, albeit with the potential to be held over time. 
This directly experienced concept seems distinct from thought. Thought is an activity, 
something that exploits concepts; it is the activation of an experience that is already 
conceptual.  
 
The direct concept is unmediated; it is the experience– the relation between subject 
and world– itself. Yet this experience is defined by its essential thinkability. 
Conceptual capacities are those that provide potential objects for rational thought. 
Thought, however, as a separate activity, seems to be detached from the immediate 
experience. It seems directed towards experience only through a medium, the 
medium of the concept, which is now objectified for it. 
 
The thought or objectified and distanced concept corresponds to a more traditional 
picture of concepts, and seems to be what Dreyfus has in mind when he criticises 
McDowell's extending it into immediate experience. While we might say this concept 
is distinct from thought, it is also dependently bound to thought, since it would not 
make sense to speak of concepts in this way, or of 'thought' as we generally use it, at 
all except in reference to each other. Although it is not clear that the originally 
experienced concepts need to be thought in this detached way, McDowell seems to 
insist their always being thinkable is part of their essential nature. 
 
We can see, then, that there seem to be two layers in McDowell's description, which 
almost correspond to the different levels that Dreyfus discusses, that is, a reflexive 
immediate level opposed to an abstract or explicitly-thought one. However, where 
Dreyfus speaks of a non-conceptual experiential layer that is abstracted into 
conceptual thought, McDowell maintains that the experiential layer is already 
conceptual, and simply provides the material for abstract thought. Or to put it another 
way, we could say that thought is the exercise of our concepts, which arise in some 
other way. 
 
McDowell takes this for granted, saying that it 
 
should not seem contentious that a conceptual capacity would need to be able to be 




content of a thought must be distinct from what would determine it to be true.76 
 
We must wonder, though, if that is where the true contention lies. Dreyfus would 
probably not argue that a conceptual capacity needs the potential to be exercised in 
thought, and indeed, he would probably also agree that thought just is the exercise of 
a conceptual capacity. The finer question remains, rather, of whether we can say that 
the content of the direct, involved perceptual experience undergoes any change when 
it is expressed in thought?  
 
This is an important question that will require a lot of expanding, but it has so far 
become clear that an essential point of the debate is McDowell's saying 'no' to this 
question where Dreyfus says 'yes.'  
 
Understanding their divergent responses will mean that we need to take ourselves 
back away from the realm of thought– that both agree is a conceptual capacity in 
action– to the real site of the dispute, the initial, involved experience. In the following, 
we will examine how Dreyfus and McDowell understand the human, rational animal's 
encounter with the world, and the steps it takes toward experiencing that world as 
thought. I will then lay out the parallels in both thinkers' accounts and argue that, 
while they understand different things by 'conceptuality,' we can put them onto the 
same page by attending to their basic agreement over the phenomena that are present 
in experience.  
 
1.4 – World 
in which I compare Dreyfus and McDowell's conceptions of  
'world,' finding that they agree that a concept is a relation to  
the world, yet differ insofar as Dreyfus holds we have a  
more fundamental mode of cognition than this relation. 
 
Both McDowell and Dreyfus understand concepts in the context of the human being's 
relation to the world. But this apparent common starting point conceals an important 
difference in the issues at stake for each philosopher. In this section, I will unpack 
what each thinker understands by 'world,' revealing a larger gap in their 
understanding of concepts than the one we seemed to have bridged. 
 
We have seen how McDowell understands content as the 'world-directedness' of a 
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conceptual capacity. But we will see in this section that McDowell's use of 'world' 
fluctuates between an external sense and a more phenomenological one with its 
source in Gadamer, a distinction which is often lost. In some places, McDowell evokes 
the world as something almost objective, or at least, the objective sum of what our 
epistemological faculties– our perception and rational thinking, understood as 
conceptual capacities– can reveal to us of the nature of reality. “The world,” he writes 
in this sense, “understood as everything that is the case, is not outside the sphere of 
the conceptual.”77 That is, we are to understand world as something like a totality of 
our conceptual relationships, relationships that have a truth value. 
 
It follows from this that world is something that belongs only to those creatures who 
have conceptual relationships, that is, only to rational animals. For this reason, 
McDowell sees a kindred thinker in Gadamer, who distinguishes between the world 
(Welt) and the environment (Umwelt), reserving the former for humans, while the 
latter is a more basic relationship held by animals. We will look more closely at our 
differences with animals in Chapters Three and Five. What is more pressing for the 
moment is the triangular relationship between rational animals, concepts, and world. 
Following Gadamer, McDowell emphasises a new feature that serves to hold the 
corners of the triangle together, a feature indisputably associated with human beings: 
language. 
 
McDowell picks up on Gadamer's claim that it is language which introduces the “free, 
distanced orientation” to our relationships to the world.78 However, McDowell does 
not understand this distance as the one we saw above, dividing immediate perception 
from reflective thought. Gadamer's distance is, in McDowell's reading, a distance 
which extends the immediate percept beyond its moment of experience into a 
categorial schema. That is, even while the perception is experienced as part of its 
immediate context, it is distanced enough to relate to the broader context of the 
perceiver's past and future projects and expectations. If our most immediate 
experience is conceptual, then that experience is already distanced from the world. 
The experience itself discloses a 'world' to the perceiver; the object is immediately 
perceived as belonging to a class of objects with an enmeshed significance in the 
totality that is the world. “If an experience is world-disclosing,” says McDowell, “any 
aspect of its content hangs together with other aspects of its content in a unity of the 
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sort Kant identifies as categorial.” 79  Thus our experience of a cow, for example, 
includes not just the perceptual experience of the animal immediately before us but, 
just as immediately, the wider array of properties we associate with it (curious, 
intelligent, stubborn, sacred), properties which in turn derive both from our own 
experience and from our wider cultural setting. 
 
So we find that 'categorial,' a property associated with a detached understanding of 
concepts, also plays a key role in McDowell's understanding not only of concepts but 
of world. Our world is categorial experience, or put better, the experience of a rational 
animal is one that immediately takes its objects of experience as a cohesive system of 
relationships– that is, as concepts– that have their content through their reference to 
the entire system– their world-directedness. Crucially, McDowell emphasises, we do 
not need to be aware of or even to perceive the entire system in each moment of 
experience; 
 
“What is important is this: if an experience is world-disclosing, which implies that it 
is categorically unified, all its content is present in a form in which... it is suitable to 
constitute contents of conceptual capacities.”80 
 
The subtle point of McDowell's view arises as he relates concepts out to the world. We 
can see now why he adamantly insists that holding our fundamental experience to be 
conceptual is not to be taken to mean that that experience is thought. When he calls 
our attitude to the world 'pervasively rational,' he means rather that, as rational 
beings, we are such that any relation we could potentially form gets that potential 
from our capacity to connect it into our categorial understanding of objects– there 
simply is no other way we can form relationships. 
 
The above quotation also highlights the integral relationship of language and world-
disclosure within McDowell's theory. Specifically, it is important to note his emphasis 
on the potentiality of the content's becoming conceptual, through its disclosing a 
world. We should read this as an emphasis on the active role of the perceiver in coming 
to experience the world. The world does not 'give' itself to a passive receiver, but this 
suggests nothing like its being idealistically created by an isolated mind. Rather, 
McDowell's point is that our experience of the external world is always structured by 
the conceptual capacities we bring to it. As a result, every experience is constituted by 
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content that could, by its very nature, be articulated.  
 
Thus McDowell maintains that rationality– our conceptual capacities– is present in 
our most fundamental relation to the world, the basic level of action that Dreyfus 
insists is non-conceptual. Here, however, there is scope to inquire whether McDowell 
and Dreyfus are on the same page. Dreyfus certainly doubts that they are, believing 
that “McDowell begins his description of mind and world too late.”81 
 
Dreyfus reads 'world' directly from Gadamer's teacher, Heidegger. In Heidegger, we 
certainly see concepts as a relation between Dasein (the rational animal82) and the 
'world,' but only after an important shift in Dasein's consciousness.83 In his so-called 
'theory of equipment' in Being and Time, Heidegger argues that during our everyday 
activities, things like subject, object, and world– all the things invoked by McDowell's 
description of concepts– remain invisible.84 It is only after something has gone wrong, 
after the activity has been interrupted by equipment breaking, going missing, or being 
unsuitable for the task that Dasein is forced from its immersed involvement and “the 
world announces itself.”85 
 
Reading world in this way, we find the heart of Dreyfus' problem with McDowell's 
thesis, and it has less to do than we first thought with a disagreement over what 
concepts are. As we have seen, Dreyfus seems to agree with McDowell that a concept 
can be understood as a relation connecting Dasein and the world, if we take thought 
as the employment of conceptual capacities that are by their nature world-directed. 
But as we saw earlier, what this means is that the concept, as relation (or even 
relational activity), is a mediation. Even if the concept is viewed only as a relation, it 
is a relation between the subject and the world. The world is something other; it is a 
thing. 86  But in our original, 'un-broken' dealings, we– Dasein– are being-in-the-
world. That is, the world is not some-thing beyond us to which we relate. Primordially, 
the world disappears, so that there is no need for mediation.87 “When Dasein is totally 
merged with the world” in the context of an activity, says Dreyfus, “there is no place 
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for content.” 88  That is, content– as world-directedness– simply cannot apply to 
descriptions on this level, because there is no world outside of Dasein for it to be 
directed towards. 
 
There is no content, Dreyfus says, because there is nothing that could contain– no 
outer and, therefore, no inner. Hence McDowell's description does not remain 
strongly divorced from Dreyfus' but rather, in the latter's terms, seems somewhat 
incomplete. By beginning at the level of the world, we find that mindedness– 
rationality– is not only present in but is that basic relation towards the world of things, 
of everything that is the case. Conceptuality does indeed pervade down to our first 
experience of the world. But this misses the crucial point– the world is by this stage 
already 'distanced.' 
 
I have so far been examining Dreyfus and McDowell's differing ideas of concept. We 
have seen that the two philosophers do not completely lack common ground. Both 
identify differing spheres of thought and action, with Dreyfus arguing for a 
conceptuality that is based on reflection and hence limited to the thought sphere, 
while McDowell argues that it is the potential to be the content of reflection that 
makes something conceptual. I therefore wish to step back from definitions of concept 
to examine the kind of content that is present in these different situations. I will argue 
in the following section that McDowell needs to acknowledge a second kind of content 
that I believe is equivalent to what Dreyfus is attempting to show, even though 
McDowell maintains that both are conceptual.  
 
1.5 – Parallels 
in which I argue that Dreyfus and McDowell agree on the phenomena  
at stake, while differing in the way conceptuality is understood. 
 
We have so far been examining Dreyfus and McDowell's differing ideas of concept. 
We have seen that the two philosophers do not completely lack common ground. Both 
identify a phenomenal difference between spheres of thought and action. The key 
point of their divergence is rather that where Dreyfus argues for a conceptuality that 
is based on reflection and is hence limited to the sphere of thought, McDowell insists 
that it is an experience's potential to be the content of reflection that makes it 
conceptual. 
                                                 




These overlapping layers of agreement and disagreement may lead one to question 
whether the two philosophers are entirely on the same page, and Rouse, for one, 
argues that they are not. He takes a step away from the debate and identifies two ways 
of talking about concepts, the 'descriptive' and the 'normative,' which he then says 
Dreyfus and McDowell respectively exemplify.89 For descriptive approaches such as 
Dreyfus', conceptuality is understood as tied to a reflective faculty. Concepts only 
come into being when they are articulated in language (or analogously in thought, 
narrowly construed). Conceptual content is understood as something “actually 
present”90; hence Dreyfus argues that its absence in absorbed coping means that the 
content of that coping is non-conceptual.  
 
'Normative' approaches, on the other hand, emphasise the conditions under which 
conceptualisation is possible. The conceptual is understood as performances and 
capacities that are appropriately assessed according to rational norms.91 It is for this 
reason that McDowell speaks rather in terms of content's potential articulation as 
conceptual, than whether any such articulation or thought has actually taken place. 
 
 
When McDowell argues that smooth-coping must necessarily be the activation of 
prior learned concepts, then, he is asserting that the actions being undertaken– as 
part of a human way of life– ought to be judged in terms of the rational norms that 
give those actions meaning in the context of human life. And the human activities that 
Dreyfus constantly uses as examples all presume initially learning concepts that 
belong to a social context, a context that extends far beyond what is available to non-
rational animals. While the skills employed in these activities may be accomplished 
through what Merleau-Ponty called 'motor intentionality'– the unreflective 
understanding demonstrated in skilful bodily actions92–  we have already seen that 
they tend to be taught using conceptual steps, and at any rate take place within a 
context created via learned concepts– what McDowell calls 'second nature.'93 Thus, 
although it is conceivable that, through imitation, a child could learn to use a cricket 
bat without any explicit instruction, she must also acquire such 'strong' concepts as 
'wicket' and 'out' before she could be said to have any kind of understanding of or 
expertise in the sport. Even though Dreyfus would argue that such strong concepts are 
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internalised as one becomes an expert, and are hence no longer 'operative' in the way 
McDowell holds, he does not deny that concepts are involved in the acquisition of 
many of our skills.94 
 
Based on these agreements, Rouse argues (rightly, I believe) that descriptive and 
normative accounts are actually compatible, since the disagreement is rather over the 
way 'conceptual' is understood, rather than the phenomena in question. He argues 
that Dreyfus should admit that humans understand the norms of their activities, while 
McDowell could agree that experts may not have any explicit rules governing their 
normatively-assessable actions.95 Rouse also emphasises that McDowell does agree 
that coping doesn't involve explicit reflection on norms.96 Yet Dreyfus might take this 
point even further, to focus our attention beyond the network of norms onto the actual 
task itself, the moment of action. In this case, it is perhaps misleading to speak of 
cricket (or chess, or any other activity) as a 'task,' in and of itself. The tasks completed 
with smooth-coping are rather 'micro-tasks'– throwing, catching, running– that are 
smaller and more momentary than the larger task of which they are a part.97 Yet it is 
just these moments that interest us– and only as they are enacted. And as Rietveld 
points out, McDowell “does not mention anything related to what happens in an 
episode of unreflective action,” but only the results of the reflection, which necessarily 
occurs only “after the fact.”98  
 
I will therefore argue in the final two sections that McDowell does admit of a kind of 
reflection, although one that is more direct and involved than the explicit stepping-
back that Dreyfus focuses on. I will argue for this in the next section by drawing a 
parallel between these two pictures of reflection through what I will call 'Naming.' In 
the final section, I will argue that McDowell also admits of an unreflective content, 
that applies prior to 'Naming.' 
 
* * * 
                                                 
94 McDowell 2007b, p. 366. 
95 Rouse 2013, p. 254. 
96 Ibid. 
97 It is equally important to remember that humans do not usually 'smoothly cope' at their tasks for long 
periods of time. Cricket or chess include just as much time standing or sitting around, watching, 
thinking, daydreaming, and so on. Part of what makes the performance of experts 'in the flow' so 
impressive is the apparent lack of the 'broken-ness' that permeates our everyday smooth-coping. 
These points will be expanded upon in Chapter Two. 
98 Rietveld 2010, p. 197. 
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1.6 – Naming 
in which I identify 'Naming' as a process that both thinkers  
describe as making content available for reflective thought. 
 
As we begin to understand how 'concept' is understood by McDowell and Dreyfus, we 
have found that the debating philosophers share a deal of common ground. One of the 
main points of contention between them remains whether the content of an 
experience changes in reflection. We will leave this open for the time being, to explore 
another point that both thinkers share– the role of Naming in introducing concepts 
into experience. Although the point at which this Naming occurs will be disputed, it 
will be significant later on if we can establish that both Dreyfus and McDowell 
understand Naming in a similar way, and find an interwoven link between reflection, 
conceptuality and language– understanding the last of these, not always as explicit 
words, but at least the experience of objects and relations as something onto which 
words can be mapped.  
 
'Naming' is my own term, yet it is appropriate in the context of both Dreyfus' and 
McDowell's accounts of conceptuality. 'Naming' for Dreyfus is the process of taking 
some non-conceptual content and making it explicit as the object of thought, 
something which may literally involve attaching a word to it, but in any case involves 
incorporating it into a broadly linguistic structure. What was before a fluid 'field of 
possibilities,' as Dreyfus quotes Merleau-Ponty, becomes concretised as a definite 
thing– a movement Dreyfus takes from Heidegger's account of the 'breakdown' from 
dealings with the ready-to-hand to knowledge of the present-at-hand.99 
 
Naming's tie to language is pertinent in McDowell's case, as he accepts as instructive 
Sellars' thought that “grasping a concept is mastering the use of a word.”100 It is with 
such a thought in mind that he claims that some of our world-disclosing experience is 
already embraced by our conceptual capacities– or simply put, we already have words 
to mark the categorial extension of the objects of experience. McDowell is quite clear 
that not every world-disclosing experience is actually articulated. He is open to there 
being world-disclosing experiences whose content must be “determined” by a subject 
as the content of a conceptual capacity.101 What this means is that our experience is 
not restricted to a limited 'vocabulary' but can be extended into further and further 
                                                 
99 Dreyfus 1991, pp. 70-1; cf. Heidegger, 1962, p. 104. 





categories.102 This is the process of Naming. 'Naming' for McDowell means to “annex” 
language to some world-disclosing experience so as to equip ourselves with new 
conceptual capacities, to “carve [the experience] out from the categorically unified... 
[yet]... unarticulated experiential content of which it is an aspect, so that thought can 
focus on it by itself.”103 
 
This means more than attaching a new label to something never seen before, in the 
way that European explorers gave the name 'dropbear' to those carnivorous koalas 
that inhabit Queensland's rainforests. It also means to form new categories within an 
existing categorial whole– picking out the eucalypts from the previously experienced 
forest. Importantly, McDowell emphasises that some world-disclosing experiences 
are never embraced by conceptual capacities. This is not to say that some parts of the 
world remain physically invisible, or unknowable. Rather, it means that our 
experience can only be as fine-grained as our 'vocabulary.' For example, we may name 
and conceptualise eucalypts, but never learn to distinguish between black gums and 
cabbage gums. The world that would thereby be disclosed by our experience of a 
eucalypt forest would be different than the one disclosed to an expert on Australian 
trees. 
 
Either way, McDowell says, the experience discloses a world; 
 
whether or not a piece of experiential content is focused on and brought within the 
reach of a vocabulary, either given a name for the first time or registered as fitting 
something already in the subject's linguistic repertoire, it is anyway present in the 
content of a world-disclosing experience in a form in which it either actually is, or has 
the potential to be simply appropriated as, the content of a conceptual capacity.104 
 
Our experiential content, to be experienced, must have this potential to be Named. 
But the Naming– and again this is crucial– need not have a verbal nor even an external 
articulation. “No aspect” of our experience, says McDowell, “is unnameable,” but this 
does not mean that we have a name for every aspect.105 “We do not need words for all 
the content that is conceptually available to us.”106 What is vital to the experience is 
                                                 
102 Cf. the 'generative capacity' of language that Chomsky (2005, pp. 3-4) suggests holds the key to our 
human reasoning ability. 
103 McDowell 2007a, p. 347. 





its potential to be Named. We do not have words necessarily in advance, but since we 
bring a conceptual structure with us to the experience, the discovery of the categorial 
extension of the object just is the experience itself. That is, our ability to recognise this 
tree as this kind of tree– a black gum, an old tree, infected with termites– marks our 
conceptual experience of it as such. 
 
1.6.1 – 'This' and 'That' 
in which I argue that 'Naming', and hence, conceptuality, is  
seen by both thinkers as less dependent on situation-independent  
propositions as the direct experience of something as 'this' or 'that'. 
 
If McDowell's understanding of concepts is 'normative,' we might ask how important 
this 'categorial extension' is to our unreflective experience. Is it really necessary to 
conceptually understand categorial relations in order to experience something? For 
McDowell rightly points out that we don't have a name for every aspect of our 
experience, and an aspect's name-ability often never extends further than a 'that.' 
When we pick out a particular colour, it is often 'that blue,' highly specific to the 
referent of the experience before us, not extending even to the similar shade nearby 
to which 'blue' refers but 'that' does not. Or on a shelf of apparently-identical books, 
we can nevertheless isolate and grab 'that book' as an object without any further 
extension. 
 
Much of our experience never goes beyond this basic level of (pre-)verbalisation. As 
Dreyfus says,  
 
we rarely do just drop a name on an already-fully determinate feature implicit in the 
world. In our everyday skilful coping we are not focusing on and naming fixed features, 
let alone reflecting on them.107 
 
While McDowell does not think the lack of reflection stands in the way of an 
experience's being conceptual, he is concerned about what to make of an unnamed 
experience. If a 'that' is so immediate and unextended, if it lacks a “certain generality,” 
ought we still to consider it fully conceptual?108 McDowell's doubts here show how 
important he considers the conceptual experience's categorial extension, and reveal 
his intuition that even our most direct experiences disclose to us objects of a type– we 
don't just see a 'thing' or 'fruit-source' but a tree. 
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Finally, however, McDowell concludes that the 'that' is a concept in action, because 
although it remains very specific to the situation, it is not so specific that its content 
or “associated capacity” cannot persist into the future. 109  That is to say, even 
something as specific as 'that blue' can be returned to over and again, at least for the 
duration of the context in which we name it as such. It becomes a category unto itself, 
its extension not being to other objects, but to other experiences of itself as a unity. 
This indicates that there is a temporal aspect to concepts, although the concept need 
not persist very long at all. We may be unable to pick out that same blue the next day, 
or amongst a different context of blue things. But the fact that we do pick it out and 
hold it as 'that' for any duration suggests that it has been conceptualised.  
 
Dreyfus, on the other hand, doesn't believe that there even is a conceptual 'that' in our 
coping experience. If the 'that' is conceptual, he would say, then it is not even implicit 
in the experience.110   In his original attack on McDowell's theory of mind and world, 
he says: “Nothing about the position need be nameable and thinkable as a reason for 
acting.”111 And again: 
 
It is important to be clear that... these conceptual structures are not implicit in our 
involved experience any more than reasons for our actions are implicit in our expert 
coping, or than the detached attitude is implicit in the engaged one.112  
 
That is, Dreyfus insists that Naming is not helpful to us if it only describes the making 
explicit of an implicitly held concept, for he is adamant that the level he is interested 
in, the level of smooth-coping, is non-conceptual. To move away from it is not to make 
its implicit content explicit; rather, “reflection must introduce some other sort of 
content.”113 (However, McDowell also cautions against seeing Naming as just a move 
from implicitly to explicitly conceptual, although for different reasons. He is wary of 
having 'implicitly conceptual' read as “only implicitly conceptual,” which seems to 
imply that conceptuality only becomes real in discourse.114 “Making the content in 
question explicit does not make the content newly conceptual in any sense that is 
                                                 
109 Ibid, p. 44. 
110 Dreyfus 2005, p. 51. 
111 Ibid, p. 55, Dreyfus’ emphasis. 
112 Ibid, p. 60, Dreyfus’ emphasis. 
113 Dreyfus 2007a, p. 360. 
114 McDowell 2007b, p. 367. 
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relevant to my claim,” he says. “It was conceptual already.”115) 
 
Despite their disagreement on where conceptuality begins, what these two stories do 
show is that both Dreyfus and McDowell accept Naming as tied to that beginning. For 
Dreyfus, Naming is the reflection, the change in content as it is brought out of non-
conceptual coping into reflective thought. McDowell, for whom there is no change in 
content between coping and thought, still holds that the Naming marks the first 
exercise of a conceptual capacity– the coping either is or is simultaneously with the 
Naming. That is, only when something has been Named– as tree, eucalypt, or black 
gum, for example– can it be experienced– and everything experienced has been 
Named in some way (remembering of course that the Naming need not be actual 
verbal articulation). For Dreyfus, something un-Named is experienced only non-
conceptually, prior to the subject-object experience. For McDowell, the un-Named is 
not– cannot be– experienced at all. 
 
Yet we can see in the parallels between how Naming works for both Dreyfus and 
McDowell that, on the phenomenological level, some kind of reflection is going on 
even in the most situation-specific Naming of something as 'that.' Although 
McDowell– following the 'normative' view of concepts– considers 'that' to be 
“conceptual already,” if we read his thoughts rather through the descriptive view 
favoured by Dreyfus, we seem to find a similar change in content. In the final section 
below, I will try to step outside these competing understandings of 'concept' and focus 
on the content of experience, arguing that a change of content can be found in each 
philosophers account. I will then conclude with the suggestion we base our idea of 
'concept' on this division in content. 
 
1.7 – Two forms of content 
in which I argue that the thinkers each describe two  
layers of content, above purely reflexive actions, and differ  
in where they see the transition between layers occur. 
 
We have just seen how both Dreyfus and McDowell connect a language-like process– 
what I have called Naming– to the experience of content as conceptual. Where they 
differ is in how they conceive of that process– for McDowell, Naming is perceptual 
and enacted in our direct experience. For Dreyfus, Naming is reflective, and involves 
a break in the direct experience of acting. The Naming process is how we produce 
                                                 




strong concepts. As Carman summarises, the strong concepts revealed by Naming are 
 
why McDowell draws such a sharp distinction between human and 'mere animal' 
perception. He concedes that the two have something in common, yet it seems, on his 
view, such a something cannot be a kind of content. Not that he thinks mere animal 
experience has no content, only that whatever content it can be said to have cannot be 
the kind of content we have as rational subjects in our experience. For in order to be 
non-conceptual, our experience would have to be in principle unavailable to thought, 
as he seems to think mere animal perception is, while in order to have experience with 
conceptual content, an animal would have to be capable of autonomous rational 
thought, like us.116 
 
That is to say, McDowell reasons that since we can think the content of an embodied 
act, such as catching a frisbee, such an action must already be conceptual. By the same 
reasoning, since a dog is not capable of rational thought, the same action on its part 
must be non-conceptual. But there is another possibility– that the distinctively 
human trait is not a conceptual rationality that extends all the way out, and that we 
can also bring forward reflectively; rather, reflection itself is the result of the key, 
uniquely human, ability, that creates conceptual content out of the pre-conceptual. 
Carman therefore sides with Dreyfus to argue that McDowell overlooks such reflective 
translation of content, and commits what Carman calls the 'Scholastic Fallacy,' the 
“illicit projection of the structure and content of reflection into unreflective 
experience.”117 For Dreyfus, our basic coping is as momentary, reflexive and solicited 
as a dog's, but we can translate the content of that experience into concepts through 
our reflective faculty. Other animals, lacking this faculty, also thereby lack concepts 
(in the strong sense).  
 
We will leave aside the question of animals until Chapter Three. But what is emerging 
here are two pictures of the relationship between humans, concepts and world that 
share a lot of overlap. The debate now becomes one over where to draw the dividing 
lines, because we will see in this Section that McDowell also admits of some non-
conceptual (or un-Named) experience, although he plays down its relevance. Here, 
then, I would like to suggest that if we probe a little more deeply into this point of 
                                                 
116 Carman 2013, p. 168. 
117 Ibid, p. 175. O'Regan (2000) calls this kind of thinking the 'refrigerator light illusion.' Just as we 
should not conclude that the fridge light is always on because it seems to be every time we open the 
door to check, neither should we conclude than an experience is always conceptual (or conscious, 
etc.) because we encounter it this way each time we 'check' by reflecting. Cf. Dreyfus (2007b, p. 
373) on how Sartre 'always finds' the ego in reflection. 
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McDowell's thinking, we will find not-quite-common ground with Dreyfus, but that 
each thinker's model, seen side-by-side, will reveal differing layers of content, 
although there remains a sharp disagreement between when each thinker believes this 
occurs. 
 
As we have seen, McDowell rejects the assumption that thought or deliberation is 
necessary for rationality.118 He extends conceptual capacities into our actions, and 
holds that the articulation (or Naming) of concepts need not be verbalised in the 
distance of language, but forms part of the very perception or action itself. As we saw 
above, what is really important is the potential or 'suitability' of expression in 
language, rather than its literal articulation. By accepting the centrality of a concept's 
potential articulation, we find the range of what can be considered conceptual vastly 
extended. McDowell argues that human actions should be understood as conceptual 
since the rational animal can always give reasons for its action, if prompted. Thus, 
McDowell would counter Dreyfus' example of the blitz-chess master's non-conceptual 
understanding by arguing that, although the chess-master would not have time to 
express any reasons as she makes her reflexive movement, she would not hesitate if 
asked to explain that a particular move would, for example, 'put my opponent's king 
in check.'  
 
But McDowell goes even further, to assert that it is not simply the articulation of a 
reason that makes an act conceptual. He also posits the case of somebody walking 
through a park and spontaneously catching a passing frisbee.119 When asked 'why?', 
such an agent could only reply “I just felt like it,” but McDowell all the same insists 
this action involves conceptual capacities since there is an extended awareness of what 
her catch and the frisbee involves, even if it is no more than a momentary 'this.' 
Dreyfus, on the other hand, holds that the very act of articulation, changes the content 
to bring it out of the non-conceptual involved coping into a different mode of 
encounter. We may want to ask McDowell what happens if that potential for 
articulation or reflection is never acted upon, but his reply would be that the potential 
alone is enough, or rather, that by simply entering our conscious perception, such 
potential needs to have been actualised, as it has already entered a normative 
framework of meaning. That is, without such actualisation, the phenomenon couldn't 
have become an object of experience in the first place. 
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But McDowell also recognises that many of our actions have become so internalised 
and habitual that there is little potential for them to become something experienced, 
becoming themselves a part of the background world that sets us up for other 
experiences. He himself chooses the example of the culturally-given distance we stand 
from a conversation partner as an illustration of an action that is clearly intentional 
and yet even in its learning seems to bypass any connection to concepts or rationality. 
Here, McDowell's account starts to appear less firm than it seemed. His reply attempts 
to avoid considering such actions as actions at all, claiming that a behaviour like 
distance-standing is “not an exercise of agency,” and therefore is “not a counter 
instance to the pervasiveness thesis but falls outside its scope.” 120  This reply is 
problematic, however, and reveals an ambiguity in McDowell's thesis that our 
normative responsiveness to the world is 'pervasively' conceptual.  
 
McDowell comes to this conclusion by distinguishing between two different types of 
'null' response to the 'why did you do that?' question that brings a concept-in-potentia 
into full articulation.121 The first such 'null response' applies to episodes such as the 
spontaneous frisbee catch. Here, our friend replies “no particular reason,” or “I just 
felt like it,” from which McDowell infers that she naturally has an awareness of her 
action as an action, the frisbee as a frisbee, and so on. Thus, he would claim, if we were 
to probe a little deeper, we would have to find her in possession of the relevant 
concepts and reasons, even for such an impulsive act. On the other hand, says 
McDowell, if we were to ask someone why they were always standing about two feet 
from their various conversation partners at the Christmas party, their likely response 
would be “I didn't realise I was doing that.”122 Hence, McDowell seems to feel, the 
action is non-conceptual, but is also irrelevant to his thesis about the pervasiveness of 
concepts, and therefore of little concern. He even goes on to compare the norms of 
distance-standing to the tendency (for most humans) to instinctively use their right 
hand when they need to reach for something.123 
 
This response is clearly not right, even beyond the fact that right- (and left-) 
handedness is a hard-wired trait, and distance-standing a culturally-absorbed norm. 
If we really press someone on why they are standing where they are, or why they 
stepped-back as their interlocutor moved towards them to let the waitress past, we 
                                                 
120 Ibid, p. 51. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, p. 50. 
123 Ibid, p. 51. 
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might find some response like 'to give them room,' or perhaps just simply 'it doesn't 
feel right.' We can find many cases where a subject might initially answer 'I didn't 
realise I was doing...' extending out beyond distance-standing to actions like crossing 
a street, entering a building, driving, or even the way one holds a musical instrument– 
all of which perhaps might never achieve a clearer response than 'it just feels right.' 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the human tendency to confabulate means that 
even clearer answers to these questions do not necessarily reveal a conceptual process 
at work in these 'automatic' actions. As Carman would say, to project the content of 
such reflection back into the unreflective experience is an illegitimate move, an 
example of the 'Scholastic fallacy.'124 
 
McDowell's comparison of such unreflective actions with right-handedness seems to 
me a non sequitur. But is it perhaps just a bad example, or does it reveal a serious flaw 
in McDowell's thinking? A few pages later, McDowell uses a slightly stronger example 
of learned actions functioning unreflectively below the level of agency. Here, he 
compares the distance-standing norm to the 'click' noises made by Xhosa speakers– 
a behaviour that is acquired, no doubt, and normative, but seems truly without an 
intentional object. However, this lack of an intentional object is a distraction from the 
issue, which is the content of an action and how that action is experienced. Producing 
phonemes can certainly have a content in the same way as other actions. Learning 
Spanish in Spain, I was aware that 'J' is pronounced with a guttural rasp that has no 
equivalent in English, and yet I struggled early on to produce this sound. Even as I 
improved, I felt for a time self-conscious whenever I pronounced it, and it was only as 
my fluency increased that I began using it in a natural and unplanned way– something 
that I, of course, realised only on reflection, after the fact. 
 
Thus we should not focus overly on an agent's ability to give reasons for their 
actions. 125  What is essential here is that the action can become the content of 
reflection– can be Named– or not. If one never learns another language or visits 
another culture, producing a phoneme or distance-standing might always remain 
unreflected upon. And yet the very possibility of reflecting on them– of making them 
the object of thought– signifies a change in content. 
 
McDowell, therefore, in his discussion of these actions, admits a kind of content that 
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differs from the content of thought. This should not be surprising, given that his 
'normative' account of conceptuality has focused rather on content's potential 
articulation. Yet by identifying conceptual rationality as simply the ability to 'give 
reasons,' he is forced to explain away phenomena that are in a clear continuum with 
the actions he describes. Indeed, we will see in Chapter Three that McDowell does 
offer a more nuanced understanding of strong 'rationality' that goes beyond 
articulating reasons for an action. Yet his focus on 'giving reasons' here means that his 
claim that acts like producing phonemes distance-standing do not involve agency does 
not stand up to the fact that such acts can be learned in just as conceptual a way as 
any manual skill, and performed as reflexively as Dreyfus claims. 
 
To find actions that entirely lack agency, we would need to turn to bodily reflexes, 
such as blinking, flinching, or the knee-jerk. These responses entirely lack a cognitive 
element. What we find here is a fourth layer, a truly basement level below what 
Dreyfus thinks of as non-conceptual, a layer where talk of conceptuality and non-
conceptuality does not really apply, since there is no agency here at all. We can 
illustrate this by imagining a third 'null response' to McDowell's question “Why are 
you doing that?” As we saw, the first response applies to the disputed level of the 
frisbee-catch, where the agent replies “I just felt like it,” revealing a sense of 
conceptuality to McDowell that Dreyfus doesn't really buy. The next layer down is one 
that we have seen– surprisingly– that both philosophers agree is non-conceptual, 
where the distance-stander makes the second response of “I didn't realise I was doing 
that, but it just felt right.” Yet here McDowell's claim that there is no agent in such an 
activity is unconvincing. Perhaps there is no sense of an agent initiating the action– 
certainly there is no reflective thought– but this only emphasises Dreyfus' point that 
these basic activities take place before subject, object and world have arisen. Similarly, 
the question to a Xhosa speaker “Why are you making that click?” (or equivalently, 
from a German to an English speaker, “Why are you making that θ sound?”) would 
have no intelligible response. At this level, there is not even a question of something 
feeling right or not; the only reply could be “because that's the way things are.” 
 
None of these actions should be confused with the basement layer of hard-wired 
action. Such reflexes are not a matter of choice, and can therefore only be answered– 
if at all– with a totally different kind of 'null response.' If asked why you blink every 
four seconds, or why you kicked out when the doctor tapped your knee, you could 
legitimately answer that 'I didn't mean to do it.' Even if your awareness is brought to 
such actions, you cannot alter them (or perhaps only with an extreme effort), showing 
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that they are indeed not an act of agency.126 
 
What this discussion shows is that both McDowell and Dreyfus see a non-conceptual 
layer to account for. But McDowell's way of handling it– brushing it off by equating it 
with the basement-level of hard-wired response– is inadequate, and fails to account 
for the situationally-responsive agency in the ground-floor non-conceptual level. The 
best he could do here would be to introduce the idea of a continuum running through 
these non-conceptual layers that reads the agency we see on the ground-floor as at 
best implicit projections. But this kind of answer begins to look suspiciously like 
Dreyfus' own argument as to why we should take the middle-floor, situationally-
specific actions as non-conceptual rather than conceptual as McDowell claims. That 
is, if we allow a continuum between the basement and the ground-floor, we are just as 
justified in continuing it through to the first floor. 
 
1.7.1 – Combined models 
in which I show the parallels in Dreyfus' and McDowell's accounts. 
 
We have seen, therefore, that despite some serious differences in how they understand 
the way such experiences relate, Dreyfus and McDowell share some agreement over 
the phenomena that are present. To finish, then, I will sketch out a side-by-side view 
of each thinker's model in the terms I have described in this Chapter (see Figure One). 
Although we find that their views do not strictly overlap, we seem to find three tiers 
of increasing abstraction– from a non-conceptual lower floor, to a situationally-
enacted middle, and an abstractly-conceptual top floor– that both Dreyfus and 
McDowell seem to acknowledge, although both interpret the middle floor with a 
rather different emphasis. Both thinkers agree that the top floor is conceptual in the 
traditional, reflective sense that is tied to explicit language. I will therefore call such 
content logos, in anticipation of the discussions to come in the following Chapters. 
Both thinkers also, I have argued in this Section, agree on a form of non-conceptual 
experience on the ground floor. 
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The real point of difference is what to make of the middle floor, and this– we have 
seen– comes down to where each thinker envisions the act of Naming. Dreyfus places 
Naming between the middle and top floors, and hence does not really distinguish 
between the lower and middle floors. For him, any action prior to Naming reveals an 
understanding and experience involving non-conceptual content. McDowell, on the 
other hand, since he denies any agency to lower floor dealings, would insist that the 
content of the middle floor has already been Named; the situational-enactment of 
such content is for him the employment of conceptual capacities, and distinct from 
uninterpreted lower floor actions, which belong rather on a direct continuum with the 
instinctive basement level. 
 
Whether these groups are really groups, and these gaps are really gaps, or whether 
they instead mark out a continuum along which all cognitive activity falls, we will leave 
open for now, and understand this model as a theoretical tool representing what is 
stake in this debate.127 As a minimum, however, it is now clearer that, despite very 
different understandings of the term 'concept' and the way they read it in one 
another's work, Dreyfus and McDowell do have a broad agreement over the 
phenomena in question, as well as more than superficial differences in how they 




I have argued in this Chapter that both Dreyfus and McDowell agree on several key 
points. They agree that our cognition extends beyond linguistic thought, that our 
coping is embodied, and most importantly, I have argued that they should agree that 
there is a change in content between these two levels. McDowell would probably 
contest this final point. However, I have shown that his disagreement with Dreyfus 
over whether to call embodied, absorbed content 'conceptual' rests on differing 
understandings of conceptuality, with Dreyfus restricting it to a reflective capacity, 
while McDowell holds that it needs simply to be a potential object for reflection, 
assessable by rational norms. 
 
With this in mind, I have suggested laying aside the question of whose definition of 
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'conceptual' is better, and focusing on the phenomena. I have shown that McDowell 
also understands a change in content that takes place when an intentional object's 
potential conceptuality is actualised. That is, we experience entities differently based 
upon whether we have Named them or not, and McDowell's struggles to account for 
acquired yet unconscious actions such as distance-standing shows that space for this 
kind of content must be included in his model. Extrapolating from this experience, we 
can also see that his insistence on a single kind of content pervading both linguistic 
thought and coping is inconsistent. McDowell is right to say that all experience can be 
Named (is, therefore, potentially conceptual), but wrong to say that un-Named 
actions are not part of experience or agency. That when we do Name them they 
become part of a normative system is uncontentious, because Naming just is that 
process. But to hold that the Name could be before the act is to fall into what Carman 
calls the 'Scholastic Fallacy': the “illicit projection of the structure and content of 
reflection into unreflective experience.”128 
 
What McDowell does teach us is that Dreyfus' talk of 'reflection' may appear a little 
too strong– reflection does not require stepping back and asserting propositions. 
Naming is a perceptual process, and can be as simple as focusing on something and 
saying 'this.' These final thoughts will be expanded upon in the coming chapters. For 
the present, I will take these two forms of content, and provisionally term the 
linguistic, Named content 'conceptual' for the purposes of this thesis. I will take a 
deeper look at the transition between these two forms of content in Chapter Three, 
but I turn now to clarifying their difference via a phenomenology of expertise. 
  
                                                 




The Phenomenology of Expertise 
 
In this Chapter, I examine the phenomenology of expert performance to provide 
support for the non-conceptual layer I posited in Chapter One. Expertise provides the 
ideal starting point, not only because Dreyfus' examples of smooth coping are drawn 
from expert practices, but also because they provide demarcated zones of 'body' and 
'mind' in action together, and are therefore an ideal arena to test hypotheses about 
the place of conceptual content in embodied skills. Yet the concept of 'expertise' itself 
needs clarification if our search is to be fruitful. Dreyfus' phenomenology draws upon 
the actions of highly-practised masters as well as what he calls 'everyday experts'– 
any- and every-body who copes smoothly at mundane tasks like opening the fridge or 
crossing the road. In order to better understand what is going on in the expert's mind-
body, it is important to be clear on the varieties of expert and expertise. 
 
I answer these questions in this Chapter in two main parts. In the first part, I look at 
the features of expertise identified by Collins and Evans in their 'periodic table of 
expertise.'1 They articulate a spectrum running from ubiquitous (everyday) expertise 
to specialist or contributory (esoteric) expertise. All expertise involves both 'tacit' and 
'explicit' knowledge. 'Tacit knowledge' describes that form of knowledge where we 
'know more than we can tell,' and I argue that it is equivalent to the non-conceptual 
content identified in the previous Chapter. I argue that the experience of enacting tacit 
knowledge– that is, of performing expert actions without drawing upon explicit 
propositions– is what unites everyday and esoteric expertises. However, Collins 
distinguishes between somatic (embodied) and collective (socialised) tacit knowledge, 
and uses the distinction to play down the parallels between embodied and socialised 
actions. Yet I emphasise that similarities in the experience, in particular the absence 
of explicit thought, and performance of tacit knowledge unites both kinds, and that 
the primacy of tacit knowledge (that is, non-conceptual content) is the central feature 
of all of the expertises on their periodic table. 
 
In the second part of the chapter I turn to the major objection to this conclusion. 
Esoteric expertises can be so complex that some thinkers argue that they require 
explicit thought if they are to be performed at their best. Montero holds that esoteric 
expertise requires a constant, conscious striving for improvement, arguing that 
                                                 




Dreyfus is mistaken to extend the 'Principle of Automaticity' from the everyday to the 
esoteric. I reply by presenting a more fine-grained picture of esoteric expertise based 
on closer examination of its phenomenology, to argue that what we consider single 
'expertises' are actually families of micro-tasks, which share the un-minded moments 
of action with gaps where explicit thought is unproblematic to the model. However, I 
conclude by arguing that Montero is right to question Dreyfus on his extension of the 
automaticity of everyday moments to esoteric activity. I argue that esoteric actions, 
performed 'in the flow,' while un-minded, are better characterised as spontaneous 
rather than automatic, drawing upon Heidegger's description of Eigentlichkeit and 
Uneigentlichkeit to articulate the difference. 
 
2.1 – Expertise 
in which I introduce philosophical conceptions of expertise, with a  
particular focus on the contrast between 'everyday' and 'esoteric' experts. 
 
Literature on expertise has defined two broad ways in which we might be considered 
experts at a subject or task. These differ in how expert knowledge is understood, with 
the distinction made along the lines of Dewey's division of knowledge into 'know-how' 
and 'know-that.'2 Goldman, for example, distinguishes between 'skill expertise' and 
'cognitive expertise,' where the former designates mostly practical skills such as 
violin-playing, billiards or textile design, and the latter refers more to a knowledge of 
facts, concepts, and propositions, as well as how to apply them.3 
 
Similarly, Collins and Evans, in their 'periodic table of expertise,' contrast “tacit” 
knowledge with “explicit” knowledge.4 This distinction, however, is less clear-cut, as 
both kinds of knowledge are seen as involved in most kinds of tasks. The tacit is more 
broadly viewed as the background knowledge that enables expertise of all kinds, and 
is therefore involved in both practical skills and in more cognitive expertises, which 
themselves require a lot of tacitly-assumed knowledge in order to be mastered. Yet 
the core feature of tacit knowledge for Collins remains, following Polanyi, that it is not 
explicable, such that we can therefore “know more than we can tell.”5 Crucially, tacit 
knowledge is unable to be expressed in terms of propositional concepts or rules, thus 
linking it to the non-conceptuality discussed by Dreyfus.6 
 
                                                 
2 Dewey 1922, pp. 177-8. 
3 Goldman, 2001, p. 91. 
4 Collins & Evans, p. 13. 
5 Collins 2010, p.4. 
6 Collins & Evans, p. 17. 
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On the other side, Collins posits an explicit knowledge, only in opposition to which 
the concept of tacit knowledge has any meaning. This explicit knowledge is manifested 
in all of the expertises he and Evans identify in their periodic table, together with 
differing degrees of tacit knowledge; 'beer-mat' knowledge,7 for example, relies on a 
less dense support of tacit knowledge than the 'contributory expertise' that marks the 
most developed stage of proficiency. 
 
Here emerges a second axis to Collins and Evans' understanding of expertise. Along 
with the division into tacit and explicit, they identify a division between 'ubiquitous' 
and 'esoteric' expertise. As with the first, this division is not sharp, but it identifies an 
important conceptual distinction that must be incorporated into any account of 
expertise. Ubiquitous or everyday expertise comprises those activities we achieve 
skilfully, yet which don't necessarily require the kind of training that specialised skills 
need. Typical examples would include untaught skills like speaking one's native 
language, walking up stairs, or the distance-standing discussed in Chapter One. But 
Collins suggests it might also include skills such as balancing on a bike, or catching a 
ball– skills where the instruction, if any, doesn't explain to you what to actually do 
with your body. Collins calls this kind of teaching “coaching.”8 For example, we might 
tell a child to 'keep their eye on the ball,' or encourage them to look straight ahead as 
they wobble on a cycle, but the coaching doesn't in itself convey the bodily skills that 
are acquired as the child masters the skill. 
 
An important difference between everyday and esoteric expertise is how we judge an 
expert. For many instances of esoteric expertise– ballet, for example, or 
musicianship– we have some pretty clear criteria about what makes an expert an 
expert– namely, that they can perform the tasks involved in the expertise, and 
perform them well. We might say an expert concert violinist can sight-read a piece by 
Vivaldi, but also that they hold the violin in a certain way, their fingers are positioned 
just so, and so on. Likewise, the success conditions for esoteric expertise are fairly 
clear. An expert violinist plays the piece well and without mistakes; an expert athlete 
wins lots of games (or at least qualifies for high-level competitions). With ubiquitous 
or everyday expertise, like cycling or chopping wood, however, the criteria are much 
less stringent, as to be an expert in this sense means only to be good enough to 'get 
the job done.' For although there are esoteric expert cyclists and even wood-choppers, 
                                                 
7 As indicated in the name, 'beer-mat' knowledge is the kind of superficial knowledge one might pick 
up from a beer mat, that might enable the knower to do better at a pub quiz, but that lacks any 
significant application. 




who put great energy into perfecting their techniques, such refined techniques are not 
necessary to achieve everyday expertise. Thus, while your father-in-law might insist 
there exists one objectively most efficient way to chop wood, we can at any rate also 
imagine someone who has been successfully chopping wood for twenty years using a 
less efficient technique– although still efficiently enough to get the job done. They 
might be slightly slower or have chronic back pain as a result of their imperfect 
technique, but they are nevertheless an everyday expert; they perform the task 
smoothly to a standard that meets their needs.  
 
This is the sense of expertise that is central to Dreyfus' phenomenology of coping, 
where what makes someone an expert is less the quality of their knowledge or 
technique than their experience as they act. Dreyfus and Dreyfus emphasise that the 
central criterion for expertise is that the practitioner does not follow explicit rules, but 
responds to the affordances presented by the situation.9 At this stage, as I will discuss 
further below, the Dreyfuses do not distinguish between everyday and esoteric 
experts– a suburban cyclist's experience involves the same flexible responsiveness as 
a touriste de France, although within a less demanding context. To be an everyday 
expert, then, means to be able to get the job done as a matter of course– without 
attending to one's bodily movements, and perhaps with one's mind somewhere else. 
Whether the style or technique corresponds to that of an esoteric expert is secondary 
here; as far as everyday expertise is concerned, it is the practitioner's experience as 
they act which is important, and this is the key point I will come back to later. 
 
There is an obvious parallel 10  between everyday expertise and the everydayness 
(Alltäglichkeit) discussed by Heidegger as he introduces readiness-to-hand in Being 
and Time.11 Heidegger's everydayness is described as uneigentlich, conventionally 
translated 'inauthentic,' but more accurately read as 'unowned.' That is to say, there 
is a certain lack of ownership, or a kind of automaticity, to our everyday expert actions. 
As we have seen, it is the very mark of our proficiency at such tasks that we can 
hammer nails or change our car's gears with our mind on other matters. While 
Uneigentlichkeit and Eigentlichkeit certainly do not map perfectly onto everyday and 
esoteric expertise respectively, the distinction between owned and unowned actions 
will play an important role in our discussion towards the end of this Chapter. 
                                                 
9 Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986, p. 30; cf. Dreyfus 2005, p. 63 [n. 32]. 
10 And indirect line of philosophical descent, in that Collins developed his ideas on tacit knowledge 
through a reading of Polanyi, who developed his through a reading of Heidegger. 
11 Heidegger 1962, p. 422; cf. p. 76. 
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However, not all philosophers agree that everyday skills– precisely because of their 
ubiquity– ought to count as expertise. Addis, for example, finds it “odd to say” 
someone speaking their native language is an expert, and that it is rather the context 
in which a skill is used– and by implication, the explicit concepts one has absorbed as 
it is acquired– that decide whether a skill is an expertise as opposed to a general 
competence.12 In one sense, this is merely an argument over terminology. And yet 
there is a deeper issue at stake. As I will show in more detail below, what everyday 
expertise shares with the esoteric is this non-conceptual, tacit element. Dreyfus argues 
for a continuum between esoteric and everyday expertise, holding that they are united 
by an ability to act 'in the flow,' with what he calls 'smooth coping.'13 What makes the 
actions of esoteric experts impressive, he argues, is their accomplishment of difficult 
skills in the same way that our wood-chopper approaches their everyday task.14 
 
What interests me here, then, is the content involved in experience of expert 
performance, starting with the hypothesis that the tacit knowledge discussed by 
Collins lines up with the non-conceptual content discussed in the first Chapter. 
Although we'll see in the next section that Collins distinguishes between the tacit 
knowledge at work in everyday expertise and the tacit knowledge involved in esoteric 
expertise, I aim to show that this division is overemphasised. If we instead attend to 
the form of content of the tacit knowledge in both kinds of expertise, we will gain a 
fuller appreciation of the significance of the tacit in our actions. 
 
2.1.1 – 'Thought' in expertise 
in which I question the role of explicit, reflective 
– that is, 'strongly' conceptual– thought in expertise. 
 
Expertise intersects with the Dreyfus-McDowell debates in questions over whether or 
not 'thought' is involved in expert action. Dreyfus' position is based largely around the 
claim that “thinking disrupts smooth coping,” as he declares in his interpretation of 
the Chuck Knoblauch case. 15  It is worth pausing for a moment, therefore, and 
clarifying what is meant by 'thinking' and 'thought,' and their place in expertise. 
 
                                                 
12 Addis 2013, p. 330. 
13 Dreyfus 2007a, p. 356. 
14 There is also a more practical use of this definition: Many skills have such a broad spectrum that any 
definition of 'expert' is arbitrary. Is an expert driver one who has been driving for a certain amount 
of time, or one who knows x number of special manoeuvres, or one who can do those manoeuvres 
at a certain speed, and so on? By taking into account a practitioner's awareness during the task, we 
find a much more consistent understanding. 




In Chapter One I argued that reflection is the process of translating something from 
the lower layer of content into the higher, and that thought is cognition in this higher 
layer. There is a tendency to associate such thought with propositions. However, I also 
agreed with McDowell that conceptuality need not involve explicitly invoking a 
Kantian 'I think...'. Merely pointing or focusing on something and saying 'this'– what 
I have called Naming– is, I have suggested, an act of transforming content from one 
layer to the next, which for our purposes means conceptualisation. 16  Stanley and 
Krakauer have suggested that the same point applies to expertise. One can have expert 
knowledge even without being able to express that knowledge in propositional form. 
They ask us to imagine an expert yet punch-drunk boxer, asked how to fend off a 
southpaw. “This,” the boxer replies, demonstrating with her arms how she would fight 
a left-handed opponent, “this is how you fight a southpaw.”17 In so demonstrating, the 
boxer performs the breakdown or 'Naming' described in Sections 1.6 and 1.6.1. Thus 
we see in accounts of expertise the same transition between layers we discovered in 
the previous Chapter, bringing with it the same question of translation from one form 
of content to another. 
 
Stanley and Krakauer are talking here about what Collins calls 'tacit knowledge.' More 
precisely, they discuss what he calls 'medium' or “somatic” tacit knowledge, which is 
one of three forms of tacit knowledge that also includes 'weak' or “relational” and 
'strong' or “collective” tacit knowledge.18 Collins claims that only the strong, collective 
tacit knowledge is truly tacit in the sense that 'we can know more than we can tell'; the 
other two, he claims, are explicable at least in principle, and so do not capture 
anything essentially different from what can be put into propositions. Thus, for 
Collins, only collective tacit knowledge could be described as having a non-conceptual 
content in the sense discussed in Chapter One, while somatic tacit knowledge 
undergoes no translation of content. Stanley and Krakauer's boxer would be 
demonstrating knowledge that is in principle propositional, even if she is unable (for 
the time being, or ever) to actually express that knowledge in natural language.19 By 
extension, Collins criticises Dreyfus' focus on the embodiment of skills, claiming that 
                                                 
16 This point will be expanded upon in Chapters Three and Five. 
17 Stanley & Krakauer 2013, p. 7. 
18 Collins 2010, p. 85. 'Weak' or relational tacit knowledge is knowledge that is only contingently 
unexplicated due to social or practical reasons (Collins 2010, pp. 97-8), and so is not directly relevant 
to our discussion here. 
19 Similarly, in Chapter One I suggested that, while a chess master could explain after the fact reasons 
why she performed a certain move, this does not capture what was happening as she moved. In 
Carman's words, “reflection rationalises.” 
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there is “nothing philosophically profound” about embodied tacit knowledge.20 In this 
next section, however, I will argue that, by considering embodied knowledge as 
ultimately propositional, Collins downplays the experience of embodied acting which 
is the real point at stake.  By ignoring this, he misses parallels between collective and 
embodied tacit knowledge. By taking these parallels into account, I argue, Collins 
ought to accept that the translation from non-conceptual to conceptual that he says 
occurs in collective tacit knowledge occurs likewise in the somatic. 
 
2.1.2 – Embodied knowledge 
in which I argue that the experience of tacit knowledge reveals that it has not  
undergone the reflective change of 'Naming', something Collins overlooks  
when he argues that embodied tacit knowledge is of a kind with the explicit. 
 
It must be said that Collins denies that his understanding of embodied tacit knowledge 
is conceptual in the sense that it need have “something to do with propositions, or 
'true and justified beliefs'.”21 Rather, like the case of the punch-drunk boxer above, 
knowledge for Collins is “demonstrated by the ability to do things.”22 When we ask 
whether a person, animal, or even a machine 'knows' anything, what we are really 
asking is whether or not it can perform the action in question. 
 
The human per complicated animal... is continuous with the animal and physical 
world. We are just like complicated cats, dogs, trees, and sieves. When [performing 
bodily actions] we are just complicated sets of mechanisms (which become mysterious 
only if we start to try to describe our experiences– to make them explicit).23 
 
A sieve 'knows' the smaller rocks from the larger by its design, just as a worm knows 
edible matter in the soil by virtue of its own biological makeup. 24  More complex 
animals have finer powers of discrimination and a wider repertoire of actions, yet the 
principle, for Collins, remains the same. Somatic tacit knowledge can in principle be 
broken down into discrete actions that are expressible as explicit knowledge. Collins 
does not emphasise this to denigrate human (or animal) bodily abilities, but because 
he wants to focus our attention on the 'strong,' collective tacit knowledge that we 
acquire and use in social settings, and which he argues can not be made explicit in the 
same way as 'medium' somatic or 'weak' relational tacit knowledge. However, I will 
                                                 
20 Collins 2010, p. 117; cf. p. 148. 
21 Collins 2013b, p. 413. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Collins 2010, p. 104. 




argue below that emphasising this difference neglects a shared similarity that I take 
to be tacit knowledge's most important feature– its experience as non-conceptual. 
 
Collins argues that embodied knowledge is ultimately propositional by dissecting 
Polanyi's example of riding a bike.25 Polanyi took riding a bike to be the example of 
tacit knowledge– 'knowing more than we can tell'– par excellence.26 When we ride a 
bike, we are constantly adjusting our body in all kinds of subtle ways so as to keep 
upright. We don't explicitly learn any of these adjustments, and if we try to consciously 
isolate and attend to those movements, we are more likely to fail and fall off. This kind 
of observation plays a crucial role in Dreyfus and Dreyfus' model of skill acquisition, 
and, we have seen, is central to Hubert Dreyfus' thesis that smooth coping is non-
conceptual. Yet Collins is unconvinced by this example. He first makes an important 
distinction between bike-balancing and bike-navigation, both of which form a part of 
everyday human cycling. This allows us to differentiate between the mostly somatic 
knowledge that we use in staying upright and steering on the bike, and the social 
knowledge that is involved in getting by in traffic, knowing where and where not to 
manoeuvre our bikes. Collins wants to refocus our thinking onto the social, collective 
tacit knowledge, but I will argue he does this at the unnecessary expense of the 
somatic. 
 
Collins cites the fact that machines have been made that can balance on a bike using 
gyroscopic technology, thereby asserting that our ability can essentially be reduced to 
an analogous series of mechanistic actions. He continues with a thought experiment, 
in which he aims to show that the tacit knowledge we use in cycling could 
straightforwardly be made explicit. Collins claims that, as the gyroscopic machine is 
explicable in principle, the only reason bike-balancing tacit knowledge seems 
inexplicable is because our brains don't run fast enough to explicate our activity in 
real time. But suppose we were learning to cycle on an asteroid. Here the low gravity 
would mean that we probably could learn to bike-balance using more explicit 
knowledge, in the way we might programme a machine– lean forward, lift your leg, 
tilt your hip, and so on. In such conditions, Collins argues, there is no reason to 
suppose our body 'knows' anything different than our mind, and somatic tacit 
knowledge is therefore of a kind with explicit knowledge.27 In the terms of the Dreyfus-
McDowell debate, Collins would seem to take McDowell's side with respect to somatic 
                                                 
25 Ibid, pp. 100-1; Collins & Evans 2007, pp. 26-7. 
26 Polanyi 1966, p. 4. 
27 Collins 2010, p. 100. 
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tacit knowledge, holding that no form of translation takes place in moving from tacit 
to explicit knowledge. 
 
However, the really important difference between tacit and explicit knowledge is not 
a question of speed. It is rather, about the content of the action and how that action is 
experienced by the agent. When we take this into account, we will see that Collins 
overlooks a Dreyfusian translation of content that does indeed take place when 
somatic tacit knowledge is made explicit, or vice versa. Collins is correct to assert that 
we would probably learn to cycle in a different way if we tried it on an asteroid. We 
could follow step-by-step instructions, perhaps with a coach radioing us explicit 
commands about what to do next in order to stay upright. Yet this is just how we learn 
many skills here on Earth. Indeed, it is exactly how Dreyfus and Dreyfus describe the 
initial stages of skill acquisition. 
 
What Collins doesn't consider in this example is what happens as we master a skill. It 
is not simply that we start following the steps more fluidly, but rather that we 
experience the entire task differently, no longer as a series of steps but as a single, 
fluid action. We no longer think about what to do next; we feel what needs to be done, 
and we respond immediately, without conscious deliberation. One proof of this, that 
Dreyfus likes to point out, is that it therefore frees up our explicit, minded attention 
to think about other things. We are cycling over the hill, dodging potholes, rounding 
bends, but we are thinking about our invitation to the barbecue, and wondering what 
kind of beers we ought to bring. Collins' error is to assume that because we learned to 
cycle more explicitly on the asteroid, we would not come to embody that skill as we do 
on Earth. Yet there is no reason to think that we would not. Once we had mastered 
asteroid-cycling, we would be able to do it, however slowly, in an absorbed, non-
conceptual way. We could navigate the craters and the slopes, while having a radio 
conversation about what we were seeing, and wondering about the lights on the 
horizon. 
 
This is not merely a qualitative difference in experience, although that difference 
marks our primary clue. In becoming embodied everyday expertise, our experience 
no longer draws upon the explicit concepts that were involved in our initial learning. 
As such, it makes no difference if that knowledge is explicable. As I argued with 
Dreyfus in the previous Chapter, such a change in content is not merely the implicit 
activation of what was originally explicit. Collins' conception of somatic tacit 




explicit content. The relevant fact about somatic tacit knowledge is not that it can be 
expressed explicitly, but that any such expression requires a translation away from 
the content that is enacted with the non-conceptual awareness that Dreyfus calls 
smooth coping and that Heidegger called dealings with ready-to-hand equipment. It 
is this mode of awareness, indicating enacted tacit knowledge, that I argue makes 
everyday actions expert in the most important sense of the word. 
 
Stone agrees that Collins' conception of tacit knowledge in expertise is improved by 
bringing it into line with a Heideggerian phenomenology of coping, since Collins took 
the concept from Polanyi, who Stone argues misread Heidegger in an important 
way. 28  Stone criticises Collins' and Polanyi's understanding of knowledge, not so 
much for its definition, but because Collins takes it to be our “fundamental 
relationship to the world.” 29  Stone, instead, follows Heidegger in arguing that 
“knowledge and knowing are founded on a relationship with the world that pre-exists 
either our cognitive or our praxical relationship to it.”30 From this angle, the forms of 
explicability that Collins describes are third-person points-of-view that do not capture 
the tacit, but merely describe it in derivative terms. 
 
Collins admits his knowledge of Heidegger is “sketchy,” and Stone does grant that if 
Polanyi and Collins have been led to something fruitful in their readings, this may be 
more important than their faithfulness to Heidegger's text.31 Yet Stone insists the 
oversight is not merely of “scholarly interest,” but reveals that Collins, while 
disclaiming that he thinks of knowledge as propositional in nature, nonetheless 
belongs to the epistemological tradition that does. 32  From Plato to the early 
Wittgenstein, and including also McDowell, the point has been that even when we are 
not relating to the world through explicit propositions, the way of knowing that 
propositions capture forms our basic connection to the world. Anything else is 
mysticism, that we must pass over in silence. 
 
Heidegger's project can be seen as an attempt to demysticise that world that (early) 
Wittgenstein passed silently over.33 Understanding knowledge in a Heideggerian way, 
then, can help us see where Collins has not broken free from that tradition as radically 
                                                 
28 Stone 2013a, p. 294. 
29 Stone 2013b, p. 419. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Collins 2013b, p. 412; Stone 2013a, p. 290. 
32 Stone 2013a, p. 290; 2013b, p. 419. 
33 One can also see the later Wittgenstein's work in the same way. 
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as he claims, as well as pointing the way to take his genuine insights further. Reading 
Collins through Heidegger also reveals just why some of Collins' claims seem so 
counter-intuitive. For example, it sounds strange to say that a sieve 'knows' the size of 
stones, but since Collins defines knowing as 'doing,' we can understand what such a 
statement means (although we might still dispute it). But if 'knowledge' is, as 
Heidegger aimed to show, founded on a more fundamental relationship with the 
world, the statement makes sense, although not in the way Collins supposes. The sieve 
could be said to 'know' the size of stones– although certainly not in any literal sense– 
but only against the background of our using it in one of the projects that forms our 
way of living. The sieve's 'knowledge' rests entirely on human being-in-the-world. 
 
Central to being-in-the-world is understanding (Verstehen), Dasein's access to Being. 
Understanding is not merely a mode of cognition, but the very possibility of entities 
showing up, and showing up as significant.34 Now, Collins argues that machines and 
computers (especially AI), and even sieves, have knowledge insofar as they are able to 
accomplish certain tasks, and it is unimportant whether these tasks are accomplished 
in a different way to how we do them. Yet even with our most intelligent AI, the success 
of their 'knowledge' only has any meaning against the background of the human 
projects in which they are involved; they have no Verstehen in and of themselves. As 
Haugeland says, 'computers just don't give a damn.'35 
 
Hagueland's point, applied to Collins' story, is that Collins has misunderstood the 
Heideggerian criticism. Collins is right that it does not matter if a machine achieves 
something in a different way to a human; this does not change the outcome for the 
human. What matters is that the machine does not act towards a possibility; it just 
acts. Collins is wrong, then, to lump sieves, trees, animals and humans together. 
Sieves, we have seen, can only be spoken of as knowing or doing with reference to 
human projects. Animals, I will argue in the next chapter, do give a damn– at least to 
some extent, they act for a greater possibility, but without an awareness of that 
possibility as a possibility. But the point remains Collins has moved too quickly in 
equating our concernful understanding with the explicable, derived 'knowledge' of 
machines and the third-person point-of-view. 
 
* * *  
                                                 
34 Heidegger 1962, pp. 182-195. 




2.1.3 – Embodied and social knowledge 
in which I argue that Collins' division between 'somatic' and 'collective'  
tacit knowledge is too strong, as both involve non-conceptual content. 
 
In discussing somatic tacit knowledge, I have so far focused on fairly mechanical 
expertises, arguing that our ability to explicate them is not reflective of the way we 
experience them. Collins calls these kinds of skills “mimeomorphic,” because they can 
be learned via mimicry, or via the indirect 'coaching' that does not convey explicit 
bodily instructions.36 For example, as we saw, Collins distinguishes between bike-
balancing and bike-navigating. Bike-balancing is a mimeomorphic skill. We are not 
explicitly instructed how to stay upright on the bike and, conceivably, a chimp could 
be taught to do it. 
 
Bike-navigating, on the other hand, is an example of what Collins calls “polimorphic” 
skills, which come with their own kind of tacit knowledge, 'collective tacit knowledge.' 
The emphasis in both these terms is on the social. Polimorphic skills are those skills 
which cannot be fully acquired by mere mimicry. They require an understanding of 
the social context of their deployment.37 Bike-navigating involves all of the rules and 
conventions of getting about in traffic. It involves, therefore, a great deal of cognitive 
expertise on top of bodily skill. It is not merely knowing that red lights mean stop and 
arrows mean 'one way.' It also means knowing when to speed up at an orange and 
when to squeeze the brakes; it even includes knowing when it's okay to go the wrong 
way up a one-way street. Polimorphic skills are therefore tied into cultural norms. In 
Denmark, one can never cycle up a one-way street. In Italy, one finds a bit more 
leeway.38 
 
Thus, polimorphic skills are not simply knowing the rules, but knowing how to use the 
rules. This is the kind of knowledge that Collins calls 'collective tacit knowledge.' 
Accounting for the content of collective tacit knowledge is a challenge for my account 
of expertise. On the one hand, it is more obviously conceptual– it begins from explicit 
rules, expressed linguistically. On the other hand, navigating within that conceptual 
domain is not so straightforwardly mechanical as with bodily skills. Indeed, Collins 
insists that only the collective is truly tacit, since we cannot reduce the knowledge to 
a series of rules or norms. 
                                                 
36 Collins 2010, pp. 55-6. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Our smooth-coping within cultural contexts will be further discussed in Chapter Four. 
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This seems problematic for the story I have been telling. I have associated somatic 
tacit knowledge with the non-conceptual layer of content, since mimeomorphic skills, 
on the face of them, seem to involve less explicit thought than polimorphic, at least 
according to the provisional definition I have been using. Yet I will argue below that 
we can dissolve this problem by showing that the distinction between somatic and 
collective tacit knowledge is too sharp, as both invoke non-conceptual content. 
 
Collins is right to point out that there is a vast degree of subtlety involved in collective 
tacit knowledge, although in some senses it is not clear– if we take actual rather than 
in-principle- explicability as our clue– that it is more tacit than the somatic, even if it 
is less amenable to schematisation. For example, we can imagine someone asking, like 
McDowell in the previous Chapter, 'why were you doing this...?' of both a polimorphic 
action, like our instinctive swerving in front of a parked car to let the traffic behind us 
pass, and of a mimeomorphic action, such as shifting our weight on the seat as we 
swerved. Here, I imagine, we would have a more ready answer to the first question, 
with the second possibly returning the 'I didn't realise I was doing that' of the lower 
layer discussed previously. 
 
Yet the outcome is not important here, because the key point I want to emphasise is 
the lack of a substantial difference in the experience of both mimeomorphic and 
polimorphic actions. I argued in the previous Chapter that a signal of applying non-
conceptual content was that we can accomplish the task with our conscious attention 
on other matters. We find this to be equally the case in both bike-balancing and bike-
navigation– we stop reflexively at a red light, and just as automatically touch our toes 
to the ground before we lose balance. Similarly, we have seen how the act of reflection 
signifies a change of content, and so we can now see that the same kind of change is 
going on in the shift from tacit to explicit knowledge in both the somatic bike-
balancing and the collective bike navigation. 
 
Collins might object that we have missed his point that collective tacit knowledge is 
not normatively expressible in the same way as somatic. And it is true that some 
actions, such as riding up a one-way street, are not easily generalisable as 'if... then...' 
rules. But if we attend to individual cases, we find no divergence from the model of 
skill acquisition we have been discussing so far. Our first time riding up a one-way 
street may well involve explicit, deliberate judgements– 'there's no one around, 
there's room to pull over if a car turns in,' and so on. Yet if cutting up that one-way 




kind of automaticity that we find in the popular example of arriving at work without 
any memory of the drive over.39 
 
The content we seek, therefore, is that which belongs to the moment of the task– that 
is, the extended moment of the coping activity which dictates how entities show up to 
and solicit us.40 The actions performed in these moments are enactments of tacit 
knowledge. In Collins' terms, some of that knowledge may be, at least in principle, 
explicitly explicable. Some may not be even in principle. Where to draw that line is up 
for debate, but this point is secondary to the experience of such knowledge in the 
moment of the task. And here we find again that the phenomenology of the moment 
is free from 'thought,' in the explicit, reflective sense. 
 
2.1.4 – Against disembodied knowledge 
in which I argue that Collins' contention that the embodiment  
of knowledge is secondary overlooks the way in which explicit  
or conceptual knowledge is derived from embodied experience. 
 
Collins illustrates the difference between somatic and collective tacit knowledge with 
a story about Data, the android from Star Trek.41 In one episode, apparently, Data 
wants to learn to dance. He studies a manual of dances and instantly becomes a 
proficient dancer, never putting a foot wrong. However, his skill quickly reaches a 
limit; he is unable to improvise. While Data is able to follow instructions to an enviable 
degree of exactitude, he has no sense of what counts as beautiful, as interesting, or as 
novel in a performance. Technically excellent, he has no 'spark.'42 
 
With this story, Collins suggests that collective tacit knowledge is the truly 
inexplicable tacit knowledge, as opposed to the somatic, which is 'not philosophically 
profound.' In teasing out the difference between the two, Collins naturally turns to 
explicate the social dimension. For this, he draws upon what he calls 'Interactional 
Expertise.' This kind of expertise is almost exclusively cognitive. Collins uses the term 
to describe the ability to interact with 'contributory' experts in a field in which one 
cannot actually perform the tasks in question. For example, a music journalist might 
be able to carry on a fluid conversation with an artist about a piece of music technology 
he is personally unable to operate, or the manager of an astronomical project can co-
                                                 
39 This non-conceptual navigation of the social world will be expanded upon, and tied more closely to 
the experience of memory in Chapter Four. 
40 Supra, p. 26. 
41 Collins 2010, p. 123. 
42 See p. 82, below. 
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ordinate the activities of a large team even without the specific skills to work the 
telescope or deduce the composition of the bodies it is investigating. In both these 
cases, the interactional expert has considerably greater knowledge than a layperson. 
They are able to 'speak the language' of the technical expert, and in cases like the 
project manager, this expertise may even be essential in getting the other experts to 
achieve anything. 
 
Collins devises several tests for interactional expertise, based loosely on the Turing 
Test for computer intelligence. A person can be said to possess interactional expertise 
if, in conversation with a contributory expert, they can pass themselves off as the real 
deal. What this reveals, Collins argues, is that the interactional expert possesses the 
same tacit knowledge as the contributory expert. They have 'learned the language' of 
the expert community, and absorbed its tacit practices. What this also demonstrates, 
according to Collins, is that an important part of collective tacit knowledge has no 
connection to the body. Since the interactional expert possesses tacit knowledge 
without actually being able to perform the skill, this tacit knowledge must be 
unembodied. Indeed, Collins goes on to expand on this thought to argue for what he 
calls the 'minimal embodiment thesis' of knowledge, maintaining that this form of 
knowledge would be sufficient for an organism or machine to pass as intelligent. 
 
Collins' account is persuasive, but if we reflect back on Stone's earlier criticism of 
Collins' conception of knowledge, a potentially fatal flaw opens up. Once again, in this 
claim, Collins does not seem to consider that the kind of knowledge held in 
interactional expertise is derivative of a more primordial connection to the world. 
Furthermore, as Selinger points out, “by omitting developmental consideration of 
how humans develop linguistic competence or skill itself, Collins misrepresents how 
knowledge is acquired as well as what kinds of people expert knowers truly are.”43 
That is, Collins puts too much weight on the 'knowledge' and too little on the more 
fundamental understanding from which it is derived. Without a basis in this 
fundamental relationship, the knowledge held by the interactional expert, whether 
tacit or explicit, would be meaningless– would be related only to other concepts held 
in the language, what McDowell called, in another, not entirely unrelated, context, a 
“frictionless spinning in the void.”44 
 
Heidegger called this kind of disconnected ability to talk Gerede, 'idle talk,' or as 
                                                 
43 Selinger in Selinger, Dreyfus & Collins 2007, p. 723. 




Haugeland colourfully called it, 'bullshit.' 45  Words are used without any direct 
connection to their meaning as part of a way of living. In Heidegger's terms, the 
interactional expert does not actually have any knowledge; they merely “pass the word 
along.”46 The minimally embodied self that Collins posits is, rather than the expert 
agent, what Heidegger called das Man, an inauthentic and disconnected social totality 
of language and practices. While das Man is to some extent an intelligent 'knower,' 
the metaphysical as well as practical problem is that such an intelligence does not deal 
with entities. It repeats words, telling stories about stories. Of course, this is not to be 
dismissive of interactional experts. A music critic might share listening expertise with 
an artist, as well as having their own expert skill set that the musician does not 
possess. But it does suggest that, regarding the content of tacit knowledge, we cannot 
so quickly dispense with the body based on interactional expertise alone. 
 
I have argued that both collective and somatic tacit knowledge are rooted in an 
embodied way of being-in-the-world that is experienced as prior to linguistic 
thought. 47  What is important about the tacit knowledge demonstrated in expert 
performance is the expert's un-thinking enactment of that knowledge, irrespective of 
whether it could be explicated (as Collins holds, in principle, for somatic tacit 
knowledge) or not (as he holds for collective tacit knowledge). It should also be 
emphasised that Collins does not intend the pairs of tacit/explicit knowledge or 
somatic/collective tacit knowledge to map squarely onto the everyday/esoteric 
expertise division. The categories involved are fuzzy, which is why Collins and Evans 
present their account of expertise as a 'periodic table,' allowing correspondences and 
divisions to be made within and across categories. 48  It would be expected, for 
example, that esoteric expertises require more explicit knowledge than everyday 
expertises. These differences are of the utmost importance to our understanding of 
expertise. All the same, in the second half of this paper, I will emphasise that the 
important element of esoteric/contributory expertise is actually what it shares with 
ubiquitous expertise; namely, its experience in a non-conceptual way. 
                                                 
45 Haugeland 2013, p. x. 
46 Though, with an accurate enough knowledge, the interactional expert's concepts would still map 
largely onto the world, to the point where they could solve problems. But this knowledge remains 
suspended in the world of words; even if accurate, it is somewhat contingent in how much it 
corresponds to the phenomena, which the interactional expert knows at best second hand. 
47 'Prior' here is meant in terms of the action, not the individual's development. Rouse (2000, p. 19) 
discusses our use of language in a ready-to-hand way, raising problems for accounts that attempt to 
present coping as completely distanced from language. I will have more to say about this in Chapter 
Five. In the meantime, it is important to keep in mind the difference between using language, and 
the objects of language (which can be, but are not necessarily, simply words). 
48 Collins and Evans 2007, p. 13. 
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I have so far argued, with Collins, that there is an important distinction to be made in 
kinds of expertise, the everyday and the esoteric. I have taken his division of tacit and 
explicit knowledge, and argued that all kinds of expertise are marked by the primacy 
of the tacit. However, I have disagreed with Collins' emphasis on the difference 
between embodied (somatic) and collective tacit knowledge, arguing that both of them 
demonstrate non-conceptual content as discussed in Chapter One. While Collins 
argues that somatic tacit knowledge is explicable, he neglects the change in content 
brought about by reflection (again, as argued in Chapter One). Even if all somatic tacit 
knowledge is in principle explicable, and collective tacit knowledge turns out not to 
be, this disguises the fact that at the performance level, they are experienced in the 
same way. Thus, our discussion of expertise so far has revealed that both everyday and 
esoteric experts are those who enact unreflective, pre-propositional content. 
 
2.2 – Esoteric expertise 
in which I extend the argument that all expertise involves  
a non-conceptual form content by arguing that esoteric  
expertise, too, provides only a secondary role for explicit thought. 
 
I have argued, therefore, based upon the forms of content discussed in the previous 
Chapter, that 'thought'– that is, propositional mental content– is not involved in 
moments of enacted expertise. This claim is contradicted by Montero, who argues that 
conscious thought is not only present in, but crucial to achieving genuine esoteric 
expertise. However, by carefully attending to her descriptions in the light of my 
argument, I will maintain that a conclusive argument against non-conceptual content 
in expert coping cannot be inferred from the evidence she gives. Montero's description 
points rather to a more complex interplay of contents during performances of esoteric 
expertise. While thought certainly does play a role in the achievement of complex 
tasks, this is a long way from saying that conceptual thought infuses every part of 
those tasks. 
 
2.2.1 – Automaticity 
in which I outline Montero's argument against extending the  
'Principle of Automaticity' from everyday to esoteric expertises. 
 
My discussion of expertise so far has been chiefly about everyday, ubiquitous 
expertise– the embodied expertise involved in such tasks as chopping wood or riding 
a bike. It may well be replied that even if what I have argued does hold for everyday 




highly-skilled at a specialised task– is of a different nature. For example, much of what 
I have argued so far draws upon Dreyfus' contention that thought interferes with 
expert action. Montero calls this view 'the Maxim,' 49  or later, the 'Principle of 
Automaticity.'50 She admits it has wide anecdotal evidence, and is indeed treated as a 
commonplace amongst athletes and performance artists. Nevertheless, she questions 
the assumption that we perform at our best when we are not thinking, and argues that, 
even if the Maxim holds for everyday expertise, esoteric expertise actually requires a 
good deal of reflective cognitive effort if it is to be truly expert. 
 
In this section I will agree with Montero on some important points that both 
complicate the understanding of expertise I have so far argued for, and yet also offer 
opportunities to clarify it. I will agree that thought– explicit, cognitive expressions– 
does play a role in esoteric expertise. Yet I will argue that on closer inspection, what 
scholars describe as esoteric expertises are actually built up out of many smaller 
expertises, and that esoteric expert performance is comprised of overlapping layers of 
coping and thought. In an important way, I will maintain, the core of even esoteric 
expertise involves a state that, like coping, lies prior to or 'beyond' thought. Yet even 
granting such a role for thought, a final worry raised by Montero remains. Where 
Montero admits of un-thought actions, she shares with Dreyfus the belief that they 
are purely reflexive and automatic. Her criticism, therefore, is of Dreyfus' extension 
of the 'autopilot' of everydayness into acts of esoteric expertise, arguing instead that 
what is impressive in such performances is precisely the opposite of stereotyped 
reacting. A third possibility therefore opens up, a kind of being-in-the-flow that is 
experienced non-conceptually, yet is truly spontaneous rather than automatic. I will 
conclude by outlining this experience, and by briefly relating it to Heidegger's 
descriptions of authentic and inauthentic acting, descriptions which will prove of use 
to us in later Chapters. 
 
Montero questions the belief that esoteric expertise accords with the 'Principle of 
Automaticity.' She admits that the Maxim seems to apply to everyday expertises– such 
as riding a bike or hammering a nail– where explicit attention to our bodily actions 
seems to draw us awry.51 Her criticisms are rather aimed at those who, like Dreyfus, 
would extend the Maxim beyond everyday actions to esoteric experts, such as ballet 
dancers or professional athletes, “those generally recognised as experts in their 
                                                 
49 Montero 2010, p. 106. 
50 Montero 2013, p. 304. 
51 Ibid, p. 305. 
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fields.” 52  Although such a definition appears vague, Montero believes that most 
experts in this sense conform to the 'ten year rule,' where the journey from novice to 
expert is held to take around ten years of intensive practice.53 Intensive is the key word 
for Montero. After we acquire everyday expertise, we tend not to engage in strenuous 
practice to improve upon it.54 Thus while almost anybody within a short time could 
learn to bowl a cricket ball, few of us take the time or effort to develop that skill to the 
level of a first class cricketer. 
 
Esoteric expertise, for Montero, is marked by a continuous desire to improve.55 And, 
she continues, this highly-motivated attitude– called kaizen in Japanese– requires 
explicit cognitive attention if it is to succeed. One example of this, she says, is Tiger 
Woods, who, as the top-ranked golfer in the world, set about changing his swing where 
he saw room for improvement.56 However, Montero also mentions that during the 
period he was perfecting his new swing, Woods had a “rather dismal string of 
games.”57  But she denies that this is support for the Maxim, saying that Woods' 
problem was rather that he wasn't yet achieving his desired swing. 
 
This comment is particularly revealing. Montero resists a Dreyfusian reading that 
would attribute Woods' “dismal” games to his conscious thinking, not just because she 
wants to highlight the thought involved in expert actions, but also because that would 
make him a 'novice' at his own swing, even though he is undoubtedly an expert in the 
game of golf.58 Montero is wary of following through on this logic because there would 
be “very few experts left,” since true experts for her, as we have just seen, are always 
striving to improve and hence always in a sense beginning again.59 Yet this point, I 
will now explain, raises a problem not only for Montero's definition of expertise, but 
also for the concept of esoteric expertise itself. 
 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Montero 2010, p. 106. Another commonly-held aphorism is the '10,000 hour rule,' which holds that 
anyone can become expert at any skill if they put in that amount of practice. Spaced over a decade, 
this would involve intensive practice of 2-3 hours every day, suggesting the same dedication to 
improvement that Montero wants to emphasise. 
54 Montero 2013, p. 305. 
55 Ibid, p. 303. 
56 Montero 2010, p. 116. Montero later, with Toner and Moran (in Toner et al. 2015: p. 1133) gives a 
similar account based on the more recent experience of Martin Kaymer. In the most important 
respects– changing stroke at the height of professional achievement, the following 'slump,' and 
eventually surpassing the original excellence– the two cases are parallel, and, I hold, further support 
my interpretation. 
57 Montero 2010, p. 116. 





Woods' dry spell as he worked on his new swing reveals problems with Montero's 
definition of expertise, opening a space to question the usefulness of trying to 
understand expertise in this way. I suggested above that the real mark of expertise 
should be the expert's experience as they act. In that case, Woods– while still an expert 
at the broader skill-set of golf– was certainly not an expert at the micro-task of his 
new swing. We find here a certain ambiguity in the term 'expert,' where it can be 
applied both to the practice of a specific technique (say, a certain golf swing), and to 
the overall portfolio of skills ('golf') of which the technique in question is an important, 
relevant, yet perhaps not strictly necessary element (Woods was a PGA champion 
before he developed his new swing). The second use of 'expert' is the most common 
and generally most useful, as we certainly don't want to suggest Woods is not an expert 
because he doesn't win every game. But as we continue, it will be important to 
recognise that, even within a domain, experts-as-people bear a certain 'family 
resemblance' to one another with regard to their particular expert micro-skills.60 
Regarding examples of skill refinement like Woods' new swing, Dreyfus and Dreyfus' 
stages of skill acquisition apply within the expert's game.61 While Woods remained an 
expert at most aspects of golf, his learning process involved once again focusing on 
aspects of his technique and practising them until he had embodied them– which was 
proven as he put his perfected technique into practice and started winning 
tournaments again. 
 
This grates against Montero's distinction between everyday and esoteric expertise. 
Montero rightly points out that driving is an everyday expertise for most of us because, 
once we've mastered it to an adequate degree, we tend not to apply any kaizen to 
continued improvement (this goes for most of our skills, from cooking to driving to 
singing– unless we really develop a passion for something, most of us, for better or 
worse, content ourselves with 'good enough').62 Yet the difference between an expert 
cook or driver and an everyday one is simply that on achieving expertise– in Dreyfus' 
sense of embodied coping– to an everyday level, esoteric experts use that skill as a 
foundation on which to build more refined skills, a process which in many ways 
mirrors the journey from novice to expert all over again. Toner, Montero and Moran 
emphasise the role of mindedness in continuous improvement, citing work that shows 
                                                 
60 We can also imagine someone who could be an expert in the first sense without ever achieving 
expertise in the second– say, someone who mastered Woods' swing without ever bothering learning 
to putt. 
61 Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986, pp. 19-35. 
62 Montero 2013, p. 305. 
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that expert athletes must “experiment with and research” their bodies. 63  Yet this 
attention to aspects of an existing skill presupposes its previous mastery. Expert 
athletes and performers need first to have developed a skill to the point where they 
have absorbed it as Dreyfus and Dreyfus maintain. Only then, by bringing thought 
back to the skill, can they change the way they perform it– in effect, learning a new 
form of that skill, the process of which, as Woods' case above attests, comes with a 
similar cross-fade of improved performance with diminishing thought. 
 
This raises a second issue about our understanding of esoteric expertise more broadly. 
Most thinkers of expertise tend to speak of things like golf, cricket and ballet as tasks 
in and of themselves. And yet, as far as the phenomenology of expertise is concerned, 
these should rather be seen as emergent wholes built from micro-tasks. Cricket, for 
example, includes not only the different roles such as batting and bowling, but even 
within those roles we find a range of different expertises, which even the best players 
possess in different degrees. 64  And most importantly, these micro-tasks are not 
performed continuously, but tend to manifest in relatively short bursts. In games such 
as cricket, the gaps between the truly expert micro-tasks of bowling, catching, 
running, and so on, are so long that to assert there is thought within the gaps is a 
truism. Thus, while Toner, Montero and Moran argue that golfers think several steps 
ahead as they “design” a shot for a particular situation, it does not follow that such 
thought is present in the actual shot itself.65 Dreyfus would claim that to continue 
explicit thought into the micro-task of hitting the ball would be disruptive. 
Furthermore, he would claim that the kind of planning performed by the expert would 
be different than that of the novice– rather than applying rules, the expert would 
“directly see” what the situation calls for; the wind, the slope, the grain of the green 
would all solicit a response, rather than be calculated into a decision.66 
 
Even in more flowing activities such as dance or basketball, there are certainly gaps– 
even if only of a matter of instants– between actions where explicit thought could 
make an appearance. Our question, rather, needs to be whether there is thought in 
the moment of performing the expert micro-tasks. And it is not clear that the examples 
of thought within esoteric expert performance we have seen so far are anything other 
than thoughts arising in these gaps. Montero, for example, draws upon her own 
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64 Compare Brian Lara's cover drive to VVS Laxman's flick. 
65 Toner et al. 2015, pp. 1135-7. 
66 Cf. Dreyfus (2005, pp. 55, 59) on the expert's direct perception of affordances. This point will be 




experience as a ballet dancer to detail examples of explicit thoughts she and other 
performers expressed during performances. A dancer might carefully attend to a mark 
on the floor, or they might will commands such as “I am going to nail that coming 
balance.”67 Yet such thoughts seem clearly to belong to the gaps in the flow. As a 
dancer mentally prepares for a balance, they may be performing a more routine stage-
crossing in a quite automatic way, just in the way we might routinely and 
automatically change the gears in our car as we mentally prepare to round the difficult 
bend we see further ahead. Yet this does not make the execution of the balance any 
more 'minded' (although in the final section of this Chapter I will discuss a possible 
difference in the experienced 'flow' of the balance when compared with routine 
moves). 
 
These gaps, then, can also be layered over more 'automatic' coping, revealing side-by-
side cognitive processes, such as the way, as Pike holds, that a jazz soloist's active 
decisions presuppose a “smooth, almost automatic” use of their instrument.68 Our 
phenomenology thus reveals that while thought is involved in esoteric expertise, it is 
restricted either to gaps between moments of coping, or in gaps over moments of 
automatic performance. So far, this is not inconsistent with the Maxim that thought 
interferes with truly expert action, for the micro-tasks the thinking sits over (the 
stage-crossing, for example) are separate from the micro-tasks the thought refers to 
(the balance). It would also be likely that thought could only appear over moments 
that are less difficult and more automatic– thus while a dancer may well think of his 
balance as he crosses the stage, it would be surprising to learn that he was thinking of 
crossing the stage during the moment of his difficult balance.69 We can therefore see 
that, in this way, esoteric expertises like ballet themselves contain micro-tasks that 
can have an everyday character or an esoteric one– characterised now by whether it 
is possible for the thinker to employ explicit thought over their moments. 
 
I will focus more on the difference between these moments of coping in the next 
section. But initially, they raise a further argument that esoteric coping involves 
thought in a way that automatic, everyday coping does not. Montero claims that 
explicit, linguistic thought is an inextricable part of the very moment of performing 
difficult esoteric actions. She recalls whispering phrases like 'stretch-lift-whoosh' to 
                                                 
67 Montero 2013, pp. 312-3. 
68 Pike 1974, p. 94, n. 6. 
69 That said, another version of the Maxim holds that one should think of something else while engaged 
in a particularly difficult bodily action, although, as I argue below, the best performances come from 
a state of intense concentration, albeit one that does not involve thought in the way Montero claims. 
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herself during performances, in order to keep her focus right there in the moment of 
a sequence of movements and expressions.70 
 
Sutton, however, draws a distinction between these kinds of explicit phrases and 
maxims, and 'thought' in the fuller, explicit sense in which it has been used so far. He 
calls such phrases “instructional nudges,” following sociologist and jazz pianist David 
Sudnow who– before he had mastered the art of jazz improvisation– was often 
frustrated by his teacher's apparently empty 'nudges' like 'sing while you're playing,' 
or 'go for the jazz.'71 These 'nudges' do not belong to the 'gaps,' being not “merely a 
preparatory tactic in the quiescent peacetime between periods of mindful activity,” 
but become part of the action themselves.72 Like 'stretch-lift-whoosh,' such phrases 
are meaningless except as tied together with the practised, embodied skill. Once one 
has mastered the skill, however, these nudges can be used as prompts to hold oneself 
within the embodied moment. Sudnow calls instructional nudges “quasi-worded 
reflexive spark”s, which suggests that they are not fully abstractions, but nevertheless 
touch on explicit thought, as an instantaneous glance at verbal content that serves to 
orient the actor as they plunge into coping.73 As Sutton puts it: 
 
the expert's occasional use of simple maxims like 'watch the ball' or 'get the feet 
moving' are not instructions sent from mind to body... instead they are themselves 
material symbols with temporary but crucial causal roles as a 'new fulcrum for the 
control of action.' Thus a complex bodily pattern or set of possible movements can be 
compressed into and partly cued by a phrase or memory or ingrained image, bringing 
the player back to, rather than away from, the well-learned habits.74 
 
And again (with his colleagues): 
 
The function of the verbal maxim is not exhausted– perhaps no longer significantly 
affected– by its semantic content: rather, it operates in real time as a material symbol, 
an iterated an interactive self-stimulatory loop.75 
 
During practice especially, but also during performance, it is easy to see how such 
'instructional nudges' could assist an expert focused on constant improvement. Toner, 
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Montero and Moran argue that 'nudges' “represent a form of mindedness because 
their adoption requires the performer to be consciously aware of the general feeling 
of their movement while executing a task.”76 Yet we must be careful to separate the 
nudges from the coping that is going on together with them. While 'instructional 
nudges' are thoughts in the moment of action, they are not embodied action 
themselves, for the action can be performed without the nudge. Instead, they serve to 
“sculpt and shape” our expert skills, rather like the 'coaching' that Collins ties to the 
learning of embodied skills.77 In this respect, they are independent of embodied skill, 
having become an affordance calling for a response rather than explicit linguistic 
content. Importantly, the most effective 'nudges' do not involve an explicit tracking of 
the specific bodily movements they call for. Toner and colleagues themselves cite 
Mullen and Hardy, who found that “holistic process goals”– instructional nudges or 
'swing thoughts' in golf that gave vague, concentrating commands like 'easy' or 
'straight– led to better performance than “part process goals,” which focused 
attention on particular body parts or movements.78 This is consistent with what I have 
argued so far, that 'nudges' are not literal instructions, which is to say, they are not 
conceptual in Dreyfus' sense of explicit thoughts involved in actively monitoring 
action– monitoring which Dreyfus would regard as lapsing out of absorbed smooth 
coping.79 Rather, as I will argue in more detail in Section 2.2.3 below, 'nudges' are 
used to focus attention within coping, dampening out explicit thoughts that might 
detract from the task at hand. Hence 'holistic process goals'– which evoke a mood– 
are more effective than the 'partial process goals' that carve up the task into isolated 
elements. For this reason, it is probably misleading to call holistic 'nudges' 
propositional, as their primary purpose is not to convey propositions in the explicit 
way that 'partial' nudges do.80 Their real importance is to focus the actor and keep 
them 'in the zone.' 
 
We can therefore identify two forms of mindedness that appear in esoteric expertise. 
Firstly, there is the thinking 'in the gaps,' thought that is expressed between or over 
moments of smooth coping. And there are also 'instructional nudges' which occur 
during moments as objectifications of practised action, used to prompt embodied 
                                                 
76 Toner et al. 2015, p. 1139. 
77 Sutton 2007, p. 772; cf. Collins 2010, pp. 62-3. 
78 Mullen & Hardy 2010, pp. 276-7. 
79 Dreyfus 2007a, p. 357. 
80 As Wittgenstein (2009) pointed out, we should not let the fact that we use words to do things confuse 
us into inferring the presence of abstract linguistic thought (§11: pp. 9-10). On his account, the view 




knowledge in real time. Thus Montero is correct to assert that esoteric expertise 
involves thought, but her arguments do not stand convincingly against the Maxim, as 
the actual moments of action within the overarching esoteric activity have a content 
more like that of the everyday expertise discussed earlier. That esoteric experts are 
more proficient within a wider repertoire of embodied actions goes without saying, 
and is a direct result of their kaizen. Yet what marks that proficiency is their ability to 
smoothly cope at difficult tasks in the same thought-free way in which the rest of us 
approach our own habitual tasks. 
 
2.2.2 – Esoteric Awareness– 'the zone' 
in which I argue that spontaneous performances of esoteric expertise  
show them to be reflexive enactions of non-conceptual content, yet are  
as experienced qualitatively different to the 'automatic' everyday. 
 
I have been suggesting that thought is restricted to the 'gaps' between and above 
moments of smooth coping. I have also identified 'instructional nudges' which are tied 
to and focus such moments. Yet in doing so, I have not fully taken into consideration 
another understanding of the distinction between everyday and esoteric expertise. 
This is that the form of awareness during our esoteric practice differs from the pure 
automaticity of everyday coping. Montero suggests this, but her answer finds the 
difference to be connected to thought, which I have argued is not pervasive in the way 
that she holds. In this section, I will argue that if we attend closely to the experience 
of coping, we can distinguish different experiences which do not rely on invoking 
conceptual thought to differentiate them, and instead reveal a phenomenological 
distinction in experiences of coping between the everyday and what I will call, 
following Csikszentmihalyi, flow. 
 
We have seen that Montero emphasises the conceptual within esoteric expertise. But 
her major blind-spot may be the example at the heart of her account– ballet. Ballet is 
an extremely concept-heavy example, typically being precisely choreographed to 
music that is written to be played precisely each time. Even in the midst of the 
performance, as Montero says, the dancer must constantly be reflecting and checking 
that he is on the right spot, the right distance from his partner and the other dancers. 
He must be aware of which way to move next, as well as keeping in mind how a certain 
character that he is playing ought to feel at each stage of the story. While I have no 
doubt ballet dancers 'lose themselves' from time to time in their performances, my 
point is nevertheless that there are so many fixed points in the choreography that the 




frequently that Montero is justified in her assertion that even an expert ballet dancer 
finds himself constantly stepping into the realm of thought. However, I maintain that 
this is no argument against an un-minded level that the dancer enters in his moments 
of action. As is also the case in ordinary human life, we slip from moments of smooth-
coping into reflective thought and back again at incredibly frequent intervals– from 
one moment to the next. 
 
A far better example of expert 'losing oneself in the flow' would be certain kinds of 
improvised modern dance and physical theatre (I'm thinking largely of butoh here, 
although many techniques would exemplify the point I want to make). These styles of 
dancing can be entirely improvised, without set choreography.81 The expert dancer in 
this case masters a set of techniques for moving the body, which are then used in 
spontaneous movement, such that the performance becomes reacting, rather than 
reciting. The dancer responds reflexively to their environment, to the position of their 
body, their partners, the props and the stage, perhaps even the audience. Similarly, 
while Montero says that the addition of a persona gives the ballerina one more 
element of which to remain aware, the butoh performer's training involves character 
work similar to method acting. The goal is to embody the character and actually feel 
their emotions, such that they guide and influence the movement as much as the 
immediate environment does.82 
 
As we see with the contrast between butoh and ballet, some activities emphasise the 
spontaneous more than others, with traditional western 'high' art seeming (for 
reasons that would be fascinating to explore but are entirely tangential to our 
investigation here) to prefer 'concept-heavy' forms. This cultural preference may bias 
a lot of thinking on the subject, as we find with music, where a traditional focus on 
classical styles may lead thinkers to suspect that musicians must be situated in a swirl 
of conceptual thought even as they play.83 Here, however, one need not travel far to 
find a musician who can play a complex piece by rote simply through muscle-memory, 
with their mind entirely elsewhere. Similarly, playing along while sight-reading is not 
an obviously reflective process. 
                                                 
81 Or the choreography can be quite loose. The dancer may still have to move to a mark on the stage, 
yet this is not done via premeditated steps. Going into the dance, into character, the dancer lets the 
mark solicit them forwards– they are aware of it, of course, but not so much as an object of thought 
but precisely as the soliciting force that Merleau-Ponty (1963, p. 168-9) describes. The movement 
towards it, however, remains quite open. 
82 Baird 2012, p. 170. 
83 Similarly, Toner et al.'s (2015) reliance on golf as a core example also betrays a preference for a 
particularly 'concept-heavy' activity. 
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While these may fall under what we have been calling smooth-coping, a more 
interesting experience occurs when we turn to musical traditions with a large role for 
improvisation. Be it jazz in the West or the raga in the East, we find musicians who 
can play expertly at a new piece without rehearsal. Like butoh, expertise in such styles 
requires mastering a set of techniques to be combined spontaneously. Such musicians 
describe the experience of playing as one of being 'in the groove,'84 “caught up” in a 
moment where ideas are “articulated as instantly as conceived. No lead time separates 
conception from expression, and the gap between intention and realization 
disappears.”85 Pike explains that this direct experience is more akin to perceptual 
seeking than to structured planning, with the emphasis on 'finding' the right notes or 
phrases, matching Dreyfus' classic description of skilful coping, where too much 
explicit thought about one's action leads to mistakes or 'losing' the groove.86 Sudnow 
further emphasises the relegation of explicit thought to an 'observer' of his 
improvising hands, often surprising himself and thinking “look at that, that jazz just 
came out.”87 
 
However, the difference between 'open' styles and more rigid ones seems a difference 
of degree rather than of kind. Benson points out that precisely written pieces of 
classical music or ballet always contain Unbestimmtheitstellen, or indeterminacies, 
that the performers must 'fill in,' since, aside from vague notes regarding tempo, mood 
and so on, the score can never contain all the intricate variables of playing an 
instrument.88 “Not only do performers have room for improvisation,” writes Benson, 
“but also it is required,” and he thus concludes that all musical performance involves 
a form of improvisation.89 The same point surely applies to ballet, where there is room 
within even the most tightly choreographed piece for the dancer to make a part their 
own. Indeed, as we will see in a few moments, Montero argues that it is in how they 
make use of such leeway that the best dancers– the ones with 'spark'– distinguish 
themselves as true esoteric experts.90 
 
Where Benson argues that classical forms of music contain more improvisation than 
we might first be aware of, he also holds that improvisation-heavy styles such as jazz 
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or raga are conversely “far more organised than [they] might appear.” 91  It goes 
without saying that improvisation in such styles is no random sounding of notes, but 
is a skill involving intense study and practice, albeit one that– certainly historically, 
and probably even today– tends to involve a more practical form of learning, involving 
playing with and imitating experts rather than learning theory. 92  For instance, 
Berliner stresses the importance of jam sessions, of playing and improvising with 
other performers, and informal 'apprenticeship' relationships in learning to play 
jazz. 93  While such relationships also involve the transmission of formal theory, 
Berliner argues that the knowledge gained directly through playing is “as essential” to 
jazz as technical information; playing jazz involves getting a feel from other players 
for what counts as good. 94  This practical form of skill-acquisition, as Gallagher 
observes, has an analogy with Aristotle's phronesis or 'practical wisdom,' which can't 
be captured in maxims but is picked up by “hanging around with the right people.”95 
Yet as Gallagher also emphasises, just 'hanging out'– or in this case, simply listening 
to good improvisers– is by itself not enough; the aspiring phronimos– or musician– 
must actively imitate the experts. 
 
What jazz musicians learn from the experts, of course, are techniques. In this respect, 
they are not so different from a cricketer who, having mastered a repertoire of 
different strikes, demonstrates her expertise by performing the best one that each 
situation calls for. Pike describes the improvised jazz solo as a trial and error process 
where the player takes feedback from their own playing, interspersing moments of 
playing with gaps of explicit, conscious judgement and 'nudges' in new directions.96 
According to Benson, even “the highly inventive improvisations” of such a celebrated 
player as Charlie Parker “were actually composed out of about one hundred basic 
musical ideas, runs, and phrases.”97 He continues: 
 
As odd as it may sound, the musician who is most prepared– not only in terms of 
                                                 
91 Benson 2003, p. 136. 
92 Ibid, p. 140, n. 25. Although most jazz practitioners come to jazz having learned the fundamentals of 
their instruments and basic music theory (scales, chords, etc.) in more 'rigid' styles. 
93 Berliner 1994, pp. 39-44. Similarly, the guru-shishya ('master-apprentice') relationship is central to 
Indian classical music, as the basis for the student's enculturation into an understanding of music 
that goes beyond pure technique (Neuman 1990, pp. 50-1). 
94 Berliner 1994, p. 41. Berliner (1994, pp. 56-7) even suggests that despite the rise of jazz as a formal 
subject in music conservatories, the importance of those institutions is less the explicit instruction 
they offer and more their role as a locus for bringing together musicians in an era where jam sessions 
and touring bands have become less common. 
95 Gallagher 2007, p. 211. 
96 Pike 1974, p. 91. 
97 Benson 2003, p. 137, n. 17. 
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having thought about what is to be played but even having played various 
possibilities– is most able to be spontaneous.98 
 
This planning, however, seems akin to the 'thought in the gaps' that I have argued 
pervades our smooth coping at extended tasks. As such, it tells us little about the 
experience of playing in the flow itself. It does suggest, however, that esoteric coping 
has more to it than automatic everydayness. As Sutton and his colleagues remind us, 
even our finely practised habitual actions like driving or playing sport require us to 
actively pay attention to what is going on.99 Even though our actions may be reflex-
like and spontaneous, if we are to perform well we must remain 'in the game.' 
 
The spontaneity of improvised music and dance is significant, because it brings us 
closer once again to sport. Sports are unpredictable in a way that all but the most 
experimental of improvised arts are not, although like performance arts they always 
have at least a basic structure that constrains the possibilities of the actions taking 
place. These structures challenge the assertion that smooth coping is automatic and 
instinctual, and not merely because such structures must be learned conceptually 
before the game can even be played. Sutton notes a cricketing maxim similar to the 
Maxim, that a batter should 'play every ball on its merits.'100 Like the Maxim, this 
advice suggests 'don't think, just do'– trying to decide in advance how you will play a 
ball will lead to being caught off-guard by the bowler, or to making a sloppy strike as 
you play the ball you were imagining, not the actual ball in front of you. Good cricket 
is supposed to come from simply reacting, not deliberate planning. 
 
Yet Sutton points out that the best cricketers expressly disregard this sage advice. In 
the “crucial dying overs of a one-day game,” for example, when the batter knows her 
team's only chance of winning requires her to hit several boundaries, an expert player 
does– indeed, must– decide in advance, and intend to turn even an unfavourable 
bounce into a smash hit.101 In a similar way, improvising musicians might decide that 
a piece needs to lift or slow, or come to an end. 
 
Such factors do not apply only to 'open' or unpredictable performances such as 
improvisation or sport, but also play a role in more 'precise' arts. Perhaps Montero's 
strongest argument against the 'principle of automaticity' in esoteric expertise is that 
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“a performance on autopilot... leads to doing the same thing in the same way.”102 For 
no matter how precisely a ballet or concerto is written, there are certainly differences 
in how such pieces can be performed. Countless tenors have sung Puccini's 'Nessun 
dorma' in a technically excellent way, yet the public and critics alike judge Luciano 
Pavarotti's best performances as having something more. In a similar way, BB King 
tended to play very simple (technically speaking) guitar licks, often just a single note, 
yet they rarely sound flat or uninspired. Montero calls this intangible element 'spark,' 
and says that “performing the same piece in the same way day in and day out can 
result in a performance without spark”– and spark is what distinguishes the real 
masters from the also-rans.103 Thus, while it seems perfectly possible that one could 
be a technical expert and just 'go through the motions,' there seems to be a kind of 
expert performance– one that is highly prized– that is expressly not automatic in this 
way. This leads to the question of whether smooth coping is best described by the 
'principle of automaticity,' even though Dreyfus does make frequent allusions to the 
idea of its being on a kind of 'autopilot.'104 Yet what really marks esoteric smooth 
coping is not so much its automaticity as its spontaneity. As I will discuss below, 
spontaneity describes the smooth, un-deliberative decisions taken during expert 
coping that, although they appear automatic and reflexive, are far from being 
stereotyped responses but are direct responses to the intricacies of the moment. 
 
2.2.3 – Flow 
in which I account for the difference between everyday  
and esoteric experience as involving a different kind of  
awareness, which I identify with Csikszentmihalyi's 'flow'. 
 
I have argued against Montero by holding that esoteric expertise is not distinguished 
from the everyday in containing explicit thought. I argued that esoteric expertises can 
be broken down into moments of micro-tasks, and that the thought Montero identifies 
appears in the gaps between these moments. Nonetheless, we saw earlier that while 
some micro-tasks have an automaticity that lends itself to being thought over, others 
maintain an intensity that seems less automatic, even while they are still performed 
in an immediate, reflexive way. And we have just seen that really prized esoteric 
performances have a certain 'spark' that distinguishes them from automatic reactions. 
This spontaneous acting in the flow, I will argue below, is distinct from the two poles 
exemplified on one side by the thoughtful acting Montero describes, and on the other 
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104 E.g., Dreyfus 2007a, p. 358; Dreyfus 2009, p. 54. 
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by the everyday coping that Dreyfus sees as its opposite. Such coping 'in the flow,' I 
aim to show, occurs when experts enter a different mode of awareness. 
 
We find a description of this awareness in jazz pianist Bill Evans' famous description 
of the recording sessions for Miles Davis' Kind of Blue, the critically-acclaimed record 
that is still the biggest-selling jazz album of all time. He begins by comparing his art 
to Japanese sumi-e painting: 
 
There is a Japanese visual art in which the artist is forced to be spontaneous. He must 
paint on a thin stretched parchment with a special brush and black water paint in such 
a way that an unnatural or interrupted stroke will destroy the line or break through 
the parchment. Erasures or changes are impossible. These artists must practice a 
particular discipline, that of allowing the idea to express itself in communication with 
their hands in such a direct way that deliberation cannot interfere... 
 
This conviction that direct deed is the most meaningful of reflections, I believe, has 
prompted the evolution of the extremely severe and unique disciplines of the jazz or 
improvising musician.105 
 
What Evans says accords with what we saw Benson say earlier. The improviser's 
training involves not only practising a technique, but cultivating a distinct form of 
awareness. Being prepared is not so much planning what one will do, but preparing 
oneself to do it.106 Smith describes Miles Davis' style as composer and bandleader as 
creating a “ritual space.”107 He sought to create the conditions where his musicians 
would be in the right state of awareness to put their techniques into practice. One way 
he did this was to deliberately withhold information from his musicians, so that they 
wouldn't try to anticipate the piece and conceptually compose responses ahead of the 
moment.108 Instead, Davis tried to instil an awareness that was bound within the 
moment of playing. 
 
Miles wanted a quality of attentive musical flexibility that would lift the players to the 
level of co-composing interpreters; one that would encourage them to respond to the 
improvisational moment with the same alert freedom that he did.109 
                                                 
105 Evans 1959. 
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107 Smith 1995, p. 42. 
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These states of focused yet open concentration seem crucial to high-level 
performance, and we saw earlier that instructional nudges, as holistic cues, seem to 
be used to induce this type of state. This form of awareness, like the state Evans 
describes, and that Davis seemed intent on evoking for his musicians, matches what 
Csikszentmihalyi calls 'flow.' 110  Flow is based on what Maslow called 'peak 
experiences,' feelings of wholeness and transcendence achieved when one feels 
entirely absorbed in a moment or action.111 Examples of flow correlate well with many 
of Dreyfus' examples of absorbed coping (a connection Dreyfus acknowledges 
although, we shall see, he does not distinguish the flow from the everyday 112). A 
musician 'lost' in a piece, or an athlete 'in the zone' are experiencing flow, although 
activities as diverse as gardening or being immersed in a religious ritual could also be 
described as flow. 113  Csikszentmihalyi describes the phenomenology of flow 
experiences as follows: 
 
1. a narrowing of the focus of consciousness on a clearly delimited stimulus field; 
2. exclusion from one's awareness of irrelevant immediate stimuli, memories of past 
events, and contemplation of the future; hence a focusing on the unfolding present; 
3. merging of action and awareness, also described as absence of doubt and critical 
reflection about one's current activity; 
4. awareness of clear goals and unambiguous feedback, so that one knows one's 
standing with reference to the goals; 
5. lack of concern regarding one's ability to control the situation; 
6. loss of self-consciousness, which in turn may lead to a sense of transcendence of ego 
boundaries and of union with a larger, transpersonal system.114 
 
There are certain common features between flow and everyday expertise. Most 
significantly is the focus on the present, which is exemplified not just in the absence 
                                                 
saturated with heroin. Musicians actively sought an altered state of consciousness in which to 
perform, and the drug offers a short-cut to a trance-like state. Interestingly, and consistently with 
what I have been arguing, heroin-using improvisers do not credit the drug with any positive or 
negative effect on musical ability. Rather, they claim it facilitates a state of concentration in which 
irrelevant thoughts– “internal noise,” as Charlie Parker put it– dissipates, so that one is focused only 
on the music (see Spunt 2014, pp. 39-42). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to make too 
much of this connection, it is a reasonable hypothesis that the moment I am positing has some 
relationship with the physical functioning of the brain, or more precisely, the inhibition of the pre-
frontal cortex (which correlates with effects of heroin use; see Petry et al. 1998). The connection 
between drug use, the brain, and improvisation, therefore offers an interesting angle for future 
empirical research. 
110 Csikszentmihalyi 1975, pp. 36-48. 
111 Maslow 1962, p. 9. 
112  Dreyfus 2013, p. 28. 
113 Csikszentmihalyi 1988, pp. 30-1. 
114 Csikszentmihalyi 1987, p. 362. 
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of memories in a flow state, but in the different quality of memory that is retained 
from such a state. The absence of episodic memory115 of automatic, everyday tasks is 
an oft-repeated example in phenomenological literature– our arriving safely at work 
with little recollection of the ride over, for example, is frequently given as evidence for 
smooth coping. Yet Bielock and her colleagues have highlighted a similar 
phenomenon among experts at tasks requiring a high degree of concentration, what 
they call “expertise-induced amnesia.” 116  In a series of studies, they found that 
although experts were unsurprisingly better than novices at a given task, they were 
worse at giving an account of the steps they took to complete it.117 They found that 
 
highly-skilled online performances are controlled by automated procedural 
knowledge that operates largely outside the scope of attention and is therefore 
substantially closed to explicit analysis and report.118 
 
This was the case even when the experts were told they would be asked to detail their 
experiences after the fact, leading Bielock and her colleagues to conclude that “it is as 
if experts cannot pay enough attention to remember as well as novices” at a practised 
skill. 119  Sudnow recalls that his jazz piano teacher had a hard time reproducing 
improvised phrases, often not even being aware of having created the interesting runs 
that caught his student's attention.120 “I'm not following rules so I don't really know 
what I just did,” he would say when Sudnow asked him to stop, repeat, and explain 
his technique. “You have to have a feel for it.”121 
 
'Expertise-induced amnesia' supports the notion that the moments of enacted 
expertise are different from the gaps in which explicit thought arises. A similar 
phenomenon is found in the flow of intense ritual states, in which participants enter 
what Turner called a 'liminal' (or 'liminoid') space, which is frequently marked by a 
different quality of memory after the fact.122 I will return to explore the connection 
                                                 
115 Episodic' memory (Tulving 1972, 1983) is the memory system that is experienced as a form of 
'mental time travel,' allowing us to relive the details of our past experiences, and is to be 
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something, which of course the expert has in abundance. Further to note 109, above, episodic 
memory is also associated with the pre-frontal cortex (Wheeler et al. 1997), and its absence or 
alteration in absorbed coping further suggests a link with the inhibition of that brain region, and an 
interesting lead for future research. 
116 Bielock & Carr 2001, p. 703; Bielock, Wierenga & Carr 2003, p. 305. 
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between memory and these modes of awareness, and their contrast with explicit 
attention and articulation, in Chapter Four. For now, the key point is the common 
poverty of episodic memory associated with both flow and everyday coping. 
 
Another shared feature of the two states that will become significant later is the lack 
of self-consciousness. Once again, such a feature is taken for granted as a feature of 
everyday coping– Heidegger's original example of the hammer's readiness-to-hand 
emphasises that our dealings take place without a sense of being a subject at work.123 
There is just the hammering, and the network of equipment lit up by the task. Yet flow 
states are also characterised by a similar lack of self-consciousness. Csikszentmihalyi 
gives the following informants' quotes as exemplary of the flow experience: 
 
An expert rock climber: 'You are so involved in what you are doing [that] you aren't 
thinking of yourself as separate from the immediate activity... You don't see yourself 
as separate from what you are doing.' 
 
A dancer...: 'Your concentration is very complete. Your mind isn't wandering, you are 
not thinking of something else; you are totally involved in what you are doing... Your 
energy is flowing very smoothly. You feel relaxed, comfortable, and energetic.'124 
 
[Another climber]: 'It's like when I was talking about things becoming 'automatic'... 
almost like an egoless thing in a way– somehow the right thing is done without... 
thinking about it or doing anything at all... It just happens... and yet you're more 
concentrated.'125 
 
It is significant that the final climber distinguishes between a kind of automatic 
reacting and an un-thinking 'concentration' that characterises the flow. This suggests 
a distinction between the smooth coping that characterises everyday dealings, and 
that of the flow, and it is to this distinction that we turn our attention in the final 
section. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                 
123 Heidegger 1962, p. 98. 
124 Csikszentmihalyi 1975, p. 39. 
125 Ibid, p. 43. Compare Sudnow's (1993, p. 152) account of his jazz improvisation: “I sing with my 
fingers, so to speak, and only so to speak, for there is a new 'I' that the speaking 'I' gestures toward 
with a pointing of the music that says: It is a singing body and this I (here, too, so to speak) sings.” 
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2.2.4 – Everydayness, Flow, and Eigentlichkeit 
in which I find a parallel between flow states and the 'authenticity' 
 described by Heidegger, which broadly accounts for the different  
forms of awareness between everyday and esoteric practice. 
 
Our phenomenology of expertise has complicated the picture of smooth coping we 
have seen so far. While I have argued that Montero is wrong on the pervasiveness of 
thought in esoteric expertise, she is right to distinguish everyday coping from expert 
performance. Dreyfus, on the other hand, moves too quickly in his comparison of an 
expert athlete 'in the zone' with everyday activities. Yet nevertheless, the parallels 
between everyday and flow coping are too strong to separate them completely. What, 
then, is the difference between automaticity and spontaneity? 
 
I earlier suggested that there was a parallel between the everyday expertise we have 
been discussing, and the 'everydayness' (Alltäglichkeit) that Heidegger says 
characterise our actions. Everyday actions, for Heidegger, are uneigentlich– they are 
'inauthentic' or un-owned.126 Heidegger disclaims a moral element to inauthenticity, 
even where it is clear that he thinks authenticity is something we should strive for. 
Inauthenticity is a fact for Dasein; it is a natural state, and one to which we inevitably 
return.127 Thus, we should not judge it negatively, but all the same, Eigentlichkeit is 
viewed as a positive overcoming of this everyday state. 
 
Our everyday skilled actions– our hammering, driving, hill-walking– have a sense of 
Uneigentlichkeit. We do not own them, but do them as 'one' does them, as das Man 
does them. And, I submit, any action in which we have achieved a level of (everyday) 
expertise– that we can do automatically– we do in this un-owned way. Ratcliffe 
describes this mode of acting as 'letting the world do the work.' 128  Performance 
requires no special effort of concentration, because we can let go of responsibility by 
acting 'as we've always done,' without the need to focus ourselves on creating a unique 
event. Our esoteric expertises, on the other hand, when we are immersed in the flow, 
are eigentlich– we own them. When we are fully absorbed in an activity, 'in the zone,' 
the experience takes on a different character, one where we are absorbed to the 
exclusion of any other activity, and of thought as well. 
 
Eigentlich flow, therefore, is a state of concentration that marks the experience of 
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esoteric expertise. It is not the expertise itself– a practitioner still requires the skill or 
techne if we are to consider them truly expert; flow on its own is not enough. However, 
the experience of flow by esoteric experts belies their claim that mindedness/explicit 
thought is pervasive in esoteric expertise, by demonstrating how their performance 
can be 'mind-less' without being automatic. Furthermore, although I have associated 
Eigentlichkeit with esoteric expertise and Uneigentlichkeit with the everyday, there is 
no sharp dividing line between which activities can be authentic and which 
inauthentic. Even for an esoteric expert, uneigentlich performances may be more or 
less frequent. A great dancer or musician can slip out of the flow and fall back on more 
automatic routines. Even an improviser can slip between the two modes. As Pike says 
of the jazz improviser: 
 
If his search is fruitful the tonal images flow along freely without interruption. If some 
impeding factor arises, his inspiration may lag or lapse. At this point free productive 
imagery gives way to stereotyped, reproductive patterns, which are drawn from the 
fund of his previous jazz experience.129 
 
In the same way, an expert martial artist fighting a novice opponent, or a lecturer 
giving the same talk as last year and the year before, might find themselves 'going 
through the motions,' falling back on habitual moves or stock phrases in an automatic 
way. Most activities that we can do authentically, we can do inauthentically, although 
it seems likely we need to master them authentically first– which would account for 
the gradually-diminishing 'buzz' we get from repeating an activity we have 
mastered.130  While some particularly challenging activities might perhaps only be 
achievable in a state of flow, the story of the jaded performer, no longer with any 
'spark,' is a familiar one. 
 
On the other hand, we need not restrict Eigentlichkeit to professional-level practices. 
While a rally car driver perhaps must be 'in the zone' to successfully complete a course, 
she might also initiate the same form of concentration when driving to the beach. 
                                                 
129 Pike 1974, p. 90. Berliner (1994, p. 217) notes that accomplished jazz soloists always have 'crips' or 
stock patterns as backups when inspiration is slow. He quotes trumpeter Tommy Turrentine: “A crip 
is like a crutch. It's like a brace or bridge from one idea to another. Bird [Charlie Parker] might rip 
off something real mean and then play a crip. And after that, he'd come out of the crip, and he'd rip 
off something real mean again.” 
130 Csikszentmihalyi (2002, pp. 155-7) compares the experiences of surgeons who find their work 
exhilarating and addictive to those for whom it has become a repetitive “drudgery.” He ties a lack 
of challenge to dissatisfaction with even a prestigious job like surgery, suggesting that, having 
mastered their skill to the point where they can perform it automatically (and hence, inauthentically), 
they no longer get a feeling of flow from their work. 
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Although 'one' doesn't normally garden, cook, sweep, or climb stairs in the flow, it is 
possible to perform everyday activities with a cultivated awareness. The practices of 
Taoism and Zen Buddhism, for example, with their frequent celebration of the 
mundane, seem designed to cultivate such an awareness, which can be brought to any 
activity.131 
 
The difference between owned and unowned actions is connected to the role of 
thought, although not in the way that a thinker like Montero might have suggested at 
the beginning of this chapter. Her hypothesis was that, while everyday actions are 
indeed automatic, esoteric expertise is characterised by the presence of explicit 
thought. I have argued, however, that the explicit thought in esoteric expertise is only 
present in the gaps between moments, and that moments of flow are thought-free in 
the manner of the everyday– except that they are owned. Yet being owned, I argue, 
makes them even more thought-free. For the differentiation of unowned, everyday 
actions seems to be that we can quite easily think over the top of them. Whether it's 
the lecturer 'going through the motions,' the jazz musician falling back on stock 
phrases, or me on my cycle on the way to the barbecue, our minds are present and 
thinking– only not really on the task we're immersed in. What characterises the 
authentic expert is that their mind is right there on the action– or, perhaps more 
accurately, their mind is not there at all. They have 'lost themselves' in the flow. 
 
That is to say, automatic, unowned actions allow explicit thinking over the top because 
they involve a less intensive concentration than owned actions, even if, from the 
outside, owned actions appear just as automatic. As Csikszentmihalyi puts it: 
 
Although the flow experience appears to be effortless, it is far from being so. It often 
requires strenuous physical exertion, or highly disciplined mental activity. It does not 
happen without the application of skilled performance. Any lapse in concentration will 
erase it. And yet while it lasts consciousness works smoothly, action follows action 
seamlessly.132 
 
Such flow is admittedly a fragile state, and I seriously doubt that even the best experts 
stay fully immersed in it for the duration of a performance or a game. Eigentlichkeit, 
for Heidegger, is not a permanent state that one achieves, nor even a particularly 
common one. Uneigentlichkeit is our default mode, and one to which we continually 
                                                 
131 See, for example, Dōgen's (1985) 'Instructions for the Tenzo [cook]' (pp. 54-8, 64-5). 




slip back. Even where experts have rituals, 'nudges,' or other techniques to induce the 
right state of concentration, it remains easily broken. Thoughts may creep in, or one 
might lose the groove, in which case the real experts will have stock patterns to fall 
back on, and to relax back into the flow. 133  Yet this fact does not diminish the 
phenomenal reality of the flow state.  
 
Dreyfus is therefore wrong to equate expert acting in the flow with everyday 
expertises, even though we have seen that some esoteric experts, having mastered 
their skills, may perform them in an automatic, unowned way, while ordinary folk 
may perform our everyday tasks in the owned flow. Montero is therefore correct to 
distinguish esoteric expertises, those with kaizen and 'spark,' from the 'principle of 
automaticity.' However, I have argued that in doing so, she has not shown that the 




I have argued in this Chapter that expertise is characterised by the experience of 
enacting non-conceptual content. I have argued this in two ways. In the first half of 
the Chapter, I argued that different forms of expertise– everyday and esoteric– are 
united by the predominant role of tacit knowledge, which phenomenologically 
corresponds to the non-conceptual layer of the previous Chapter. I argued that Collins 
overemphasises the distinction between the embodied (somatic) and the social 
(collective) forms of tacit knowledge when he claims that the former, unlike the latter, 
undergoes no translation in becoming the content of explicit knowledge. However, I 
argued that the really crucial relationship of tacit knowledge to expert performance is 
our experience of acting, and that the phenomenology of enacted somatic tacit 
knowledge reveals the same change in content that Collins claims for collective tacit 
knowledge. Such a translation in content lends itself to a Dreyfusian understanding 
of expertise as non-conceptual coping. 
 
In the second part, I responded to Montero, who claims that esoteric expertise 
requires explicit thought in order to achieve its best results. I argued that everyday 
and esoteric expertises share an un-minded direct experience of the moment of action, 
yet I agreed with her that Dreyfus' extension of the 'Principle of Automaticity' from 
the everyday to the esoteric is problematic. Through accounts of sport and improvised 
                                                 
133 Cf. Charlie Parker's 'crips,' supra, p. 88, n. 129. 
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performance art, I argued that un-minded moments of esoteric expertise, unlike those 
of everyday expertise, tend to be experienced as flow. Drawing on Heidegger's account 
of Eigentlichkeit, I argued that 'owned,' flow experiences are characterised by an 
absorption in which explicit thought disappears, whereas everyday moments have an 
automaticity that allows them to recede into the background, such that explicit 
thought on different matters can arise without detriment to the performance. 
However, I also noted that these relationships have a degree of contingency– esoteric 
expertises can be performed in an 'un-owned' way, while everyday tasks can also be 
'owned.' Yet typically, our everydayness, as Heidegger observed, is uneigentlich, while 
our very best esoteric performances, as Montero holds, require a spontaneity that is 
more than reflexive automaticity. 
 
We see in the phenomenology of expertise, therefore, evidence for the layers that in 
Chapter One I argued both Dreyfus and McDowell admit– an un-Named, tacit layer 
that is translated by Naming it as explicit content. Above all, our examination of 
Collins' account of tacit knowledge suggests that a translation must occur as we make 
knowledge explicit, and that the enactment of tacit knowledge has a different quality 
than the expression of explicit knowledge, even where tacit knowledge may, in 
principle, be formulable explicitly. Similarly, we saw in our discussion of Montero that 
the ongoing process of learning and improvement by esoteric experts follows the same 
process of internalisation and embodiment that Dreyfus and Dreyfus put forward. The 
thought that occurs in 'gaps,' or above 'un-owned' actions, gives further evidence for 
a separate, 'minded' layer alongside the direct. 'Instructional nudges,' too, point to an 
interaction between layers, as a phrase stands in as an abstract representation for a 
sequence of embodied coping. Thus, it appears, the layers of Chapter One have a fluid, 
and sometimes parallel, interaction. In the next Chapter I will focus on the transition 
between these layers, and investigate exactly what comprises the translation of 








What is the Meaning of 'this'? 
 
I have so far been arguing that human cognition is comprised of two layers that, while 
they may operate in tandem, can be analysed distinctly. I have argued that, although 
they diverge in important ways on the structure of content that they involve, both 
Dreyfus and McDowell admit of these layers. Another important difference rests on 
the extent to which such layers are shared with other animals. Schear argues that the 
debates should be read as centrally concerning the continuity of human beings with 
other animals. Understood in this way, McDowell's claim is that our rational or 
conceptual way of experiencing things creates a sharp break between our experience 
and that of other animals. Dreyfus, on the other hand, counters that the phenomenon 
of 'coping' shows that conceptual content is derived from a non-conceptual base that 
we share with other animals and pre-linguistic children.  
 
In this Chapter, I will examine the differences between human and animal coping as 
they are discussed by Dreyfus and McDowell, as well as by Heidegger, to defend the 
view that non-conceptual content is shared by humans and non-rational animals, and 
therefore that the rational conceptual capacities discussed in the previous Chapters 
are not, as McDowell holds, pervasive. Firstly, I will argue that while McDowell 
correctly understands 'rationality' as our capacity to experience an object as an 
independent 'this,' in so doing he glosses over its relation to a more basic, non-rational 
'this.' Finding parallels in Heidegger's 'theory of equipment,' I will use his 
phenomenological insights to establish how we can make sense of that basic 'this,' 
concluding we will understand it best if we take ready-to-hand coping as a non-
rational capacity that we share with other animals. I then deal with objections to this 
interpretation by showing how this capacity does not rely on Dasein's possession of a 
culture and 'world,' and that McDowell is not fully justified in using the 
'world'/environment distinction against Dreyfus. However, after a closer look at what 
Heidegger called the 'abyss' between Dasein and other animals, I will moderate this 
conclusion to argue that while the content of both human and animal coping is not 
conceptual, they may yet differ in an important way, thus setting the scene for the 
discussion of 'post-conceptuality' in Chapter Four. 
 




3.1 – Animal experts 
in which I outline the connection between the non-conceptual  
cognition discussed by Dreyfus, and animal behaviour. 
 
As we have seen, Dreyfus' arguments for non-conceptual cognition are based on his 
phenomenology of skilled activity, where he argues that experts in various fields tend 
to perform at their best when they are not (reflectively) thinking about what they are 
doing. It is therefore tempting to equate our smooth-coping actions with the 
behaviour of animals, since a fielder chasing a ball seems, on the surface, to act with 
the same smoothness and immediacy as a cat chasing a mouse. Indeed, Dreyfus 
argues that the form of awareness in coping is shared among “animals, prelinguistic 
infants, and everyday experts like us.”1 But we have also seen that McDowell would 
respond that human activities presume initially learning concepts that are far beyond 
what we would hope another animal could learn. 
 
It is important in this connection to stress with Dreyfus 'everyday' expertise. Focusing 
overly on the complex actions of expert athletes and artists when they are 'in the flow' 
seems to discount everyday activities such as climbing a steep path– activities that 
still require learning, but not necessarily in the same concept-heavy way as something 
like chess. But such everyday activities are precisely the sort of thing that the theory 
of smooth-coping– in its Heideggerian origins– was developed to account for. A 
preoccupation with 'experts' leads us to forget that much of our daily life is actually 
lived (albeit inauthentically) in a flow-like state, and that what makes the activities of 
experts so impressive is their accomplishment of difficult tasks with the same non-
rational reacting that most of us employ only on mundanities like crossing the street.  
 
Following this line, Rouse suggests that animals ought to be considered 'experts' who 
exemplify smooth-coping by reflexively accomplishing often complex tasks with a 
minimum of planning.2 In the terms of the previous Chapter, then, we should rather 
think of them as 'everyday' experts who do not strive to improve but nevertheless 'get 
the job done' in a smooth and un-deliberative way. Most animals, to be sure, do not 
learn most of their tasks, at least not in the conceptually-loaded way that we learn the 
rules of chess or how to change a tyre. Yet they do seem capable of incredibly intricate 
everyday tasks, making them look so simple as to appear automatic, but in reality 
employing a finely-tuned discrimination of the highest degree. A horse that gallops 
                                                 
1 Dreyfus 2005, p. 57. 
2 Rouse 2013, p. 252. 
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along a hillside, for example, is not just running but taking in its surroundings, 
avoiding stones, large tufts and other obstacles, judging the depth of pools and leaping 
over the larger ones.  
 
Likewise, it appears that a dog playing frisbee in a park must have some concept of 
the frisbee– in Taylor's 'minimal sense'3– shown by the way he chases it, drops it for 
you, and tracks it as you wave it before his nose. During the chase, he seems to be 
finely tuned to his environment as he runs down the slope, avoiding park benches, 
other walkers, and scary-looking dogs. This kind of reflexive yet complex smooth 
coping appears very similar to our own experience of running after a frisbee. And yet, 
we shall soon see, McDowell insists that our experience is completely other, and that 
even our simple actions are pervaded with strong-concepts and rationality in a way 
that the dog's could never be. In the following section, I will elaborate on what 
McDowell means in his claim that humans use 'strong-concepts' even within the 
action of smooth-coping– thereby exploring the ambiguous, first-floor layer we saw 
in Chapter One– before exploring Dreyfus' alternative of a non-conceptual (or as 
Taylor might say, minimally conceptual) awareness that we might share with the other 
animals. 
 
3.2 – Animals, reasons, and rationality 
in which I discuss McDowell's conception of the 'Rational  
Animal', finding his understanding of rationality rooted in the  
experience of a 'this' that is unavailable to the animal. 
 
Schear frames the Dreyfus-McDowell debate in terms of the 'Venerable Thesis'– homo 
est animale rationale: humans are to be understood in terms of their rationality, with 
rationality here, as we saw in Chapter One, understood by both Dreyfus and McDowell 
in terms of conceptual capacities.4 Schear spells out three possible outcomes. Firstly, 
it could be false; we might be contingently rational creatures who would still be 
recognisably human without a 'strong' rational capacity. Neither Dreyfus nor 
McDowell support this possibility. Secondly, a 'weak' form of the Thesis may be true. 
That is, rationality may be a central feature of the human, but it is only one of our 
capacities; no matter how important conceptual understanding is, there is a 
significant sphere of our life to which it does not apply. This seems to be Dreyfus' 
position. Thirdly, we find the 'strong' Venerable Thesis, that rationality “is the form of 
the human as such,” in which rationality is understood to pervade and to be involved 
                                                 
3 Supra, p. 17. 




in all human activity, even that which does not seem to fit an understanding of 
rationality as 'reflective thought' or 'reason-grounded decision.'5 McDowell appears 
“committed” to this reading.6 
 
McDowell illustrates his point with the frisbee-catching example I alluded to in 
Chapter 1.7. Imagine you are playing frisbee with your dog in the park, when another 
person (let's call her Sally) wanders through the game. The frisbee sails in her 
direction, and spontaneously, she reaches out and catches it– a perfect example of 
what Dreyfus would call smooth-coping. McDowell fully grants that there is no 
reflective thought involved in this scenario. If asked for a reason why she just did what 
she did, he suggests, she would be lost for words. “No particular reason,” she might 
reply, “I just felt like it.”7 Nonetheless, McDowell maintains, her unreflective action 
was an exercise of her particularly human, rational capacities. Your dog, which might 
catch a frisbee just as spontaneously and effortlessly as our quick-reflexed friend, 
would not be utilising any similarly rational capacities. “In the relevant sense,” says 
McDowell, “he has none.”8 
 
Although he doesn't say as much, McDowell here makes an important distinction that 
is easily lost in discussions of reason and rationality. In English (as in Latin) the root 
'reason' (ratio) covers two concepts that are distinct in other languages. In German, 
for example, we find the word Grund for 'reason why...' (as in, our friend had 'no 
reason' for catching the frisbee), with Vernunft referring to the intellectual capacity. 
It is this second meaning of ratio that is at stake in the Venerable Thesis' claim. As 
Okrent points out, making a similar distinction between what he calls practical 
rationality and instrumental rationality, there is no controversy in granting animals 
Gründe or reasons for a certain behaviour– a wasp buries food for her unhatched 
babies, even if she could never be aware of that fact.9 Thus, even though we might 
poke around for a reason for the dog to catch a frisbee (to impress you? In hopes of a 
treat? For the sheer delight?), we have already seen with McDowell's frisbee-catcher 
that the presence or absence of a clear Grund need not be connected to the presence 
of Vernunft. 
 
It is Vernunft, this acting with rationality, that McDowell argues is pervasive in all 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid, p. 290. 
7 McDowell 2007b, p. 369. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Okrent 2007, p. 110. 
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human activity, and hence does not require the reflective deliberation that acting for 
reasons seems to imply. When McDowell says reason is pervasive, he does not mean 
that we actively weigh up Gründe for everything we do or see. Rather, he is talking 
about the capacity that makes deliberating on such Gründe possible in the first place. 
But what exactly does this mean, this rationality divorced from reasons?  
 
We find McDowell's answer in his discussion of the difference between the human's 
frisbee catch and the dog's. Suppose we grant all of Dreyfus' conditions for non-
conceptual coping.10 Sally is walking through the park. She is unaware of the frisbee, 
she is making no plans about it, no conscious decision to catch it at such-and-such a 
point. When it enters her visual field, she reacts smoothly, instinctively, solicited by 
the frisbee as a 'force' that draws her to run towards it, to grab it from the air.11 
McDowell even grants that perhaps she is unaware of herself as catching a 'frisbee.'12 
That is, we need not assume that she is realising the concept 'frisbee,' with all of its 
conceptual extensions and cultural significations.13 Even if it were the first frisbee she 
had ever encountered, McDowell holds, Sally is realising in her actions the “practical 
concept” of “catching this.”14 
 
It is this 'this' that holds the key to rationality as McDowell and I want to understand 
it. But what is so special about 'this,' that we read out of it a cognitive capacity that 
makes us unique on this planet? Surely other animals– some of them, at least– can 
see 'this' or 'that' around them, and deal with it, in much the way that we do. Why is 
McDowell so insistent that the dog's catching a frisbee is so entirely removed from the 
human's? I aim now to explore this question, with a view to establishing the identity 
of the capacity for seeing-'this' with rationality. 
 
Let us look at where we differ from the dog, and what we may share with it. John 
Haugeland constructs an interesting thought-experiment to highlight the difference 
in experience between humans and animals.15 He asks us to imagine coming home to 
find all the members of our household have had their features switched around. 
Mother's head is on father's body, father's head speaks with sister's voice, and so on. 
                                                 
10 Dreyfus 2007, pp. 361-2. 
11 Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1963, pp. 168-9. 
12 McDowell 2013, p. 48. 
13 In so claiming, McDowell attempts to distinguish his 'world' from a merely verbally-articulated 
version of the holistic network of connections that Dreyfus draws upon when he describes non-
conceptual coping. 
14 McDowell 2013, p. 48. 




If we were to confront such a scene, our first move would be to doubt our perception– 
'I didn't see what I just thought I saw.' If the scene persists, we would continue by 
doubting our perceptual faculties– 'someone's spiked my drink,' or 'I'm losing my 
mind.' 
 
Haugeland suggests that the family dog, confronted with this strange scene, would 
also recognise something was out of order. He would be confused, Haugeland 
suggests, and would probably bark.16 But he would not be able to doubt what he was 
seeing. While the dog seems well capable of recognising individual people and has 
some idea, proven by his confusion, of how those individuals 'ought to be,' he cannot 
doubt what is presented immediately to his perception. The perception, alone, is fact. 
 
Pippin makes a similar point with a less far-fetched example. 17  Say you are 
approaching your house from downwind. Your dog sees you while you are still far 
away and, not recognising you, begins to bark as she would at an intruder. As you get 
closer, and the dog perceives more features that reveal you to be you, she stops 
barking and happily wags her tail. This is philosophically interesting, says Pippin, 
because the dog's change in attitude is total and immediate. She is not embarrassed, 
or sorry, or otherwise perturbed for misidentifying you. She cannot be, because from 
the dog's point of view we cannot really speak of a misidentification. First the dog was 
barking at a person approaching; then she was pleased to see her master. Although 
she must have some idea of you as an individual unity– something familiar, to be 
celebrated rather than confronted– the existence of that unity is only for the moment 
of its perception.18  
 
The key lesson here seems to be the tie between the animal's perception and the 
'moment of the task.' 'Moment,' as described above, indicates not a mere instant of 
time, but rather the extended interval of the coping activity, and includes the network 
of relevant entities involved in the task, which take their significance from that task.19 
                                                 
16  Anecdotally, I witnessed something just like this one Christmas, when a friend handed around 
elaborate animal masks as part of a game at a party. The dog wandered in, was extremely confused, 
and the verbal reassurances from its masked owner only served to agitate it further. 
17 Pippin 2013, pp. 101-2, based, apparently, on his own experience with his dog Molly. 
18 There are senses in which the dog can be aware of a known individual thing in the absence of 
perception, but only via some connected stimulus– the place where you are normally found, perhaps, 
or some object containing your scent. There are some subtleties to be aware of, such as when the 
dog perceives the scent of rabbit who is no longer there. Here it would be more accurate to say that 
the dog perceives the rabbit-scent rather than the rabbit. But in any case, the rabbit-scent is clearly 
present, and directly connected to the rabbit, in a way we need not call abstract. 
19 Supra, p. 26. 
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The momentary nature of coping also aligns with the 'amovable' forms of behaviour 
that Merleau-Ponty claims we share with (at least) the 'higher' non-human animals.20 
Such behaviour corresponds broadly to smooth coping, although the animals 
significantly lack the ability to step back and reflect and therefore, for Merleau-Ponty, 
to form a conception of a thing as a context-free object. For a chimp who can use a box 
alternately as a seat or as a tool to obtain out-of-reach food, 
 
the box-as-seat and the box-as-instrument are two distinct and alternative objects... 
and not two aspects of an identical thing. In other words, the animal cannot at each 
moment adopt a point of view with regard to objects which is chosen at its discretion; 
rather the object appears clothed with a 'vector,' invested with a 'functional value' 
which depends on the effective composition of the field.21 
 
Insofar as a we can speak of a 'this' for the dog, therefore, it is the 'this' that it is 
perceiving in its moment– this 'stranger' approaching, this master 'appearing.' From 
the dog's viewpoint, we ought not to say that she was 'incorrectly' barking at her 
master, because she wasn't barking at her master– she was barking at the 'stranger.' 
Notice that we are not quite saying either that there are two 'this'es– a master-this and 
a stranger-this– nor that the stranger-this 'turns into' the master-this. Rather, each 
'this' is only in the moment of its perception. This is quite a subtle point, and it should 
be stressed that it is a claim about experience rather than truth. What any person or 
thing 'is' or means to the dog is bound up with the action that it solicits.22 In a parallel 
way, our experience of a baseball (what the ball 'is' to us) differs from the moment of 
hitting to the moment of running. Moments are transitory because they are context-
bound, and are concerned with the involved action rather than the objects of that 
action, and how they might objectively be. It is not so much the 'ball' we see as the 
target we aim for, or the fielder we try to escape. Thus, while a philosopher might 
retort that the dog is most certainly and self-evidently barking incorrectly at the 
master she has misidentified, this would be to misunderstand the point by taking an 
objective stance toward truth that is unavailable to the dog. The dog's action is 
solicited by the perceived presence of an intruder. For the dog, there is no objective 
truth to the moment beyond the immediate perception, which, as during coping, is 
precisely the point. 
 
                                                 
20 Merleau-Ponty 1963, pp. 113-4. 
21 Ibid, p. 116. 
22 Cf. Millikan (2005, p. 175) on what she calls 'Pushmi-Pullyu Representations' (PPRs), although the 




Let us return to McDowell's frisbee-dog. We concluded that he must have some form 
of 'this,' what Taylor calls a “pre-understanding” or 'basic, minimal concept,' that at 
least lets him track and remain concerned with the frisbee throughout the task.23 And 
yet, we now see, that 'this' seems to be tied intricately within the moment of the task. 
The dog simply reacts to what is before it, in its present moment. This is not to say 
that a dog has no sense of history, that it confronts the world anew in each moment. 
The dog is principally guided by habits that may have been taught during training, or 
acquired through experience. It may, for example, be afraid of someone who has 
mistreated it in the past, or it may even go on to associate all manner of events with 
its past abuse, developing defensive habits in reaction to subtle cues like raised hands 
or male voices. Yet all the same, it requires the presence of some cue for it to re-enter 
the moment of its fear and to evoke the subsequent reaction. 
 
Now, McDowell claims that Sally, smooth-coping in the flow, experiences a minimal 
'this,' apart from any more extended concept of a 'frisbee.' The question, then, 
becomes, whether her 'this' is akin to the momentary animal 'this' when she plucks 
the frisbee from the air. Or is even her most basic 'catching this' conceptual in a way 
that the dog simply cannot share? To rephrase the debate, McDowell's claim is that 
(mature) humans have one pervasive, conceptual 'this' that is completely other to the 
non-conceptual, momentary 'this' of the dog. Dreyfus, on the other hand, claims that 
humans experience both. 
 
3.3 – The 'as'-structure 
in which I explicate Heidegger's account of the 'as-structure' 
 of interpretation, drawing parallels between its  
two 'as'es and the two 'this'es discussed previously. 
 
The concept of two, distinct 'this'es may not appear initially obvious nor even 
intelligible. But we can find a description of comparable phenomena in Heidegger's 
Being and Time. In this section, I will unpack Heidegger's 'theory of equipment,' to 
show how we can relate his descriptions of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit to non-
conceptual and conceptual experience respectively. This will help to illuminate the 
debate by providing rich phenomenological support for the notion that our everyday 
experience is other to the rational 'this' that McDowell claims is pervasive, thus 
clarifying what Dreyfus means by a mode of experience that we share with infants and 
                                                 
23 Taylor 2002, p. 111. Cf. Taylor 2005, p. 34. 
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animals.24 As noted above, while I aim at providing a coherent reading of Heidegger 
on this topic, my use his thought here is concerned not so much with exegesis as with 
finding a useful application of his concepts to the questions at issue in this debate.25 
Heidegger's 'Analytic of Dasein' (Division I of Being and Time, where these concepts 
are introduced) forms just part of a vaster project of 'fundamental ontology.' However, 
for the purposes of this Chapter I wish to focus on his phenomenological insights into 
our experience of other entities. Consequently, although they are naturally 
interrelated, an acceptance of these insights need not entail acceptance or rejection of 
Heidegger's broader conclusions on Dasein's being. 
 
According to Heidegger, the ready-to-hand entities we encounter in our ordinary 
dealings (Umgänge) are revealed by our actions 'as' being of a certain relevance, 
whose meaning (or being) is 'articulated' by the action itself within the context in 
which it's undertaken.26 At this pre-conceptual stage, the entity is not experienced as 
a standalone 'thing' with any independence from the situation. The emphasis on the 
action highlights the distance of this kind of articulation from anything explicitly 
thought. A table, for example, could be picked out 'pre-conceptually as' a table by 
resting one's coffee cup on it. Heidegger calls this involved perception or 'articulation' 
interpretation (Auslegung), which centres around what he terms the 'as-structure.'27 
 
In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it 
circumspectively, we 'see' it as a table, a door [etc.]; but what we have thus interpreted 
need not necessarily be also taken apart by making an assertion which definitely 
characterises it.28 
 
The 'as' here refers to the experience of an entity as a unity and in terms of its being 
relevant to us in our current action. Heidegger's scare quotes around 'see' emphasise 
the circumspective nature of this experience– we are not looking at and naming an 
objective 'door,' but rather understand pre-reflectively the possible actions it offers. 
That is, we see what is before us as a potentiality which holds within it (or better, holds 
through our relationship towards it) a meaning, as being or being-for something. 
 
                                                 
24 Dreyfus 2005, p. 57. 
25 Supra, p. 3. 
26 Heidegger 1962, pp. 189-90. 
27 Ibid, p. 200. It should be noted that interpretation here is a technical term for Heidegger, referring to 






In this first, zuhanden sense of interpretation, we pick the entities out as elements of 
a wider context, and only in the context of the particular action that articulates them. 
That is, the table 'affords' (to use Gibson's term29) resting the coffee cup– that is, it is 
articulated as a table in the ready-to-hand sense– because of its place in the living 
room, amongst the other furniture, in the context of the friend's house we are 
visiting. 30  Heidegger calls this mode of interpretation “hermeneutic,” where the 
interpreted entity is picked out in and by the action, without attached predicates or 
properties or anything that could remove it from its web of attachments in the ongoing 
task.31 
 
This is what Heidegger calls our most primordial way of encountering other entities. 
Our being-in-the-world means that we always find ourselves in a world in which, as 
Taylor says, we “know our way about.”32 Heidegger is therefore attacking the notion 
that we first experience an objective world of things that we only subsequently invest 
with meaning. That kind of objective perception of things without interpretation or 
significance– 'just staring'– is, far from being the foundation of seeing, in fact derived 
from it: 
 
When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to 
us bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that 
just to grasp something free... of the 'as' requires a certain readjustment.33 
 
Of course, we do experience entities as things beyond the hermeneutic interpretation 
of our ready-to-hand action. Heidegger famously describes the process where our 
dealings break down, and we experience malfunctioning or missing equipment as 
'unready-to-hand.'34 We can then step back from the entity to perceive it as simply 
vorhanden or present-at-hand– that is, as a self-contained, context-free object.35 The 
predication of the entity-as-object begins with apophansis, which Heidegger 
                                                 
29 Gibson 1979, pp. 127-9. 
30 The same table, stumbled over in a field, while of course being objectively the same table, could not 
be pre-conceptually revealed as such. Conversely, a sheet of plyboard on cinder blocks might, in the 
context of an undergraduate living room, be revealed in the same way as being a coffee table. 
31 Heidegger 1962, p. 201. 
32 Taylor 2002, p. 111. 
33 Heidegger 1962, p. 190. 
34 Ibid, p. 104. Dreyfus (1991, pp. 196-8) draws on this account of breakdown in his argument for the 
translation of reflective, conceptual thought out of smooth coping. 
35 As Wheeler (2005, p. 141) notes, we rarely experience anything as purely ready-to- or present-at-
hand, and the two modes of experience are better understood as limits on a spectrum that is for the 
most part experienced as unzuhanden (cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 103). 
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translates as “letting an entity be seen from itself.”36 In a movement analogous to the 
unready-to-hand breakdown in a dealing (Umgang), an assertion (Aussage) is made 
which characterises the ready-to-hand entity.37 Heidegger emphasises that natural 
language need not be involved at this stage. An assertion can be made in the form of 
an action, such as when an unready-to-hand hammer is put down for being 'too 
heavy,' implicitly asserting its “definite character”– its heaviness.38 
 
Importantly, however, what is 'put-forward' in the assertion is not the character-
giving predicate (“is heavy”), but the entity itself (the 'hammer').39 The as is now an 
apophantic-as, revealing the hammer not as an involved ready-to-hand piece of 
equipment, but as a hammer, as a definite object with properties. The affordance or 
relevancy fades to the background, and the object is experienced as something that 
need not be for anything– that is, as context-free. However, in giving the entity this 
“definite character,” we don't discover it, as though it appears from nowhere. 40 
Rather, we highlight the previously articulated entity, simultaneously 'dimming down' 
other entities around it, and “restrict” it into its newly-defined characterisation.41 We 
now see the entity from a particular angle; the content of the experience has been 
'narrowed' to that of an independent Thing. 
 
By making an assertion– in this technical sense– an important transition is made in 
our conscious experience of the entity.42 The assertion “aims” at something present-
at-hand within the ready-to-hand, and what emerges is a disconnected Thing with 
definite properties. 
 
Within this discovering of presence-at-hand, which is at the same time a covering-up 
of readiness-to-hand, something present-at-hand which we encounter is given a 
definite character in its Being-present-at-hand-in-such-and-such-a-manner… only 
now are we given any access to properties or the like.43 
                                                 




40 Ibid, p. 197. 
41 Ibid. 
42 As mentioned in Chapter One (p. 30, n. 52), 'conscious' is a particularly problematic word that 
Heidegger makes a point of avoiding. However, although I lack the space to argue it here, I believe 
it to be useful and appropriate in this context as I hold it is precisely the type of awareness that begins 
with assertion that is at issue in analytic discussions of consciousness. 
43  Heidegger 1962, p. 200. Concealed beneath the Latin in 'properties' is an emphasis on 'own,' 
something that is more obvious and of which Heidegger was very conscious in employing the 
German 'Eigenschaften.' The owning of properties implies that the entity is something complete in 




When an assertion has given a definite character to something present-at-hand, it says 
something about it as a ‘what’; and this ‘what’ is drawn from that which is present-at-
hand as such.44 
 
In becoming this “what,” the as-structure transits from the hermeneutic to the 
apophantic 'as.' Heidegger here argues that the act of asserting changes our very 
experience of the entity we're dealing with, from that of a context-embedded piece of 
equipment to a standalone thing. The “speciality” of asserting, he says, is that it 
modifies the as-structure of interpretation.45 It  
 
no longer reaches out into a totality of involvements… [but] dwindles to the structure 
of just letting one see what is present-at-hand, and letting one see it in a definite way.46 
 
The two as-structures, I submit, correspond to the two 'this'es we saw earlier. And 
thus what we find in Heidegger's discussion of the 'as-structure' is a detailed 
phenomenological description of those very different experiences of 'this'ness. Taking 
them at face-value, they add weight to the case against McDowell. We saw McDowell 
claim that his frisbee-catching friend differed from the dog because even her most 
'basic' this could “immediately” form the object of a judgement. And yet, we can now 
see, McDowell only seems to be describing what Heidegger called the apophantic-as. 
If McDowell considers the hermeneutic-as, as we ought to read Sally's “practical 
concept” of “catching this,” he has failed to distinguish it from the later apophantic 
assertion.47 For Heidegger's hermeneutic-as describes a more basic 'this' than the one 
McDowell intends, one whose being is only momentary and contextual– that is to say, 
something like the dog's basic 'this' that we saw earlier. It is only after the apophantic 
assertion that we can speak of judgements, and hence the 'this' McDowell describes is 
not immediate at all. Reflecting back on the debate, it becomes apparent that the 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, p. 201. 
46 Ibid, p. 200-1. 
47 It is not clear that Dreyfus fully appreciates the distinction between the two 'as'-structures. In some 
places (e.g., Dreyfus 2007b, p. 371) he claims rather that smooth coping with ready-to-hand 
equipment doesn't involve an 'as'-structure at all. However, his assumption that the 'as'-structure 
reveals “objects with general properties like weight, [and] situation-specific aspects like too heavy” 
shows that he identifies the 'as'-structure with only the apophantic-'as.' In a footnote (ibid, p. 377, n. 
1), however, he both acknowledges the hermeneutic as-structure and its parallels with animal coping, 
as well as the orthodox Heideggerian reason for denying Dasein's 'as' to animals (Dasein's 'as'-
structure contains an understanding of being). Dreyfus avoids the resulting complications of this 
view by saying he is interested in the phenomenological, not ontological, consequences of 
Heidegger's claim. While I could make the same caveat, I hope as I progress to both suggest 
important distinctions between human and animal hermeneutic experience, as well as more firmly 
linking Dasein's understanding of being to apophansis. 
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rationality McDowell claims is pervasive is at best only latent during smooth coping, 
which we can now understand with Dreyfus as a non-conceptual dealing that we could 
in principle share with non-linguistic animals. 
 
3.4 – Experience and the 'world' 
in which I explore objections to my claim that animals  
experience the ready-to-hand hermeneutically-'as'. 
 
I have so far argued that the form of rationality that McDowell claims is pervasive in 
all human activity is the capacity to take something as an apophantic 'this.' However, 
I have argued that this 'this' pertains only to what Heidegger calls the asserted, 
present-at-hand object, and that Heidegger demonstrates another, primordial 'this' 
that McDowell neglects. In doing so, I have suggested that the ready-to-hand, 
hermeneutic-'this' is something that we share with non-human animals. This 
suggestion, however, will be fiercely contested by many commentators, who hold that 
the experience of the zuhanden I described above belongs uniquely to Dasein. There 
are two main arguments to this effect. Firstly, commentators such as Haugeland hold 
that experience of the ready-to-hand is exclusively human on account of being tied to 
culture, that ready-to-hand equipment is dependent on the normative structure given 
to it by a society to make it what it is. I reply in the following section that such 
arguments overplay the role of human culture and that what is really crucial is the way 
equipment is used towards an end, such that animal experience is sufficiently similar 
to justify a continuum with humans along the lines of the ready-to-hand. Secondly, 
thinkers such as Ratcliffe emphasise that the ready-to-hand is only available to 
creatures with a 'world' in Heidegger's technical sense.48 In the final section, however, 
I will argue that Heidegger's own description of animals as 'world-poor' provides us 
with a starting point to connect animal and human experience.  
 
3.4.1 – Culture 
in which I answer the first objection– that equipment gets  
its being principally from social norms– by arguing  
that what matters most is the context of its use. 
 
I turn first to the objection that experience of the ready-to-hand requires a language-
borne culture. This objection does not deny, of course, that animals have encounters 
with other entities, which hold particular, context-sensitive significances for them. 
                                                 
48 I use 'world' in quotation marks to indicate that I am using the term in Heidegger's sense, in contrast 




However, it distances animal experience from Dasein's dealings with the ready-to-
hand because in the latter case, the significance is drawn from the social norms laid 
down by the human cultural context. While culture certainly plays a role for us, I will 
argue in this section that emphasising it overlooks the crucial significance that 
equipment gets from its use, and thus overlooks the broad similarities between our 
ready-to-hand dealings and animal activity. 
 
Many commentators have already pointed out the parallels between Heidegger's 
description of Dasein's dealings and animal coping. Winkler argues that the 
hermeneutic-as is exactly what we share with other animals.49 That is to say, while 
animals are unable to form judgements of truth or falsity, they nonetheless interpret 
(in Heidegger's technical sense) the relevancy of things they encounter. Indeed, says 
Winkler, they must, if they are “to orient themselves in their environment,... to 
survive.”50 As I argued in the previous section, this orienting can be described as we 
do a human's hermeneutic-'this,' and it is a simple logical step to identify them, if we 
strip back human action to consider only our ready-to-hand dealings, prior to the 
apophantic assertion. Furthermore, as Wheeler points out, this mode of 
interpretation highlights our pre-theoretical, embodied way of coping. Understanding 
it, then, also means understanding our own animality.51 
 
Thus there is a strong case that hermeneutic interpretation and ready-to-hand coping 
describe not only Dasein's use of equipment, but offer a way of connecting human and 
animal experiences of being. Yet other commentators insist that it is a mistake to 
identify an animal's behaviour with Dasein's zuhanden actions, pointing to the 
“abyss” that Heidegger firmly carves between Dasein and non-human animals.52 For 
despite the obvious similarities, Heidegger maintains that Dasein enacts its zuhanden 
dealings within a 'world' (Welt), and this 'world' is more than the totality of available 
entities, but encompasses the vast web of relationships between equipment, and 
hence requires a cultural basis, as that which designates the norms of equipment 
use. 53  Animals, on the contrary, have only an 'environment' (Umwelt), a limited 
sphere of involvements with fewer possibilities of action, and Heidegger is never 
explicit about the being of the entities that show up for them.54 
                                                 
49 Winkler 2007, p. 527. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Wheeler 1995, p. 69. 
52 Heidegger 1995, p. 264; cf. Heidegger, 1993, p. 230. 
53 Heidegger 1962, p. 93. 
54 Heidegger 1995, p. 239; cf. pp. 192-8. 
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After this first glance, it might appear that McDowell, with his emphasis on a total 
division between human and animal experience, is closer to Heidegger than Dreyfus 
is or than I am, with my equation of the pre-conceptual 'this' with the hermeneutic. 
And this is hardly coincidental, as it is from Heidegger's student Gadamer that 
McDowell takes the distinction between Welt and Umwelt to argue that the human's 
ready-to-hand coping must be of a different order to the animal's.55 Yet I will show 
below that while we ought to accept the distinction, we should nonetheless hold that 
the entities revealed by animals' behaviour in their environments are of the same, 
ready-to-hand kind as the equipment in Dasein's 'world.' 
 
Gadamer's Heideggerian distinction must have had an obvious appeal to McDowell, 
who was developing his idea of a human 'second nature' to account for phenomena, 
such as mindedness, which can only problematically be explained by the reductive, 
natural sciences.56 And through this distinction, we can draw another link between 
McDowell and some interpretations of Heidegger. For McDowell, second-nature is 
acquired via the process of Bildung, a person's development within and through a 
culture. Only with the development of a second-nature does the human animal 
acquire a 'world.'57 
 
With this emphasis on the role of culture, McDowell finds himself in broad agreement 
with Haugeland's influential (although admittedly “free-wheeling”) reading of Being 
and Time.58 Haugeland argues that it is only through its existence in a culturally-
mediated 'world' that Dasein is able to encounter equipment as ready-to-hand. 
Equipment's being, he argues, comes not simply from its being for or 'in order to' do 
something, but from its publicly-designated or “proper” use, its “what it's for.” 59 
Where an ape might use a stick to get a banana, Haugeland maintains that it is not 
using equipment in a ready-to-hand sense because, no matter whether it works or not, 
one cannot say the ape uses the stick properly or improperly.60 
 
Dasein, by contrast, can use a screwdriver properly to drive in a screw, or improperly 
to carve graffiti into a wall, and the propriety of the act is independent of the individual 
                                                 
55 McDowell 2007a, pp. 344-6, cf. McDowell, 1994, p. 115. 
56 McDowell 1994, pp. 76-84. 
57 Ibid, pp. 124-6. The similarity is even more pronounced when we note that Heidegger's Welt is also 
gebildet (although the choice of words here appears coincidental). 
58 Haugeland 1982, p. 15, although Haugeland was later to moderate this view and retract his attribution 
of it to Heidegger (see Haugeland 1998a, p. 4). 
59 Haugeland 1982, pp. 17-8. 




Dasein or whether it succeeds or not.61 The proper use interprets the screwdriver 
hermeneutically-as a screwdriver because it also highlights the 'equipmental 
network,' referring (verweisung62) to the wider context of screws, timber, furniture, 
and so on, and this equipmental totality belongs to the vaster cultural pattern of which 
each Dasein is only a particular manifestation or “case.”63 None of this, Haugeland 
claims, is manifest in the chimp's use of a tool. 
 
Yet here Haugeland ties the phenomenon of verweisen or 'referral' too closely to 
culture. For Heidegger the key function of referral is the placement of ready-to-hand 
equipment into a network of involvements (Bewandtnisse) that are aimed toward a 
task, ultimately for the sake of the being of Dasein.64 Thus the improper use of the 
screwdriver refers to a network no less than the proper use does, this time of wall, 
letters, and a particular possibility of Dasein (artist, protester, or what have you). It 
should be noted that Heidegger does not discuss 'appropriateness' (Geeignetheit) in 
terms of culture, but as a characteristic of the ready-to-hand that is to be contrasted 
with the properties (Eigenschaften) of the present-at-hand. That is, where present-
at-hand Things have properties by which one can 'tell' what they are, ready-to-hand 
equipment is similarly 'told' by whether it can be 'appropriated' (zugeeignet) to the 
task or not.65 The 'improper' use of the screwdriver-as-graffiti-tool is therefore not 
'inappropriate' in the sense Heidegger intends, as it can just as easily be 'appropriated' 
to the task of carving as to that of screwing. A better example of inappropriateness for 
a screwdriver would be polishing a window. In the context of this task, if the 
screwdriver were to show up as equipment at all, it could only be as inappropriate. 
 
This indicates that equipment takes its zuhanden being not from its design or 
designation, but its use. As Wheeler points out, Dasein frequently uses natural entities 
like stones in a ready-to-hand way to accomplish some task.66 The referral is a feature 
of the act itself, and is tied to the in-order-to. In later work, Haugeland moderates his 
thesis and admits that the roles that make equipment what it is can be temporary and 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Macquarrie and Robinson translate verweisen as 'reference or assignment,' noting the difficulty in 
capturing the precise meaning of the German in a single English word (see Heidegger 1962, p. 97, 
n. 2). I follow Haugeland in translating it simply as 'referral,' which feels equally satisfactory, so 
long as one keeps Heidegger's intention in mind. 
63 Haugeland 1982, p. 20. 
64 Heidegger 1962, pp. 115-6. 
65 Ibid, p. 98. I use 'tell' here in Haugeland's (1998d, p. 313) sense of identifying, discriminating, 'telling 
apart,' 'telling the difference,' and so on, which I agree is a useful translation of what Heidegger 
means by Rede (cf. Dreyfus 1991, pp. xi, 214). 
66 Wheeler 1995, p. 66, n. 3. 
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ad hoc, but still connects this with a cultural 'standard' or 'proper' role.67 Yet even this 
remains too strong, as it focuses more on the present-at-hand thing than on the task 
which gives being to the equipment. 
 
For example, to properly tune a djembe drum, one needs to use a stick in the final 
stages to tighten the string. There is no designated 'right' stick for this job (you cannot 
buy a 'djembe tuner'68); a suitably strong stick must literally be appropriated to the 
task. Using the stick, a ready-to-hand network of the drum skin, string, and so on is 
lit up as you work away. If you then use the stick for another task– to beat a different 
drum, or to shoo the dog away from the picnic basket– a whole different equipmental 
network is lit up. As we saw earlier on, what an item of equipment actually is readily-
to-hand is only, like its network, for the moment of the task. 
 
Haugeland's error comes from thinking of the tool as a present-at-hand Thing with 
pre-defined properties. Yet the screwdriver-Thing is only revealed as such when it is 
taken apophantically. This vorhandensein is certainly cultural, although there is a 
degree of arbitrariness even to that. If enough people used screwdrivers to carve 
graffiti, there is no reason it couldn't be culturally-designated as for that and renamed 
the 'Graffitor.' But before that, its Zuhandenheit is only for the moment of the task, be 
that driving a screw, carving a wall, or anything else it is 'handy' for. If culture were 
such a defining factor, there would not only be a problem with the use of natural, 
unmade tools, but also with new inventions. But invented tools do not need to wait 
until a culture has accepted them and generated a proper network for their 
involvements before they can be encountered as equipment. They are equipment, 
complete with network, the first time they are used.  
 
The cultural element of equipment that Haugeland seeks is to be found insofar as 
Dasein is always Mitsein, 'being-with.' Any tool therefore holds the potential to be 
used, more or less successfully, toward a goal available for Dasein in a broad sense. 
The patterns of Dasein are vastly overlapping; while the screwdriver more obviously 
reveals a world of others via its ergonomic design, the network of tuning-stick just as 
readily articulates a shared 'in-order-to' of drumming, while that of the stick-as-dog-
                                                 
67 Haugeland 2013, pp. 105-6. 
68 Since writing this, I have discovered that one can indeed buy a small lever (or 'cleat') that is handy 
for tuning djembes. Such tools are obviously not traditional, and at any rate, while some drum shops 
sell specially-marketed djembe cleats, cleats were originally designed for other rope-pulling 
activities, such as windsurfing, thereby demonstrating once again that it is the appropriation to the 




shoo-er reveals a vast world of picnics that is most certainly shared, and which belongs 
to a wider for-the-sake-of a possibility of being. 
 
3.4.2 – Having 'world' 
in which I answer the second objection– that readiness-to-hand  
can only be experienced with Dasein's 'world'– by arguing that the  
animal's 'poor world' must contain a kind of 'poor ready-to-hand'. 
 
I have argued that the way equipment is used is more important to its being than any 
cultural significations, thus clearing the way to describe animal experience as of a kind 
with our dealings with the ready-to-hand. However, some thinkers would object to 
this, holding instead that having 'world' implies a relation to entities that is closed off 
from other animals. In this section, I will explore Heidegger's own discussion of 
animals and 'world' to argue that, although he maintained an 'abyss' between Dasein 
and animals, that difference has less to do with the experience of using ready-to-hand 
entities while coping than it does with the apophantic-as we saw above. 
 
Ratcliffe, for example, argues that the crucial feature of 'world'-possession is the 
capacity to “understand possibilities as possibilities.”69 Zuhanden dealings within-a-
'world' cannot, therefore, be likened to animal behaviour which is merely “driven... by 
environmental stimuli,” because it is experienced instead within a range of 
possibilities that Dasein chooses, or chooses not, to pursue.70 In Ratcliffe's reading, 
the apophantic distance is already within sight in the ready-to-hand and, as a 
prerequisite for 'world,' forms the basis for vorhanden experience as well. As such, it 
mirrors McDowell's side of the debate, as it implies that there is no translation of 
content between hermeneutic and apophantic experience. 'World,' on this account, is 
therefore not seen as co-arising with Dasein's capacity to experience entities 
apophantically-as, but as a necessary condition for it (although to call it a 'necessary 
condition' is perhaps misleading; Heidegger would emphasise that Dasein is not in a 
world within which it then comes to experience the apophantic– they are 
equiprimordial, with 'world' providing the background against which the apophantic 
is known). As this possibility of distance, 'world' is thereby argued also to precede and 
inform our zuhanden dealings, thus making them of another order to the animal's 
environmental coping which, as we have seen, remains captivated within its moment. 
The idea is that 'world' has a temporal extension, and therefore our ready-to-hand 
                                                 




dealings are always undertaken in the context of having future consequences that we 
will also have to deal with. 
 
Ratcliffe, like McDowell and Haugeland, is right to maintain that there is an important 
distinction between Welt and Umwelt that shapes how Dasein comes to be with other 
entities, and the significance those entities hold for it.  Yet that distinction, which 
Heidegger fully articulates in his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics lectures of 
1929-30,71 while important, is not conclusive to our core question. We are asking 
about Dasein's experience while it is coping readily-to-hand, and whether that 
experience is of a kind with an animal's coping. Whether this coping takes place in a 
'world' or in an 'environment' is secondary here, because the experience at issue takes 
place before the assertion of the apophantic that allows the experience of anything– 
including possibilities– as that which they are. On Ratcliffe's account, 'assertion' is 
read merely as the literal making explicit (aus-sagung) of what is already present in 
the ready-to-hand. Yet this is to understand the ready-to-hand as something which is 
essentially present-at-hand being used in a particular way, rather than as a different 
mode of being, one which takes its being precisely from the context in which 
equipment is used, and which is ontologically prior to the present-at-hand.  
 
The asserted vorhanden entities, experienced apophantically-as entities– like the 
awareness of possibilities apophantically-as possibilities– do not impinge on the 
momentary, qualitative experience of the zuhanden hermeneutically-as the 
zuhanden. As Okrent argues, an animal's activities are as future-directed as ours 
without being experienced as possibilities.72 Our hammering may well be for-the-sake 
of our future, sheltered Dasein, but the conscious, subject-object awareness73 of that 
possibility does not enter into the moment of coping any more than newly-hatched 
chicks enter a bird's nest-building. Heidegger's analytic aimed to isolate the 
constituent capacities of Dasein, and while he maintained that those existentialia 
were to be found equiprimordially in Dasein, I will argue below that we can hold that 
dealings like ours with ready-to-hand entities, at least, can be attributed to beings 
which lack experience of the present-at-hand without losing the force of Heidegger's 
phenomenology. 
 
That our momentary actions with the zuhanden have a parallel with other animals' is 
                                                 
71 Heidegger 1995, p. 239. 
72 Okrent 2007, p. 104. 




shown by our absorption in them. In the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
lectures, Heidegger describes an animal as 'captivated,' benommen, by the entities in 
its environment. Thus, an animal can only 'behave' (benehmen) towards other 
entities, unlike Dasein, who is able to take them as entities– that is, apophantically.74 
Yet in Being and Time, of which those lectures are but an elaboration,75 Heidegger 
similarly notes Dasein's Benommenheit (translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as 
'fascination') with the ready-to-hand of its concern, and contrasts this with looking at 
something as present-at-hand. 76  Never one to be casual in his choice of words, 
Heidegger's use of benehmen when he later comes to discuss animal experience is 
significant, and points back to the clear parallel of hermeneutic-interpretation across 
both humans and other animals. It indicates that within the context of ready-to-hand 
coping– within the moment of the task– Dasein is just as 'captivated' as the animal. 
What differentiates Dasein from animals is not to be found within the coping, but 
rather through the additional capacity of apophantic assertion of the entity via its 
unzuhanden breakdown. Ratcliffe has made the same mistake as McDowell in not 
seeing that as soon as attention is drawn to the experience of possibilities as 
possibilities, an apophantic breakdown has already been made, and the ready-to-hand 
left behind.77 
 
Of course, for Heidegger, the animal's inability to experience possibilities as 
possibilities is a crucial factor in the 'abyss' that separates them from us. His 
distinction between Dasein's Welt and the animal's Umwelt in the Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics does not involve much discussion of ready-to-hand coping 
but rather focuses on Dasein's ability to take an entity as an entity– that is, 
apophantically. But it is important to note in this connection that although Heidegger 
discusses the animal's Umwelt (whence it is taken up by Gadamer and finds its way 
ultimately to McDowell), it is not his preferred term. He speaks rather of the animal 
as weltarm, 'poor-in-world.' 78  This poverty is not to be understood as an 
                                                 
74 Heidegger 1995, p. 259. 
75 Although the FCM lectures come two years after Being and Time's publication, and Heidegger 
addresses some topics, such as life and animality, that receive no attention in his masterwork, the 
core themes of the lecture course– 'world,' finitude, and the logos, particularly the logos 
apophantikos– elaborate on and are consistent with how those topics are treated in Being and Time 
and contemporaneous works such as the Basic Problems of Phenomenology lectures (1927/1988– 
which discuss the material of the unwritten Division 3 of Being and Time) and Kant and the Problem 
of Metaphysics (1929/1990). I therefore hold that Heidegger's thoughts on animality in FCM are a 
natural extension of his thinking in Being and Time, and should be treated as such. 
76 Heidegger 1962, p. 88. Cf. p. 220, where 'inauthenticity' is described as a state of being 'fascinated' 
by the world, and hence a closing-off of the owning of one's own possibilities. 
77 Cf. Carman's 'scholastic fallacy' and O'Regan's 'refrigerator light illusion,' supra, p. 44. 
78 Heidegger 1995, pp. 176, 185. 
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incompleteness, but rather a “lack” or “deprivation” with respect to Dasein.79 I will 
argue below that what is lacking is precisely the apophantic-as, and that we can 
therefore conceive the hermeneutic-'this' apart from it. 
 
While Heidegger does not address animal experience explicitly in terms of 
interpretation, a careful reading reveals how we can do so while remaining consistent 
with what he does have to say about the commonalities and differences between 
animals and humans. In his discussion of the animal's poverty-in-world, McNeill 
draws upon Heidegger's cryptic statement that non-human animals 'both have and 
don't have world.'80 McNeill suggests that the claim that the animal has world means 
that it has “some kind of openness for encountering other beings in general,” while 
saying that it does not have world means it “does not have access to other beings in 
the way that humans do.”81 
 
'The way that humans do' may appear inconclusive, since as we have seen, Heidegger's 
very point in Being and Time is that humans experience entities both hermeneutically 
and apophantically, as ready-to-hand and as present-at-hand. Haugeland's and 
Ratcliffe's views above are rooted in the observation that Heidegger thinks in terms of 
mutually-dependent pairs of opposites. They would argue that Zuhandenheit only 
makes sense in opposition to Vorhandenheit, just as Eigentlichkeit ('authenticity') 
only makes sense with reference to Uneigentlichkeit. Furthermore, it could be argued 
(in a McDowellian vein) that 'world,' as something 'formed' through initiation into a 
culture, is always something public, and our hermeneutic experience thus crucially 
differs from any version we might attribute to an animal.82 
 
Yet the concept of 'world-poverty' signifies just that the animal is deprived of the 
possibilities that are opened to Dasein through its gebildet 'world.' There is no 
interplay between immersed dealings and detached thought for the animal, but there 
remains nonetheless some relation to entities, unlike the 'worldless' (weltlos) stone.83 
This relation, I have argued, finds a strong parallel in our own captivated, momentary 
experience. And this conclusion is strengthened as McNeill continues, for it becomes 
apparent that the exclusively human access that is at stake is really the apophantic. 
                                                 
79 Ibid, p. 195. Cf. Kuperus 2007, p. 15. 
80 Heidegger 1995, pp. 209-10. 
81 McNeill 1999, p. 216, McNeill’s emphasis. 
82 I will indeed argue in the next Chapter that there is a difference between human and animal coping, 
although I will maintain that the mode of awareness captured by the hermeneutic-as is shared across 
this difference. 




To say that the animal is unable to apprehend beings as beings (Seiendes) is to say that 
it is unable to apprehend them in their being (Sein), that is, in respect of the fact that 
they 'are': that they are this or that; that they are present here and now and not absent; 
and so on.84 
 
He goes on to quote Heidegger, who states that the animal's “driven behaviour,” just 
like Dasein's zuhanden action, “does not relate itself... to what is present-at-hand as 
such.”85 
 
It is important here to note that when Heidegger says that the animal has no 'as,' he 
means the apophantic as something.86 While Heidegger denies his lizard a present-
at-hand relationship to a rock as a rock or to the sun as the sun, he maintains that it 
does have “its own relation to the rock, to the sun, and to a host of other things.”87 
Despite the animal's lack of apophantic interpretation, McNeill therefore argues, it 
still “in fact has and must have a certain ability to relate to something as something, 
although not, indeed, as being something.”88 
 
A cat responds to the presence of a mouse as its potential dinner, or as something to 
play with; it responds to the presence of a dog as a potential threat– and not as its food 
(but this 'and not'... is presumably not open to the animal as such).89 
 
The closed-off 'and not' clearly refers to apophansis, for as McNeill observes:  
 
to have access to any particular entity as being this entity is already to see it in an 
originary relation to other beings, as being this entity and not another90 
 
before elaborating that: 
 
Apophantic discourse is discourse which makes the specific claim solely to point out 
and manifest that which already is in its presence at hand.91 
                                                 
84 McNeill 1999, p. 221. 
85 Heidegger 1995, p. 248 in McNeill 1999, p. 221, Heidegger's emphasis. 
86  A superficial reading of, for example, Heidegger 1995, p. 274, might lead one to believe that 
Heidegger denies the animal the 'as' rather than the 'something as something,' where only the latter 
implies the apophantic. 
87 Heidegger 1995, p. 198. 
88 McNeill 1999, p. 239. 
89 Ibid. 




The important difference between humans and animals, therefore, is not that animals 
don't have access to other entities, a claim that barely needs refuting, but that they 
don't have access to other entities as being entities. That is, they cannot interpret them 
apophantically-as entities which are isolated from the moment in which they are 
encountered. Just as we saw with Haugeland's dog earlier on, the animal's encounter 
is contained entirely within the moment of its action, with no possibility of the 




To return to our opening scene: The arguments I have presented in the course of this 
Chapter suggest that Sally's frisbee catch, insofar as it is a hermeneutic interpretation, 
is indeed of a kind with the dog's. But what becomes apparent is a very subtle 
distinction, tied to the assertive transition that Heidegger describes. Sally seems to 
take the frisbee she spontaneously caught as something zuhanden. As McDowell says, 
she was not engaged in any reflective thinking or planning prior to the catch she so 
expertly performed. She ran toward it, as the dog did, with an implicit awareness of 
her environment, proven as she avoided obstacles and did not stumble, aiming for the 
point at which her path crossed the frisbee's, and reached toward it as she approached 
with her hand already taking the shape of the frisbee as she stretched out her arm.92 
With all of this we find parallels in the dog's behaviour, which is likewise focused on 
and articulates the frisbee as a hermeneutic-this– not as a 'frisbee,' as the object of 
judgements, but as what Merleau-Ponty might call a 'force' which solicits her towards 
it in a particular way.93 
 
When McDowell then asks Sally “why did you just do that?”, he is performing the 
assertive breakdown both for himself and for Sally. The 'catching this' that he refers 
to, and that she considers, is not the soliciting force that captivated her a moment ago 
as she raced towards it. It is now an apophantic-this, a 'frisbee.' And where this 'this' 
can be used 'immediately for judgements,' it is not the 'this' that we are concerned 
with in regard to coping. 
 
To look at it another way, we cannot ask the dog 'why' he chased the frisbee. This does 
not mean there was no reason (Grund) for it; it means the dog does not have Reason 
                                                 
92 Cf. Kelly 2000, p. 174. 




(Vernunft). That is, the dog does not have the apophantic-this that Sally does. 
Therefore, as McDowell observes, Sally can employ rational capacities (Vernunft) 
towards the frisbee, even when she can't articulate a Grund. But this vernünftig, 
apophantic-this, is not the one at issue in the coping; it arises afterwards.  
 
This Chapter has argued that conceptual capacities do not pervade human beings “all 
the way out,” even into our 'smooth coping,' as McDowell argues in his debate with 
Dreyfus. It has done so via three interconnected arguments. In the first, I argued that 
the kind of rational conceptuality that McDowell argues for is the capacity to take 
something as a 'this.' In the second section, however, I showed how McDowell actually 
refers only to what Heidegger calls the apophantic-'this,' which arises from the more 
basic hermeneutic-'this' that is involved in coping, and which McDowell overlooks. In 
the final section, I showed how this basic 'this' is of a kind with that involved in animal 
dealings and does not, pace McDowell and Haugeland, require a culturally-mediated 
'world.' Where I have used Heidegger principally as a source for the phenomenology 
of the two distinct 'this'es, I have also showed how his broader analytic should be read 
consistently with my thesis. His influence on McDowell through Gadamer on precisely 
this subject implies that re-understanding Heidegger in this way also requires re-
understanding the foundations of McDowell's own theory. However, we have also 
seen important parallels between Heidegger and McDowell that suggest Dreyfus' 
equation of animal and infant behaviour with second-natural coping may be too quick. 
This sets the scene for our next Chapter, where I will argue that, while Heidegger and 
McDowell are right to emphasise the role of language in 'world' or second nature, 
Dreyfus' emphasis on un-mindedness keeps us closer to the phenomena involved.
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Chapter Four  
Phronesis and Post-Conceptuality 
 
In the previous Chapters, I have argued that human experience and cognition can be 
described in terms of two distinct layers. I have called these layers the 'non-
conceptual' and the 'conceptual,' understanding conceptuality as the capacity to 
experience entities and the world in a context-independent way, apophantically as 
'this' entity. Such experiences are available as content only for animals with rationality 
in the sense of Vernunft, which is to say, human beings.1 However, I have argued that 
rational animals share with non-rational animals the qualitatively different 
experience of entities hermeneutically 'as' the non-conceptual content of smooth 
coping. The key difference has emerged as the ability of rational animals to step back 
from the moment of their coping and to reflect, even if only for the instant it takes to 
Name something 'this.' 
 
Yet it may be objected that the equation of human and animal coping seems 
oversimplified, especially insofar as I have thus far focused only on the translation of 
content from the non-conceptual to the conceptual. I have yet to fully discuss an 
important objection that arose at several points earlier: the observation that, even if 
we perform our skills with non-conceptual cognition, this presupposes our having 
learned them as concepts. Our chess master, for example, might directly and 
reflexively see the right move to make, but they are still– by enacting the verb 'to 
castle,' or displaying an understanding of how a knight can move– employing 
knowledge that can only be learned in a reflective, conceptual way. What is seen in the 
moment may be non-conceptual, but it implies entities that get their being from social 
practices, practices that are conceptually structured. The suggestion that non-
conceptual coping is always prior to our conceptual understanding, then, seems to 
give an incomplete picture of the kind of coping under discussion. 
 
In this Chapter, therefore, I will begin to refine the account I have given so far. Where 
I have previously isolated two distinct layers, I aim now to explore their entanglement, 
and to consider what it means to hold that conceptually-derived content can be 
experienced as the non-conceptual content of unreflective coping capacities. To do 
this, I will explore accounts of what Aristotle called phronesis, or 'practical wisdom.' 
                                                 
1 Further arguments as to why we should deny the presence of Vernunft in non-human animals will be 




Phronesis is discussed by Dreyfus and McDowell, as well as at length by Heidegger, 
as an exemplar of coping in peculiarly human contexts. Heidegger in particular 
discusses it with reference to Umsicht and Eigentlichkeit, suggesting that parallels 
may be drawn between phronesis and the authentic moments of esoteric expertise, 
which we saw in Chapter Two are intertwined with reflective thought. These 
descriptions, then, should serve as a starting point for articulating a second and 
peculiarly human form of non-conceptual cognition that diverges from the parallels 
with animals that I argued for in Chapter Three. 
 
In the first Sections of this Chapter, I will explore conceptions of phronesis, as well as 
its possessor, the phronimos, to argue that, as a practical application of ethical action, 
it demonstrates a fluidity between technical and ethical practice. This opens the door 
to discuss the relation of phronesis to expertise, showing how phronesis is an 
exemplar of a wider form of smooth coping with concepts. In the following Section, I 
ground the phenomenology of phronetic coping in its special relationship to memory, 
and in its association with the conscience, to show how it describes conceptual content 
experienced in an embodied, non-conceptual way. I conclude by taking up Charles 
Taylor's suggestion that, rather than non-conceptual, phronesis is post-conceptual, 
and argue that it is an example of coping in a non-conceptual way within our 
conceptually-built McDowellian second-natures. The content of such coping is 
experienced as distinct from the apophantic-'as,' but also from whatever version of 
the hermeneutic-'as' that non-rational animals may share with human beings. This 
will later inform my arguments in the Chapters of Part Two, which will hold that 
human experience is characterised by a direct linguistic perception. 
 
4.1 – Why phronesis? 
in which I introduce Aristotle's account of phronesis and  
explain why, in spite of its heritage as an ethical concept, it remains  
highly relevant to our questions of concepts and perception. 
 
Phronesis plays a central role in the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, with both thinkers 
drawing upon Aristotle's discussion of it to support their side of the argument. In this 
first section, therefore, I will explore and unpack this arete or 'virtue' both to 
understand the different conceptions of it, and to gain a clearer idea of its relevance 
to the debate. 
 
Phronesis is generally translated 'prudence' or 'practical wisdom' and is a major theme 
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of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, where it is discussed at length in Book Six. It is 
listed, together with noûs, sophia, episteme and techne, as one of five intellectual 
virtues (aretai dianoetikai), “by which the soul attains the truth.”2 Among these, it is 
grouped together with techne– skill expertise– as being concerned with things which 
can change, unlike sophia and episteme, which give access to universals, to that which 
does not change.3 Unlike the latter two, phronesis and techne, as forms of knowledge, 
are unable to be captured in abstract rules or propositions, as their possession is 
marked by a direct discernment of what needs to be done that is unique to the specific 
situation in which it is performed.  
 
There is therefore an important overlap between phronesis and techne. They share a 
form of deliberation which is not dialectical reasoning, but is tied directly to 
perception.4 They differ principally in the ends to which the knowledge serves and is 
applied, with techne producing an object, while phronesis is directed at the actor 
themselves, and more broadly to their actions in the situation.5 Phronesis is tied to 
moral virtue, as its enactment leads its possessor to choose the 'good' or 'noble' path 
of action.6 Aristotle explicitly distinguishes phronesis from deinoteta or 'cleverness,' 
a morally neutral ability to work any situation to one's advantage.7 While cleverness 
obviously involves great skill, knowledge, and discernment, it is not phronesis, since 
its possession says little about the character of the actor or the action. 
 
It may be objected, then, that phronesis is too narrow a topic to inform our discussion, 
and that Aristotle's apparent concern with the ethical is tangential to the questions of 
cognition which we are concerned with here. Yet for Aristotle, the subject matter of 
ēthikē or 'morality' is much broader than the questions of 'right' and 'wrong' that the 
word has come to signify, something we should notice as we reflect on the word 'ethos,' 
which refers to habits and customs that construct our character ('ēthos') and which 
we develop just as much in our practical dealings as in our social lives.8 Phronesis is 
therefore relevant to our question in many ways. As we will see below, an 
understanding of phronesis formed the starting point of the Dreyfus-McDowell 
                                                 
2 Aristotle, 1139b15. Unless otherwise stated, references to Aristotle are to the Nicomachean Ethics and 
are given by Bekker number, usually in a range (e.g. 5-10) indicating the paragraph rather than the 
exact lines. I have principally relied on Bartlett & Collins (2011) for English translations, and 
Rackham (1926) for Greek text, having also made use of Irwin's (1985) translation. 
3 Aristotle, 1139a5-10. 
4 Aristotle, 1141b25-30. 
5 Aristotle, 1140b5. Cf. Heidegger 1997, p. 35. 
6 Aristotle, 1144a25-30. 
7 Ibid. 




debate, which began with Dreyfus criticising McDowell's use of phronesis as an 
example of enacted conceptual capacities.9 Even more importantly, perhaps, is the 
role that phronesis plays in Heidegger's thought. Although the term is not mentioned 
in Being and Time, Kisiel's comprehensive study of the background of that text asserts 
that “the phronesis into human action constitutes the exemplary paradigm of [Being 
and Time's] Second Division, just as the other nontheoretical 'dianoetic virtue,' 
techne... is the basic example of the First.”10 That is, it is not phronesis itself, but the 
mode of knowing and acting of which it is an example that is of key importance to 
Heidegger, McDowell, and Dreyfus. As such, an investigation of phronesis serves as 
an entry point to this wider mode of enacted cognition. 
 
The distinction between techne and phronesis, and its mirror in the Divisions of 
Heidegger's masterwork, therefore becomes significant to our investigation. Much of 
Dreyfus' argument, as I have presented and for the most part defended it in Chapters 
One and Three, has its roots in Division One and the theory of equipment– that is to 
say, with the application of techne as a situation-specific enacted form of knowledge. 
However, we saw in Chapter Two that the everyday expertise of our ready-to-hand 
dealings– which in Chapter Three I argued we ought to extend to animals– is for the 
most part uneigentlich– unowned. Division Two of Being and Time, however, revisits 
the themes of the first Division through the lens of Eigentlichkeit, and we therefore 
find something of a parallel between the enactment of phronesis and the authentic, 
esoteric expertise I discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
The line between moral imperative and technical expertise, then, is not so pronounced 
as it might at first appear. As mentioned above, Aristotle's view of ethical practice 
went beyond narrow questions to take in the broader way we approach our form of 
life, and it would not be surprising if Heidegger was thinking about the common 
thread linking our practical and ethical dealings. For example, in the years before 
Being and Time was published, Heidegger referred to phronesis as Umsicht, 
'circumspection,' the form of sight which in Being and Time characterises our 
practical dealings with the ready-to-hand, thereby blurring the line between techne 
and ways of living.11 By the same token, as will become clear in what follows, we should 
                                                 
9 Dreyfus 2005, p. 50. 
10 Kisiel 1993, p. 250. 
11 Heidegger 1997, p. 33. Cf. Heidegger 1992, p. 377 (retranslated and abridged in Kisiel 1993, p. 266) 
where he calls phronesis 'fürsorgende Umsicht,' thereby restricting it to our dealings with Others, 
which suggests that phronesis is called upon rather as an exemplary case of a broader species of 
cognition than as representing that mode of cognition entirely. 
121 
 
extend our understanding of phronesis beyond purely moral knowledge.  
 
I have argued in this section that Heidegger drew upon phronesis as one example of 
the kind of authentic practical understanding that develops out of the everyday 
dealings exemplified by techne. In the following sections, then, I will investigate 
phronesis as it is taken up in the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, in order to gain a better 
understanding of the divergence of this form of eigentlich coping from the accounts 
of the everyday we have seen so far. 
 
4.2 – Phronesis, coping,  
and the Dreyfus-McDowell debate 
in which I explore the role of the logos in phronesis, and suggest that phronesis  
involves the experience of concepts in a non-conceptual way. 
 
Phronesis appears in the opening volleys of the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, when 
Dreyfus, in his Presidential Address, criticises McDowell's understanding of it in Mind 
and World.12 In particular, he objects to what he understands as McDowell's assertion 
that the phronimos responds to reasons that are specifiable in advance, outside of the 
enacted situation. However, following McDowell's response in his first Inquiry article, 
Dreyfus retracts that criticism, admitting that he misunderstood McDowell's 
reading.13 Phronesis, for McDowell, is a “situation-specific discernment,” suggesting 
the same absence of generalised rules and concepts that Dreyfus emphasises in his 
discussion of smooth coping.14 
 
This basic agreement on phronesis covers up dissensions that will become the basis 
for the subsequent disagreement between the two philosophers. Phronesis is 
discussed by both Dreyfus and McDowell, as it was by Heidegger, as an exemplar of 
practical coping. The original question, as discussed in the previous Chapters, is 
whether practical coping involves conceptual content, in the sense of whether it has 
been Named– that is, whether it involves content that need undergo no 
transformation if it is to be expressed as the subject of a proposition. In the terms of 
Chapter Three, it asks whether phronesis involves the apophantic-'this.' In Aristotle's 
terms, this 'this' is the logos, as expressed in the logos apophantikos– that is, a logos 
that can be immediately expressed propositionally without a change in content. 15 
                                                 
12 Dreyfus 2005, p. 50. 
13 McDowell 2007a, p. 340; Dreyfus 2007a, p. 353. 
14 McDowell 2007a, p. 340. 
15  Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 16b26-17a8. Heidegger explicitly connects his conception of the 




Recognising the Aristotelian roots of both Heidegger and McDowell's thought, we find 
a more explicit expression of the overlap between rationality and conceptuality that 
has pervaded the debate so far, for the kind of rationality that McDowell invokes 
descends from what Aristotle discussed as logos and legein. When McDowell 
discusses 'the space of reasons,' he means the conceptual realm, with its particular 
access to truth, that for Aristotle is tied to speech and which also for McDowell arises 
through our acquisition of linguistic capacities and development of a 'second nature.'16 
The 'rational animal' McDowell so frequently invokes is the zoon logon echon– 
literally, the 'animal (or even more literally, the 'living being') with logos'– and hence, 
as I argued previously, rationality or Vernunft must be understood less in terms of an 
ability to give reasons (Gründe) but rather as the ability to relate to the world in terms 
of the logos.17 
 
McDowell's use of phronesis becomes an issue for Dreyfus, then, because the latter's 
account of coping draws upon Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, which claims that in 
phronesis “there is accomplished something like a pure perceiving, one that no longer 
falls within the domain of the logos.”18 Dreyfus sees this as support for his central 
point that thought is not involved in our expert performances, in that the cognitive 
content of coping is not such that it can be immediately expressed linguistically. 
However, McDowell disputes this understanding, arguing that it is problematic to 
equate the 'domain of logos' with the 'domain of language' in an abstract or 
universalised sense. He replies that “[c]ontrary to what Dreyfus implies, the domain 
of conceptual articulation includes thoughts that are not intelligible in abstraction 
from particular situations.”19 However, we saw in Chapter One that these situation-
specific thoughts are still reflective rationalisations– that is, articulating them means 
that we have already taken a step away from the moment of coping, even when we 
have not universalised that experience as an abstract concept. Or, in the terms of 
Chapter Three, McDowell's discussion is restricted to the apophantic-this, which is 
produced by stepping back from the momentary, hermeneutic-this of absorbed 
action. 
 
Although he overlooks (or rejects) non-conceptual content, phronesis in McDowell's 
                                                 
1988, pp. 180-1; cf. 1995, p. 313. 
16 McDowell 1994, pp. 75-8, 84-5. In this sense, McDowell's 'space of reasons' differs, probably under 
Aristotle's influence, from Sellar's purely logical (in the modern sense) space of reasons. 
17 McDowell 1994, p. 79; Aristotle, De Anima, 427b10-15, 428a20-25. 
18 Dreyfus 2005, p. 51; cf. Heidegger 1997, pp. 111-2. 
19 McDowell 2007a, p. 342. 
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understanding exemplifies conceptual capacities that are distinct from the abstract, 
detached reflection traditionally identified with conceptuality. Dreyfus' ascription of 
this traditional understanding to McDowell leads to his initial faux pas, yet an 
important difference remains in spite of Dreyfus' acceptance of a shared 
understanding of the situation-specificity of phronesis. Where Dreyfus emphasises 
the absence of logos in phronesis, McDowell insists that in this context, “logos must 
be situation specific conceptual articulation”; that is, phronesis just is an articulation 
of the logos in a purely situation-specific sense.20 Our question thus becomes one of 
the role of logos in phronesis. For while both thinkers seem to agree that reflective 
language is not at the heart of the issue, we find Dreyfus continuing to hold that this 
indicates non-conceptual content where McDowell argues for a situationally-specific 
logos– an apophantic-this that is never expressed or Named beyond the context in 
which it is encountered and used. 
 
Having argued that the Dreyfus-McDowell debate centres on the place of logos in 
phronesis, in the next two parts of this Section I will examine phronesis in more depth 
to steer a course between the rival claims of Dreyfus and McDowell. Expanding on 
Aristotle's claim that phronesis both contains the logos and yet goes beyond it, I will 
argue that the disagreement arises from both thinkers emphasising different 
elements. In Section 4.2.1, I examine phronesis' relation to memory in order to draw 
parallels between its enactment and our unreflective skill performance. In Section 
4.2.2, I elaborate on Heidegger's association of phronesis with the conscience to argue 
that phronesis exemplifies a felt or perceptual experience of conceptually-derived 
entities. While both parts take their cue from Aristotle, they also aim beyond textual 
interpretation, in order to ground his discussion in lived phenomena, and to argue 
that phronesis is a direct experience of the logos in a non-conceptual way. 
 
4.2.1 – Memory 
in which I examine the claim that phronesis cannot be  
forgotten in the light of recent work on memory systems, arguing  
that this demonstrates that phronesis is 'embodied' knowledge.  
 
In this first part of the Section I will examine phronesis' relation to memory, looking 
at Aristotle's claim that it 'cannot be forgotten.' 21  By comparing this with 
contemporary accounts of memory systems, I will argue that memories involving the 
logos or explicit conceptual knowledge are much more easily forgotten than the 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 




implicit memories that show parallels with phronesis. In this way, I will argue that 
phronesis involves an embodied, non-conceptual knowledge. 
 
Aristotle argues that the soul (psyche) has two parts, one rational and one non-
rational (meta logou and aneu logou).22 At first glance, this claim could be taken to 
support my thesis of two layers of mindedness, one of which is shared with animals, 
and thus shifting the emphasis from the zoon logon echon to the psyche logon echon. 
Yet the case is not so black and white. With regards to phronesis, it is McDowell's 
understanding that appears, on the surface, to be the more straightforwardly 
Aristotelian, since Aristotle is explicit that phronesis is 'accompanied by rationality' 
(meta logou).23 It is therefore problematic for us to liken phronesis to any behaviour 
we share with non-rational animals, even if we were to grant them a shared non-
rational psyche. Crucial to our understanding of phronesis, therefore, is an 
understanding of how it is meta logou, and what exactly this signifies. 
 
Meta logou is used adjectively for the five 'intellectual' aretai listed above, those which 
Aristotle ascribed to the rational part of the psyche– episteme and sophia, which deal 
with universals (which do not change), techne and phronesis, which deal with 
particular things (which do), and noûs, which, however, is accompanied by (or rather, 
accompanies) logos in a different way, as we will see in the next Chapter. Their 
relation to legein, or speech, means that they provide us with access to truth 
(aletheia), in the sense that making a true statement also articulates the possibility of 
what is false (in the same sense in which, in De Anima, Aristotle holds that 
understanding that something is 'white' equally implies an understanding of 'not-
white').24 This distinguishes it from perception (aisthesis), which cannot be 'false' and 
hence can neither be 'true' in this specific sense.25 The logos, then, is not something 
that is contingently added to the intellectual aretai, but defines their ways of relating 
to the world. As Heidegger reads it, the “meta does not mean that speech is an 
arbitrary annex to the modes of aletheuein... [it] signifies that in these modes, right at 
the heart, lies legein.”26 It is from this same Aristotelian understanding of truth that 
McDowell begins his argument that the 'space of reasons' has an access to the world 
                                                 
22 Aristotle 1139a1-5. 
23 Aristotle 1140a15-20. 
24 Aristotle 1139b10-20; De Anima 430b1-5. Cf. De Interpretatione 16a9-18. 
25 Aristotle, De Anima, 427b5-15. Compare the discussion of Haugeland and Pippin's confused dogs in 
Chapter Three, supra, pp. 97-8. 
26 Heidegger 1997, p. 19. 
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that ultimately goes beyond our simpler, first-natural access.27 
 
However, despite the centrality of the logos, phronesis stretches beyond a purely 
intellectual understanding. Aristotle writes: 
 
Yet phronesis is also not merely a characteristic accompanied by reason [is not meta 
logou monon], a sign of which is that it is possible to forget such a characteristic [i.e., 
a state meta logou], but not to forget phronesis.28 
 
Key to an understanding of how phronesis is meta logou, then, is understanding how 
it is not meta logou monon– not merely meta logou. What should interest us, then, 
is the way in which phronesis is more than a rational faculty. And the clue here seems 
to be in its special relationship to memory. 
 
There is an obvious link back to technical skills here, in both the everyday and the 
esoteric sense. When we truly absorb a skill, to the point where we no longer need to 
call to mind the steps through which we learned to perform it, we have in a sense 
'embodied' the skill to an extent where we cannot 'forget' it in the same way that we 
forget phone numbers or appointment times. When we really know something in the 
phronetic sense, it becomes almost instinctual, 'like riding a bike.' In some cases, this 
kind of embodied knowledge functions even as we lose the ability to articulate it– we 
may be unable to call the chord progression to mind until we are actually holding the 
guitar, after which our hand naturally finds the right shapes.  
 
We can make sense of this forgettable-unforgettable distinction by relating it to recent 
work on memory. Psychiatrist and phenomenologist Thomas Fuchs describes this 
'unforgettable' phronetic knowledge as 'body memory' or 'implicit memory,' 
distinguishing it from the 'explicit memory' which can be forgotten.29 This largely 
follows the line Squire describes between 'declarative' and 'nondeclarative' memory, 
where the latter pertains more to skill and habit formation, and retains “knowledge 
expressed through performance rather than recollection.”30 Fuchs expands on the 
                                                 
27 McDowell 1994, pp. 76-85. It is from this point that my major disagreement with McDowell, which 
will be discussed at the end of this thesis, begins to crystallise. McDowell has faith that the logos of 
aletheia is able to give us direct insight into fundamental reality, while I will hold that this very 
movement disconnects us from ultimate truth. 
28 Aristotle 1140b25-30. 
29 Fuchs 2012, p. 11. However, Fuchs' (2012, p. 23-4) body memory is not strictly unforgettable, but 
rather is much less liable to being lost than explicit memory. Cf. Tulving 2005, p. 9. 




phenomenology of body memory, noting that it comes in many varieties, which 
correspond to the everyday and esoteric expertises I discussed earlier. 'Procedural' 
body memory, for example, describes the way I know my way around a keyboard, and 
how while I may be unable to recall whether the 'C' or the 'V' key is next to the 'X' when 
I'm away from my computer, I have no problem finding the right keys when I'm 
immersed in the act of touch-typing.31 Yet body memory also extends beyond such 
'automatic' tasks to a 'situative' memory that helps us orient ourselves in our 
environment, from the simple 'at-home' feeling we have walking around a familiar 
house even in the dark, to the more complex familiarity that an expert acquires after 
years of experience, such as the 'sixth sense' that might alert an expert sailor to an 
oncoming storm.32 Such skills are parallel to phronesis in that the expert may not be 
able to articulate just how they know what they know; rather, they are keying into 
multiple, subtle signs. This inarticulable body memory has its dark side with the 
'traumatic' memory that lingers in the phobias and anxieties that follow surviving a 
horrific event, and which may be triggered by similar situations even if the original 
experience is forgotten or repressed. 33  Yet here, as with embodied skills, the 
knowledge has not been forgotten in the way that we forget facts, but rather “what we 
have forgotten, has become what we are.”34 
 
Recent work on explicit or declarative memory systems also supports a distinction 
between phronesis and embodied skills on the one hand, and articulable memories on 
the other. Tulving famously distinguishes between 'semantic' and 'episodic' 
memory.35 Episodic memory involves what Tulving describes as “mental time travel,” 
through which we are able to relive past events by re-experiencing them in a distanced 
yet 'inner' way (as well as being able to imagine and anticipate possible future 
events).36 Tulving argues that episodic memory– a “recently evolved, late developing, 
and early deteriorating brain/mind memory system”– is central to our experience as 
the “owner” of memories and thoughts.37 Tulving calls this sensation of ownership 
'autonoetic consciousness' or 'autonoesis' and argues that it is crucial to our sense of 
being a self, since it makes it possible for us to identify ourselves as the subject of past 
                                                 
31 Fuchs 2012, p. 12. 
32 Ibid, pp. 13-4. 
33 Ibid, pp. 17-8. 
34 Ibid, p. 13. 
35 Tulving 1972, 1983, 2005. 
36 Tulving 2005, pp. 6-7. Such 're-experiencing' has a detached, observational character to it, being 
clearly experienced as a memory, unlike body memory which– as encountered most vividly in the 
'traumatic' body memory accompanying post-traumatic stress disorder– is experienced as though the 
recalled event were actually happening again. 
37 Ibid, p. 9. 
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experiences and the agent of past (and planned) thoughts and actions, thus giving rise 
to a sense of narrative continuity. 
 
Episodic memory is contrasted with 'semantic' memory, which is experienced only in 
the present as a response to specific, ongoing activities. Where a sense of time is 
inextricable from episodic memory, semantic memory has “no special relation to 
time.”38 It is a memory of facts or of how to do things, separate from the context in 
which they are done or as part of a life-narrative. Tulving cites brain-damaged subjects 
who have lost their episodic memory capabilities while their semantic capacities 
remain intact. One typical subject, for example, is able to remember facts such as their 
previous address, and to recognise that house when standing in front of it, yet lacks 
any recollection of events associated with it. 39  Such people remain “capable of 
impressive feats of intelligence,” problem-solving, communication, and the ability to 
learn skills, yet lose their capacity to draw upon information that does not belong to 
the context of their activity.40 
 
Tulving argues that while we share semantic memory with other animals, episodic 
memory is confined to humans.41 More specifically, it is confined to human beings 
after a particular stage of development, as young children don't seem to acquire 
episodic memory until the ages of three to six years. For example, Tulving cites an 
experiment where young children were taught a novel and unusual colour name (for 
example, 'chartreuse').42 After correctly demonstrating their knowledge of the colour, 
the children were asked how they had learned the word. While the older children (five 
to six years old) would recount being taught earlier in the day, four year olds typically 
asserted that they 'always knew' the word. Tulving further hypothesises that 
'childhood amnesia' (the fact that most of us retain very few memories from before 
the age of around four) is explained by our simply not having developed episodic 
memory before that age. 43  Tulving hypothesises that, since young children lack 
episodic memory, animals almost certainly lack it as well. Pippin's dog, for example, 
whom we met in Chapter Three, does not act as though her master seemed to be an 
intruder only moments before.44 Semantic memory alone is enough to account for the 
way a dog can remember where the bone is buried or where the rabbits are usually 
                                                 
38 Ibid, p. 18. 
39 Ibid, pp. 24-5. 
40 Ibid, pp. 25-6. 
41 Ibid, p. 14. 
42 Ibid, p. 32. 
43 Ibid. 




found on the daily walk, without needing to postulate that it remembers the act of 
burying the bone, or the time it so very nearly caught a rabbit. 
 
This offers interesting support for our thesis so far. Episodic memory and autonoesis 
are associated with the capacity to take something apophantically-as something that 
I have argued is restricted to human beings. On the other hand, the autonomous 
semantic memory system is shared with animals and pre-linguistic infants, and– as 
the cases of young children and Tulving's episodically-amnesiac subjects show– is 
sufficient for smooth coping. Coping with a hermeneutic-this, then, seems to involve 
a different form of memory, one which is not so easily forgotten as the episodic 
memory that characterises more explicit knowledge. Similarly, there is at least a 
phenomenological link with the 'expertise-induced amnesia' discussed in Chapter 
Two, where Bielock and her colleagues confirmed the anecdotal experience of many 
athletes and performers who lack, or have a significantly different quality of, 
memories from the intense flow of peak performance. 45  If, therefore, phronesis 
“cannot be forgotten,” it would appear to belong rather to the region of semantic 
memory, of situationally-evoked skilled responsiveness, than to the realm of abstract 
thought that autonoesis makes possible. In a similar way, such abstract thought is 
connected to an ability to understand entities as persistent over time as well as out of 
a particular time-context, and hence, in Aristotle's terms, belongs to the aretai that 
are concerned with universals (i.e., episteme and sophia), rather than phronesis, 
which is concerned with the “ultimate particular thing,” in this moment, now.46 
 
Fuchs' phenomenology and Tulving's psychology have supported and refined 
Aristotle's distinction between the facts we forget and the phronetic knowledge we 
cannot. Implicit and embodied– that is, non-declarative and semantic– memories 
are, strictly speaking, harder (though not quite impossible) to forget, and people 
suffering amnesia or dementia continue to display implicit body memory even in the 
absence of almost all episodic memory.47 It seems clear that Aristotle is referring to 
the relatively fragile explicit or episodic memory as a contrast to phronesis. And it is 
through this contrast that we see the entanglement of episodic memory, the 
(autonoetic) self, and the logos.48 
                                                 
45 Supra, p. 85; cf. Bielock et al. 2001, 2003. It seems unlikely to be coincidental that the brain 
regions associated with episodic memory are the same as those associated with abstract reasoning, 
and which are lacking in most non-human animals. 
46 Aristotle, 1142a25-30. 
47 Tulving 2005, p. 23-4; Fuchs 2012, pp. 20-1. 
48 The parallels between episodic memory acquisition, autonoesis, and McDowell's concept of Bildung 
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This contrast becomes clearer in Heidegger's expansion on the relation of phronesis 
and memory through his reading of truth or aletheia as 'unconcealing.' Phronesis 
cannot be forgotten (lethe) because it is not a revealing (aletheia) in a way that 
involves apophansis. 49  One cannot conceal what cannot be unconcealed. Or less 
cryptically, the kind of knowledge that phronesis involves is not the kind used to make 
propositional judgements that are true and false. This stands in contrast to the earlier 
description of the aretai meta logou as aletheuein or unconcealers. Yet it runs 
together with Heidegger's rejection of the logos as the proper place of truth, for the 
logos apophantikos is taken as the place of pseudos or falsehood, since every 
proposition directs us into understanding an entity from a concrete and particular 
angle.50 That is, it freezes our understanding in the terms of a single point of view– 
what we call 'white' is now understood as different from 'not-white' and the same as 
other 'whites,' even those beyond the immediate situation.51 For example, when I 
Name the wall 'white,' I am understanding the wall's colour– both in the sunny 
patches and the shadowy corners– in the same way as I understand the colour of snow 
or of clouds. As such, the logos directs us away from the unique situation, from 
particulars to abstract universals. 52  Yet what is important about phronesis– for 
Heidegger and Dreyfus as well as for McDowell– is precisely its focus on the unique, 
specific situation. 
 
We therefore find the apparently contradictory description of phronesis as an 
aletheuein meta logou and yet beyond (mēn monon) it, with a grasp of truth that goes 
beyond the dialogical play of opposites that the logos implies. Our examination of 
memory has shown that phronesis bears more resemblance to the logos-free 
embodied memory than it does to explicit memory. It is still unclear, however, exactly 
what this means in practice. In the remaining part of this Section, I will delve deeper 
into Heidegger's understanding of phronesis as 'conscience' in order to clarify the 
experience of phronesis as direct, imperative perception. 
 
 
* * * 
 
                                                 
will become very significant as we continue. 
49 Cf. Elden 2006, p. 55. 
50 Heidegger 1997, p. 125; cf. p. 18. 
51 Cf. supra, p. 124. 
52 Cf. Heidegger's (1995, pp. 343-5) rejection in his 1929-30 lectures of the phrase 'the board is black' 
as an example that could give us any real insight into the board's being, preferring rather the 




4.2.2 – Conscience 
in which I argue that phronesis' association with  
the conscience signifies that it is an experience  
of conceptual entities in a non-conceptual way. 
 
Gadamer– Heidegger's student and one of McDowell's major influences– recalls that 
Heidegger associated phronesis with the conscience.53 'Conscience' (Gewissen) is one 
of the major themes of Division Two of Being and Time, where it is highlighted as a 
call to Eigentlichkeit.54 The conscience is a call from the tranquillising comfort of das 
Man to resoluteness, an “authentic Being-one's-Self.” 55  That is, through the 
conscience's call Dasein wrenches itself away from letting itself be carried along by 
having decisions made in advance by 'the way things just are.' It 'chooses itself,' and 
is thereby individualised, taking ownership of itself as a self. 56  'Self' here is no 
detached ego, for  
 
[r]esoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is 
ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.57 
 
These two modes of Being– concernful (besorgende) and solicitous (fürsorgende)– 
are united in that they involve the circumspection (Umsicht) of everyday dealings 
(Umgänge). 58  With the conscience and the call to resoluteness, then, we see a 
movement in our coping away from the uneigentlich everyday towards an owned 
mode of coping, marked by the presence of the self right there in the dealings with 
equipment or Others, which we find echoed in the qualitatively different form of 
concentrated absorption of flow that was discussed in Chapter Two. A further 
characteristic of this authentic coping is the movement away from the stereotyped, 
automatic reactions of the 'general situation (Lage)' to a spontaneous coping in the 
'specific situation (Situation).'59 
 
One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should 
want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been 
proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them. The resolution is precisely the 
                                                 
53 See Elden 2006, p. 55. 
54 Heidegger 1962, pp. 343-4. 
55 Ibid, p. 344, Heidegger's emphasis. 
56 Ibid, p. 334. 
57 Ibid, p. 344. 
58 Recall Heidegger's earlier definition of phronesis as fürsorgende Umsicht, supra, p. 120, n. 11. 
59 Heidegger 1962, p. 346. 
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disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time.60 
 
The connection to phronesis as authentic coping starts to become clearer. Kisiel 
argues that for Heidegger, the state or habit of phronesis “is what it is by its being 
embedded in praxis,” as a “'voice' beyond logos.”61 That is to say, phronesis is not the 
kind of knowledge that we 'have' in an abstract sense. As Gadamer puts it, “we do not 
possess moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and then apply it to 
specific situations.”62 In this sense, it has more in common with embodied skill than 
with thought. A master potter does not need to decide how to curve the edge of the 
clay she is throwing, nor does an expert cyclist need to think about how far to lean into 
a curve. In both these cases, as with phronesis, our knowledge is something we enact 
in a process of responsive adjustments to the evolving situation. 
 
Most significantly, the 'call of conscience' is not experienced as a personal decision, 
but directly and unbidden.63 Furthermore, our conscience is not an opinion that can 
be changed by rational propositions; it cannot be reasoned with. Of course, our 
conscience may call us to different decisions over time as our sense of what is 
appropriate to do evolves via explicit deliberation, yet the point remains that we 
cannot wilfully change what we actually believe, even if we come to believe that we 
should change those beliefs and even choose to attempt such a change.64 As with 
learning a skill, where we might theoretically know how to do something without 
being able to actually do it, we can also 'know' an action is right without being able to 
shake the feeling that it is actually wrong. 
 
None of this implies that we always follow our conscience or even that we should, but 
simply that we are always aware of when we are acting against it. More subtly– and of 
key relevance to our investigation– it also reflects the way we completely absorb 
practices into our ways of life. Think, for example of how difficult it is to drive through 
a red light, even when the street is deserted. While we can reason that doing so would 
be a victimless crime– it's three in the morning, it's well-lit, we can clearly see there is 
no one around, there are no cameras to record us– the red light itself exerts a push 
                                                 
60 Ibid, p. 345, Heidegger's emphasis. 
61 Kisiel 1993, p. 306. 
62 Gadamer 1989, p. 317, my emphasis. 
63 Heidegger 1962, p. 320. 
64 Or at least, changing one's beliefs involves not an intellectual decision, but coming to embody and 
internalise a new relationship to the world. We could draw a comparison here with the advice often 
given to novices or converts to spiritual practices– most famously by Pascal (1962, pp. 200-205) in 
his 'Wager'– that, despite whatever doubts one might have, if one acts as though one believes– if one 




against us almost as of a physical force.  
 
It may be contested here, however, that this example does not show a call to 
authenticity, but precisely demonstrates the inauthenticity of das Man, where we step 
back from choosing and let the normative structures of the world 'do the work' for 
us.65 However, we could also say that, in surrendering to social norms, conscience 
itself does not appear. 'Tranquillised' Dasein would not consider running the light; 
only on considering an alternative course of action do we experience the “abrupt 
arousal” of conscience, after which das Man “collapses.”66 Conscience arises with an 
understanding of possibilities, of taking ownership of one's actions. As the call to 
authenticity, it comes together with a questioning of the norms of das Man. However, 
being authentic– owning one's actions– does not mean breaking social norms simply 
for the sake of doing so. Conscience instead awakens us to recognising the good of the 
norms we do or do not follow. The central point remains that conscience's call is 
immediate and silent. Even if we choose to go anyway and drive through the red light, 
the movement is experienced with a physical heaviness that is experienced more as a 
perceptual sensation than a conceptual doubt. 
 
Conscience, then, is experienced similarly to Merleau-Ponty's 'optimal grip' or 'best 
hold' (meilleure prise), the unthought, felt solicitation to maintain or improve one's 
position in an activity, which Dreyfus draws on heavily in his description of embodied 
coping.67 It is to express the same point that Aristotle calls phronesis an aisthesis, a 
perception: 
 
[P]hronesis is concerned with the ultimate particular thing, of which there is not an 
episteme but rather a perception, and a perception not of things peculiar to one of the 
senses, but a perception of the sort by which we perceive that the ultimate particular 
thing, in mathematics, is a triangle.68 
 
Kisiel argues that Heidegger took this to mean that phronesis “brings us into the realm 
of praxis, human action, the getting about of human life with itself.”69 Phronesis, 
therefore, acts as a bridge between the rational and the perceptual, between the meta 
                                                 
65 Cf. Ratcliffe 2007, p. 73; supra, p. 87. 
66 Heidegger 1962, pp. 316-7. 
67 Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, pp. 308-9/278-9. Cf. Merleau-Ponty 2012, pp. 261; Dreyfus 2007a, p. 
358. Note also that for Aristotle, the aretai are located at the mesotes or mean between excess and 
deficiency. 
68 Aristotle, 1142a25-30. 
69 Kisiel 1993, p. 267. 
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logou and the aneu logou, insofar as it deals with the minded content of the logos, 
and yet deals with it in a way that experientially bypasses rational thought, being 
instead directly perceived as a solicitation or affordance on the level of our purely 
practical dealings. 
 
However, as Aristotle points out in the above-quoted statement, this is not a 
perception in the sense of a simple sensation, but a direct understanding, as of a 
mathematical object. Bartlett and Collins note that there are two ways of 
understanding the statement. 70  In the first, attributed to Albertus Magnus, the 
triangle is 'ultimate' as the product of a logical reduction to starting premises. The 
second, attributed to Aquinas, understands the triangle as simply an example of 
something ultimate in the sense that “we simply perceive a given particular thing as 
what it is and must rely on that perception in whatever we may go on to say about it.”71 
The Aquinian reading is more consistent with my argument so far, supporting an 
understanding that Aristotle here is describing a direct sensory perception of entities 
that we would otherwise expect could only be known meta logou. This certainly 
echoes the Heideggerian understanding in Being and Time, where he argues that what 
we “'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the 
motor-cycle.”72 Our perception rarely reveals 'pure' sense-data, but a whole that is 
immediately and unreflectively experienced as significant. This point also connects to 
Heidegger's earlier, more explicitly Aristotelian thoughts, such as his assertion that 
“[c]ircumspecting [i.e., phronesis73] culminates in... something akin to noûs in its 
simplicity free of an [apophantic] as-structure.”74  
 
The introduction of noûs here is an important move, and its role as an exclusively 
human form of perception will be the topic of the next Chapter. But briefly, as 
mentioned above, noûs is mentioned as one of the five rational virtues, but with a 
special relation to logos. Where sophia and episteme are held to do with universals 
and phronesis and techne with particulars, noûs is described as a form of perception 
that links the two groups. For Aristotle, 
 
the universals arise from the particulars. Of these, then, one must have a perception, 
                                                 
70 Bartlett & Collins in Aristotle 2011, p. 126, n. 44. 
71 Ibid. Cf. Aquinas 1993, pp. 384-5 (lecs. 1214-5), where he claims that even animals can be “prudent,” 
thus offering a direct link to what I have called the non-conceptual direct perception that we share 
with animals. 
72 Heidegger 1962, p. 207. 
73 Supra, p. 120.  




and this perception is noûs.75 
 
Heidegger argues that noûs is itself aneu logou but gives access to the logos as a direct 
form of perception.76 Yet this kind of perception is not that of raw, animal primitives, 
but of complex, learned conceptual objects. As Aristotle points out, aisthesis is always 
of wholes– of streets, houses, trees or people.77 Such wholes, we could argue, might 
also be taken in some way by animals hermeneutically-as such. Yet humans can also 
directly perceive triangles, stop-signs, violins, and words as such, in a direct, 
hermeneutic way. To account for this phenomenon, we need to re-evaluate the 
equation of the human and animal hermeneutic-'as'es of the previous Chapter. While 
certainly animals, from bees to rats to monkeys, are capable of being trained to 
associate a whole variety of signs with specific actions, the richness of that significance 
is limited in comparison to the human experience. When we hear the motorbike 
arriving, we hear it for what it is, a motorbike, something more than it is for the dog 
whose master's arrival it simply announces. Phronesis, then, as meta logou and yet 
experienced as a logos-free aisthesis akin to noûs, suggests a mode of experiencing 
cognitive, conceptual entities as we would experience a direct, bodily solicitation. 
 
In the two parts of this Section, I have grounded our understanding of phronesis in 
two phenomena. Firstly, I discussed phronesis's relation to memory in order to show 
that phronesis is enacted and experienced in the same way as an embodied skill, with 
a direct seeing that bypasses rational, deliberative thought. In the second part, I 
expanded on the association of phronesis with the conscience to argue that it is 
experienced as a direct perception, a felt tension akin to Merleau-Ponty's 'optimal 
grip.' In both, I argued that this form of coping differs from the simpler, technical 
coping that I previously argued we share with other animals, in that the direct 
perception is of entities that only have their being through shared, artificial human 
concepts– such as stoplights or triangles. In closing this Chapter, I wish to suggest 
that the phenomenon of phronesis demonstrates a form of coping that draws upon 
this direct perception of the logos, albeit in a non-conceptual way. 
 
 
* * * 
 
                                                 
75 Aristotle 1143b5-10. 
76 Heidegger 1992, p. 380. Cf. Kisiel 1993, pp. 267, 285. 
77 Aristotle 1142a28. 
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4.3 – Post-conceptuality 
in which I argue that phronesis is not non-conceptual  
but post-conceptual– the navigation of conceptual  
second-nature in a direct, non-conceptual way. 
 
In the previous sections I have been exploring phronesis in order to shed light on the 
relation of coping and concepts. It is worth re-emphasising that both Heidegger and 
McDowell draw upon phronesis as an example of a broader species of cognition. In 
this final section, I will expand the discussion away from phronesis to the form of 
cognition it exemplifies, and argue against McDowell that it is not conceptual in the 
way he holds. Yet I shall draw upon the previous discussion to argue that Dreyfus 
cannot hold that it is simply non-conceptual in a way that we share with infants and 
animals. Instead, I shall follow Charles Taylor in calling it post-conceptual– the 
navigation of our second-natural worlds in a non-conceptual way. 
 
We saw above that McDowell focuses on the presence of logos in phronesis, denying 
that the presence of the linguistic implies a context-free abstraction. If that were the 
case, he argues, it would be impossible to make statements like 'this is beautiful,' 
which can only make sense in a situationally-specific context.78 Hence rationality, as 
far as it is tied to language, must not be understood only as situationally-independent, 
but as part of how the phronimos deals with an immediate situation. Phronesis– like 
all human cognition in McDowell's view– must be rational (vernünftig) to the core. 
 
Yet in this statement we again find the centrality of the apophantic-'this' in 
McDowell's conception of rationality, and here it becomes apparent that he is 
misplacing it into phronesis. For 'this is beautiful,' while certainly only meaningful in 
a specific situation, is a judgement, an assertion of properties. An 'assertive 
judgement' in this context, as we saw in Chapter Three, means that a change in content 
has occurred through a transition in the 'as'-structure. By invoking an apophantic-
this, McDowell's speaker has left the domain of smooth-coping. With this argument, 
McDowell has erroneously emphasised situation-specificity as the defining factor in 
phronesis, rather than the embodied mode of coping that I have argued for above. 
While we can no doubt have situation-specific awareness of something as an object, 
McDowell has not shown that this is the phronimos' experience, only that she can 
break into that experience from the hermeneutic. 
 
                                                 




Nonetheless, his reading of logos as the “domain of the definable” still leaves some 
room to argue that the logos is active in phronesis.79 In McDowell's original thesis, the 
content of coping is considered rational because it is available immediately as the 
content of a judgement. Since McDowell denies that any change of content akin to the 
assertive transition from hermeneutic to apophantic takes place, he might want to 
describe the phronimos' actions themselves as judgements. The expert certainly acts 
as though they have judged– a cricketer's throw implies some judgement of the 
distance and necessary force. But regarding the immediacy of that content as 
judgement, the question is rather over whether the phronimos' judgement is 
propositional in form. 
 
As we have seen, 'judgement,' in the Aristotelian sense used by Heidegger, is 
something that can be true and false, and hence is a proposition about an 
apophantically-revealed entity, the logos. This most obviously refers to statements 
made in natural language. But as Wittgenstein reminds us, we very often make 
judgements that bypass explicit propositional language– say, by taking a 
measurement with our fingers.80 However, such a judgement is still an example of 
apophantic interpretation. It reveals a 'this'– the measured object– which is 
articulated via its property– its length (compare Heidegger's description of assertion, 
discussed above, where the hammer is articulated by its asserted property of 
heaviness in the action of dropping it81). This kind of content is not immediately 
drawn from the action, but is precisely mediated by the assertive transition into the 
apophantic-this. 
 
A truly hermeneutic judgement in this context would be our reflexively pressing our 
foot– as we see the light turn orange– on either the accelerator or the brake. Such a 
'judgement,' achieved in the fluidity of the action, has no objective 'this' to guide it, 
but is strongly felt as a pull to either speed across the line or to stop before it. It draws 
heavily on a wealth of knowledge and experience, applied, adjusted or ignored, 
depending on a situation so varied– in terms of the time and distance to stop, the 
particular car's systems, the general traffic, and the context of our journey– as to be 
completely unique. Yet while all of these variables make sense only in a complex, 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80  Wittgenstein 2009, p. 114 (§ 330). Wittgenstein does not mention using one's fingers, but it 
emphasises his point. His other example in that paragraph– of discovering a pencil to be blunt but 
deciding to use it anyway– bears interesting parallels to Heidegger's (1962, pp. 102-3) account of 
equipment's becoming 'conspicuous' and therefore unzuhanden. 
81 Heidegger 1962, p. 196. 
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normative structure, our judgement is one of immediate bodily perception and action 
that does not call them into account as weighted 'reasons.' 
 
Such a judgement is of a kind with that of the phronimos, as Charles Taylor describes 
it. Even when the phronimos deliberates, 
 
his actions will be 'post' or 'ultra' conceptual, because his training has opened him to 
situations with refined meanings that he can sense and respond to, way beyond his 
ability to articulate them conceptually.82 
 
This thought becomes clearer if we read the training Taylor mentions in conjunction 
with Dreyfus and Dreyfus' account of skill acquisition.83 The embodiment of skills that 
takes place indeed involves coming to experience an apophantic-this as a hermeneutic 
solicitation. And Dreyfus, in his debate with McDowell, rightly observes that the most 
significant feature of expert coping is that entities are experienced as ready-to-hand. 
Words, shapes, traffic lights, all disappear into the activity, such that they are 
experienced phenomenologically as pushes and pulls to an 'optimal grip' (and hence, 
in the previous Chapter, we could compare our frisbee-catching with the dog's). But 
such an observation leaves out an important point: that all the skills Dreyfus 
discusses– from driving to baseball to chess– require an awareness of things as 
vorhanden before they can get off the ground. 
 
To be sure, we may learn some skills without breaking out of purely hermeneutic 
understanding. The motor skills that infants learn, including even perhaps the 
manipulation of tools like spoons, probably fall into this category. But it is fair to say 
that by the time we are language-users, all of our learning at least begins with a 
conceptual awareness of what we are using to do what. Not only that, but we become 
aware that there are also ways to do what we do. This is an important distinction. 
While no doubt a chimp could learn to use a spoon or a mug to eat or drink, it seems 
unlikely that it could learn to hold that spoon 'properly,' with 'good manners.' 
Furthermore, it does not get solicited to leave the mug on the sink when it is finished, 
nor to wash it and stack it on the top of the dish-rack to leave room for the bowls 
below. 
 
And so with post-conceptual coping, we find a return of the points we saw Haugeland 
                                                 
82 Taylor in Dreyfus 2005, pp. 62-3, n. 23. 




raise about culture in Chapter Three. But the key lesson is not that the culture gives 
the equipment its readiness-to-hand, but that culturally-defined objects and norms 
are experienced in a ready-to-hand way. And by arguing for post- rather than non-
conceptual awareness in human coping to account for this central role of culture, we 
can take an important point from McDowell without going so far as to accept his claim 
that conceptuality is pervasive 'all the way out.' Post-conceptuality– exemplified by 
phronesis– means coping with the ready-to-hand within our second-nature worlds. 
 
As we acquire a language and culture (and autonoesis) through the process of Bildung, 
we are introduced to entities that simply don't exist in the first natural world that 
infants share with animals and navigate via basic, non-conceptual motor 
intentionality. We develop the ability to reflect and objectify entities as present-at-
hand, and yet as we cope with them, our awareness is not of them as objects, even if 
it is still informed by this and presupposes it. We navigate our second-nature worlds 
with a circumspective awareness that is as embodied and situation-specific as first 
natural reflexivity, and yet the hermeneutic-objects of that awareness are constructed 
from the web of conceptual, cultural practices we have been initiated into. 
Understanding this coping as post-conceptual, then, allows us to steer a middle course 
between Dreyfus and McDowell. McDowell errs by assuming that, since second-
nature is brought into being by language and culture– by a connection to the logos– 
our awareness remains of concepts as concepts. Yet Dreyfus goes too far in holding 
that, since we are not dealing with the logos as the logos, it has disappeared. The third, 
middle possibility is that, with a post-conceptual awareness, we are dealing with the 
logos circumspectively. As with phronesis, post-conceptual coping is not meta logou 
monon, but both meta and aneu logou. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, it should be stressed that during coping we have the 
possibility of asserting things apophantically-anew at any time. As significant a 
phenomenological feature as the flow is, it tends to be very brief, and whether we enter 
it during sport, music, driving or cooking, our awareness is constantly brought back 
to the experience of things. As a phenomenologist, Heidegger sought to isolate the 
elements of our experience and articulate them independently, even though our 
awareness of things as ready-to-hand and as present-at-hand overlap in nearly all of 
our activities. In this sense, Aristotle, too, was a phenomenologist. It is worth 
reflecting that phronesis is but one of many aretai, and as philosophically useful as it 




I have argued in this final Section that phronesis is an example of a wider form of 
awareness that, following Taylor, I have called post-conceptual. I have argued that 
this form of awareness describes circumspective coping in the conceptually-
constructed second-natural world, thus steering a middle way between Dreyfus, who 
insists that all of our coping is of a non-conceptual kind shared with infants and 
animals, and McDowell, who holds that second-nature implies immediate experience 




In this Chapter I have refined the arguments developed in the previous Chapters of 
Part One to argue that human coping is not simply non-conceptual but post-
conceptual. By 'post-conceptual,' I mean that we cope with the elements of our 
conceptually-constituted second-nature worlds in a non-conceptual way. In doing so, 
I have steered a middle course between the positions of Dreyfus and McDowell, 
incorporating Dreyfus' phenomenological account of skill acquisition with 
McDowell's account of conceptually-mediated Bildung. 
 
I have reached this conclusion through an exploration of Aristotle's discussion of 
phronesis, which Dreyfus, through Heidegger, and McDowell drew upon as an 
exemplar of human coping. In the first Section, I established phronesis as an 
'authentic practical understanding,' outlining its overlap with techne and more 
practical coping in order to show the blurred line between ethical and technical 
expertise. I argued that phronesis, and the wider form of coping it exemplifies, is 
related to eigentlich esoteric coping in being a spontaneous, rather than automatic, 
reaction to the immediate situation. 
 
I then argued that, in Aristotelian terms, the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell 
centres on the role of the logos in phronesis. Their disagreement is made plainer when 
we see that Aristotle held phronesis to be both meta and aneu logou– accompanied 
by, and yet free from, the logos– and the two contemporary figures respectively 
emphasise a different aspect. I therefore demonstrated, by grounding phronesis in the 
phenomena of memory and the conscience, that although, as McDowell claims, 
phronesis acts on rational concepts, these concepts are experienced in a bodily and 
immediate way, akin to direct perception. 
 




judgements (in the sense of 'truth'– aletheia– and 'falsity'– pseudesthai) and hence 
cannot properly be called conceptual. I therefore argued in the final section that our 
phronetic judgements are rather post-conceptual, responding to cultural, second-
natural entities as direct, non-conceptual solicitations. In so arguing, I refined 
Dreyfus' and my own earlier claims that our ready-to-hand coping is identical with 
animal and pre-linguistic human behaviour. Post-conceptual coping cannot be 
equated entirely with non-conceptual coping, since although it shares a direct 
perception of affordances, it is enriched by the vaster range of possibilities available 
to rational animals who dwell in a second-nature 'world.' 
 
Thus, although throughout Part One I have emphasised our continuity with non-
human animals, in Part Two I will explore our divergence. I begin in the next Chapter 
with an exploration of noûs, which Heidegger equated with vernehmen, an exclusively 
human form of perception. As we saw briefly above, although he considered noûs 
aneu logou, it provides us with a direct perception of the logos. In Part Two, therefore, 
I will argue for the centrality of logos, of language, in all aspects of the human 











Chapter Five  
Conceptual Perception 
 
In Part One, I argued that human cognition comprises two layers, whose distinction 
lies in the way entities are experienced. The first way, experienced during our smooth-
coping, I originally called 'non-conceptual,' describing it as the mode through which 
we experience entities hermeneutically-as solicitations within the tasks we are 
immersed in. In the final Chapter of Part One, I refined our understanding of this 
mode of cognition and called it 'post-conceptual,' in order to highlight that many (if 
not most) of the entities we deal with through this mode gain their significance via our 
immersion in a conceptually-mediated second nature or 'world.' Both of these modes 
are distinct from that mode of cognition I called 'conceptual.' This latter is a reflective 
awareness of entities as entities, through which we experience them as detached from 
the context of a particular task, apophantically-as an isolated 'this.' 
 
I initially argued that we shared the non-conceptual layer with non-rational animals. 
Seeing our coping in the light of 'post-conceptuality,' this point is better re-phrased as 
saying that the particular form of experience in question (that is, of entities 
hermeneutically-as) is found in both non- and post-conceptual dealings, in non-
rational and rational animals respectively. In this Chapter, I will begin to strengthen 
the links I have posited between language, rationality and conceptual experience by 
returning to the transition between layers that I briefly discussed as 'Naming' in 
Chapter One. In doing so, we should be able to see more clearly how it is that humans 
diverge from other animals, as this transition belongs only to rational animals– that 
is, to zoa logon echonta, 'animals who have logos.' I will argue that having logos– 
language or speech– is central to the conceptual mode of understanding entities 
apophantically. In doing so, however, I will argue that we need to think of language 
within the context of a broader capacity for understanding the world; indeed, I will 
argue that logos is essentially the content of this form of perceptual understanding. 
Our possession of this capacity– which, following Heidegger, I will identify with 
noûs– makes it possible for us to say that humans inhabit the world linguistically. 
 
I will argue this by returning to the aretai meta logou, focusing now of noûs. Noûs is 
generally translated as 'mind' or 'intellect,' and is related to the verb noein, 'to 
understand' or 'to see' in an intellectual manner.1 We saw in the previous Chapter that 
                                                 




noûs is a special kind of intellectual virtue, differing from the others in that it 
generates the logos, and is experienced as a kind of perception or aisthesis. In this 
Chapter, I introduce noûs as it appears in Aristotle, before going on to discuss how 
Heidegger expands on it in Being and Time and beyond as vernehmen, 
'apprehending,' an exclusively human form of perception. I aim to show how both 
thinkers isolate a conceptual faculty that is experienced as a form of sensory 
perception.2 I will explore and unpack noûs through Heidegger's understanding of it 
as vernehmen, the act of apprehension. I will argue that in Heidegger's 
understanding, vernehmen is an exclusively human form of perception, differing from 
the animal's, for whom it is unavailable. Vernehmen, I will argue, is a direct perception 
of a thing apophantically-as such; it is a direct perception of the logos. Language, I 
will therefore argue, is founded upon a perceptual capacity that enables the world to 
be experienced as things that can thereafter be communicated, although I will later 
suggest that such a faculty develops in tandem with our intersubjective awareness. 
 
5.1 – Noûs in Aristotle 
in which I outline Aristotle's account of noesis and noûs. 
 
We saw in the previous Chapter that phronesis is considered both meta and aneu 
logou– both rational and non-rational– insofar as, although it involves the logos, it is 
experienced rather as an aisthesis, a perception.3 We also saw that, in Heidegger's 
understanding, phronesis “culminates... in something akin to noûs,” meaning that it 
is experienced as the immediate understanding of something as a whole.4 According 
to Aristotle, noûs shares with phronesis (as well as synesis– 'comprehension'– and 
gnomeis– 'judgement') a concern with 'ultimate, particular things.'5 
 
Like phronesis, then, noûs is described as both meta and aneu logou. As mentioned 
above, Heidegger considered noûs to be itself aneu logou, yet included in the 
intellectual virtues because it gives rise to their possibility 6 ; indeed, the phrase 
'intellectual virtues' translates aretai dianoetikai, which we might better understand 
as 'capacities performed through (or after) noesis'– that is, capacities whose content 
                                                 
philosophers, most famously by Augustine (2002, pp.62-3 [11.1.2]). 
2  The idea that the mind is a sense is common in Indian philosophy. See, e.g., Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad, Books III and IV (Roebuck 2003, pp. 43-4, 69-70). 
3  Supra, pp. 133-4. 
4  Heidegger in Kisiel 1993, p. 267; cf. Heidegger 1992, pp. 381-2. 
5  Aristotle 1143a25-30. Regarding citations of Aristotle, see p. 115, n. 2. 
6  Heidegger 1992, p. 380. 
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is produced by the enactment of noûs, or which 'discuss' such content. Thus, in a 
certain sense, the logos is dependent on noûs, as it is through noûs– as a form of 
perception– that we have access to the logos. It is the bridge between understanding 
aneu and meta logou. Aristotle states that 
 
noûs is concerned with the ultimate things in both directions, for [what grasps] both 
the first defining boundaries and the ultimate particulars is noûs and not logos. That 
is, on the one hand, noûs pertaining to demonstrations grasps the unchanging first 
defining boundaries; on the other hand, noûs in matters of action grasps also the 
ultimate particular thing that admits of being otherwise... For these ultimate 
particulars are the principles [archei] of that for the sake of which one acts: the 
universals arise from the particulars. Of these, then, one must have a perception, and 
this perception is noûs.7 
 
Noûs, therefore, is understood by Aristotle as a form of perception, one through which 
we grasp the particulars and so abstract from them the universals.8 “For as there is 
sight in the body,” Aristotle says, “so there is noûs in the soul [psyche].” 9  It is, 
however, a peculiar form of perception, and perhaps only analogous to the bodily 
senses (aistheseis). Unlike our sight, which can be blinded by a bright light, or our 
hearing, which is dulled by loud sounds, noûs is not weakened by exposure to strong 
thoughts.10 And, as will prove important in conjunction with our later discussion of 
second nature, Aristotle holds that noûs is something which develops, and is absent 
in both animals and children.11 
 
As a form of perception, noûs 'grasps' the boundaries and ultimate particulars. 
Through noesis, that which is seen as the logos and expressed through the logos 
apophantikos becomes understood as universal.12 We therefore find noûs right at the 
centre of our human way of knowing. It sits at the intersection of the particulars and 
the universals, of the non-/post-conceptual and the conceptual. Prior to logos, it 
provides the content of logos and the dianoetic aretai. Taking this opening 
understanding, then, of noûs as 'direct perception of the logos,' I will examine how 
Heidegger understands and expands on it as vernehmen. 
                                                 
7  Aristotle 1143a35-1143b10. 
8  As Schopenhauer (1891, p. 114) puts it: “To conceive is to think less than we perceive.” 
9  Aristotle 1196b25-30. Cf. De Anima, 427b27. 
10  Aristotle, De Anima, 429a30-429b10. 
11  Aristotle 1144b10. Although presumably in the latter, it is present to at least some degree. In my 
arguments below, I will hold that noûs first arises at a very young age, with the first stirrings of 
language. 




5.2 – From noûs to vernehmen 
in which I discuss Heidegger's identification of noûs with  
vernehmen, the apprehension of 'something as something.' 
 
I argued in Chapter Three that the capacity to take entities hermeneutically-as ready-
to-hand is a capacity we share with non-human animals, and that Heidegger's 
phenomenology on this point can be useful in understanding our connection to those 
animals. Nevertheless, Heidegger, in several places, asserts that human beings are 
separated from other animals by “an abyss.”13 In Chapter Three, I argued that this 
'abyss' is carved by our capacity to take something apophantically-as something. In 
this Section, I will argue that this capacity is conceptualised as the perceptual capacity 
vernehmen ('hearing' or 'apprehension') which Heidegger identified with noûs.14 As 
mentioned above, Heidegger’s thinking is ultimately concerned with the ‘question of 
being,’ and his discussion of vernehmen forms part of his larger ontological project of 
showing Dasein as the place where entities come to presence. 15  My aims in this 
Chapter are more modest, and my exploration of vernehmen here is principally 
concerned with developing concepts to deepen the account of the difference between 
humans and animals that I have put forward so far, concepts which I will then apply 
in the following Chapter to the interpretation of empirical studies. 
 
In the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics lectures, Heidegger argues that animals 
do not simply attach different meanings to entities that they perceive together with 
us, but that the content of our perception is qualitatively different. Human beings 
perceive things as actually being entities. It is, he says 
 
not a question of whether or how the animal takes what is given to it in a different way, 
but rather of whether the animal can apprehend [vernehmen] something as 
something, something as a being at all. If it cannot, then the animal is separated from 
man by an abyss.16 
 
                                                 
13  Heidegger 1993, p. 230; Heidegger 1995, p. 264. 
14  Heidegger uses vernehmen in a technical way. In ordinary German, the word means 'to hear' or 'a 
hearing' (being used both as a verb and a noun), although it is not really an everyday word and 
sounds rather old-fashioned. In translations of Heidegger, it is generally rendered 'apprehension' 
(e.g., Heidegger 1995), although Macquarrie & Robinson (Heidegger 1962) and Gray (Heidegger 
1968) translate it as 'perception.' I generally leave it untranslated, although I will occasionally use 
'apprehension.' 
15  Cf. supra, pp. 3, 101. 
16  Heidegger 1995, p. 264. 
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Vernehmen is highlighted as the capacity to take “something as something.”17 This is 
not to deny that other animals experience things hermeneutically-as solicitations 
within a very narrow context– recall the lizard, for which Heidegger argued the sunny 
rock must show up as invested with significance, but for which the 'rock' and the 'sun' 
could never be revealed as such, that is, as tokens belonging to a conceptual class.18 
Similarly, while a flower is obviously significant for a bee, it cannot encounter the 
stamens 'as stamens,' nor as belonging to a plant to which also belong seeds, leaves, 
roots, and so forth.19 
 
For Heidegger, animals merely 'behave' (benehmen) and are 'captivated' (benommen) 
within what he calls 'disinhibiting rings.' 20  By this, Heidegger is describing the 
animal's experience of an entity as what Gibson called an affordance that, within a 
given context, solicits a certain response.21 The rings are 'disinhibited' in the context 
of the animal's 'drives' in its present environment. Thus a lizard, approaching the 
sunny rock in the cool of the morning, would have it show up as a solicitation in a way 
that it would not later when, sufficiently warm and feeling hungry, its ring is 
disinhibited by the sight of a caterpillar crawling nearby.  
 
Heidegger uses the same word, Benommenheit, to describe Dasein's absorption in its 
ready-to-hand dealings.22 When we are fully immersed in a task, such as fielding a 
cricket ball, we are drawn towards it not as a ball, but as an element of the overall task, 
that must be chased down, stopped, and thrown back as quickly as possible. In a 
similar, though more subtle way, towards the end of the drinks break we find that the 
bin draws us toward it, not as a bin, but as a place to throw our beer can. Even before 
we have completely finished our beer, if we pay attention, we may even be aware of an 
almost physical pull, where the bin holds itself open as this possibility, this next step 
in the 'activity' of our drinks break.23 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, our essential difference with animals is our capacity to 
step back and to take the bin or the ball as context-free, separately from any 
solicitation– that is, as an apophantic-'this.' Heidegger explicitly denies any such 
                                                 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid, p. 198. 
19  Ibid, p. 193. 
20  Ibid, p. 254. 
21  Gibson 1979, pp. 127-9. 
22  Heidegger 1962, p. 88. 
23  An inability to resist the pull of such 'captivating' ready-to-hand objects is, I suspect, at the heart of 





reflective understanding to the 'captivated' animal. 
 
An animal can only behave [sich... benehmen] but can never apprehend [vernehmen] 
something as something– which is not to deny that the animal sees or even perceives. 
Yet in a fundamental sense the animal does not have perception [Wahrnehmung].24 
 
Heidegger's claim here plays on the root nehmen, 'to take.' The animal can of course 
sense things, and can 'take' them (or, rather, be taken by them) as solicitations within 
its captivated ring of dealings. But since it cannot apprehend– vernehmen– them, or 
'take' them as something, it does not really have Perception or Wahrnehmung– 
literally 'true-taking.' It has no perception of objects. 
 
In Heidegger's thought, then, vernehmen has a connection to truth (and by extension, 
falsity). As we saw earlier, animals can misperceive– mis-take– one thing by 
responding to it as a solicitation for an inappropriate action, but they are not, strictly-
speaking, in error since they are unable to take an objective stance on the truth of the 
matter. Truth and falsity (aletheia and pseudesthai) are, for Heidegger, intimately 
bound up with our understanding something through the logos– which is itself the 
product of this capacity to vernehmen something as something: 
 
At the basis of the logos there lies an apprehending [Vernehmen], noesis, noûs, an 
apprehending of something– or rather the logos is, in accordance with its essence, this 
apprehending of [something].25 
 
Vernehmen is therefore identified with noûs, the direct, perceptual understanding 
that underpins the logos.26 In Being and Time, vernehmen describes our awareness 
of the present-at-hand, arising as we step back from our 'fascination' (Benommenheit) 
with the ready-to-hand, withdrawing from involvement with an entity to “just tarrying 
alongside” it.27 It is an abstracting power, in which we no longer take entities as part 
of an involved, flowing context, but as eidei, “purely in the way they look.”28 In an 
elaboration of the Aristotelian connection between logos and noûs, Heidegger argues 
that language is central to the act of vernehmen. 
                                                 
24  Heidegger 1995, p. 259. “Ein Tier kann sich nur benehmen, aber nie etwas als etwas vernehmen, 
wogegen nicht spricht, daß ein Tier sieht oder auch wahrnimmt. Im Grunde aber hat das Tier keine 
Wahrnehmung” (Heidegger 1983, p. 376). 
25  Heidegger 1995, p. 314. 
26  Cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 85. 
27  Heidegger 1962, p. 88. 




[Vernehmen] is consummated when one addresses [ansprechen] oneself to something 
as something and discusses [besprechen] it as such.29 
 
Addressing and discussing– ansprechen and besprechen– share the root sprechen, 
'to speak,' highlighting the sense in which vernehmen is an essentially linguistic form 
of perception. Keeping in mind that speech (Rede, Sprache), for Heidegger, has an 
existential significance beyond natural language, this passage offers a thought-
provoking account of the emergence of a peculiarly human form of awareness. It is 
significant that the first clause of the sentence is reflexive: “one addresses oneself...”30 
One comes to know what one is aware of; one establishes a relationship. That is to say, 
in coming to know the thing as a thing, a separation is realised. Where the thing is, 
one is not. That is to say, the relationship established by vernehmen is experienced as 
essentially dualistic, holding between a subject and something present-at-hand. 
 
This awareness– noûs– is of another kind than the involved, ready-to-hand dealings 
that characterise our reflexive activities. Rather than using the entity for something 
('with-which,' 'in-order-to,' and so on), we hold back and 'speak-to' or address it, 
acknowledging it as a Thing that we dwell alongside within-the-world, autonomously, 
‘holding back’ from manipulation. 31  Once it has been established as a Thing– an 
object– we can 'speak-of' or discuss it, taking what-we-have-come-to-know (that is, 
what-we-have-addressed) and moving it around, in the grammatical sense that to 
speak-of something is to place its signifier into new contexts, (which are themselves 
'placed' in an overall temporal relationship to one another in a whole). A second stage 
of abstraction takes place, in that what is discussed is not the Thing, but the logos 
drawn from the Thing. This is only possible through the removal of the ready-to-hand 
context, or what I earlier referred to as Naming.32 
 
Vernehmen, then, as a 'hearing', is a calling-out of something as a this, separating it 
from the totality of involvements.33 Vernehmen freezes our experience of entities out 
                                                 
29  Ibid, p. 89. 
30  The verb ansprechen as Heidegger uses it in the German passage is not itself technically reflexive, 
but there is the same implication of a relationship, setting the object before oneself. 
31  Heidegger 1962, p. 89. 
32  Supra, p. 39ff. 
33  Vernehmen can also be used in the sense of a judicial hearing, giving us the image here of an entity 
that has been called forth out of the context of involvements– placed before us 'in the dock,' as it 
were, and questioned. Heidegger (1962, p. 89) insists, however, that this calling out is not a case of 
a subject forming representations [Vorstellungen]. There is no mediation here; the experience is 




of the context of the circumspective dealings in which we saw through them to the 
goal of our task, and which in that context fluidly determined what they are to us. 
During coping, for example, the cricket ball is now a target of pursuit, now a missile 
to be thrown, and now irrelevant to our celebration of the run-out. But vernehmen is 
an act of “making [an entity] determinate (bestimmen)” as a Thing, which can be 
expressed in propositions which are “retained and preserved.”34 The vernommen ball, 
present-at-hand, is the same ball, whether we discuss it as being hit, fielded, or put 
away in a bag. 
 
Heidegger discusses this point in Being and Time as he introduces presence-at-hand, 
making it clear that noûs is the faculty that gives us access to entities in the present-
at-hand form in which we typically (that is, un-phenomenologically) think of them (as 
opposed to the 'hidden' yet primordial mode of readiness-to-hand that he discusses 
in the following chapter). In the context of that work, where he has not yet discussed 
the readiness-to-hand of equipment, Heidegger's point is to articulate that Western 
philosophy has typically taken our access to entities to be through noein or 'knowing.' 
Given what is to come in Being and Time, it may appear that Heidegger is setting up 
these concepts in order to reject them. Yet Division One's argument is only that we 
shouldn't take noesis and presence-at-hand as the basis of an ontology, not that they 
aren't phenomenologically real and important, as their centrality in Heidegger's later 
work shows.35 
 
An important theme that begins at this early point of Being and Time and extends 
into his later work is Heidegger's emphasis on the role of language in giving us access 
both to entities as well as giving us access to them as (being) entities. As this Chapter 
progresses, we will see that what is essential here is not natural language, but the way 
in which our perception of entities is structured as the logos. We can cast a further 
light on this form of access via Heidegger's later thoughts on the matter.36 Heidegger 
returns to many of the themes of Being and Time from another angle in his final 
lecture course, What Is Called Thinking? 37  In the second half, he spends a 
                                                 
note some important differences with this towards the end of this thesis, p. 254. 
34  Heidegger 1962, p. 89. 
35  Heidegger (1995, p. 177) criticises those who would emphasise Division One's focus on techne and 
equipment as the central point of his thinking, saying it “never occurred to me... to try and claim or 
prove... that the essence of man consists in the fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks or 
use the tram.” 
36  Indeed, thinkers such as Malpas (2012a, pp. 23-5) hold that Heidegger's early thought can only be 
fully understood through the light of his later thinking. 
37  Heidegger 1968. 
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considerable amount of time arriving at a translation of Parmenides' sixth fragment: 
“Chrei to legein te noein t'eon emmenai.”38 Conventionally, this is translated as “one 
should both say and think that being is,” but Heidegger believes that this reading 
obscures the essential point that Parmenides was thinking. Heidegger carefully 
examines each word, and once again equates noein with vernehmen, emphasising it 
as an active, interpretative faculty rather than a passive receptivity.39 However, this 
time he pushes the translation further, finally satisfying himself with: “It is useful both 
to let-lie-before-us and so also to take-to-heart beings in [their] Being.”40 
 
Heidegger's re-thinking of noein as an intimate perceptual 'taking-to-heart' (In-die-
Acht-nehmen) is particularly illuminating in the context of his earlier thinking of 
vernehmen as a conscious apprehending or perception.41 We can read our example 
from Being and Time with Heidegger's later understanding in mind: 
 
Taking-to-heart is consummated when one addresses [ansprechen] oneself to 
something as something and discusses [besprechen] it as such. 
 
'To know' or 'to apprehend' has become a 'taking-to-heart.' We now find even more 
strongly the emphasis on establishing a relationship, a thought that becomes richer 
when we consider that Acht literally translates as 'heed' or 'attention.' I speak-to (an-
spreche) the thing as something separate from me, and yet take it into myself, 
incorporating it even while it retains its own unity. What is taken-to-heart is taken as 
something, as the object of my attention. It is mine, but it is not me. It is mine in the 
sense that, when I perceive something in this very conscious way– a cricket ball, for 
example– I establish something unique with respect to it. In the moment of 
apprehension, I am aware of it in a particularly personal way. While I of course 
maintain a background, circumspective awareness of the context I am in and of other 
things happening around, there is something unique about the ball as the object of my 
focus– I have taken it to heart. If I then turn to throw the ball, my awareness of it 
changes. I still perceive it, in that I am still aware of it, but not as a ball. My 
vernommen apprehension forms a new relationship with something else– with my 
target, perhaps– while the ball becomes circumspectively ready-to-hand. 
                                                 
38  Ibid, pp. 182-228. 
39  Ibid, p. 203; cf. Heidegger 2002, p. 205. 
40  Heidegger 1968, p. 223; “brauchet es das Vorliegenlassen und so das In-die-Acht-nehmen auch 
Seiendes [im] Seiend” (Heidegger 2002, p. 227). 
41  Heidegger 1968, pp. 203, 207, 209-14. Note the connection between the 'taking' (nehmen) in 





Taking-to-heart is intimate in the sense that I cannot be conscious of many things in 
this way simultaneously. Like a spotlight, this conscious perception lights upon one 
thing and then another–passing swiftly, to be sure, but nonetheless only taking-to-
heart one single thing at each discreet moment. The 'single thing' need not correspond 
to an indivisible primitive; there is no metaphysical claim here. Rather, it refers to the 
experience of a unity as such. For example, I can now apprehend this 'row of books' 
or I can apprehend 'this red book,' and back and forth, but only consecutively, never 
simultaneously as 'this.'42 
 
In this Chapter so far, I have been detailing Heidegger's understanding of noûs as 
vernehmen, a taking-to-heart that signifies an exclusively human perception of an 
object as present-at-hand, and immediately understood as the logos. In the next 
Section connect noûs/vernehmen to my earlier discussion of rationality, in order to 
demonstrate its significance to the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, and the picture of the 
human that we are drawing from our exploration of it. 
 
5.3 – Noûs and logos 
in which I connect noûs to the rational faculty  
discussed in earlier Chapters, and examine  
its relation to truth, falsity, and the logos. 
 
In this final Section, I will argue that noûs, as the ground of the logos, identifies what 
McDowell calls the faculty of reason that allows us to 'have' the logos as zoa logon 
echonta– it is what makes us 'rational animals.' I will explore the parallels in 
McDowell and Heidegger's work, as discussed so far, to suggest that, through the 
development of noûs in world-formation, we come to experience entities within a 
'space' that is both constructed by noûs and experienced bodily. 
 
In Chapter Three, I argued that McDowell's understanding of human beings as 
rational animals is grounded not in our ability to give reasons (Gründe) for our 
actions, but in our possession of the faculty of rationality, Vernunft, the ability to 'take' 
something as an apophantic-'this.' 'Vernunft' is etymologically descended from 
'vernehmen,' emphasising its perceptual essence. 43  Heidegger, too, traces the 
connection between noûs and logos to explain how logos– properly the content of this 
                                                 
42  However, the fact that we experience both the 'book' and the 'row of books' as united entities does 
have metaphysical implications, which I will touch upon at the end of this thesis. 
43  See Inwood 1992, p. 242. 
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perception– came to be identified with the faculty of rational perception itself. 
 
In accordance with its inner possibility, logos is grounded in noûs, ratio in Latin, 
which is why this comes to be equated with logos, because the latter is noûs.44 
 
McDowell's emphasis on (in my terms) rationality as Vernunft therefore needs to be 
taken as a concern not just with the logos but with the particular capacity that gives 
rise to it– namely, noûs– which is why McDowell states that his invocation of 
rationality must be understood “in the sense that is in play in the traditional 
separation of mature human beings, as rational animals, from the rest of the animal 
kingdom.”45   
 
As I showed in Chapter Three, Dreyfus makes much of the enactment of this capacity 
during the 'breakdown' of coping, which he discusses as the source of our apophantic 
awareness of the present-at-hand.46 Through 'assertion,' which Heidegger emphasises 
need not be explicit speech, we step back from our involved use of ready-to-hand 
equipment, as its as-structure is 'modified' from the hermeneutic to the apophantic.47 
In the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, assertion is identified with kateigoria. 
 
Kateigoria... designates those moments which apply to the logos in a particular way, 
moments which the logos necessarily asserts as the kateigoriai which accompany it, 
which accompany assertion and have their definite possibilities.48 
 
Kateigoria is literally an 'accusation' (from kateigoros, 'accuser'). Assertion, 
therefore, is both the calling-out of something as a 'this,' and the understanding of the 
'this' as belonging to a conceptual class or category. The entity is declared to be of a 
type, as understood from the particular angle of the accuser, and defined as such. Yet 
the capacity to do this presupposes noûs, as the ability to take an entity as such. 
Assertion– the pointing-out of the object as logos– is not the source of this 
understanding, but marks its enactment. While the breakdown of coping is perhaps 
the most dramatic prompt of this enactment, it is not a necessary condition of it. Our 
very act of perceiving (vernehmen) with noûs is this transition. Logos– language in 
the broadest sense of Rede and Sprache– is only possible for creatures who have this 
                                                 
44  Heidegger 1995, p. 314. 
45  McDowell 2007a, p. 338. 
46  Cf. Dreyfus 1991, pp. 196-8. 
47  Heidegger 1962, p. 201. 
48  Heidegger 1995, p. 289. Recall also (supra, p. 34) that McDowell insists that all conceptual– that 




capacity. As Heidegger puts it, “all logos can only point out... whatever is already pre-
logically manifest.”49 
 
'Manifestness' (Offenbarkeit) is how Heidegger describes the entities to which Dasein 
has access, in contrast to the experience of animals, who merely have an 'openness' 
(Offenheit) to entities, to being 'taken' by them.50 The animal's 'mere openness' is tied 
to its being 'poor-in-world.' It describes the access it has to the entities which break 
through its 'disinhibiting ring,' its 'openness to being captivated' by the entities that 
'show up' as relevant to it but not as entities.51 Manifestness, on the other hand, is tied 
to 'world,' in the full sense in which Dasein is 'world-forming.'52 That Dasein already 
exists as world-forming means that entities are already available for it as being 
potentially manifest.53 That is to say, Dasein's relation to the world– through noûs– 
means that Dasein sees the world in terms of entities. Being able to 'break' out of our 
captivated coping is a possibility that is always available to us, and so we are never 
truly captivated in the sense of a world-poor animal. Noûs, as the possibility of seeing 
'as,' is therefore the ground of the manifestness of entities as they become available as 
something that can be expressed as the logos, for 
 
the [apophantic] 'as' expresses the fact that beings in general have become manifest in 
their being, that that distinction has occurred... We never first have 'something' and 
then 'something more' and then the possibility of taking something as something, but 
the complete reverse: something first gives itself to us only when we are already 
moving within projection, within the 'as'.54 
 
The key point here is that, possessing the faculty of noûs and being 'world-forming,' 
Dasein perceives the world as such that it always has the potential to express entities 
as the logos apophantikos. As Malpas puts it, world-formation “has its ground in the 
original opening-up of the world as a whole that enables the accessibility to things in 
order that they can be grasped as thus and so, and in order that statement and 
assertion about them can be possible.”55 This is rooted in noûs or vernehmen, because 
for Heidegger,  
 
                                                 
49  Heidegger 1995, p. 346, Heidegger's emphasis. 
50  Ibid, pp. 333, 342-3. 
51  Heidegger 1995, pp. 269-70. 
52  Ibid, pp. 279-80. 
53  Ibid, p. 341. 
54  Ibid, p. 365. 
55  Malpas 2012b, pp. 327-8. 
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Apprehending [vernehmen] is intrinsically a taking together that takes apart. As such 
it is the essential ground of the possibility of revealing or concealing pertaining to the 
logos, i.e., the logos apophantikos.56 
 
'Revealing and concealing' here refer to truth and falsity (aletheia and pseudesthai), 
which are therefore asserted to be grounded in vernehmen.57 
 
'World' therefore signifies an open space in which we experience the entities within it 
with vernehmen as entities, expressible as logos which is either true or false. We 
experience something– the 'red book,' or the 'row of books'– as a unity, a 'this' about 
which we can make statements. Vernehmen is therefore bound up with language, yet, 
as Malpas stresses, the capacity for vernehmen is the prior possibility of experiencing 
the 'world,' not something that is brought about by language. 
 
[T]he implication of language in world-formation should not be taken to mean that 
world formation is brought about by language, any more than world-formation is 
simply brought about by human beings... Indeed, the human only appears as human 
and language as language in and through the forming of world... [World-formation] 
has its ground in the original opening-up of the world as a whole that enables the 
accessibility to things.58 
 
This emphasis on noûs giving an 'always-already' potential to articulate something 
apophantically begins to quite strongly resemble McDowell's argument, seen earlier, 
that  
 
if an experience is world-disclosing, which implies that it is categorically unified, all 
its content is present in a form in which... it is suitable to constitute contents of 
conceptual capacities.”59 
 
Heidegger and McDowell are therefore united in holding that the possession of noûs– 
Vernunft rationality– means that human beings bring to every experience the 
possibility of taking entities as entities. Their subtle difference, as I argued in Chapters 
                                                 
56 Heidegger 1995, p. 316, Heidegger's emphasis. Cf. Being and Time (Heidegger 1962, p. 269): “The 
truth of aisthesis and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the primordial kind of uncovering. And only because 
noesis primarily uncovers, can the logos as dianoein also have uncovering as its function.” This 
point will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
57  Cf. Heidegger 1995, pp. 314-5: “the prior apprehending of something as something in forming a 
unity, is the condition of the possibility of truth and falsity of the logos” (Heidegger's emphasis). 
58  Malpas 2012b, p. 327. 




One and Three, is that in focusing on the potential for articulation– which in this 
Chapter I have argued signifies the prior presence of noûs as making an entity's 
manifestness possible– McDowell overlooks the translation of content that occurs 
when the potential for assertion or the act of apprehension is enacted. Nonetheless, 
considering that noûs is a capacity that overlaps with our practical modes of cognition, 
and that noesis is a direct perception of the logos without the need for an actual 
breakdown of coping, there is a sense in which our conceptual understanding– of the 
apophantic as something– is, for the most part, pervasive, although this is not the 
argument McDowell makes. Rather, he has essentially argued that noûs is the primary 
and perhaps the only way we relate to the world. 
 
The most promising overlap of McDowell's and Heidegger's Aristotelian thought lies 
in their agreement that it is through the logos that we have access to truth, and that 
this is bound up with the possibility of falsity.60 As such, there is something of a 'gap' 
or 'room for error' involved between noetic perception and the logos that expresses it. 
As Dretske notes, there is space to make a 'conceptual' error without implying a 
corresponding 'perceptual' one.61 A person fooled by a fake watch, for example, would 
not be making a perceptual error. “Good fakes,” he says, “are supposed to cause the 
same kinds of experiences as the originals.”62 The conceptual error is only possible 
because we inhabit a space of reasons in which it is meaningful to say 'that “Rolex” is 
a knock-off.' In Heidegger's terms, “the logos apophantikos as assertion is possible 
only where there is freedom.”63 
 
Heidegger calls this freedom Spielraum, literally 'play-space,' the “leeway within 
which those beings that assertion is to be about are themselves manifest.”64 Malpas 
points out that there is a link here– albeit an unintentional one– with the 'space of 
reasons' that McDowell invokes.65 The shared image of this spatial language is that 
the world-formation (Weltbilden) or the Bildung that creates second-nature produces 
a space in which we perceive entities as filtered through, though not necessarily 
mediated by, concepts– that is to say, as either conceptual or post-conceptual. Just as 
non-rational animals perceive first-natural environmental spaces through pure sense 
                                                 
60  McDowell's endorsement of a 'disjunctive' theory of perception has its roots in this understanding. 
See McDowell 1998b, pp. 386-7. 
61  Dretske 1995, p. 67. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Heidegger 1995, p. 339. 
64  Ibid. 
65  Malpas 2012b, p. 339, n. 32. 
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perception (aisthesis), so rational animals apprehend second-natural 'worldly' spaces 
with the vernehmen-perception of noûs. While the 'world' may in some sense be 
'constructed'– or better, dependent on our possession of noûs for the manifestness of 
entities– it is lived in such a way that we inhabit it as we do a space– or more precisely, 




In the previous Chapter, I argued that our development of second nature results in 
our navigation of our 'worlds' with post-conceptual coping, and through this capacity– 
exemplified by phronesis– we experience even conceptually-derived entities 
hermeneutically-as solicitations. In this Chapter, I have argued that the acquisition of 
second nature amounts to the development of noûs, the cognitive-perceptual faculty 
of vernehmen through which we directly see entities and concepts apophantically as 
entities. We therefore discover two modes of experiencing content within second 
nature. I have suggested that both of these modes are experienced in a spatial sense– 
that is to say, as immersive experiences that are known primarily in a perceptual sense 
in spite of being arrived at through the exclusively human cognitive faculty of noûs. 
 
By examining how Heidegger expanded on Aristotle's thinking by discussing noûs and 
noesis as vernehmen, apprehension, I highlighted first and foremost that noûs is 
experienced as a form of perception. This form of perception is distinctively different 
to the perception I have attributed to animals, which is closer to our own 
circumspective coping and background awareness. With vernehmen, we perceive 
entities as entities, as unities with their properties. Such entities are experienced as 
the objects of our attention. We experience them intimately, 'taking them to heart' as 
a single entity, detached from practical or metaphysical interpretations. With 
vernehmen, we focus now on 'the red book,' now on 'the pile of books,' now 'the red 
books in the pile,' and now 'the cluttered desk.' Noetic perception gives us the ability 
to perceive deeper into and beyond the entity we perceive; it allows us to abstract. For 
this reason, Heidegger argues that only vernehmen, unlike animal perception, should 
really be considered Perception– Wahrnehmung, 'taking as true.'  
 
Understanding noûs as the direct perception of things in a conceptual aspect– as 
the logos– echoes McDowell's claim that conceptual capacities are pervasive in 
mature human beings. Yet I argued in Part One that the post-conceptual experience 




through the reflective transition that noûs enacts. This picture is complicated when 
we observe that, in a sense, noûs is 'always operative.' What we begin to see is that 
these intentional modes are not exclusive or sequential, but parallel, and feed back 
into one another, to build the world of human experience. Through the development 
of noûs and second nature, we enter a space where we point out things as things, and 
can hence hold them to be true. In Chapter Seven, I will discuss how this ability to 
take something as true by abstracting it also brings with it the ability to take things as 
false, since as our apprehension separates and combines noetic perceptions, it creates 
the possibility to take things as they are not. However, I shall leave aside such 
implications for the present, and turn my attention in the next Chapter towards 






Chapter Six  
The Linguistic Capacity 
 
In the previous Chapter, I gave an account of the conceptual links between noûs and 
logos– between vernehmen and Sprache– in Aristotle and Heidegger's thought and 
argued for an essential dependence of language on vernommen perception,  
suggesting that the logos is not the ability to communicate, but rather that which is 
communicated– that is to say, it is the form of the entity revealed through vernehmen, 
which, as the ability to take something apophantically-as something, is the very pre-
condition of natural language. I argued that Heidegger's vernehmen, following 
Aristotle's noûs, identifies an exclusively human mode of cognition that perceives 
entities in the world as entities. As such, it is equivalent to what McDowell describes 
as the rationality we develop with 'second nature,' an equivalence which is 
strengthened through an emphasis by all three thinkers on the interconnection of this 
faculty with logos or language. It may be objected, however, that having done no more 
than that, then as elegant as these accounts might appear, they tell us little about 
human beings as we actually are. In this Chapter, then, I will argue that Heidegger's 
description gives us concepts that can be usefully applied to investigations of the 
development and functioning of the mind, by drawing upon empirical evidence to 
show that it is the appearance of language in human beings– and its absence in other 
animals– that marks the very distinctive way in which we perceive and inhabit our 
'world.' 
 
I will do this in two ways. In the first Section, I directly compare humans with animals 
to argue that the relevant phenomenon revealed by human language is the noetic 
perception argued for in the previous Chapter– it is this that makes us the zoon logon 
echon in contrast to other animals. I show that, while animals certainly communicate 
in elaborate ways, such communication remains on the level of purely ready-to-hand 
and does not involve the logos. That is to say, the signals animals use are not 
representations of present-at-hand entities, but are themselves tools used 
circumspectively as part of an ongoing task. I will argue that this holds even for the 
most human-like animals, as demonstrated in the curious fact that apes never point. 
Elaborating on a series of studies by Tomasello and his colleagues, I argue that this 
fact demonstrates that chimps have no awareness of objects as objects. This is in sharp 
contrast to human infants, who begin spontaneously pointing as they start to acquire 




of taking the world. 
 
In the second Section, I expand on this by comparing the insight into pointing with 
what Merleau-Ponty discussed as the 'pointing' and 'grasping' modes of cognition. 
Building on Goldstein's account of 'the Schneider Case' of brain-damage-induced 
visual agnosia, Merleau-Ponty argues for two modes of intentional directedness which 
are in principle separable. I relate these modes to my earlier discussion, arguing that 
the 'grasping' mode is operative in ready-to-hand coping and offers an insight into 
animal activity. The impairment of Schneider's pointing capacity, I will argue, 
demonstrates a deficiency in his faculty of noûs, and will hence clarify both what 
human coping shares with other animals, and how noûs makes us different from 
them. 
 
6.1.1 – Animal Language 
in which I argue that animals lack language in a true  
sense– insofar as, lacking grammar, they do not articulate  
the logos– and hold that their communication is better  
understood as a form of coping with ready-to-hand equipment. 
 
I have so far argued that the 'abyss' Heidegger identified between humans and animals 
is carved by noûs and the ability to take entities as entities. As noûs is one of several 
cognitive capacities that humans have, we can therefore maintain the presence of the 
abyss even while arguing that we share many capacities with other animals. This is 
precisely the picture we find in Merleau-Ponty's Structure of Behaviour, which I 
briefly noted in Part One. 1  Merleau-Ponty identifies three distinct forms of 
behaviour– the 'syncretic,' the 'amovable,' and the 'symbolic'– which broadly 
correspond to the three categories of 'lower animals,' 'higher animals,' and 'Dasein' 
that I articulated earlier.2 'Syncretic' forms of behaviour are reflexive responses to 
“certain complexes of very special stimuli,” such as a frog's flicking its tongue at 
moving black specks, while 'symbolic' forms involve a conceptual abstraction from the 
immediate experience.3  'Amovable' forms of behaviour, in the middle, describe a 
situation-specific flexible responsiveness comprised of the agent's response to signals 
which are “founded on structures which are relatively independent of the materials in 
                                                 
1 Merleau-Ponty 1963, pp. 104-127; supra, p. 51, n. 127. 
2 Merleau-Ponty 1963, p. 103-4. As mentioned earlier (p. 24, n. 51), 'higher' and 'lower' here do not 
imply any sense of hierarchy or teleology. 




which they are realised.”4 They are, as such, not prescribed responses, but responses 
that the agent “selects” from a range of solicitations that are open to it.5 'Amovable' 
forms therefore describe what we experience as “pre-conceptual” coping, a term 
Taylor uses to cover both what I have called non-conceptual and post-conceptual, 
arguing that we must necessarily extend it to animals as a midway point between 
rational decision-making and inanimate-causal reactions.6 
 
While Merleau-Ponty cautions that the forms of behaviour are shared within and 
across groups of animals and hence do not correspond to particular classes of animals, 
he nevertheless says that “animals can be distributed along this scale according to the 
type of behaviour which is most typical of them.”7 Significantly, he holds that symbolic 
forms of behaviour are only found in human beings. I would also argue that it is 
unlikely that invertebrates at least, and possibly some vertebrates, ever display 
amovable forms, and indeed, all of Merleau-Ponty's examples of the amovable are 
drawn from 'higher' animals such as birds, dogs, and chimps. His caution, then, is 
rather against supposing that humans embody only symbolic forms, but that we also 
demonstrate amovable and even instinctive, syncretic forms of behaviour. Where his 
account is most significant for us is in the recognition of these diverse modes of 
behaviour and their asymmetric overlapping, where 'higher' animals share forms with 
'lower' but not vice versa. 
 
Thus Merleau-Ponty argues that our own amovable behaviour has parallels with that 
of other animals. This is most significant to our investigation insofar as it governs our 
experience of entities. If we use a water bottle 'amovably' now to drink from, and now 
as a club to shoo away a wasp, our pre-conceptual experience of the bottle is as of two 
different entities. The very way we approach it, grasp it, and the whole context of 
possibilities that are solicited from and through it are completely different in each 
context. It is only through reflection– through the symbolic form, or the enactment of 
noûs– that we are able to 'unite' these different perspectives into a single experience. 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty argues, chimps, lacking the symbolic form of behaviour, can 
only experience objects in the context of the particular task they are engaged in (and 
hence as ready-to-hand).8 For this reason, even a chimp's creative tool-use tends to 
                                                 
4 Ibid, p. 105. 
5 Backhaus 2009, p. 17. 
6 Taylor 2005, p. 34. The 'pre-' in 'pre-conceptual' therefore signifies the opposition to conceptuality that 
is shared by non- and post-conceptuality, and hence is not here the opposite of the 'post-' in 'post-
conceptual.' 
7 Merleau-Ponty 1963, p. 104. 




be ad hoc, for they do not first envision the possibilities a piece of equipment could 
afford several steps ahead.9 Even when a chimp quite cleverly builds a structure from 
boxes to get an out-of-reach banana, their constructions tend to be quite unstable, 
built with the objects that come sequentially to hand rather than with methodical 
forethought. The boxes– both during construction and as a finished product– are 
utilised as an extension of the chimp's own body– and indeed, Merleau-Ponty claims 
that the chimp's success relies far more on their own refined sense of balance than 
their skill at engineering.10 Abstract thought is not possible for an animal 'captivated' 
in the moment; something is what it is only within the context of the present activity, 
be it sitting or trying to reach food. Hence, as we saw in a previously quoted passage, 
Merleau-Ponty holds that: 
 
The box-as-seat and the box-as-instrument are two distinct and alternative objects in 
the behaviour of the chimpanzee and not two aspects of an identical thing. In other 
words, the animal cannot at each moment adopt a point of view with regard to objects 
which is chosen at its discretion; rather the object appears clothed with a 'vector,' 
invested with a 'functional value' which depends on the effective composition of the 
field.11 
 
It is only through symbolic behaviour that abstract relations can be drawn from 
multiple perspectives and experiences. “Here behaviour no longer has only one 
signification,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “it is itself signification.”12 Backhaus argues that 
the “thing-structure” of objects– as things, as objects– only emerges at the level of 
symbolic forms.13 The symbolic form, therefore, arises through what Heidegger called 
having a 'world' in Dasein's richer sense, and through our capacity to take an entity as 
an entity. That is, while a chimp might, for example, come across a cup and be able to 
use it as a drinking vessel or as a nut-cracker, it could not take it (conceptually) as a 
                                                 
9 Cf. Tulving's (2005, p. 9) discussion of the 'mental time travel' associated with episodic memory, which 
he argues also applies in the future direction, giving us the ability to envision possible futures, an 
ability which he also denies to non-human animals. 
10  Merleau-Ponty 1963, p. 116. Since Merleau-Ponty's time, much more work has been done 
documenting tool use in non-human animals, both primates and non-primates (see e.g., Seed & 
Byrne 2010, for review). Such studies indicate that many animals are capable of sophisticated 
problem-solving, including the careful choice and refinement of tools. However, in all such 
examples, the animals do not appear to plan abstractly, but rather prepare their tools sequentially– 
with 'insight' rather than 'foresight' (ibid, pp. R1035-6)–  remaining, as Heidegger might say, 
captivated within a particular task rather than showing an awareness of the task as a whole or the 
tools as isolable elements of that task. 
11 Merleau-Ponty 1963, p. 116. 
12 Ibid, p. 122. 




cup, devoid of any practical context, as an isolated, abstract object, with features or 
properties like hardness, blue-ness, and so on, that could likewise be abstracted from 
the momentary action-context. 
 
None of this denies the richness of animal experience. We need only think of a dog's 
sensitive nose, the additional cone-cell in a pigeon's eye, or the magnetically-tuned 
navigational capacities of tuna to realise that animals are capable of distinguishing 
phenomena well beyond the range of humans. Yet the point remains that these 
animals cannot experience the phenomena as phenomena, as disconnected from the 
task they are involved in. They remain “captivated” within their ready-to-hand 
dealings.14 The 'abyss' between humans and non-human animals, therefore, is carved 
by animals' lack of noûs, their inability to take objects as present-at-hand. That is, 
there is a qualitative difference between animal experience and human experience.  
 
In the previous Chapter, I noted the link between vernehmen and language. Similarly, 
Merleau-Ponty holds that symbolic forms of behaviour are tied intimately to language, 
unlike animal behaviour in which “signs always remain signals and never become 
symbols.”15 In what follows, I will explore the differences between human and animal 
communication to argue that the development of language– specifically, grammatical 
language– demonstrates the arising of noetic understanding. I emphasise 
grammatical language because there should be no doubt that animals communicate, 
and often communicate very precise information in elaborate ways, as the well-known 
'waggle dance' of bees attests. Yet such communication can only be considered 
'language' in a very limited and metaphorical sense. As Collins says, there is an 
important distinction between information 'transformation' and linguistic 
'translation.' 16  Bees transform information about the location of flowers and the 
position of the sun into their dance, which other bees then transform into the 
behaviour of seeking nectar. Language-using humans, on the other hand, translate 
information into language, which requires an active interpretation by both the 
speaker and the hearer in context– there are no set meanings. The obvious advantage 
of this is the possibility of abstracting linguistic items from the immediate context. 
But as such, the translational nature of language means that something is often lost 
in moving from one medium to another, unlike animal communication, which in a 
sense has its meaning pre-determined.17 The English word 'hawk,' for example, can 
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mean many things depending on the context in which it is spoken and interpreted, 
unlike the vervet monkey's signal, which only ever means 'there's a hawk: hide!' 
 
The relative lack of ambiguity in animals' communication stems from the fact that, as 
Millikan points out, in animal communication the imperative and the indicative 
functions of a signal are bound together.18 A bird's cry does not just indicate the 
presence of a cat; it says 'fly away!' The same holds even for more specific signs. Vervet 
monkeys, for example, are well-known for having a 'vocabulary' of distinctive cries for 
different types of predators.19 The cry signalling 'leopard' drives them to climb a tree 
to safety. A cry of 'snake' leads them to scan the ground. Yet it must be emphasised 
that the signal and the action are inextricable for the monkeys. A cry of 'hawk' always 
means both that a hawk is in sight, and to take cover in the appropriate way. The 
monkey cannot communicate a hawk 'as such.' That is, it cannot communicate a 
'hawk' without the perceived presence of a hawk, nor without a corresponding 
imperative instruction.20 
 
Pinker has argued that the same thing holds even for those apes that have ostensibly 
been taught sign language. 21  He pulls apart many well-known attempts to teach 
chimps language, and shows that, while chimps have been taught to use a vocabulary 
of signs in their interactions with their handlers, such sign use remains a long way 
from human, grammatical language. As with wild vervet monkeys, the signs for 
objects remain entangled with a related action. As Pinker notes, “virtually all their 
signs are demands for something they want, usually food or tickling.”22 Their signs are 
also not used with any kind of consistent structure. “Juice can mean 'juice,' 'where 
juice is usually kept,' or 'Take me to where the juice is kept'.”23 
 
Rather than thinking of these apes as using language, it makes more sense to think of 
them using the signs as tools. In Heidegger's terms, the signs are something ready-to-
                                                 
18 Millikan 1993, pp. 98-9. 
19 Seyfarth et al. 1980, p. 1070. 
20 Of course, the monkey might misperceive, and utter an 'eagle' cry when there is no eagle around. Yet 
even this mistaken communication is context-dependent. The monkey perceives incorrectly, yet acts 
correctly on that basis, and the point remains that the monkey is incapable of experiencing the eagle 
(or pseudo-eagle) in a context-free way. Similarly, birds frequently sound alarm calls in the absence 
of a real threat. Mother Nature's cautiousness leaves a lot of room for error, although 'error' is perhaps 
too strong a word in these cases. Cf. supra, p. 94. 
21 Pinker 1994, p. 333-42. 




hand that the apes have learned to apply towards a goal (generally, getting food).24 It 
is also worth pointing out that the learning process for sign-using chimps involved 
years of intensive training, in a task that essentially involved learning behavioural 
responses to get a reward– a long way from the natural and spontaneous language 
production of infants. Possibly the most astounding feature of infant language 
acquisition is that grammar is operative almost from the beginning.25 Speakers as 
young as two have been shown to have a clear understanding of the effect of 
grammatical organisation on meaning.26 In chimps, however, learned forms such as 
'kiss me' are not immediately transferred over to 'kiss the dog,' indicating that chimps 
tend to learn phrases as a whole rather than by building them out of ultimate 
particulars. 27  Such grammatical organisation is also distinctly lacking in chimp 
'sentence' production; after years of training, one particularly adept ape, dubbed Nim 
Chimpsky, uttered as typical 'sentences': 
 
Nim eat Nim eat. 
Drink eat me Nim. 
Me banana you banana me you give. 
Banana me me me eat.28 
 
Nim is clearly using his learned signs to articulate a world of significances. Yet his use 
of words to get a banana remains closer to his use of a stick to get termites than to a 
linguistic utterance. Heidegger would say that Nim has no experience of the banana 
as a banana, and I will now argue that this absence of any grammatical organisation 
to Nim's 'speech' is tied to his lack of the qualitatively different mode of experience 
belonging to humans. 
 
6.1.2 – The Point of Grammar 
in which I argue that the effect of grammar on perception can be  
shown by the fact that infants acquiring language spontaneously  
point declaratively at objects, unlike apes, which never do. 
 
I have argued that, on the Heideggerian view, language, as logos, is grounded in a way 
of seeing the world as entities, through noûs. Work in developmental psychology 
                                                 
24 Cf. Heidegger (1962, p. 108) on the readiness-to-hand of signs. 
25 Laurence & Margolis 2001, pp. 233-238. 
26 Noble et al. 2011, pp. 975-6. 
27 Pinker 1994, p. 335. Cf. the 'taking together that takes apart' (synthesis and diairesis) that Heidegger 
(1995, p. 316) argues lies at the heart of vernehmen. This will be further expanded in the next 
Chapter. 




suggests that this grammatical capacity indicates a new way of seeing and being with 
the entities in the world. I have already mentioned the vast gulf between ordinary two-
year-old human utterances and the repetitive babblings of sign-using apes. Yet this 
point can be made even more clear by comparing pointing gestures in human infants 
and in chimpanzees, following developmental and comparative psychologist Michael 
Tomasello who, drawing on multiple previous studies, has convincingly demonstrated 
an empirical abyss between humans and chimps.29 
 
The interesting thing about apes and pointing, says Tomasello, is that they never do it 
(with some rare exceptions that, I will show below, only serve to strengthen my 
argument). This is interesting because chimps are well-known for having excellent 
intersubjective awareness.30 They can follow the gaze of conspecifics and often alter 
their behaviour accordingly,31 with subordinate chimps, for example, avoiding food 
that they know a more dominant ape has seen hidden, yet going for it when they know 
the latter remains ignorant.32 They also show an awareness of competitors' intentions, 
and attempt to conceal their actions when there is a possibility of being caught out.33 
They have a wide repertoire of gestures, indicating that they wish to play, or to nurse, 
groom, attack, appease, have sex, and so forth.34 And yet the only accounts of apes 
pointing are among captive apes pointing for their human handlers; “there is not a 
single reliable observation, by any scientist anywhere, of one ape pointing for 
another.”35 
 
Human babies, on the other hand, begin pointing spontaneously at around twelve 
months of age– significantly and, I will argue, not coincidentally, together with the 
earliest stirrings of language acquisition. 36  Franco and Butterworth suggest that 
declarative pointing originates independently of imperative gestures like reaching,37 
while Tomasello also notes that human infant pointing has two separate functions, what 
he calls the 'declarative' and 'imperative,' which arise at around the same time, although 
                                                 
29 Tomasello 2006. 
30 Ibid, p. 508; see Call & Tomasello 2008 for review. 
31 Tomasello et al. 1998, pp. 1067-8; Povinelli & Eddy 1996, pp. 133-4. 
32 Hare et al. 2001, p. 144. 
33 Melis et al. 2006, p. 160. 
34 Goodall 1968, pp. 313-374; Tomasello et al. 1994, pp. 137-8, 140-1, 146. 
35 Tomasello 2006, p. 507. 
36 Butterworth & Morrissette 1996, pp. 228-9. 
37 Franco & Butterworth 1996, p. 330. 
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they are used to express quite different meanings.38 These functions map onto the 
'indicative' and 'imperative' representations discussed above, with imperative pointing 
giving a request or command for something, while a declarative point indicates that 
something is.39 Infants point sometimes in an effort to be helpful (the child points to 
something that an adult is looking for but can't see), but often simply to point out an 
object to another person. 
 
The sole purpose of declarative pointing seems to be to draw another's attention to a 
shared external entity... This interpretation is supported by the fact that infants at this 
age also regularly hold up objects to show them to others, seeming wanting [sic] 
nothing from the adult but a sharing of experience (and emotion).40 
 
On the other hand, “[a]lthough some apes, especially those with extensive human 
contact, sometimes point imperatively for humans... no apes point declaratively 
ever.”41 
 
Likewise, Merleau-Ponty argues that pointing reveals an awareness of ourselves now 
as subjects in an objectively-given world. 
 
The insertion of our factical situation as a particular case within the system of other 
possible situations begins as soon as we designate a point in space with our finger. For 
this pointing gesture, which animals do not understand, supposes that we are already 
installed in virtual space– at the end of the line prolonging our finger in a centrifugal 
and cultural space.42 
 
Tomasello interprets these facts in a way that is consistent with our thesis so far. Apes 
seem to use pointing as a tool, something which past experience has shown works to 
get them what they want.43 In human infants, however, there is an added dimension 
to their pointing, one tied to an intersubjective communicative experience. Tomasello 
shows this via a simple but clever experiment that reveals that infants tend not to be 
fully satisfied if their pointing gets them what they want by mistake. When the infant 
points to one of two items, the adult responds with “You want this [wrong object]? 
You can’t have it but you can have this one [right object] instead.” Despite having 
                                                 
38 Tomasello 2006, p. 510. 
39 Cf. Millikan 1993, pp. 98-9. 
40 Tomasello 2006, p. 511. 
41 Ibid, p. 510. 
42 Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 7. 




achieved their 'goal,' the infants nevertheless try to correct the adults.44 Needless to 
say, nothing of this sort has ever been observed in apes. 
 
What Tomasello's account shows is that, even at this pre- or proto-linguistic stage, 
human beings have an awareness that is very different from even our closest animal 
relatives. In the chimp's pointing, the indicative function is bound up with the 
imperative. Just as the vervet monkey's 'leopard' means both the presence of a leopard 
and the imperative to climb a tree, so the chimp's pointing at a grape means that it 
should be given the indicated grape. In the child's declarative pointing, however, we 
see a disconnection between the indicative and imperative functions. The infant 
points out the thing not in connection with any function or task, but simply as the 
thing itself, free from the context of the coping task. In Heidegger's terms, the child 
has “asserted” it as present-at-hand, as an object.45  
 
The ability to perceive something with noûs is the pre-condition of being able both to 
point it out, and to attach a Name to it, and this perceptual element is as essential to 
language– in the strong, exclusively human sense of the logos–  as any communicative 
function. 
 
As Heidegger put it in a later seminar, 
 
The human being cannot comport himself in any way without language. Language is 
not only verbal articulation. Communicatio is only one possibility. Sagen [to say] 
originally meant Zeigen [to point/show].46 
 
Taking language in this immersive, perceptual way clarifies just how fundamentally 
language forms (bildet) our 'worlds.' The role of language goes much deeper than the 
“repository of tradition” that McDowell gives it in his account of Bildung, the 
acquisition of which he then identifies with mindedness itself.47 Zahavi notes that 
McDowell's picture, with its focus on a pre-established natural language, leaves an 
open problem over how 'mindless' infants go on to acquire it.48 But by emphasising 
Bildung as the development of noûs rather than just the learning of culture, we get a 
fuller story of the naturalness of second nature, where natural language is not itself 
                                                 
44 Ibid, p. 512. 
45 Cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 201. 
46 Heidegger 2001, p. 16. 
47 McDowell 1994, p. 126. 
48 Zahavi 2013, p. 326. 
169 
 
that space, but a sign that we are moving within it. 
 
Chomsky has even suggested that the perceptual element of language evolved before 
the communicative and perhaps even uniquely in a single individual, approvingly 
citing Jacob who argues that “the role of language as a communication system 
between individuals would have come about only secondarily.” 49  However, it is 
important to note that our earliest pointing gestures are essentially intersubjective– 
we point for others. We saw Tomasello emphasise the centrality of sharing experience 
and emotion in infant declarative pointing, and Franco and Butterworth argue that 
the pointing gesture's importance to language acquisition lies as much in its co-
ordination of shared intentionality as in its referential aspect. 50  For this reason, 
Hinzen argues that all thinking occurs in a “deictic space” structured by the triangular 
relationship of the grammatical first-, second-, and third-persons.51 In a similar way, 
discourse (Rede) for Heidegger is the way in which Dasein “maintains itself in some 
definite way of concernful Being-with-one-another,”52 and the way in which 'being-
with-[Others]' explicitly shares its co-situatedness (Mitbefindlichkeit).53 These points 
warn against assigning a priority to linguistic perception over communication, since 
to do so is to separate the individual from our intersubjective immersion in a shared 
world. What it does establish, however, is that the presence of an ability to point out 
for others– whether with the index finger or with words– demonstrates the presence 
of a prior capacity to perceive entities as entities, and as a perception that can be 
shared. From a developmental point of view, however, as I will discuss in the next 
Chapter, it is likely that the noetic, perceptual capacity develops in parallel with the 
intersubjective, communicative dimension of language. 
 
In this Section, I have argued that the development of language in humans is 
intertwined with the development of what Heidegger called vernehmen or noûs, the 
perception of something as something. I have argued this based on two central points. 
Firstly, while other animals certainly communicate, their signals are essentially used 
as tools that function in a ready-to-hand way. Their indicative function is bound 
together with their imperative function, and as such they are better understood as 
behavioural responses to a specific situation than as linguistic assertions. This is 
shown especially dramatically in the fact that chimps never point declaratively. This 
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leads to my second point, which is that human infants spontaneously begin to point 
declaratively at the time they acquire language. I conclude from this that they have 
begun developing noûs at this point, meaning they are able to perceive and point out 
objects as objects, independent of any imperative or practical context. In the next 
Section, I will build on this argument by arguing that the infant's development of noûs, 
pointing and language does not replace their previous capacity, but adds to it. 
 
6.2.1 – The Schneider Case 
in which I argue that a case of visual agnosia is the result  
of the impairment of the patient's noetic capacities, and  
demonstrates the presence of two distinct modes of perception. 
 
I have so far argued that pointing indicates a different way of perceiving the world– 
noesis– through which we understand something as something in a way that is 
unavailable to non-human animals. I have argued that the spontaneous development 
of declarative pointing in human infants suggests that they have moved beyond the 
pure motor-intentional coping that humans share with other animals. However, in 
arguing against McDowell's claim that this rational capacity is pervasive, I have 
implied that noûs is not a replacement of an earlier form of coping, but rather an 
addition (albeit one that fundamentally changes the functioning of the first-natural 
form). In this Section, I will continue this argument by drawing upon Merleau-Ponty's 
discussion of the 'Schneider case.' Through his phenomenological analysis of a case of 
severe agnosia, Merleau-Ponty argues that we have two ways of relating intentionally 
to the world, 'pointing' and 'grasping.' I will argue that the 'pointing' mode coincides 
with the noetic awareness of 'something as something.' This stands in contrast to 
grasping, which reveals a mode of 'captivated' coping. 
 
Schneider was a German soldier who fought in the First World War. After a shrapnel 
wound to his brain, he developed what Merleau-Ponty called “psychic blindness” and 
what we would now call apperceptive visual agnosia. 54  He became a patient of 
psychologist Adhémar Gelb and neuropsychiatrist Kurt Goldstein, upon whose 
extensive discussions of his case history Merleau-Ponty draws.55 Following his injury, 
                                                 
54 Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 105; Tonkonogy & Puente 2009, p. 25. I have principally referred to the 
recent (2012) Landes translation of Phenomenology of Perception, referring also to the original 1945 
edition published by Librarie Gallimard. Somewhat frustratingly, the pagination between these 
editions, the most recent (post-2005) French editions, and the various editions of the earlier Smith 
translation, are all out of sync. The problems this entails have been rectified by David Morris' (2015) 
extremely useful “Concordance of Editions of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception,” 
which at the time of writing was freely available on his academia.edu webpage. 
55 Of the original discussions, see especially Gelb & Goldstein 1938 and Goldstein 1931. 
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Schneider became unable to point out 'abstract' objects, including on his own body. 
That is to say, he was unable either to indicate or to recognise objects or his own body 
parts outside of the context of a task. He was unable to describe the position of his 
limbs, nor to perform abstract movements with them.56 However, although he was 
unable to point to his nose, he could take a handkerchief from his pocket and blow his 
nose without effort.57 Similarly, while he was unable to say which part of his body had 
been touched, nor to distinguish between two points of contact on his skin, if he was 
bitten by a mosquito he would quickly and spontaneously reach for wherever he had 
been bitten.58 
 
Schneider was unable to perceive or act in an abstract manner. He was, essentially, 
'captivated' within a particular task, and could only perceive correctly within the 
context of a task.59 Hence we find the strange paradox that Schneider could find his 
way unproblematically to Goldstein's house if he was going there on an errand, and 
yet could not recognise it if he was passing it in another context.60 Similarly, while he 
was unable to recognise objects such as pens simply by looking at them, he was 
nevertheless able to continue his fairly intricate profession of wallet-making, 
successfully manipulating the scissors, needle, thread and leather, albeit at a slower 
although still acceptable rate than before his injury.61 
 
Based on this account, Merleau-Ponty follows Goldstein in dividing human motor 
intentionality into two modes, 'grasping' (Greifen) and 'pointing' (Zeigen).62 These 
respectively refer to what he describes as 'concrete' and 'abstract' movements. 
Concrete movements are those of the kind that Schneider remained capable of, 
actions which are directed towards 'objects' of a specific task, be it as simple as 
scratching an itch or as complex as sewing a wallet. Abstract movements, on the other 
hand, distance the object from the body; they isolate it as an object as such. 
 
Precisely like the act of naming, the act of pointing presupposes that the object, rather 
than being approached, grasped, and engulfed by the body, be maintained at a distance 
and sketch out an image in front of the patient... even this silent gesture is impossible 
if what it designates is not already ripped out of instantaneous and monadic existence 
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and treated as the representative of its previous appearances in me and of its 
simultaneous appearances in others; that is, unless it is subsumed under a category 
and promoted to the status of an idea.63 
 
Schneider's disorder, then, can be understood as the loss of his Zeigen capacity. 
Without the ability to point, he is “no longer a subject facing an objective world... he 
can no longer take up the categorial attitude.”64 
 
Merleau-Ponty presents these statements as typical of the 'intellectualist' (rationalist) 
interpretation that he means to reject. However, as I will show below, his argument is 
principally against the intellectualist equation of subjectivity, agency– and by 
extension, Zeigen– with 'mind' and 'consciousness' more broadly. Merleau-Ponty 
accepts the understanding of Zeigen as a way of relating to entities under a categorial 
schema, but stresses that the loss of this capacity does not literally mean that 
Schneider– or the Greifen capacity more generally– is non-intentional or 
unconscious. His discussion of the Schneider case aims at describing human 
behaviour in more phenomenologically accurate terms than empiricism or 
intellectualism. For our discussion below, then, we must be careful to understand 
Zeigen and Greifen as Merleau-Ponty does, sharing his aim of preserving the 
distinction while guarding against empiricist or intellectualist interpretations.65 
 
The empiricist interpretations of the Zeigen/Greifen distinction hold that it is either 
(or both) a distinction between the visual and tactile sensory faculties, or between 
intentional and reflexive actions.66 In the case of the former, Merleau-Ponty argues 
that no such interpretation is indefeasible, and offers counter-examples that show 
that Schneider's and similar cases are not limitations of vision or other particular 
senses, but are the “expressions of a more fundamental disturbance.”67 In the case of 
the latter, as Kelly notes, it is impossibly reductionist to consider Greifen as reflexive 
and opposed to an intentional Zeigen. 68  While scratching a mosquito bite might 
arguably be a reflexive action, it is intentional in a way that a pure reflex such as the 
knee-jerk is not, and at any rate, as we have seen, Greifen actions also encompass 
complex intentional tasks. Thus, Merleau-Ponty holds, empiricist accounts cannot 
                                                 
63 Ibid, pp. 122-3. 
64 Ibid, p. 123. 
65 Keat 1991, p. 168. 
66 Merleau-Ponty 2012, pp. 116-122. Cf. Keat 1991, p. 173; Kelly 2000, p. 167. 
67 Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 121. 
68 Kelly 2000, p. 167. 
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give us an accurate understanding of the Zeigen/Greifen distinction, nor of motor 
intentionality more broadly. 
 
The intellectualist distinction between Zeigen and Greifen is not so easily dismissed, 
and indeed, Merleau-Ponty holds that it is “less false than it is abstract.”69 Keat argues 
that Merleau-Ponty's analysis aims to preserve the features of intellectualism that 
make it superior to empiricism, while refining its concepts to avoid an untenable 
dualism of body and mind.70 Merleau-Ponty endorses the distinction between Greifen 
and Zeigen as ways of relating to the world. His problem is with the intellectualist 
interpretation of that distinction as one between physiology and psyche, between body 
and mind.71 By trying to split our understanding of the subject as an existence pour 
soi against a body that is en soi, Merleau-Ponty says, we risk ultimately undermining 
the distinction between Zeigen and Greifen by either reducing both modes to a 
physiological reflex– for why should pointing not be considered physical if it utilises 
the same muscles and nerves as grasping?– or attributing them both to 
consciousness– since, as we have seen, grasping shares an intentionality with pointing 
that goes beyond the purely physiological.72 
 
The solution, Merleau-Ponty argues, is to emphasise the Zeigen/Greifen distinction 
in order to re-conceive what it is to be a subject and an agent: “the two responses cease 
to merge if Zeigen and Greifen are considered as two different ways of relating to the 
object and two types of being in the world.”73  
 
The distinction [between abstract and concrete movement, between Zeigen and 
Greifen] can only be maintained if there are several ways for the body to be a body, 
and several ways for consciousness to be consciousness.74 
 
In what follows, then, I will explore the distinction between Greifen and Zeigen in the 
light of my thesis so far, to argue that the Greifen mode captures the form of awareness 
we enact through embodied smooth coping and that we share (to an extent) with other 
animals, while Zeigen refers to the enactment of noûs. I will argue first that Greifen 
corresponds to the mode of awareness employed in embodied coping. The key 
elements of this are that Greifen is only directed towards objects in the context of a 
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72 Merleau-Ponty 2012, pp. 124-5. 
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task, and that such tasks are sequential– that is, performed in a habitual way such 
that objects are only encountered as far as they are relevant to the task, and cannot be 
separated out in terms of their 'objective' or standalone properties. 
 
The defining mark of Greifen behaviour– as with dealings with the ready-to-hand– is 
that it takes place within an action-context. As Romdenh-Romluc argues, the objects 
of our 'grasping' don't have “merely objective qualities” such as size and shape but 
'verb-al' solicitations like edible, kickable, and so on.75 For Kelly, our understanding 
of the object-in-context “is dependent upon the intention to grasp” it, to use it rather 
than simply to point it out.76 Put another way, we circumspectively see-through the 
object as the 'with-which' of a broader equipmental context, rather than as something 
isolated from that context.77 Or to use an analogy, we might say that Greifen is like an 
understanding of a sentence as a whole, where Zeigen is an awareness of individual 
words. 
 
Kelly argues this with support from more recent research into agnosics.78 He discusses 
work by Goodale and his colleagues, who investigated a woman, DF, showing similar 
symptoms to Schneider. Following brain-damage due to carbon monoxide poisoning, 
she was unable to discriminate between the size, shape and orientation of visual 
objects.79 She was furthermore unable to indicate the size of objects with a gesture of 
her thumb and forefinger. Nonetheless, when she was asked to grasp them, her thumb 
and forefinger were noted to be “systematically related to the width of the object.”80 
Similarly, while DF was unable to state the orientation of a slot as either horizontal, 
vertical, or diagonal, she was consistently successful at posting a card through 
variously arranged slots.81  Significantly, Goodale and his colleagues note that she 
“began to orient the card correctly even as her hand was being raised from the start 
position in this task.”82 Similarly, 
 
when asked to pick up a block placed at different orientations on the table surface in 
front of her, she oriented her hand appropriately very early in the reaching movement 
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and grasped the object normally.83 
 
Such observations, as Kelly also argues, strongly support Merleau-Ponty's claim that 
from “its very beginnings, the grasping movement is magically complete.”84  
 
Greifen therefore signifies a perception that takes place as part of a whole. I remarked 
earlier that our absorbed coping is comprised of actions that have a more-or-less 
defined sequence. For example, it is far more difficult to play a melody or rhythm from 
the middle– one might draw a blank, and yet on being given the first bar, the rest flows 
naturally.85 Indeed, we might say– again analogously– that Greifen is a perception of 
the melody, where Zeigen sees the individual notes.86 Through Greifen, we put into 
play our absorbed habits– as seen in Schneider's ability to scratch an itch, blow his 
nose, and even sew together wallets. 
 
Further evidence for this is shown by Schneider's inability to play. Schneider is only 
able to mime movements such as a military salute or hammering a nail by “placing 
himself into the spirit of the actual situation.”87 If asked to pretend to hammer a nail, 
Schneider would raise both his right, hammering hand, and his left, nail-holding 
hand, and actually 'hammer' the invisible nail. That is, he was completely unable to 
raise only his right hand and pretend to hammer in a half-hearted or unrealistic 
manner. Essentially, the only way Schneider could play was to 'suspend disbelief' and 
fully 'get into character.' If the spell was broken, and his attention drawn to the fact 
that he was not actually saluting a superior, “all of his dexterity disappears.”88 This 
suggests that the Greifen mode extends beyond simply grasping, but describes the 
intentional state in which we approach habitual tasks, or the 'embodied skills' I 
discussed earlier. Schneider's over-realistic pretending stands in stark contrast to 
normal subjects who, when we play at an activity, tend to accentuate only the most 
significant elements of the movement.89 Thus, when young children play at a task, 
their movements are almost caricatures of the imitated action. This does not simply 
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highlight that they haven't mastered the subtleties of the task (although it does show 
that), but more importantly shows that they have a perceptive Zeigen awareness of 
key elements involved. 
 
These conclusions are further supported by another series of experiments by Goodale 
and his colleagues which 'forced' normal subjects to 'pantomime' a grasping action. 
The subjects were first allowed to see an object on the table in front of them, following 
which their vision was obscured, and the object either removed or not. At a given 
signal, their view was unobscured, and they were instructed to reach for the object or, 
if it were missing, to reach for where it had been as though it were still there.90 Both 
the position of their fingers and the speed with which they moved was “distinctly 
different” in normal subjects when they were pantomiming grasping.91 This proved to 
be true even without the delay, when the subjects were asked simply to pantomime 
the action.92 The same experiment was run on DF, who performed significantly worse 
on the pantomiming tasks, leading the researchers to conclude that she had a 
“profound inability to construct useful percepts of object features.” 93  The act of 
playing or miming, then, signifies a break away from the direct Greifen perception of 
the object. Our 'motor project,' as Merleau-Ponty puts it, no longer aims at someone 
or something in the world: 
 
it aims at my forearm, my arm, my fingers, and it aims at them insofar as they are 
capable of breaking with their insertion in the given world and of sketching out around 
me a fictional situation... insofar as I curiously examine this strange signifying 
machine and set it to work for my own amusement.94 
 
Romdenh-Romluc points out that Schneider's inability to play is symptomatic of his 
wider inability to engage with 'the possible.' 95  She argues that he is only able to 
perceive opportunities relating to his actual environment and current task, as 
evidenced by his failure to recognise Goldstein's house outside the context of an 
errand.96 And indeed, Merleau-Ponty says that Schneider never went out 'just for a 
walk,' without some kind of mission. 97  Neither did he tend to improvise in 
                                                 
90 Goodale et al. 1994, p. 1161. 
91 Ibid, p. 1163. 
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93 Ibid, p. 1177. 
94 Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 114. 
95 Romdenh-Romluc 2007, pp. 52-53. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 136. 
177 
 
conversation, nor sing on his own, and never took the initiative sexually. 98  His 
awareness was restricted to the present moment, conscious neither of other possible 
tasks nor even of events that were not presently engaging him. 
 
[I]f someone brings a dish to the table, he never wonders where the dish came from. 
He declares that one sees only in the direction that one looks, and only the objects 
upon which one focuses... When he complains about the weather, he is asked if he feels 
better during the winter. He responds: 'I can't say now... for the moment, I can't say 
anything.'99 
 
Schneider is “bound” within the moment, he “lacks the concrete freedom that consists 
in the general power of placing oneself in a situation.”100 There is an obvious parallel 
here with the 'captivation' (Benommenheit) with which Heidegger describes both 
animal behaviour and Dasein's absorption with the ready-to-hand. There is, however, 
an important difference between Schneider's boundedness and Benommenheit. Both 
humans absorbed in coping, as well as animals, are not so captivated to the exclusion 
of other possible courses of action. Dreyfus therefore criticises Romdenh-Romluc for 
arguing that the Zeigen capacity that Schneider lacks is what opens us to the possible, 
since animals who also lack that capacity are also able to change tasks– their very 
survival depends on it. 101  He accuses her of succumbing to the intellectualist 
temptation to understand Zeigen and Greifen as 'radically different,' and hence of 
viewing Zeigen as completely detached from the world. 
 
The debate between Romdenh-Romluc and Dreyfus is slightly tangential to my 
argument, and yet is worth a short detour in order to clarify my position on Zeigen 
and Greifen. I have argued so far that Greifen describes our mode of circumspective 
perception during coping, while Zeigen demonstrates the enactment of noûs, the 
perception of something as something. I have argued, with Merleau-Ponty, that these 
do not show a clear-cut division between body and mind, but rather indicate two 
functionally independent yet complementary ways of relating to entities. Romdenh-
Romluc shares this view but takes it further, to argue that it is the Zeigen capacity that 
gives us the freedom to step-back from coping and switch tasks. Dreyfus counters that 
animals and infants can also switch tasks while they are engaged in coping, and hence 
we should be cautious about equating Schneider with an animal way of being, since in 
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this respect, higher animals at least have more in common with normal humans than 
with Schneider.102 
 
There are two abilities in question here, however. The first is the ability to step back 
and reflect. The second is the ability to change tasks. Romdenh-Romluc is correct to 
say that these are certainly interrelated for humans. I could be on an errand to the 
greengrocer, for example, when I walk past Goldstein's house. Recognising it, I could, 
as Romdenh-Romluc argues, freely decide to interrupt my shopping trip to knock on 
the door and make an appointment to chat with the doctor about visual agnosia. Yet 
this is not the only way we switch tasks. I could be on the grocery mission when, 
passing the house, I notice Goldstein's dog has got out, and is wandering down the 
street. This in turn solicits me into a new mission, of catching the dog and returning 
it, and I become so absorbed in this new task that I forget all about the grocery run. 
This, argues Dreyfus, does not signify reflective thought, but rather the unready-to-
hand obstinacy (Aufsässigkeit) that breaks into our smooth coping. 103  Our 
circumspective coping has not here broken down into an awareness of detached, 
present-at-hand entities, but during this initial interruption of coping, new 
solicitations begin to summon us more strongly than our initial task. That is, 
Goldstein's dog need not show up as a dog, but our perception of it as an unready-to-
hand obstruction to our task breaks our smooth coping and jolts us from one task to 
the next. Importantly, as we saw earlier, Dreyfus attributes unready-to-hand breaks 
to higher animals as well as humans. 104  Thus, we find a similar scenario when 
throwing a frisbee for our dog in the park opposite Goldstein's. The dog races after the 
frisbee but, noticing Goldstein's dog has got out again, veers off to introduce itself. 
 
Schneider's impairment, then, seems particularly severe insofar as he has lost not just 
the ability to take entities as present-at-hand, but also as unready-to-hand. He 
struggles to break out of any task without being explicitly directed by another 
person.105 Be that as it may, it does not affect my argument that Zeigen is connected 
to the first ability mentioned above, the ability to step back and reflect. More precisely, 
                                                 
102 Ibid, pp. 67, 69. 
103 Ibid, p. 60; cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 103. 
104 Dreyfus 1991, p. 68. Cf. Dreyfus 1991, pp. 68-9, where he argues that only higher animals can be 
'startled' by the unready-to-hand. Insects, for example, living with only syncretic modes of 
behaviour, simply adapt to new tasks when pulled from one situation to another. 
105 Or so Merleau-Ponty leads us to believe. I do wonder how Schneider responded when, at work 
sewing wallets, he ran out of materials, or what he did when he felt hungry or sleepy. Presumably 
he was open to more solicitations than just the verbal cues of his carers, although the literature gives 
us little detail on these aspects of his life. 
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as I have argued so far in this Chapter, Zeigen signifies the enactment of noûs, the 
direct perception of something as something. I have so far argued this primarily 
through a distinction with Greifen. In this final part of this Section, I will briefly lay 
out what it means to say that Zeigen 'carves up' the world, exploring its connection to 
language, in order to lay the ground for the next section. In doing so I will also discuss 
one final objection to the claim that Schneider lacks Zeigen, namely, that he still 
possesses linguistic and logical skills. 
 
6.2.2 – Post-conceptuality and language-use 
in which I argue that Schneider– having acquired a post-conceptual,  
second-nature 'world'– remains capable of coping within it despite the  
impairment of his noetic capacity, therefore showing a space between  
noesis and language-use even where they remain interdependent. 
 
The primary function of Zeigen, I have been arguing, is to carve up the world into 
parts that can be experienced independently and out of the flow, as notes isolated 
from a melody. This is in contrast to Greifen, which I have argued is performed 
sequentially. This means that we perform Greifen actions in a flowing or habitual way. 
We can see the evidence for this in ourselves insofar as it is easier and more natural 
to speak a memorised line of poetry from the beginning than from partway through, 
and we see it in a more extreme way in Schneider, who was unable to imitate any 
action unless he performed it from the beginning. This mode of acting, I have 
suggested, also describes how animals perform their actions. The tricks that trained 
animals perform have clear signals and a defined goal. The animal's awareness is 
directed towards that goal, rather than to any of the individual elements. For example, 
we saw earlier that sign-using chimps appear to understand their signs as wholes– 
'kiss me' does not translate into 'kiss the dog' even where the chimp appears to 
understand both the verb and the nouns.106  
 
Similarly, Schneider's lack of Zeigen also left him with what Merleau-Ponty calls a 
“number blindness.” 107  Although he is able to count and perform arithmetic, he 
“cannot, however, imagine the number; all of these results are obtained through ritual 
procedures with which he has no meaningful relation.”108 Schneider does not perform 
equations with abstract, isolated numbers, but rather performs the task as a 
procedure, which is again approached sequentially as part of an unbroken whole. 
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When he is asked to complete the equation '5 plus 4 minus 4,' he executes the 
operation in two steps without 'noticing anything peculiar.' He simply agrees, if it is 
pointed out to him, that the number 5 'remains.' He does not understand that 
'doubling half' of a number is this very same number.109 
 
Schneider's arithmetic is therefore approached more as a skill than as mathematics, 
since he lacks the ability to take numbers abstractly that makes mathematics 
meaningful.110 
 
Zeigen, I have therefore argued, gives the ability to abstract, and in the next Chapter 
I will argue that this is what makes it– and noûs– linguistic or grammatical in a broad 
sense. Yet it may pre-emptively be objected that, since Schneider is able to both speak 
and understand language, as well as perform 'abstract' tasks such as mathematics, any 
argument towards this conclusion is fundamentally flawed. This objection, however, 
presupposes the 'radical distinction' between Zeigen and Greifen– in which all 
language-use belongs to Zeigen and the intellect while all action belongs to Greifen 
and the body– that Merleau-Ponty warned was a lapse into intellectualism.111 We must 
keep in mind that Zeigen and Greifen are not separate capacities that deal with 
different kinds of entities, but are rather two different ways of approaching entities– 
including linguistic entities– in the world. 
 
Merleau-Ponty gives us the resources to think about the Zeigen/Greifen distinction 
with relation to language in a later discussion of Schneider in which he distinguishes 
between parole parlant and parole parlée– 'speaking speech' and 'spoken speech.'112 
The parole parlant is considered an “authentic act of expression.”113 Speech here is 
not expressing a thought, since Merleau-Ponty holds that authentic speech is itself 
the accomplishment of a thought.114 Parole parlant points out and articulates some 
aspect of the world in direct way. The parole parlée is inauthentic in Heidegger's sense 
that one uses language in this way simply as one finds it, not as original thought, but 
habitually, as part of a broader pattern of habits, 'as one does.' There is a connection 
                                                 
109 Ibid. 
110 This Greifen sense of mathematics is probably also what lies behind the skill of those African Grey 
parrots and apes who have been taught to work with numbers. While certainly no mean feat, it 
probably goes too far to attribute them a knowledge of number as number based on their capacity to 
count or do arithmetic in this way (cf. Hauser et al. 2002, p. 1576). 
111 Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 125. 
112 Ibid, p. 202. 
113 Ibid, p. 203. 
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here to Heidegger's Gerede or 'idle talk' that merely 'passes the word along,' and 
indeed, there is a direct etymological relation between Gerede and geredet, a German 
translation for parlée.115 It is from such a thought that Heidegger later emphasises 
poetic language as our direct connection to being, but Merleau-Ponty notes that our 
everyday speech can also be authentic parole parlant.116 
 
The same transcendence which we found in the literary uses of speech can also be 
found in everyday language. This transcendence arises the moment I refuse to content 
myself with the established language, which is in effect a way of silencing me, and as 
soon as I truly speak to someone.117 
 
Similarly to the way in which, as I argued in Chapter Two, our everyday actions can 
be authentic while our esoteric expertise can be inauthentic, our everyday speech can 
be parlant where our rhetorical flourishes can be parlée. What makes an action or 
speech authentic has less to do with the particular style, but rather the actor's 
immersion in the spontaneity of the moment.118 The sophists Plato criticised, whose 
lack of substance was hidden within eloquent speeches, are still with us today, in the 
jargon-laden 'business-speak' of many academics, pundits and bureaucrats.119 Yet the 
parole parlée is not exclusively negative. Just as for Heidegger, inauthenticity is the 
condition of our authenticity, Baldwin argues that the parole parlant and the parole 
parlée are interdependent.120 While the parole parlant demonstrates an authentic 
awareness of things as things, it is the shared structure of the parole parlée– “which 
enjoys the use of available significations like that of an acquired fortune”– that makes 
the expression and communication of that awareness possible.121 This only becomes 
problematic when we lean so heavily on the parole parlée that we stop expressing the 
parole parlant– then, the “linguistic and intersubjective world no longer causes us 
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any wonder, [and] we no longer distinguish it from the world itself.”122 
 
This appears to be the case with Schneider. He is certainly able to use language 
fluently, just as he is able to fluidly work at stitching together wallets. But: 
 
He hardly speaks unless he is questioned, or if he takes the initiative of a question, he 
only ever asks stereotypical questions such as those he asks his children each day when 
they arrive home from school. He never uses language to express a merely possible 
situation, and false statements ('the sky is black') are meaningless for him.123 
 
In a similar (though subtler) way to the sign-using apes discussed in the previous 
Section, Schneider encounters language as a ready-to-hand tool. This in itself is not 
unusual, insofar as it is one of the ways normal subjects use language as well. Rouse, 
for instance, has argued that we should view the fluid use of language as practical 
coping, and that speaking our native language is comparable to other intellectual skills 
with which we navigate unreflectively through a configuration of possibilities. 124 
Dreyfus responded that, while there is certainly something to this, it ignores the 
reflection that occurs when we break the flow to point something out.125 In Dreyfus'– 
and Heidegger's– view, language– as opposed, perhaps, to 'language-use'– cannot be 
just another skill with which we cope, because of its very central role in disclosing the 
world. Therefore, to say that the parole parlant demonstrates the apophantic-as does 
not mean that, in our inauthentic use of language, we do not ultimately refer back to 
objects as objects, for the development of language is interdependent with the 
development of noûs and the ability to take something as something (the process of 
Bildung, which Schneider also went through). Yet this noetic awareness is not 
operative in all of our speech. The parole parlée describes the use of language 
circumspectively toward a further goal. We should remember that 'inauthenticity' 
here ought not to be read with a negative moral connotation, but describes the use of 
language in an everyday and 'un-owned' way. The point is that the parole parlant– as 
owned speech– is not used in a tool-like way, but is the logos drawn directly by the 
noûs from the object experienced apophantically before it. 
 
What makes Schneider different, therefore, is the impairment of this second function 
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of language for him. We can make this clearer by referring back to Merleau-Ponty's 
terms. Speech is indeed experienced, when we speak fluidly, as ready-to-hand. Yet the 
distinction between the paroles parlée and parlant show that this is not the feature 
of language which is at issue here. What makes the parole parlant possible is the 
ability to Zeigen, or more broadly, to take entities as entities. It is this capacity that 
Schneider lacks, and so while he is able to use language in a tool-like way, as ready-
to-hand, he struggles to break out of that smooth coping with language into the 
broader understanding of being that it normally provides. 
 
Thus we should not be surprised that the loss or impairment of the Zeigen capacity in 
Schneider has not caused him to lose his ability to produce or understand speech. 
Schneider's inability to take entities conceptually does not signify that he can only take 
them non-conceptually– that he has reverted to a pre-linguistic mode of being-in-the-
world. It signifies that he can only take them post-conceptually. Post-conceptuality, 
it will be recalled from Chapter Four, describes coping hermeneutically with 
conceptual entities– that is, with entities that can only be understood as the entities 
they are within a cultural 'world' or second-nature. 126  Despite his injury and its 
consequences, Schneider has nevertheless been initiated into a linguistic and cultural 
second-nature, and this initiation is essentially irreversible.127 The entities of second-
nature– words, concepts, artefacts, relationships– remain real for Schneider, and he 
remains able to deal with them post-conceptually, hermeneutically-as elements of a 
task-directed equipmental context. What he has lost is the capacity to take them 
apophantically-as entities, free from the involved context. This is shown as equally in 
his failure to recognise Goldstein's house when it is not the target of an errand, as 
much as in his inability to recognise the tautology of five-plus-four-minus-four, and 
in his absorption in the stereotyped parole parlée of everyday language which “never 
ceases to have this sort of evidentness and self-sufficiency of the real that stifles all 
interrogation, all reference to the possible, all wonder, and all improvisation.”128 
 
In this Section, I have sought to strengthen my claim of a link between the faculty of 
noûs– conceptual apprehension– and the ability to point by exploring the impairment 
of that ability in agnosics. I have argued that the cases of Schneider and DF show a 
clear distinction between the Greifen and Zeigen capacities, but that this distinction 
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should not be interpreted dualistically, but rather as demonstrating two modes 
through which we can experience entities. I have argued that these correspond to the 
hermeneutic/apophantic distinction I argued for in Part One. It follows from this that 
Greifen is experienced as that mode of coping that I have argued we share with non-
rational animals. This is further supported by my arguments in the previous Section 
that even the most intelligent human-reared chimps cannot point declaratively, but 
use gestures rather as tools within a captivated equipmental context. This shows 
parallels with Schneider, who has lost his ability to point, and more broadly, lost his 
ability to act outside of a similarly captivated (benommen) equipmental context. This 
does not mean that Schneider has reverted to a 'mere animal,' for he continues to cope 
post-conceptually within a second-natural cultural world. Indeed, one might argue 
that Schneider's noetic faculty is severely impaired rather than completely destroyed. 
Nevertheless, the core of my argument remains, that Greifen and Zeigen describe 
distinct modes of understanding entities in the world, and that it is the Zeigen capacity 
that allows us to 'carve up' the world to be experienced as isolated parts. I have already 
suggested that this capacity is intimately connected to a grammatical understanding 




The aim of this Chapter was to show that humans inhabit the world linguistically. I 
have argued this in three stages. Firstly, I argued for the faculty of noûs as conceptual 
perception. Secondly, I showed the difference in intentional experience when noûs is 
operative against when it is not. Thirdly, I argued that this difference comes down to 
the grammatical structure of noûs, through which we are able both to see entities as 
united with their properties, and to separate and re-combine them. 
 
In this Chapter, I have offered support for the relation between noûs, language, and 
second nature I posited in Chapter Five. I argued that the ability to declaratively point, 
which arises in human infants with the acquisition of language, signifies the presence 
of a noetic awareness of entities as entities. This pointing-out of something for others 
to see differs from the imperative-pointing of human-raised chimps, whose gestures– 
like the communicative signals of other animals– are better understood as ready-to-
hand equipment used for a task. Declarative pointing, on the other hand, presupposes 
an awareness of the Thing, isolated from its context. This conclusion was further 
supported by my discussion of Schneider, whose loss of his ability to point signified 
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the loss of his Zeigen mode of intentionality, which I identified with the enactment of 
noûs. His retention of the Greifen or grasping capacity demonstrates that these two 
modes of intentionality are separable and complementary in humans. The arising of 
noûs with the acquisition of language supports the claim that their appearance marks 
the development of second nature and induction into the space of reasons. Schneider's 
retention of language despite the loss of Zeigen suggests that we remain able to 
navigate that second-natural space post-conceptually, with only the Greifen capacity. 
 
Thus, the conclusions of this Chapter further support my thesis that human 
intentionality is comprised of both a post-conceptual understanding that experiences 
second-nature entities in a mode parallel to animal coping, and a noetic, conceptual 
understanding, which takes entities as the logos, as entities that can be separated, 
abstracted, and re-combined away from the moment of their apprehension.  
 
In the next and final Chapter, I will argue that noesis achieves this by structuring 
perception and thought grammatically, and argue that this structure both opens the 
possibility of abstract thought, as well as creating the potential of a disconnect 








Chapter Seven  
Carving Nature at the Joints 
 
In Part Two so far I have argued that the 'abyss' between humans and animals centres 
on our possession of the faculty of noûs, which enables us to perceive the world in the 
Zeigen mode– that is, to point out entities as entities, separate from the tasks of 
involved coping. I have repeatedly suggested that this mode of understanding ought 
to be described as grammatical. In this Chapter, I will argue for this conclusion by 
expanding on my discussion in the previous Chapters of noûs's power to separate 
elements out of the sequentially-experienced whole of human coping. I will do this in 
three stages. I first argue that this separation and recombination is what Heidegger 
means when he describes the logos apophantikos as structured by synthesis and 
diairesis; therefore, we ought to further understand noesis as the action of 
abstracting– of combining, separating, and re-combining– the elements perceived 
with noûs.  
 
I then argue that this noetic capacity– which develops spontaneously in human 
infants as part of language acquisition– is consistent with Chomsky's theory that 
human thought is made possible by a faculty of Universal Grammar. This theory offers 
empirical support for my thesis that the biological development of noûs in an 
individual occurs in a feedback loop with their initiation or Bildung into human 
second nature as part of a greater holistic process of becoming human, entering into 
a 'world' where both physical stimuli and conceptual objects are encountered as 
things, as well as coped with reflexively.  
 
Finally, I defend this account against objections that might take my account to imply 
an internalist account of a mind radically separated from the world. I argue that such 
a reading presumes the human being to exist as an isolated individual. I stress that 
the human is an embodied, social being, and defend the plausibility of my account by 
arguing that language and noesis evolved together with the second natural ‘niche’ that 
humans inhabit, and that the culturally-shared nature of this niche closes off an 
internalist reading. Nevertheless, the influence of culture in building our world seems 
to suggest some form of linguistic or cultural relativism, and so in the final section I 
examine my thesis in the light of the so-called ‘Whorfian hypothesis.’ I argue that the 
process of concept-acquisition detailed above does imply that different communities 




have different worlds. However, I deny a ‘strong’ Whorfian claim that such worlds are 
incommensurable, arguing that translation always remains a possibility, and that 
concept possession can differ just as much within a culture as without it. I close with 
some thoughts on the implications of this for the connection of our concepts to the 
experiences from which they are drawn. 
 
7.1 – Synthesis and Diairesis 
in which I outline Heidegger's claim that noûs is grounded in the  
functions of synthesis (binding) and diairesis (separating), showing  
noesis as a mode of perception whose content is structured grammatically. 
 
My thesis in this Chapter is that our noetic perception is grammatically-structured. In 
this first Section, I will elaborate on what that means in this context by examining 
Heidegger's claim that noûs– vernehmen– is grounded in what Aristotle called 
synthesis– 'binding' or 'relating'– and diairesis– 'separating.' Just as I argued in the 
previous Chapters that our capacity for language is underwritten by a noetic capacity 
to point out or 'take' things as isolated things– as 'notes' isolated from the sequential 
'melody' of coping– so now I will argue that the structure of noesis enables a capacity 
to recombine such elements of experience into new, wider, thoughts. 
 
In the discussion of vernehmen in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics lectures 
that I drew upon in Chapter Five, Heidegger devotes a section to the Aristotelian 
concepts of synthesis and diairesis, where he expands in detail on the rushed 
treatment he gave the topic in Being and Time. 1  Heidegger explicitly connects 
synthesis to the apophantic-as structure of noetic (vernehmende) perception. 
 
The 'as' pertains to a synthesis, to a relating, and specifically to a synthesis noeimaton, 
to a connection of representations, to the apprehending formation of a unity 
[vernehmenden Einheit-bilden] or a unity-forming apprehension [einheitbildenden 
Vernehmen].2 
 
Yet Heidegger here immediately points out that for Aristotle, everything that can be 
described as a synthesis can also be described as a diairesis, a 'taking apart.'3 It is not 
                                                 
1 Heidegger 1995, p. 315; cf. Heidegger 1962, pp. 201-2. 
2 Heidegger 1995, p. 315. 
3 Heidegger's source for this discussion is De Interpretatione, Aristotle's treatise on logic and grammar. 
Heidegger's thesis is that this text should not be read simply as an investigation into the structure of 
language, but that it describes the relation of language to our being-in-the-world, and how our 
understanding is linguistically-structured. 
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enough, then, to simply say that vernehmen is taking some entity as a unity. 
Vernehmen is “intrinsically a taking together that takes apart.”4 This means that the 
taking 'as a whole' that vernehmen describes– taking something as the logos– rests 
on taking it together– that is, as a unity– while taking that unity apart in terms of its 
properties– taking it from a particular angle. Therefore, “the entire structure of the 
logos apophantikos [the content of vernehmen] is grounded in synthesis, which in 
itself is simultaneously diairesis.”5 
 
Heidegger draws our attention to the consequence that truth and falsity (aletheia and 
pseudesthai, or revealing and concealing)– which, as we have seen, are tied to the 
logos and the apophantic-as– are therefore also grounded in synthesis and diairesis.6 
He argues this by returning to his example of the blackboard. By asserting it 
apophantically, we point out the blackboard as an entity, something present-at-hand 
with properties. We can do so either positively or negatively, by saying 'the board is 
black' or 'the board is not red.' 
 
The pointing out can be such as to ascribe something to whatever the pointing out is 
concerned with, or such as to deny it something in pointing it out... In each case there 
occurs a pointing out of the board as such, and this pointing out is in each case a 
revealing, a true pointing out.7 
 
Yet a false statement is an assertive pointing out just as much as a true one. If we say 
'the board is not black' or 'the board is red,' then 
 
here too we have a 'toward' and 'away,' in each case a tendency to point out, in each 
case concealing, false.8 
 
All of these statements– positive and negative true, and positive and negative false– 
are grounded in their separation of entities from their properties, asserting them 
together or apart. Therefore, Heidegger claims, the “unity of this structure,” of logos 
grounded in the taking-together-that-takes-apart, “is noûs,” as the direct perception 
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that gives access to entities as entities, together with their properties. 9  To give 
Heidegger's example, when we assert that a board is badly-positioned, “we do not first 
think of the bad position and then add it to the board.”10 We rather take the board and 
its bad position as a unity, which we then separate into parts. The act of noesis or 
apprehension perceives the entity at once as unity and at the same time as separated.11 
 
Heidegger's discussion here is not merely a description of language, but carries the 
implication that the structure of language reflects the structure of noetic experience 
in a mutually-dependent way. He explicitly discusses the role of the logos 
apophantikos as pointing out what is present-at-hand.12 What are taken together and 
apart, then, for Heidegger, are not just linguistic phrases, but the entities themselves 
and their properties– indeed, it is the perceptions of these– the noemata– that serve 
as the basis for natural language. As he puts it in Being and Time: “to significations, 
words accrue.”13 
 
We thus get a more nuanced picture of the way noûs, as a perceptual capacity, 
underscores language. The vernehmen-perception of entities as entities signifies the 
capacity to immediately see entities together with their properties, as a unity, but also 
to take them separately– as well as, furthermore, to capacity see those properties 
themselves as entities (for example, the 'blackness' of the board). Expressed as the 
logos, such entities can then be separated and recombined in ways that are now true 
or false. That is, this grammatical mode of perception allows us to combine elements 
of our noetic perception as the ground of abstract thought– 'the board could be better 
positioned'– but also as false thought– 'the board is red.' This suggests that the 
uniquely human capacities I have discussed in this this thesis– capacities such as non-
sequential reasoning, planning and action, recursive thinking, and projection– have 
their roots in a grammatical understanding of the world. 
 
 
* * * 
 
  
                                                 
9 Heidegger 1995, p. 317. 
10 Ibid, p. 318. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, p. 319. 
13 Heidegger 1962, p. 204. 
191 
 
7.2 – Universal Grammar 
in which I suggest that the grammaticality  
of noesis ought to be understood in the  
terms of Chomsky's Universal Grammar. 
 
I have so far argued that noûs is grammatically-structured, which means that it 
enables its objects to be separated and recombined, and that it is a mode of perception 
that serves as a precondition for the use of natural language. In this Section, I will 
offer some empirical plausibility for these claims by relating them to Chomsky's 
theory of Universal Grammar. While Chomsky's theory is still evolving and by no 
means universally accepted, I will argue that its most uncontentious claims– that the 
human language faculty is innate, that language acquisition is a stage in our normal 
biological development, and that grammatical language's exponential capacity for 
abstraction is powered by its recursivity– are consistent with and suggest mechanisms 
for my argument that the acquisition of language is the result of the development of a 
noetic faculty which gives us access to entities as entities and supports our initiation 
or Bildung into a second natural 'world.' 
 
I will argue that the grammatical organisation of language reveals underlying 
structures of thought, and that the capacity to 'merge' and 'move' linguistic items 
demonstrates that we do not experience such elements merely sequentially. I argue 
that this supports my claim that noûs is an acquired faculty tied to language that 
separates us from animals and their sequential mode of understanding, and indeed, 
that the theory of Universal Grammar assumes a human ability to perceive the world 
in the noetic way I have described. 
 
The noetic elements which underwrite language are entities experienced as objects, 
that is, conceptually. We saw in the previous Section that such entities include the 
objects of our experience as well as their properties, which can also be experienced as 
entities, and which can be separated and combined in different ways. Fodor, too, has 
argued that the central feature of concepts is their “compositionality.”14  Different 
concepts, such as 'red,' 'drum,' and 'face' can be combined, according to certain norms, 
into new concepts such as 'red drum' or 'red face' or 'red drum-face.' Fodor argues this 
based on his observation that languages operate with a 'combinatorial semantics.'15 
This describes the fact that a half-decent speaker of any language who understands a 
sentence aRb (lexical items a and b connected by relationship R) will also understand 
                                                 
14 Fodor 1998, pp. 94-100. 




the sentence bRa.16  Therefore, someone who understands 'Jane kissed Mary' will 
immediately understand 'Mary kissed Jane,' irrespective of the truth or likelihood of 
the latter, or whether they have heard it before. This stands in contrast to the sign-
using chimps we saw above, who were unable to recombine signs ('kiss' + 'me' to 'kiss' 
+ 'the dog') that they had learned as a whole.17 As I have argued, non-rational animals, 
using signs in an indicative-imperative way, experience them sequentially. The signal 
conveys an action to be performed, and cannot simply describe a thing or state of 
affairs. 
 
Fodor argues that the combinatorial semantics of human languages is made possible 
by syntax.18 This is reflected, as I have also noted, in the grammatical structure of 
natural languages. Yet what is important here is not the grammar of any particular 
language but rather that grammars themselves are the visible symptoms of this 
underlying structure of experience, what I have called noesis. Similarly, Chomsky has 
famously argued, the wide variety of grammatical organisations found in human 
languages are the surface manifestations of an underlying structure that makes them 
possible, and which he calls 'Universal Grammar.'19 Chomsky's theory has been much 
discussed, adapted, and criticised, yet its basic premise– that the human mind at birth 
is equipped, under normal conditions, to acquire language in a regular way– is widely 
accepted among linguists.20 This does not mean that grammar, natural language, or 
conceptual understanding are present from birth but that– like other biological traits, 
such those arising through puberty, for example– language will be acquired at ages 
and along a path of stages that is uniform across the human species, barring any 
significant physiological or environmental disruption.21 
 
The 'grammar' in Universal Grammar therefore refers not simply to the structure of 
sentences in natural languages, but to the underlying mental organisation that make 
that possible. In his initial articulations of the theory, Chomsky distinguished between 
'surface structure' and 'deep structure,' where surface structure is concerned with the 
interpretation of the meaning of the words at the level of a spoken sentence, while 
                                                 
16 Similarly, Evans' (1982, p. 104) 'Generality Constraint' states that “if a subject can be credited with 
the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that 
a is G, for every property of being G of which he has a conception.” 
17 Pinker 1994, p. 335. 
18 Fodor 1998, p. 99. 
19 Chomsky 1980, p. 28. 
20 Ibid, p. 65; Briscoe 2000, pp. 245-6. 
21 For example, evidence suggests that if children are not exposed to language during the so-called 
'critical period' of the early years of life, they will not be able to acquire full grammatical language 
later in life. See Grimshaw et al. 1998, pp.  238-9. 
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deep structure is concerned with the semantics of the sentence's underlying 
structure.22 This in turn was related to the distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' 
generativity, which Chomsky gave as criteria for judging whether a posited grammar 
(that is, a theory of linguistic structure) is descriptively adequate.23 A grammar is 
'weakly generative' if it can generate a set of natural language sentences, and it is 
'strongly generative' if it can generate a set of structural descriptions.24 Chomsky's 
essential thesis was that a single deep-structural grammar can account for the strong 
generativity of all natural languages. That is, while the surface grammars of English, 
Finnish, and Wiradjuri are vastly diverse, Chomsky held that at the deep-structural 
level they can be described in the same terms, as performing the same transformations 
on the same basic items, although the differences in the way transformational rules 
are applied and manifested at the surface level makes the languages as diverse as they 
are.  
 
Chomsky has more recently refined and attempted to simplify the theory of Universal 
Grammar along the lines of what he calls the 'Minimalist Program.'25 Here, Chomsky 
drops talk of 'deep-' and 'surface-structure' in favour of a single operation he calls 
Merge. 26  Merge describes the process of combining a pair of syntactic objects, 
replacing them with a single, new combined syntactic object, thus accounting for 
language's recursivity. 27  However, it is important to note in this connection that 
Chomsky considers his work a 'program' rather than a 'theory'– that is, an ongoing 
pursuit rather than a fixed framework. We should therefore be aware that many of the 
finer details of Universal Grammar as I discuss it here are the subject of ongoing 
debates among linguists, and that Chomsky's own views have evolved considerably– 
with the reduction of deep-structural operations to Merge an obvious case in point. 
Nevertheless, Chomsky maintains that the 'minimalist program' is, in its central 
respects, a “seamless continuation” of his earlier work.28 For my purposes in this 
thesis, the precise details of linguistic theory are less important than the less 
contentious central aspects of Chomsky's work that I lay out here– namely, that the 
language faculty is innate, and that natural language is underwritten by a Universal 
Grammar that operates as a recursive system of “discrete infinity” allowing the 
separation and re-combination of distinct syntactic objects, and hence lines up with 
                                                 
22 Chomsky 1965, p. 16. 
23 Ibid, p. 60. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Chomsky 2015, p. ix. 
26 Ibid, pp. 171-5. 
27 Ibid, pp. 207-8. 




the processes of synthesis and diairesis described above.29 
 
Central to Chomsky's theory is the notion that Universal Grammar– and hence 
language– is innate in humans.30 This does not mean that natural language itself is 
present from birth, nor does it mean that that the grammatical rules of any particular 
language are present at birth, for infants acquire languages as diverse as English, 
Cantonese, or Xhosa with equal ease.31 What is innate is rather the potentiality for 
infants to acquire language. Language acquisition, argues Chomsky, is a feature of the 
infant human's biological development. Like the later process of puberty, it involves 
the development of characteristics that are not themselves present at birth, but that 
proceed spontaneously unless severely disrupted through injury, illness, or 
environmental disturbance. Chomsky argues that this process is evidenced by the ease 
with which infants acquire their mother tongue: “Compared with the number of 
sentences that a child can produce or interpret with ease,” he argues, “the number of 
seconds in a lifetime is ridiculously small.”32 Infant humans are wired to be sensitive 
to language such that exposure to it acts as a trigger for its rapid development.33 As I 
will argue below, this development is part of a deeper development of a parallel 
awareness of grammatical structure and of objects as objects. 
 
Chomskyan linguists show both deep-structure as well as the operation of Merge 
through 'X-Bar' diagrams.34 While a detailed analysis would be out of place here, a 
brief look at some simple examples will prove useful and adequate for our subsequent 
discussion (see Figure Two). What will be significant for my thesis is that these 
schemas make evident the way in which, at the underlying level, the language faculty 
carves up the world. For example, the above sentence (1) 'Jane kissed Mary'35  is built 
out of a 'noun' or 'determiner phrase' ('Jane') and a 'verb phrase' ('kiss-', 'Mary,' which 
is itself built from a conjugated verb and a determiner phrase36). 'Jane' and 'kiss-' are 
the 'heads' of their respective phrases– they determine the semantic category (noun, 
verb, adjective, and so on) of their phase of the tree. 
                                                 
29 Chomsky 2008, p. 137. 
30 Chomsky 1967, p. 2. 
31 Ibid, p. 3. 
32 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
33 Mattingly (1972, p. 328) has compared infants' responses to language to the instinctive response by 
other animals to 'releasers,' and offers evidence that we are wired to be particularly sensitive to subtle 
differences in phonemes. I will expand on this in 7.3.3 below. 
34 Jackendoff 1977, p. 33-7; Chomsky 2015, pp. 157-70, 222-34. 
35 Throughout this section, example sentences will be numbered for ease of reference. 
36 Note that in English, proper names tend to have a 'null' determiner slot, and so we find only a noun 
('Mary') without a determiner ('the,' 'a,' etc.). 
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NB. For the sake of simplicity, I have mostly shown determiner phrases simply as 
nouns or noun phrases, since many DPs in English (e.g., proper names) have a 'null' 
determiner, and the distinction between varieties of nouns is not crucial to my 




















One important function of grammar is the ability to 'merge' distinct items into a single 
phrase and embed them in another sentence.37 For example, while (1) 'Jane kissed 
Mary' forms a sentence on its own, that sentence can itself form a 'verb phrase' of (2) 
'Theo said Jane kissed Mary.' This itself can be embedded within (3) 'I don't believe 
Theo deviously said Jane kissed Mary on the beach while Gayatri was surfing,' and so 
on. It is through Merge that language gets its recursivity, and becomes a “system of 
discrete infinity.”38 
 
As well as Merging elements, we can also Move and recombine them.39 We can see 
this if we form a question from (1), and get (4) 'Who kissed Mary?'. Here we find a 
simple, normative movement– the determiner phrase (Mary/'who') moves up 
through the empty argument slots of the sentence, changing it to a question. Yet note 
that the essential structure remains unchanged– the individual syntactic objects 
continue to relate to each other within the same overall framework. A more complex 
modification would be to put the sentence into the passive, that is, (5) 'Mary was 
kissed by Jane.' Here, 'Mary' moves into an inflection phrase, and the verb phrase 
'kiss-' contains an embedded 'preposition phrase.' Yet here, too, we see that on the 
structural level, the different grammatical operations are being performed on the 
same basic syntactic objects, which combine regularly. Such operations may be shared 
across languages in some ways; therefore, the Spanish (6) 'Juana besó a María' 
conforms to the same structure as (1). Even where English and Spanish assign 
pronouns in different ways– (7) 'Jane kissed her' against (8) 'Juana le besó'– the 
trees show us that the underlying structure is nonetheless shared. Through the ability 
to Merge and Move linguistic items, language users gain the capacity to represent 
more and more abstract states of affairs.40 
 
It is from the underlying structural identity of languages that Chomsky argues for 
Universal Grammar as an innate ability to recognise the structural components of a 
natural language and to apply regular rules to their transformation. The innateness of 
this ability is supported by the way even very young children use language. Firstly, 
according to the so-called 'Poverty of the Stimulus' argument alluded to above, 
children are able to understand and produce more sentences than they could possibly 
                                                 
37 Chomsky 2005, p. 11. 
38 Ibid. 
39 In more recent versions of the minimalist program, Chomsky (2008, pp. 140-1) has suggested that 
'Move' is a form of Merge and comes 'for free' within the operations of the latter. 
40 'Represent' here means to represent in language insofar as sentences relate to states of affairs in the 
world. There is at this point no claim of a representational theory of mind. 
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have heard and practised, as well as being able to recognise previously-unheard 
sentences as either grammatical or ungrammatical.41 Secondly, the kinds of errors 
children do make follow a regular pattern. It is not unusual for a child to say 'I go-ed 
to the park' instead of 'I went to the park,' but it is unheard of for a developmentally-
normal young native English speaker to say 'I park the to went.' This demonstrates 
that even at a very early stage, children are aware that the sentence gets its meaning 
from its structure.42 
 
This may seem obvious to speakers of a natural language. Yet Chomsky points out that 
the structural organisation of language is far from the most straightforward or 
intuitive mode of computing lexical items.43 Take the example: (9) 'The man who is 
tall is in the room.' While this is at first glance much more complex than (1), we can 
see that it is ultimately formed of a similar relation between a noun phrase and a verb 
phrase. If we are to turn this into a question, it becomes (10) 'Is the man who is tall 
in the room?' Note how this change follows a similarly regular pattern to (5). The verb 
phrase 'is' moves up through the empty slots of the specifiers of each phase head. 
However, the apparent simplicity of this movement betrays a very complex state of 
affairs. How is it, as English speakers, that we know to move the second 'is' and not 
the first? If we were to take the words sequentially, we have no reason to prefer the 
second 'is.' Neither could we invent some rule such as 'move the sixth word from the 
start' or 'move the fourth word from the end,' for such rules would quickly break down 
with, for example, 'The man who your mother said is quite unusually tall is still in the 
corner of the living room.' 
 
The explanatory power of Chomsky's theory is that it explains why English-speakers 
immediately, and from a very young age, recognise that we move the second 'is' 
because it is part of the verb phrase. Yet, it must be stressed, Chomsky's claim is not 
about English. Even languages which form questions in a different way are still doing 
so by modifying similar, basic syntactic objects. The relevant point for our purposes 
                                                 
41 Chomsky 1980, p. 42-4. 
42 Cf. Chomsky 1988, pp. 45-6. Errors like 'go-ed' actually show quite a sophisticated understanding of 
verb conjugation and tenses, and anyone learning a second tongue quickly becomes sympathetic to 
a child's struggle with irregular verbs. 
43 Chomsky 1976, pp. 30-2. This is one of the reasons why computers have thus far been unsuccessful 
at producing natural language, despite being efficient, sequential logical processors. Even the more 
successful of recent natural language simulators depend more for their success on the probabilistic 
crunching of 'big data' than anything approaching an understanding of grammatical structure. That 
developing infants are not performing similar probabilistic calculations is another consequence of 
the 'poverty of the stimulus' arguments, which draws on observations of infants producing novel 




is that, no matter how they go on to organise such structures at the surface level, all 
languages are built out of such discrete items, and to be able to speak a language 
means to have an awareness of these items, to understand them individually, to be 
able to Merge them with other items and embed them in a larger structure, and to 
Move them in order to change the emphasis or the meaning of the sentence. 
 
We therefore find some important correspondences between Chomsky's description 
of Universal Grammar, and the understanding of noûs I have been developing. Both 
describe a faculty that is uniquely human– indeed, grammatical understanding is so 
different from the animal's sequential understanding and communication that, as we 
saw, Chomsky (with colleagues) has suggested that communication may not be its 
primary– or at least, may not have been its initial– function (or more precisely, as I 
will argue in more detail below, we should say that the capacity to apprehend 
(vernehmen/noesis) is one that develops via the communicative triggers of deictic 
triangulation).44 
 
Both Universal Grammar and my account of noesis describe an understanding of 
entities in terms of structures that can be combined, moved, and recombined, and so 
abstracted away from their original experience. And significantly, both noûs and 
Universal Grammar are not operative in humans from the beginning, but come into 
play as the infant matures, and are marked by the appearance of pointing and 
speaking. Developing second-nature is developing noûs, Universal Grammar, and 
therefore language, although– as I will suggest below– under a more robust sense of 
second nature, Bildung is not complete with the acquisition of language, but also 
requires the absorption of more sophisticated social norms. In this case, noûs is just 
the first step of Bildung and the prerequisite for what follows. At any rate, in 
developing second nature, we enter a space where we point out things as things, and 
hence hold them to be true.  
 
7.3 – Noesis and truth 
in which I argue, by answering objections to my association  
of noûs with Universal Grammar, that humans have evolved  
to live in a shared, cultural world built by language, and that  
this creates a gap between our knowledge and experience 
 
I have been arguing in this Chapter that our noetic perception– of things as things– 
                                                 
44 Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002, p. 1574; cf. Chomsky 2005, p. 3. 
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is grammatically-structured. Grounded in synthesis and diairesis, noûs is a “taking-
together-that-takes-apart.” Noetic perception gives us the ability to perceive deeper 
into and beyond the entity we perceive; it allows us to abstract. For this reason, 
Heidegger argues that only vernehmen, unlike animal perception, should really be 
considered Perception– that is, Wahrnehmung, 'taking as true.' However– as I will 
explore in what follows– this ability to take something as true by abstracting it brings 
with it the ability to take things as false. As our apprehension separates and combines 
noetic perceptions, it creates the possibility to take things as they are not. 
 
In exploring these implications, I will defend the plausibility of my association of noûs 
and Universal Grammar. While it would be simplistic to identify noûs and Universal 
Grammar, I have nevertheless suggested that Universal Grammar describes the 
organisational structure of noûs, which is the capacity to see the world in terms of 
words, or more precisely, the logos. If the theory of Universal Grammar is true– even 
if only in the essential details I have described here– it presupposes an ability to 
perceive the elements it isolates and moves. Universal Grammar is therefore evidence 
for a faculty of noûs, the structure of the mind that makes language and thought 
possible. 
 
To defend this view, I will expand on some of the subtleties of my account in order to 
deal with several potential objections. Firstly, I briefly return to the relationship of 
synthesis and diairesis to the possibility of experiencing truth and falsity to show why 
the noetic perception of things also implies an awareness of the gaps between things, 
which explains why Universal Grammar is not merely concerned with noun phrases 
(as 'things') but also contains a perception of functional roles such as determiners and 
conjunctions.  
 
I then justify my invocation of some form of Universal Grammar as an evolutionarily 
plausible way of understanding the biological development of noûs and its connection 
to language. I will then expand on my above suggestion– that the development of noûs 
in the individual is triggered by their social interaction and the shared experience of 
deictic triangulation– to argue that this view does not imply an individualistic 
internalism.  
 
However, in my final Section, I will look again at the feedback that occurs between our 
post-conceptual coping and our conceptual reflection in the space of second nature, 




in our post-conceptual coping– there is a sense in which our second natural 
experience is dependent upon the concepts we have acquired. This invites, I will 
suggest, a weak version of the so-called 'Sapir-Whorf' hypothesis, although I will offer 
a less controversial account that sees cross-cultural differences as the result of 
differences between shared, conceptual 'worlds' borne by the interaction of language 
and coping, rather than a strong Whorfian claim that treats posited differences as the 
incommensurable result of differences in the surface grammars of natural languages. 
 
7.3.1 – Seeing the gaps 
in which I answer the first objection– that Universal Grammar  
contains heads not just for things but for functional categories 
 
I have been arguing in this Chapter that noûs– grounded as it is in synthesis and 
diairesis– is structured grammatically, and that we can make sense of this by 
comparing it to what Chomsky calls Universal Grammar, which he argues gives a 
description of the mechanisms underlying natural languages and enabling abstract, 
human thought. In the first Section, I argued that Heidegger's account of synthesis 
and diairesis offers a description of the way noetic thought creates abstract objects by 
separating objects from their properties and recombining them to offer new 
descriptions. In the second Section, I suggested– through an examination of X-bar 
models– that the operations of Move and Merge at the level of words signifies an 
underlying process of separation and recombination. 
 
It may be objected, however, that the account I gave there is oversimplified, insofar as 
I focus on the merging and moving of relatively basic nouns and verbs. Indeed, an 
important difference between Heidegger and Chomsky here is that the former's 
account focuses mainly on objects and their properties– nouns and predicates– 
whereas Universal Grammar involves a more complex picture that includes functional 
categories such as determiners, conjunctions, and negations. It is difficult to see 
exactly how we might be said to 'see' such functional categories, in the way that I have 
argued that noesis is a form of perceiving the objects and properties that we combine 
and separate. 
 
However, these worries can be surmounted by recalling that, for Heidegger, noesis, as 
a 'taking-together-that-takes-apart,' gives us access to truth– in the sense of aletheia 
or 'revealing'– and that this always involves a complementary movement of 
concealing– pseudesthai, falsity. Having noûs means not only that we can take things 
as true– revealed as things– but that we can also reveal things as false. Heidegger's 
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simple example is that we can falsely say the blackboard 'is red,' although we could 
also explicitly represent the board falsely as 'not there.' This is in contrast to animals 
who, lacking noetic perception, have only an implicit 'not,' in the sense that, as we saw 
McNeill argue in Chapter Three, a cat might represent a dog as a 'threat' and not as its 
potential dinner, but that any such 'and not' is closed off to its experience.45 
 
The grammatical perception of something apophantically-as something means taking 
it from a particular angle, separating the 'notes' from the 'melody.' The perception of 
something as something is also, implicitly, the perception of gaps, of what it is not. 
This perception of gaps is essential to noesis. We saw in the previous Chapter, for 
example, that both Schneider and DF– with the impairment of their Zeigen capacity– 
lost their ability to play and to pantomime.46 Unable to separate out the elements of 
any activity, they could only complete tasks that they began from the beginning, and 
performed sequentially as a whole. 
 
Noesis, then, as a perception of things as things, is therefore by necessity also a 
perception of the gaps between things.47 Such gaps, we could reasonably expect, are 
experienced in different ways, and this is evidenced by the appearance of functional 
categories at the surface level of spoken speech. While determiner words pick out an 
object as an apophantic-'this' or 'that,' negations signify the gap perceived where 'this' 
is not 'that,' while conjunctions express the gap where 'this' is with 'that.'48 As in the 
case of merging and moving other phrases, that speakers know intuitively when to use 
which words suggests a direct perception of the underlying distinctions. 
 
 
* * * 
 
  
                                                 
45 McNeill 1999, p. 239; cf. supra, p. 114. 
46 Supra, pp. 175-6. 
47 Note that 'perception' here refers to noetic perception, something that is experienced as directly as a 
sensory aisthesis but should not be read literally as 'seeing.' To say that we can perceive the 
separation or gap between a book and its redness, for example, does not literally imply a 
corresponding sensory experience. 
48 This account therefore has some similarities to the disjunctive view of perception, which it will be 
recalled informs McDowell's similar account on this score (McDowell 1998c, pp. 386-7; cf. supra, 
p. 20). Disjunctivists hold that a veridical perception has a different content to a similar but illusory 
experience. In my terms, we might say that the direct experience of something as a 'this' only appears 
to be the same kind of experience as an illusion in virtue of sharing a grammatical structure, but that 
such structural similarity conceals the fact that they are different types of experience. If and how the 
perceiver can tell the difference in spite of such structural similarity is an important question that 




7.3.2 –Language, Innateness, and Evolution 
in which I deal with the next objection–that Universal Grammar  
is not evolutionarily plausible– by stressing that the ‘innateness’  
it posits is rather the potential to develop spoken language,  
based on the form of noetic perception I have argued for. 
 
I have argued in this Chapter that synthesis and diairesis can be explained in 
naturalistic terms as the operations of Universal Grammar. However, the Chomskyan 
strategy of approaching linguistics as a natural science ('biolinguistics' 49 ), while 
retaining wide support, remains contentious in some circles, and has been criticised 
for overlooking the degree to which language is a cultural artefact, with many 
researchers claiming that it cannot be explained– adequately or at all– in terms of 
natural selection. Such criticisms also bear upon my thesis, insofar as I have argued 
that noesis is a form of perception, unique to humans, that underwrites language, and 
which develops rather than being learned– and would therefore be expected to belong 
to our biological rather than cultural inheritance. In this Section and the next, I will 
deal with the objection that Universal Grammar is not evolutionarily plausible, to 
argue that language and the noesis that underpins it is an intrinsic part of the human 
organism. I consider how languages could be encoded in the genome, given that 
natural languages evolve at an exponentially faster rate than living organisms, and 
have been around for a tiny fraction of evolutionary history. I answer this by stressing 
it is not language that is innate, but the form of noetic perception and the 
predisposition to acquire language which are at issue, and that such phenomena are 
most plausibly understood as intertwined with our genetic inheritance. 
 
This issue takes its starting point from the disparity between the evolution of natural 
languages, and the evolution of the language faculty. Natural languages evolve at an 
astounding rate– modern English, Kurdish, Russian, Hindi, and Venetian have all 
developed over the past 10,000 years from a single proto-Indo-European language. By 
contrast, modern humans (Homo sapiens sapiens) achieved  a stable anatomical form 
around 100,000 years ago, and stable behavioural form around 40-50,000 years 
ago.50 This disparity appears to create several problems for an innateness theory of 
language, since it is unclear how the diversity of human languages can be accounted 
for by genetic structures that were in place before and that have remained largely 
unchanged throughout natural language's relatively short but complex history. 
                                                 
49 Chomsky 2005, p. 1. 
50 Klein 1995, pp. 168-9. 
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However, this objection overplays what Universal Grammar claims is innate. It is not 
natural languages themselves, nor their surface grammars, that are claimed to have a 
genetic basis, but rather the predisposition to learning a natural language– part of 
which, as I have argued, involves the capacity to perceive (vernehmen) the world in a 
uniquely human way. Such a capacity– as the basis onto which natural languages 
map– could have evolved far enough back to belong to the common human genetic 
heritage, and involve structures that underpin all natural languages. Indeed, the 
diversity of natural languages is itself overemphasised in this objection. Baker argues 
that all natural languages must be “fundamentally commensurable,” and, since they 
are all equally learnable by a child, “must be more similar than they appear.”51 Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch also suggest that our position within a particular language leads 
us to focus more on the differences than the similarities between languages. To a 
Martian scientist, they claim, the structural similarities between human languages 
would be much more obvious than their differences.52 
 
Baker argues that what is innate in humans is the knowledge of 'parameters,' the basic 
elements and rules of combination of all natural languages. 53  He compares such 
parameters analogically to atoms. Just as all matter is comprised of different 
combinations of atoms, so all natural languages are comprised of different 
arrangements of parameters.54 Furthermore, just as atoms combine following fixed 
laws that reflect their structure– sodium, for example, readily combines with chlorine, 
but not with tin– neither do parameters combine in a purely arbitrary way. Baker 
presents linguistic evidence to argue that, despite the diversity of natural languages at 
the spoken level, they are rather fixed at the parameter level. For example, while 
different languages have different ways of combining subjects, verbs, and objects to 
create meaning in sentences (English has a strict subject-verb-object structure– 'Paul 
saw the mule'– where Latin has a more flexible structure that relies on case markings– 
'Paulus mulum spectat' is equivalent to 'Mulum Paulus spectat'), whichever mode they 
employ has quite regular consequences for the way pre- or post-positions are then 
employed in that language.55 Similarly, an analysis of the grammatical divergences in 
otherwise very similar Romance languages shows that, although such languages 
contain enough variables that there could be up to sixty-four differing kinds of 
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Romance language, in actuality they fall into two kinds. 56  Both of these findings 
indicate that natural languages rely on a fixed structure at some underlying level, and 
support Chomsky's proposal that “all differences among languages are to be thought 
of... as different choices that languages make with respect to a finite number of 
parameters.”57 
 
The innateness in question, therefore, refers rather to a brain that is wired to pick up 
language. Jackendoff lists seven reasons why we should associate language with the 
brain structure and development, including, as I have already mentioned, the critical 
period of language acquisition and the limited ability of apes to acquire anything 
resembling true language, but also the grammatical parallels in both acquisition and 
aphasia across spoken and signed languages, and language deficits associated with 
genetic conditions.58 Although none of the observations he lists are indefeasible on 
their own, taken en masse, “they offer an overwhelming case for some degree of 
specialisation for language learning in children.”59 Since the first stirrings of language 
acquisition begin at such a young age, they must be embodied in the physical and 
genetic structure of the human body. That we cannot currently explain in detail how 
this occurs, Jackendoff argues, should not distract us from such otherwise compelling 
evidence. 
 
It is premature to reject the hypothesis of Universal Grammar, as some have, arguing 
that we don't know how genes could code for language acquisition. After all, we don't 
know how genes code for birdsong or sexual behaviour or sneezing, either, but we 
don't deny that there is a genetic basis behind these.60 
 
As Dennett points out, to argue that a capacity has a genetic basis is not to argue for a 
deterministic picture that avoids the role of learning and culture, and he warns against 
a simplistic picture of 'gene x creates trait x' that ignores the “winding road” of how 
such a gene is instantiated and expressed.61 
 
Universal grammar doesn't need to be written down as rules to be consulted. It is 
partly embodied in the architecture, and partly fixed by culturally evolved attractors 
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homed-in on by individual learning.62 
 
That is to say, recognising the role of culture in language acquisition does not rule out 
the innateness hypothesis, nor vice versa. This leads us into a second question, about 
the role of culture in the evolution of language and in language acquisition. As we will 
see below, an increasing body of work argues that language cannot be explained by 
natural selection alone, but emphasises the pressures to communicate as playing a 
key role in shaping language to our brains, rather than the other way around. 
However, I will argue in the next Section that such accounts overlook the way that 
humans have co-evolved into our culture– that 'second nature' is the niche in which 
the language faculty has developed. 
 
7.3.3 – Cultural Co-Evolution 
in which I argue that the language faculty co-evolved with  
human culture, and that our shared cultural world provides  
the evolutionary niche in which language can develop. 
 
In this Section, I explore a second question that asks about the role of culture in both 
the evolution of language and in the individual subject's acquisition of natural 
languages. In particular, I note that an increasingly influential research programme 
takes language itself to be a cultural artefact that was developed specifically for 
communication, and that has adapted to the human brain/mind. However, I will 
argue that, as my account of Bildung and second nature suggests, a strict dualism of 
nature and culture is not a useful way of understanding human beings. To say that 
language evolved under the influence of cultural pressures is not to rule out a genetic 
basis. Rather, we should say that the second natural space of noûs is itself the niche 
in which both the language faculty and natural languages themselves evolved, and that 
their evolution was only possible with the co-evolution of the noetic perception of 
things as things. 
 
My argument in this Chapter is that language is underwritten by a grammatically-
structured form of perception that I called noesis. As such, the perceptual element of 
language– the capacity to take something as ‘this’– is logically prior to its 
communicative aspect. In the previous Sections, I compared this to the theory of 
Universal Grammar, which posits an innate knowledge of the parameters that 
organise natural languages. However, where such knowledge and the associated 
perception of noûs may be logically prior to communication, I will argue in this 
                                                 




Section that their manifestation– both at the level of individual development and in 
the evolution of the species– involves a process of triggering and co-evolution within 
the socio-cultural dimension of human life. 
 
On the individual level, the influence of the environment should not be seen as a 
counterargument to the innateness theory, but rather as support for it. As I argued in 
the previous Section, what is innate are not rigid, grammatical rules but rather a 
predisposition to acquire language through an inborn sensitivity to linguistic 
parameters. For this predisposition to be actualised, a human individual must be 
exposed to the right cues, as evidenced by the failure of children to fully acquire 
grammatical language if they are not exposed to it during the 'critical period' of early 
life. Significantly, such critical periods are also present in songbirds, and are an 
example of the way many young animals are tuned into specific features of their 
environment.63 Such stimuli– termed 'releasers' by ethologists– are widespread in the 
animal kingdom.64 Turkey chicks, for example, when exposed to the slow-moving 
silhouette of a short-necked bird (typical of birds of prey), react by hiding, although 
they do not react to long-necked shadows, nor to short-necked shadows moving 
backwards. 65  Cock-robins are well-known for acting aggressively towards any 
stimulus coloured red– the colour of their rivals. As well as drawing out behaviour in 
concrete situations, such releasers also serve as aids in a young animal's development. 
For example, bunting chicks have been shown to be sensitive to the rotation of the 
night sky, which in later life aids migration by attuning them to the North Star.66  
 
Releasers tend to be incredibly species-specific. Fitch notes that young songbirds have 
a disposition to learn not just birdsong, but the song of their own species.67 He also 
(with Hauser and Chomsky) notes that young songbirds respond to instances of their 
species' song with a “subsong” or “babbling” that serves as an aid to acquisition, and 
notes some direct parallels with human development.68 And indeed, Mattingly has 
shown evidence that human phonemes serve as releasers for infants.69 Human infant 
babbling can therefore be seen as a response to language, marking the acquisition of 
linguistic behaviour.70 Of crucial importance to my account, however, is that human 
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babbling is not geared simply towards parroting sounds, but shows a growing 
awareness of linguistic elements. As Guasti notes, deaf infants engage in “manual 
babbling” at the same age as hearing infants begin babbling vocally, thereby 
suggesting that 
 
Humans are born with special sensitivity not to sounds, per se, but to the particular 
units, structures, and regularities found in natural language, regardless of the 
modality of expression.71 
 
All of this suggests that language is innate in the sense that humans are wired up to 
be sensitive to the elements of language, which in turn act as releasers prompting their 
further development. For this reason, Chomsky offers the analogy of puberty, stating 
that 
 
Language learning is not really something that the child does; it is something that 
happens to the child placed in an appropriate environment, much as the child's body 
grows and matures in a predetermined way when provided with appropriate nutrition 
and environmental stimulation.72  
 
A more accurate comparison, however, would be to the behavioural changes of 
puberty, as these are changes which– while having biochemistry at their root– are 
pushed into their specific manifestations by culture, such that the individual comes to 
interpret the world in a different way. And in this respect, we might even argue that 
language acquisition shows less cultural influence than puberty, since the rites of 
initiation into adulthood and the gender roles and responsibilities these entail– not 
to mention expressions of sexuality– show far more variation across cultures than the 
patterns of language acquisition. The influence of culture, therefore, should be seen 
as intrinsically bound together with genetic expression in the development of human 
qualities, including language. 
 
In making a similar point, Christiansen and Chater have, however, used cultural 
influence on language development as an argument against Universal Grammar. 
They argue that language is easily learnable by infants “not because our brains 
embody knowledge of language, but because language has adapted to our brains. ”73 
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They argue that 
 
If linguistic conventions change more rapidly than genes change via natural selection, 
then genes that encode biases for particular conventions will be eliminated– because, 
as the language changes, the biases will be incorrect, and, hence, decrease fitness.74 
 
A constantly evolving language provides a “moving target” for natural selection, and 
so Christiansen and Chater argue that we need to explain language acquisition in non-
genetic terms. They also consider the parallels between the human infant's acquisition 
of language and the bunting chick's discovery of the North Star, but reject this is an 
example of a “circularity trap,” where “the genetic endowment of UG is proposed to 
explain language universals [and] so it cannot be assumed that the language 
universals pre-date the emergence of the genetic basis for UG.”75 
 
However, Fitch has criticised this notion of a 'circularity trap' as overlooking one of 
Darwin's key insights. Evolution does not move towards some final form, but is an 
ongoing process in a dynamic environment; “today's 'effects,'” he writes, “are 
tomorrow's 'causes.'” 76  Similarly, Barrett and colleagues note that adaptation to 
'moving targets' is “the norm rather than the exception in biology.”77 Furthermore, we 
should keep in mind that the innateness hypothesis is concerned only with the 
predisposition to language, and that the only knowledge claimed to be innate is those 
of parameters– which do not change– not particular languages– which do. Indeed, as 
Baker notes, it is through shared parameters that languages can evolve so rapidly, 
since all that changes in the shift from, for example, Sanskrit to Urdu are the surface 
expressions, not the underlying 'atoms' of language.78 
 
Smith and Kirby, however, take the same strong view as Christiansen and Chater, 
arguing that it is language itself, rather than speakers, that adapts to be learnable, 
holding that “compositionality can… be explained as a cultural adaptation by 
language.”79 That is, the equal ease with which children acquire Portuguese, Talian, 
or Pirahã is to be explained not in terms of an innate awareness of parameters, but in 
that the languages themselves have undergone an evolutionary process that has 
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'selected' them for their ease of acquisition. In some respects, these thinkers are at 
cross-purposes with the linguists quoted above, and are concerned more with the 
cultural emergence of linguistic structure than with the biological evolution of 
language; 80  they are looking at the cultural, surface structure, rather than the 
underlying mental nature. However, their conclusions have implications for the 
account I have been defending, as they exemplify a research programme that rejects 
a view of language as an essential and innate faculty of the human animal, 
emphasising it rather as a cultural artefact or 'tool' developed by humans. 
 
These thinkers are right to emphasise the socio-cultural pressures under which 
language evolved. However, to see it merely as a tool is to overlook the other cognitive 
gaps between humans and animals that come together with language, and which are 
better explained by a shared grounding in a faculty of noetic or conceptual perception. 
To say that language is merely instrumental is to overlook the way in which it connects 
us to the world. For example, proponents of this view base many of their theories on 
computer models, which explore the probabilities of hypothetical languages being 
passed on based on their putative learnability.81 The problem with such modelling, 
however, is that it is necessarily simplified and highly idealised, exploring language as 
a self-contained series of patterns, rather than something which links agents to the 
world. These models take language as simply an organisation of information, which is 
then examined in terms its efficient reproducibility. As such, they are subject to 
similar criticisms as those Dreyfus has made of artificial intelligence. 82  While 
computers are excellent at finding patterns within languages, they are unable to tell 
us much about how such patterns carry meaning, and whether or not a language is 
easy to pass on tells us little about its role in linking an agent to the world.  
 
Even some experimental work in this field that does not rely heavily on computer 
models is subject to similar criticisms. Verhoef and her colleagues, for example, 
explored compositionality by teaching subjects an artificial language constructed by 
'phonemes' comprised of slide-whistle tones, in order to chart its evolution in the 
laboratory.83 Once again, however, the 'language' here was highly simplified and the 
findings speak only of the efficiency of certain forms of pattern recognition and 
reproduction, rather than language's representational role. Since such artificial 
'languages' have only a basic syntax and no semantics, they are unable to represent 
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the complex interplay of grammatical categories that emerge at the surface level as 
nouns, verbs, and so on. The non-arbitrary positioning of these syntactic items 
relative to one another in natural languages has a critical semantic significance, and 
the rapid appreciation of this by language-acquiring infants is more completely 
explained by Universal Grammar's theory of parameters.  
 
Furthermore, Verhoef and her colleagues' experiment, like others associated with this 
research programme, was conducted on adults who were already fluent in a natural 
language. The skills used in such experiments, then, are more analogous to those 
involved in learning a second language– involving explicit reasoning and drawing of 
correspondences– and it is therefore questionable whether such experiments even 
invoke the same processes involved in first language acquisition. While such 
experiments are nevertheless useful in showing how certain organisations of phonetic 
elements are easily and efficiently learnable, they are by their designers' own 
admission more concerned with the surface structures of natural languages than they 
are with language's underlying relation to the world.84 We should therefore take them 
as valuable insights into the way cultural pressures shape surface structures, yet they 
do not provide convincing reasons to abandon the innateness hypothesis as I have 
outlined it here. 
 
Of course, I have been stressing in this Section that the innateness hypothesis 
nevertheless retains a lot of scope for culture to shape the direction of language 
without denying its genetic basis. For example, Dor and his colleagues also argue that 
“changes in society and culture must have played a central role in the entire process” 
of language evolution.85 With Jablonka, he compares the changes in the human that 
led to the development of language to those of the mole rat, whose behavioural change 
of burrowing underground created a new niche in which selection then continues.86 
However, they also interestingly note the co-evolution of social play– especially 
pretend play and pantomiming– with episodic memory and analogical thinking, all of 
which are “crucial for the evolution of language.”87  I have also noted in previous 
Chapters that all of these phenomena mark the development of noesis, and the entry 
into second natural space, as all crucially involve the apprehension of abstract, 
apophantic-'this'es that can be separated and recombined with their properties. Once 
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again, this suggests that language is not an artefact put to use purely for 
communication, but is fundamentally grounded in a unique way of perceiving the 
world. 
 
The crucial point of this Section is that the question of whether language evolved as 
an innate expression of the human genome or in response to cultural pressures should 
not be reduced to an either/or dichotomy. The evolution of natural language is not a 
question of chickens and eggs, but the story of the refinement of a communicative 
system in response to the development of a linguistic faculty. My claim throughout 
the second part of this thesis has been that this linguistic faculty presupposes and is 
underwritten by a conceptual-perceptual faculty that I have called noûs. As the 
capacity to take things as things, noesis creates a new space, a second natural space 
of reasons. This space forms the biological 'niche' in which Universal Grammar has 
fully evolved. 
 
There is some overlap here with the conception of a 'Faculty of Language– broad 
(FLB)' that Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch suggest comprises conceptual-intentional and 
sensory-motor abilities which they propose we may share with non-human animals, 
and which is contrasted with the 'Faculty of Language- narrow (FLN)' that they claim 
is exclusively human and identify with recursion (Merge). 88  I am open to the 
possibility that noûs– as a potential element of FLB– may be shared with some other 
animals as a form of 'taking-as'; to paraphrase Collins, if dolphins and chimps have 
noesis “to some extent, then to that extent they can go on the human side.”89 However, 
we have also seen throughout this thesis that noûs is bound up with other uniquely 
human traits such as episodic memory, declarative pointing, pantomiming, and 
apophansis. This suggests, therefore, a closer fit with language than its being merely 
one part of a broader faculty. Noûs is best understood, then, a faculty of 




* * * 
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7.3.4 – The Shared World 
in which I argue that grounding language in perception  
does not imply internalism, since we develop noetic  
perception within a shared, cultural world 
 
I have been arguing that language is underlain by noesis, and therefore that the 
perceptual element of language– the capacity to take something as 'this'– is logically 
prior to its communicative aspect, although I have also argued that the development 
of both aspects are intertwined, both in the individual's Bildung and in the 
evolutionary life of the species. It may be objected, however, that to ground the 
communicative element of language in the perceptual smacks of internalism, implying 
that perception is a private event to which the symbols of language are attached. Since 
Wittgenstein's 'private language argument,' however, internalism about language has 
been something of a fringe view in analytic philosophy, while Heidegger's account of 
'being-in-the-world' is frequently read as a strong parallel in the continental tradition 
to Wittgenstein in this respect.90 
 
There therefore seems to be a tension between my invocation of Heidegger, among 
others, and my use of Chomsky. Chomsky, after all, described an early version of his 
research programme as 'Cartesian linguistics,' and Chomskyan linguists continue to 
argue that they are concerned with an I-language rather than an E-language, that is, 
an 'intensional' rather than 'extensional,' language, concerned with the relations 
within the speaker's mind rather than the actual words they use.91 Nevertheless, as we 
have seen, Chomsky considers the language faculty to be part of the biological 
endowment of the human, and in my account of noesis I have argued  that it the 
language faculty is grounded in this innate (albeit developed) form of perception. 
 
This very innateness should already warn against an internalist reading of my 
account. To say that a trait is innate is to say that it is rooted in a creature's biological 
makeup, and since all specimens of a species are embodied in the same way, they 
should all be expected to encounter the world in largely the same way, too. Indeed, as 
I mentioned earlier, a central element in Heidegger's refutation of Cartesianism is the 
sense in which 'being-in-the-world' is always a 'being-with-[Others],' something he 
asserts is maintained by language (in the sense of Rede).92 The mere fact that we exist 
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within the same species on the same planet guarantees such an enormous number of 
shared experiences that it takes an effortful suspension of disbelief to count individual 
experiences as 'private' (although, as I will consider in the next and final Section, to 
the extent that our knowledge is mediated by concepts and culture, a space does open 
for some divergence between how we and others take a situation or phenomenon, 
although I will argue that the role of culture still stands against calling such 
divergences 'private'). 
 
This essentially social dimension of the human being also suggests how even the 
perceptual element of noesis is not strictly private. As I also noted earlier, while 
Chomsky has hinted at a sympathy towards the view that the language faculty may 
have evolved in a single individual, this overlooks the crucial role of intersubjective 
awareness in noesis, insofar as we initially always point for others.93 I have suggested 
throughout Part Two that noesis is an innate capacity, not in the sense that we are 
born with it, but that we develop it through the process of Bildung, our initiation into 
language and culture. In the previous Section, I noted the way that many innate 
animal traits develop only in response to the appropriate triggers or 'releasers,' and 
suggested that the development of language is a prime example of this, evidenced 
particularly by the necessity to be exposed to it during a 'critical period.' Furthermore, 
in the previous Chapter I described the overlap of noesis with declarative pointing, 
and noted its correlation with the first stirrings of language acquisition, arguing that 
the Bildung described by McDowell is not merely the learning of linguistic and 
cultural facts, but describes a distinct and crucial phase of our biological and 
psychological development. The 'critical period' shows that we are dependent on 
others as 'releasers' of this process. That is to say, noesis is activated– 'released'– by 
our pointing interactions with our caregivers. We point for others, as others point 
things out for us. These early pointing interactions draw our awareness to objects 
frozen out of context, apophantically-'as' a 'this.' 
 
Hinzen has argued that the 'space of reasons' in which thought takes place is a “deictic 
space” that is formed within the triangle of the grammatical first-, second-, and third-
persons.94 This space is opened up by the act of pointing– I (first person) point it 
(third person) out to you (second person). The act of deictic triangulation forms an 
intersubjective space formed of subject, object and other; it is an essentially shared 
space, where meaning (and truth) are affirmed in the act of communication. This 
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conception of triangulation has strong parallels to Davidson's argument for linguistic 
externalism, which rejects the possibility of a private language on the basis that all 
meaning comes from a triangle of subject, object, and the intersubjective sharing of 
both. 95  Significantly, Davidson’s account also emphasises the need for such 
communicating agents to be “very much alike” in their embodiment (or at the very 
least, in their openness to stimuli).96 
 
In this way, we can see that my account of language as based in noesis, although 
personal, does not imply an internalist understanding of its object as something 
'private.' Not only do we share our biological sensory-perceptual modalities 
(aistheses) with other humans, but the intellectual-perceptual faculty of noûs also 
forms a part of our biological development as we grow into a socio-cultural world. 
During our Bildung we develop noûs through the dynamic process of deictic 
triangulation. We point for others, and our growing noetic faculty in turn underpins 
and supports the co-development of natural language. Only by assuming a binary 
separation of the mind from the body, of the individual from society, and of biology 
from culture, can my account of noesis be taken as internalist. But I reject all three 
binaries. The embodied human individual is intrinsically a social being whose natural 
development involves acquiring noûs and thereby entering a second natural space of 
reasons. 
 
However, once we have entered this space– grammatically-structured, as I have 
argued, though synthesis and diairesis– we directly experience language and concepts 
as entities. There is a sense, then, in which the objects of our noetic experience– while 
shared– are dependent for their existence on the socio-linguistic 'world' of our second 
nature. This linguistic-cultural dependence of conceptual entities seems to imply a 
form of relativism along the lines posited by the so-called 'Sapir-Whorf' hypothesis, 
and it is to these implications that I now turn in my final Section. 
 
 
* * * 
 
  
                                                 




7.3.5 – Concepts, Culture, and Truth 
in which I argue against a strong ‘Whorfian hypothesis’  
of cultural and linguistic relativity, but conclude that  
language’s role in populating our second nature ‘world’ could  
be taken as support for a very ‘weak’ version of the claim. 
 
I have been arguing, along Chomskyan lines, that language is an innate faculty of the 
human being, albeit one that develops in feedback with the infant's initiation into a 
culture. The role of culture here creates a tension, as the diversity of human cultures 
seems to throw into question any universalist claims about human cognition. At its 
most extreme, an emphasis on language and culture's influence over cognition implies 
a cultural or linguistic relativism of the type expressed by the so-called 'Sapir-Whorf' 
or 'Whorfian' hypothesis, which in its strongest form asserts that different linguistic 
and cultural communities hold different and perhaps incommensurable worldviews 
in virtue of their linguistic differences, and that the grammatical structure of 
languages influences the kind of thoughts that speakers can (and cannot) think. 
 
In this Section, I will argue that the role I have granted to culture and grammar in this 
thesis does not imply a strong version of the Whorfian hypothesis. While I will argue 
that language affects thoughts, and that surface grammars may focus speakers' 
attention onto particular aspects of experience, nothing in my account supports a 
strong Whorfian claim of cultural incommensurability. However, my account of 
Bildung, together with the account of post-conceptuality from Chapter Four, does 
suggest the way in which our initiation into a world, through Naming and through 
acquiring and learning to use new words, enables us to think new concepts within an 
abstract space of reasons, and thus could be said to support a weak version of the 
Whorfian hypothesis, in the sense that entities we encounter would have different 
significances or none to someone who had not been initiated into our culture. Such a 
conclusion is reflective of the way my account of conceptual and non-/post-conceptual 
experience applies not only (or even principally) to bodily skills, but also to cognitive 
activities such as perception, speaking, and even thinking. 
 
The 'Sapir-Whorf' or 'Whorfian hypothesis' is a name commonly given to theories of 
linguistic and cognitive relativity, since most modern, scientific articulations of the 
idea trace themselves to the work of Benjamin Lee Whorf, who developed and 
published theories strongly influenced by his teacher, the anthropologist and linguist 
Edward Sapir.97 Whorf called his hypothesis the “linguistic relativity principle,” and 
                                                 




its central idea was that “users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their 
grammars towards different types of observations and different evaluations of 
externally similar acts of observation.” 98  The central theme of his academic and 
popular writing is that a culture's worldview is shaped by the structure of its language. 
In his strongest terms, for example, he states: 
 
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and 
types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we don't find there because they 
stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a 
kaleidoscope flux of impressions which has to be organised by our minds– and this 
means largely by the linguistic systems of our minds. We cut up nature, organise it 
into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an 
agreement to organise it in this way... we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the 
organisation and classification of data which the agreement decrees...99 
 
We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers 
are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless 
their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated.100 
 
Gentner and Goldin-Meadow summarise the basic Whorfian hypothesis as an 
observation that languages vary in their semantic partitioning of world, plus an 
argument that the structure of language influences the manner in which one perceives 
and understands the world, and thus leads to a conclusion that speakers of different 
languages will perceive the world differently.101 
 
From Whorf's various statements, Lenneberg has distilled two formalised Whorfian 
hypotheses: 
 
1. Structural differences between language systems will, in general, be paralleled by 
non-linguistic cognitive differences, of an unspecified sort, between the native 
speakers of the two languages. 
 
2. The structure of anyone's native language strongly influences or fully determines 
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the world-view he will acquire as he learns the language.102 
 
Brown in turn notes that we can read these hypotheses in either a 'weak form'– that 
there exists “a correlation between linguistic structure and cognition”– or in a much 
stronger form– that there is “a causal developmental relation” between the language 
one speaks and the kind of thoughts that one can think, and how one perceives the 
world. 
 
Lakoff emphasises that Whorf's view is not the oft-attributed notion that different 
languages form incommensurable worldviews. 103  For Whorf, Lakoff argues, 
conceptual systems can be radically different, but not totally different.104 Indeed, 
similarly to my own argument against internalism in the previous Section, Whorf 
holds that the similarity of our bodies as members of the same species implies a 
general shared experience with other human beings.105 And Whorf also tempers the 
strongest readings of his hypothesis, saying for example that 
 
language, for all its kingly role, is in some sense a superficial embroidery upon deeper 
processes of consciousness, which are necessary before any communication, 
signalling, or symbolism whatsoever can occur.106 
 
Nevertheless, Whorf's work has inspired continuing debates over the interrelation of 
language, culture, and thought, and the strong reading has come to epitomise one of 
the poles in the question over whether the source of our conceptual system is innate 
or cultural. This appears to raise a tension within my account, since Levinson has 
argued that the opposite pole is epitomised by Chomsky, whose universalist view is 
“diametrically opposed” to Whorf's.107 Therefore, one might object that my defence of 
a Chomskyan account, whereby language is understood as an innate and essential 
element of the human organism, is incompatible with the extent to which I have 
emphasised culture in the previous Sections. However, as Gopnik has noted, although 
Chomsky himself played down cultural differences in order to focus on underlying 
linguistic structures, 
 
neo-Chomskyans tend to see cognitive structure itself as innate rather than developed 
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or constructed [but] more significantly, they see cognition as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for semantic development... merely having a cognitive 
representation of the world doesn't determine one's semantic representations.108 
 
In what follows, then, I will argue that the observation that language plays a role in 
structuring thought does not imply the strong Whorfian claim that different cultures 
thereby inhabit radically different worlds. Indeed, my account of post-conceptuality 
offers a potential argument against the strong Whorfian hypothesis insofar as, having 
acquired a particular surface grammar, it becomes invisible to us in our everyday 
dealings, and the aspects of experience that it encodes are no less accessible to 
speakers of different languages. Nevertheless, I will argue that this same account of 
post-conceptuality supports a weak Whorfian hypothesis to the extent that, since we 
experience the cultural entities we discover through language as things, differences in 
languages do directly affect our perception of the world, although this has more to do 
with lexicon than grammar. 
 
7.3.5.1 – Grammar and Culture 
in which I explore the effects of surface grammar on cognition, and argue  
that, although differences in such grammars may make certain aspects of the  
world more salient, they do not open up or close off aspects of experience. 
 
There are two broad ways in which language might be said to expand or constrain 
human thought. The first is via its grammatical structure. The second is by its lexicon. 
In this subsection I will look at arguments for how a language's grammar might 
structure its speakers' perceptual and conceptual experience of the world. It should 
be noted that the sense of 'grammar' in play here is the surface grammar of natural 
languages, and not the Universal Grammar (or capacity for synthesis/diairesis) that 
I earlier argued underpins such surface grammars. For this reason, a strong Whorfian 
thesis would not necessarily be incompatible with my argument that human language 
is underpinned by an innate, developing, grammatical mode of perception. My 
universalist claim is a minimal one, committed only to the theses that language is 
innate, and that Universal Grammar enables abstract thought through Merge. It is 
therefore an empirical question whether or not surface grammars give rise to different 
forms of thought, as suggested by the strong Whorfian hypothesis, and I will present 
evidence below that has been interpreted as doing so. Nevertheless, I will argue 
against such interpretations, and show that my theory of post-conceptuality applied 
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to language-use actually offers reason to prefer, at most, a weaker, commensurist 
reading. 
 
The strong Whorfian hypothesis locates the source of cultural incommensurability in 
a language's (surface) grammar, as this element of language– unlike the lexicon– is 
shared by the entire speech community, and is also in a sense 'hidden' from most 
speakers, in that we use grammar reflexively and unthinkingly– not insignificantly, in 
the way we use acquired bodily skills. Whorfians emphasise the subtle ways in which 
grammar focuses our thought onto certain aspects of experience, a feature of language 
admitted even by Pinker, who has been highly critical of the Whorfian hypothesis.109 
 
Perhaps the most commonly-cited influence of grammar on perception is that of 
gender. Unlike English, many languages class words as belonging to a particular 
gender. It should be noted that 'gender' here does not technically have any sexual 
connotations, and is closely related to the terms 'genre' and 'genus' in referring to 
things of a 'type' or 'kind.' Most Indo-European languages have two or at most three 
genders, with the result that grammatical genders have tended to be named as 
'masculine' and 'feminine,' with 'neuter' as a third. Nouns in gendered languages are 
assigned to genders as a matter of convention, whose origin has long been lost but 
which should not be assumed to be primarily sexual; hence, Mark Twain's oft-cited 
complaint that in German 'young girl' (das Mädchen) is neuter while 'turnip' (die 
Rübe) is female is misplaced. Some non-European languages have even more genders. 
Lakoff notes that Dyirbal has four distinct genders, including one (balam) for 'non-
flesh food' and another (balan) for 'women, fire, and dangerous things.'110  
 
Speaking a gendered language correctly requires the speaker to know the gender of 
each word they use. This can sometimes force speakers to make an explicit choice, in 
cases where a word's grammatical gender contradicts some property the speaker 
wants to express and attribute to the object. For example, Hunt and Agnoli point out 
that an Italian speaker must refer to a bear (orso) as masculine, and must therefore 
consciously choose to specify the sex if they want to talk specifically about a female 
bear (orsa).111 However, we should not presume the extent to which this is a property 
of the language or some other cultural factor. In genderless English, for example, it 
remains common to speak of a 'she-bear' or 'she-wolf,' and likewise of a 'tomcat' 
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(although the decline of such terms– especially those referring to humans, such as 
‘lady doctor’– suggests cultural factors play a greater role than linguistic properties). 
Indeed, in learning to speak a gendered language, it is not clear that speakers are 
encouraged to make explicit associations between objects in the same gender. The 
gender marker (usually an article or declensional suffix) is learned together with the 
noun, such that the speaker automatically expresses the gender, without any explicit 
reasoning. 
 
Grammatical phenomena are of course not limited to genders, sexual or otherwise. 
Boroditsky and her colleagues list several of the elements that speakers of different 
languages are obliged to express.112 In the phrase 'the elephant ate the peanuts,' for 
example, an English speaker is obliged to express the past tense. A Mandarin speaker, 
on the other hand, would not need to. A Russian speaker would have to express not 
only the tense but the (grammatical) gender of the elephant, and whether he ate all 
the peanuts or only some of them. A Turkish speaker, finally, would not only be 
obliged to express the past tense, but in doing so would need to express whether they 
personally witnessed the elephant eat the peanuts, or whether it was something they 
learned second-hand. 
 
The issue with Boroditsky's claim, however, is that it is difficult to argue that such 
features are not a universal part of human experience, regardless of whether or not 
one's language obliges one to reveal it. That is, just because we are not obliged to 
express something does not imply we are not aware of it. A Mandarin-speaker, if 
questioned further, would have no trouble saying 'when' the elephant ate the peanuts; 
an English-speaker, if challenged, could confidently declare whether they saw the 
elephant eat the peanuts or merely heard about it. Thus, the Turkish-speaker's 
grammar does not seem to give them any special privileges. Indeed, as I noted in the 
previous Chapter, the fluent use of language is achieved in a manner like smooth 
coping. The Turkish-speaker, in an ordinary conversation, would probably not be 
aware of using the definite past (first-person-eyewitness) tense, any more than an 
English-speaker would be aware of using the simple past tense. The words would 
simply flow. As Pinker argues, 
 
It's not even obvious that a lifetime of coding a distinction in language should make 
the distinction more available in reasoning. It's just as likely the opposite could 
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happen. When a thought process becomes automatic, it gets deeply embedded in the 
language system as a cognitive reflex and its internal workings are no longer 
consciously available, any more than we have conscious access to the finger motions 
involved in tying our shoes.113 
 
Pinker's point here is essentially another way of phrasing Merleau-Ponty's 
observation that most of our everyday speech– the parole parlée– consists in the 
recital of automatic, stereotyped phrases. 114  They would only become a part of 
reflective thought in scenarios analogous to the 'breakdown' of coping– say, for 
example, if one was trying to lie about having really seen the elephant. In that case, 
the choice of word and tense would stand out conspicuously to a Turkish-speaker, 
breaking the flow.115 And while Lakoff argues that Dyirbal or Hopi speakers need to 
decide whether something is dangerous, or vibrating, or so on, in actuality, for a fluent 
speaker the choice has already been made for them.116 The language itself already 
encodes which gender an object belongs to, which is learned from infancy by practice 
and rote. Deliberative thought would not come into it, any more than a German would 
need to decide whether a noun needs der, die, or das.117 
 
One might nevertheless hold that such pre-made choices are precisely the Whorfian 
point, that a Dyirbal-speaker, for example, cannot but think of something balan as 
dangerous. Supporting this, Boroditsky and her colleagues found a strong correlation 
between gender and perception by comparing two objects (a key and a bridge) that 
are opposite genders in German and Spanish.118 They found a strong tendency for 
speakers of both languages to ascribe stereotypically male adjectives to the masculine 
object (the key in German and the bridge in Spanish), and stereotypically female 
adjectives to the feminine object. This offers reasonable evidence for the influence of 
language over perception, for the stereotyped results offer a counterargument to my 
above observation on the origins of 'gender.' It appears that, regardless of the term's 
actual origin, for the ordinary German or Spanish speaker, having learned about 
gender in sexual terms is sufficient to project that impression onto objects within the 
entire class. 
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Similarly, Gentner and Goldin-Meadow note that Korean uses different prepositions 
in place of the English 'in' and 'on' and which overlap in different ways, depending on 
whether the object forms a loose or tight-fit. 119  Korean subjects tended to group 
objects together along these lines, in contrast to English subjects. Lucy and Gaskins 
have found parallels in their extensive work with Yucatec-speakers, whose language 
has genders that relate to the material objects are made from, and thus obliges them 
to express that in their speech.120 Experiments conducted on Yucatec- and English-
speakers showed an overwhelming tendency for Yucatec-speakers to group objects 
together based on the material they were made from, while English-speakers had an 
equally strong tendency to group objects based on shape. These results suggest that 
languages have a subtle effect on cognition even below the level of explicit awareness, 
and structure the very way that their speakers carve up the world. 
 
It is therefore plausible that different languages, organising thought in different ways, 
focus their speakers onto different aspects of experience. Hunt and Agnoli suggest 
that this is a direct effect of the way languages work by shifting concepts from short- 
to long-term memory, noting that the fact that Italian sentences are typically longer 
than English sentences might be explained in terms of the structure of the former, 
which 'outsources' memory load onto the language-structure itself.121 Hunt and Agnoli 
also ponder a correlation between the observation that Chinese languages lack the 
subjunctive, and that native speakers of those languages tend to do less well at tests 
of counterfactual reasoning than English speakers.122 However, such cross-linguistic 
differences remain, at best, evidence only of a weak form of the Whorfian hypothesis. 
As Hunt and Agnoli point out, the “issue is not whether Chinese can perform 
counterfactual reasoning, but whether the relative cost of such reasoning is greater in 
Chinese than in English.”123 Perhaps most significantly, there has been no evidence 
put forward that speakers of any language are incapable of acquiring certain concepts 
as a direct result of the grammar of their native language. As Gopnik notes, differences 
across languages have more to do with timing than with end results.124 That is, while 
certain languages may facilitate or prioritise certain forms of thought over others, they 
can never close off thoughts entirely. Worldviews, says Gopnik, are not 
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incommensurable, but converging.125 
 
In this subsection, I have looked at the effects of surface grammar on cognition. While 
there is some evidence that the grammar of a natural language leads its speakers to 
interesting and significant differences in categorisation, this is a far cry from the 
strong Whorfian hypothesis that posits radically different worldviews to different 
linguistic communities. As I have argued, the acquisition of language and the use of 
grammar parallels skill-performance in smooth coping. The aspects of experience that 
they encode are, therefore, for the most part invisible to the speaker, only arising in 
cases of breakdown, as when a Turkish-speaker tries to lie about having really seen 
an elephant eat peanuts. Nevertheless, such breakdowns are also possible for speakers 
of other languages, albeit they may need verbal prompting– on questioning, we can 
also force an English-speaker to declare whether or not they witnessed a reported 
event first-hand. Thus, there is no reason to think that elements of experience, while 
they may be highlighted by particular grammars, are inaccessible to speakers of 
languages with different grammars. The difference remains one of emphasis, not of 
necessity. 
 
It should further be stressed that such conclusions have, at any rate, little bearing on 
my account of noesis and Universal Grammar, as this deals with the logically prior 
capacity to 'carve up' the world– through synthesis/diairesis, the 'taking-together-
that-takes-apart'– at all. The surface grammars discussed here may or may not 
instantiate this to different degrees– that is an empirical question, and I do not have 
the space here to review the entire debate. It is nevertheless difficult to conclude that 
speakers of different surface grammatical systems live in fundamentally different, 
much less incommensurable, worlds. But as even Pinker was willing to admit, despite 
whether we think Whorf is wrong to the extent that one's language determines how 
one conceptualises reality in general, “he was probably correct in a much weaker 
sense: one's language does determine how one must conceptualise reality when one 
has to talk about it.”126 
 
 
* * *  
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7.3.5.2 – Words, Concepts, and Things 
in which I explore the interrelation of word and concept acquisition  
to argue that words are instrumental in populating our shared, 
 second natural ‘worlds,’ and that these ‘worlds’ are not therefore shared 
 universally, but differ both within and between linguistic communities. 
 
In this next subsection, I will examine the second feature of language that may be 
argued to create differences in worldviews across languages– the words themselves. 
The impact of words on cognition– such as the number of Eskimo words for 'snow'– 
is both the most widely-known and highly-criticised piece of 'evidence' for Whorf's 
hypothesis.127 Pinker notes that Whorf, in drawing upon this example, 'reversed cause 
and effect,' and exaggerated the extent to which the words created a cognitive 
difference between peoples. 128  However, I will argue in this subsection that our 
lexicon nevertheless has a significant effect on our experience. Words can not only 
stand in for concepts, but in the case of many culturally-derived concepts, they are the 
concepts themselves, providing a shorthand for complex concepts that in turn allows 
the formation of higher order concepts. As I have argued in this and previous 
Chapters, we experience such verbal and cultural concepts noetically as though they 
were things, and we learn to cope with them, as we do with physical things, post-
conceptually. There is, therefore, an important sense in which acquiring concepts– 
either directly from experience, through Naming, or via new words– populates our 
second nature worlds with new entities. While, as I argued in the previous Section, 
such words are never exclusively 'private,' they are nevertheless bound in important 
ways to our speech community, and could therefore be held to demonstrate an 
instance of the Whorfian hypothesis, but again only in a weak sense; firstly, because 
there is no in principle reason why such concepts can't be translated across languages, 
and secondly because such conceptual worlds can differ as much within a linguistic 
community as without it. 
 
Words, as Brown neatly put it, are the “lure to cognition.”129 Pinker argues that, at a 
minimum, attaching a word to a concept helps retain it in memory, “making it more 
easily retrievable than ineffable concepts or those with more roundabout verbal 
descriptions.”130 McDowell concurs, suggesting that our recognitional capacities can 
be cultivated by improving our conceptual repertoire, as we find with connoisseurs of 
food and wine, who develop an ability to Name discreet flavours that may be not be 
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readily discerned by the uninitiated.131 None of this requires that we need specific 
words to make such discriminations, just that there is a mutual feedback between 
perceptions and Names. Having the words 'malty' and 'hoppy' gives me ready access 
to an expression for the experience of certain flavours in beer, as well as something to 
look for. Yet, bringing my authentic attention to the moment of tasting, I should be 
able to distinguish each flavour minimally as a 'this' regardless of whether I have 
tasted it before, or have a name for it or not. 
 
Specific words do, however, become valuable in terms of memory and recall. Hunt 
and Agnoli agree that improvements in vocabulary facilitate the naturalness of 
thought, arguing, as we have seen, that “languages evolve to move the burden from 
the short-term to the long-term memory.”132 But they stress that this is something 
which occurs as much within languages as between languages, noting developments 
in surfer slang over the past fifty years. New coinages– specific new meanings for 
terms such as 'hollow' and 'flat'– allow surfers to make finer discriminations between 
features of the sea. Having words therefore facilitates recall and recognition, although 
they do so by sacrificing detail in the process of abstraction. As Tye points out, we do 
not have “recognitional concepts for minimal shades,” citing studies which show that 
subjects struggle to re-identify specific shades, such as 'red27,' in the absence of the 
original sample.133 In the absence of the perceptual experience, the conceptual 'this' 
of the judgement is just the word or logos– that is, whatever is retained of the concept 
once the specific perception has been stripped away. Supporting this conclusion is 
Rosch's finding that members of the New Guinean Dani tribe (whose language 
contains relatively few colour words) were far more successful at re-recognising a 
colour if it belonged to a group with a word.134 Thus, even where words facilitate more 
abstract thought, they can also involve a movement away from direct experience. The 
'this' that I think, remember, and speak of– the logos– is not the 'this' that I actually 
perceive. 
 
This highlights a gap between experience and the logos. A young child need not 
understand the concept 'shade' to noetically pick out two kinds of red, just as a speaker 
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of a language that does not differentiate between 'red' and 'orange' can still noetically 
'tell' the difference between them.135  Where words become important is rather in 
enhancing our abstract recognitional capacities. For example, Winawer and his 
colleagues have shown that native Russian-speakers, who have two distinct colour 
words, goluboy and siniy, for what in English are considered two shades of blue, have 
a faster and more accurate ability to discriminate between colours across those 
categories than within them.136 That language played a key role was further supported 
by the fact that the Russian-speakers lost their advantage over the native English-
speakers if they were distracted by 'verbal interference' during the task.137 Similarly, 
Roberson and her colleagues have reported that the Himba-speakers of south-west 
Africa, lacking distinct words for 'blue' and 'green,' are generally unsuccessful at 
distinguishing between blue and green colour chips, although they are much more 
successful than English-speakers at discriminating between two shades of 'green' for 
which they possess different words.138 
 
Thus, language and noesis– Naming 'this'– play a role in structuring and organising 
thought, through a process of abstracting it away from direct experience. I argued in 
Chapter One that through the act of Naming something– as a tree, as a eucalypt, as a 
black gum– we are able to refine our perception. I argued there that to Name need not 
involve natural language; it is linguistic only in the sense that it is structured 
grammatically, in the way I have argued in this Chapter. To Name is to perceive 
noetically, to see something as something, as a 'this'– that is, as a concept. As Siegel 
notes, when we acquire the concept of something new– of a pine tree, in her example– 
it is not merely the case that we have acquired a new belief.139 The forest itself now 
actually looks different– we can see the pine trees, as pine trees.140 
 
This perceptual capacity follows the same conceptual-to-post-conceptual pattern as 
skill acquisition, and rests on the same capacity to carve up the world grammatically 
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(synthesis and diairesis). Consider foraging for mushrooms, for example, a trickier 
and higher-stakes affair than picking out pine trees in a wood. To an untrained eye, a 
tasty mushroom may not look at all different from a deadly one. To learn the 
difference, we initially need to carve them up grammatically– this colour cap, this kind 
of gills, this shaped hood, and so on. As with learning to drive a car, we employ rules 
and explicit concepts.141 Yet as we acquire the skill of identification, we no longer 
consciously attend to the parts, but see the mushroom as this kind of mushroom and 
not another, wondering how on earth novices (including our former self) can't see the 
difference. 
 
This acquisition of a skill, or absorption of the concept, signifies that we are able to 
take the mushrooms post-conceptually. Of course, we may still bring in our reflective, 
noetic perception– even an expert could be quickly sorting through a basket of 
mushrooms, and then stop to double-check the gills of an uncertain specimen. Such 
skill absorption can work to various degrees of fine-grainedness. A novice forager 
could still go out and pick all the white field mushrooms she sees, identifying them as 
a class that does not include brown ones or those growing on tree-stumps. This reveals 
an interesting phenomenological difference between the novice and the expert, for the 
absorbed concept can now be brought explicitly back into reflection. In stopping to 
'take' the specimen 'to heart,' the expert may see it as a Psilocybe, while the novice 
merely sees it as a mushroom. Yet in this way, both differ from those animals that eat 
particular species of mushrooms. For them, there are only the edible mushrooms that 
solicit them hermeneutically-as something-to-eat, and are not connected to the 
inedible species that blend into the background, not as mushrooms, but as 'generally 
inedible stuff.' 
 
Thus Naming– the capacity to carve up the world, to take wholes as their parts, and 
then together as their wholes– enables us to form more and more complex worlds. 
Our second nature world, once populated merely by mushrooms, now contains 
Psilocybes and Panaeoluses. There is a certainly a cultural element to this– the 
average Russian's 'world' contains many more types of mushroom than the average 
Scotsman's, since despite their both living in fungi-rich lands, foraging for 
mushrooms is a far more popular pastime in Russia than it is in the British Isles. 
Similarly, Polynesian mariners– who by long experience have Named and learned to 
recognise features of ocean currents and patterns of waves– perceive the sea 
                                                 




differently to modern Kiwi sailors, who rely on charts and GPS for navigation.142 Yet 
such differing perceptions of natural phenomena need not be cross-cultural or even 
cross-linguistic, as we saw earlier in the case of surfers. 
 
But perhaps the most significant differences between the worlds of different 
communities comes when those concepts are purely cultural. For the concepts and 
words we have considered so far– 'slushy snow,' 'malty beer,' 'earthy mushrooms,' 
'hollow waves'– are all concepts that are drawn directly from our sensory experience 
of the physical world. For this reason, perhaps, Pinker dismisses the observation that 
the “stock of words” reflects things in peoples' lives as “banal.”143 However, this quick 
dismissal overlooks the extent to which sometimes the words– or the concepts 
themselves– are the things. Entities like governments, universities, and theories only 
exist in virtue of the concepts held and shared by members of a community. As I 
argued in Chapter Four, even entities like traffic lights only exist as traffic lights– with 
direct causal effects on human beliefs and actions– in virtue of the shared web of 
social concepts that projects onto them the meaning that they have. Such 'social 
concepts,' as Lakoff notes, are “made real by human action.”144 
 
This supports a (weak) Whorfian point that language 'carves up' not just the physical 
world (into types of snow, types of wave, and so on), but also the cultural worlds that 
give rise to the words. Chinese languages, for instance, have different words for 'older 
brother' and 'younger brother.' Such terms most likely developed in tandem with the 
Confucian value system that stands at the core of Chinese societies, and emphasises 
the reciprocal responsibilities within hierarchical relationships that include ruler and 
subject, father and son, older brother and younger brother, and so on. But just as 
Pinker argued against Whorf's Eskimo snow-word example, such a conclusion most 
likely reverses the true order of causation if it argues that Confucian culture developed 
in response to the language. Nevertheless, having such distinct terms within the 
language should certainly aid in perpetuating the culture by making the relationship 
explicit in each use of the term. Similarly, the Japanese system of honorifics– in which 
social etiquette demands the attachment of a distinct, rank-related suffix to the names 
of all but one's closest family and friends– is both made necessary by and helps to 
facilitate the complex Japanese social structure. But such a social structure, while 
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difficult for outsiders to learn, is certainly not incommensurable across cultures.145 
 
Thus, although our earliest concepts may be based only and directly on perception, as 
soon as we begin to acquire language, we also become open to cultural entities.146 
Carey, for example, although she argues that human conceptuality is rooted in a “core 
cognition” that is nativist in character, holds that explicit language makes concepts 
“more salient and robust, more stable” and more likely to be used in further 
reasoning.147 Put simply, as we saw Hunt and Agnoli argue earlier, attaching a word 
to a concept allows us to form a shorthand for a concept that might otherwise take a 
paragraph to describe. 
 
Thus, language does not simply pick out universal qualities, but rather groups features 
in accordance with particular cultural worldviews, as Gopnik notes, discussing 'La 
Rochfoucauld's dictum' that 'no one would fall in love if they hadn't read about it 
first.'148 In this example, she says, 
 
my language may classify together as 'love' a set of emotions– intense manic-
depressive phenomenology, sexual attraction, intimacy, common understanding, 
jealousy, etc.,– that would not be so grouped by another culture, or by our culture at 
another historical period. Once I and others have interpreted my behaviour and 
feelings in accordance with this classification, however, usually through the medium 
of language, then the classification will have genuine predictive and exploratory 
power.149 
 
Gopnik's point is not the depressing conclusion that love does not exist, or that it only 
exists 'in the mind.' Rather, love does exist for us– as twenty-first century English-
speakers– because we have been initiated into a shared, cultural space of reasons that 
interprets this group of interrelated and often conflicting emotions as one concept 
under a single term. Having such a term therefore enables us to think and speak of 
this concept as though it were a single thing– ‘our love’– or property– ‘they were 'in 
love'.’ 
 
                                                 
145  Indeed, most cultures contain some version of a 'tu-vous' or 'familiar-polite' distinction in the 
language, and even those– such as English– which don't still encourage distinct forms of speech 
between formal and informal settings. 
146 Lucy & Gaskins 2001, p. 280. 
147 Carey 2009, p. 212. 
148 Gopnik 2001, p. 65. 




Such concepts of course draw on long, historical traditions– our concept of romantic 
love, for example, can be traced to the medieval troubadours and the ideas of courtly 
love that challenged the pre-existing conception of marriage as a transaction between 
families– and as such, it may be argued that such concepts are culturally-
incommensurable in a Whorfian sense, insofar as languages and cultures may carve 
up the world in ways that have such little overlap that the concepts of one language-
culture cannot be translated into the terms of another. 
 
Such a view is, however, unduly pessimistic. While it is indeed true that many 
concepts expressed by a single word in one language cannot be translated into a single 
word in another language, it does not follow that the concept cannot be described. For 
example, the Nguni Bantu noun 'ubuntu' describes a complex quality of human-ness 
or humane-ness that takes the individual as inextricably linked to the community, and 
embodies qualities not only of generosity, friendliness and hospitality, but an 
identification with the other that includes a pride in their achievements and pain at 
their suffering.150 Ubuntu can be exemplified, for example, in the image of a traveller 
arriving at a village and being welcomed in as one of its own. Where no English 
equivalent seems to capture this sentiment exactly, it is nevertheless understandable, 
and examples of ubuntu abound in our own culture, perhaps most notably in the 
Scottish tradition of 'highland hospitality.' 
 
Similarly, the German word Sehnsucht denotes a particular sense of yearning that, for 
example, as in Schiller's poem of that name, seems to describe a homesickness for a 
place that does not exist.151 C.S. Lewis described the word as denoting an “inconsolable 
longing,” an “unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other 
satisfaction.”152 Lewis' expression shows that the term is not untranslatable, although 
Scheibe and her colleagues note that Sehnsucht differs subtly from these most obvious 
translations in that German-speakers emphasise its experience as a positive emotion– 
something like nostalgia, yet future-directed– and as such, Scheibe argues that it 
serves a developmental purpose in orientating people towards life-goals. 153  While 
Lewis certainly seemed to appreciate this subtlety, in a follow-up study Scheibe and 
her colleagues investigated understanding and experiences of Sehnsucht in Germans 
and Americans.154 Of particular relevance here, they noted that although Americans 
                                                 
150 Tutu 1999, pp. 34-5. 
151 Schiller 1888, pp. 192-3. 
152 Lewis 1955, p. 74; Jasper 2010, p. 223. 
153 Scheibe et al. 2007, p. 779, 782. 
154 Scheibe et al. 2011, p. 603. 
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could relate to the concept, they were less likely to spontaneously reflect on such a 
sense of longing unless asked to do so.155 Scheibe and her colleagues also concluded 
that Americans were less likely to use the concept to interpret the unattainability of 
life goals positively, which in turn offers some support for the effect of cultural 
concepts on individual experience.156 
 
These three examples– love, ubuntu, and Sehnsucht– all support Lakoff's conclusion 
that it “does not follow from the impossibility of translation that understanding is 
impossible.” 157  While words can delineate concepts, such that languages which 
contain them offer their speakers expressive resources that aren't immediately 
available to speakers of languages lacking such concepts, the key difference seems to 
be rather that non-speakers have not taken the chance to Name such a concept, not 
that they cannot. Indeed, the existence of loanwords is proof of the power of languages 
to adopt wholesale concepts that do not exist in their own conceptual systems. For 
example, while Sehnsucht might remain mostly unknown to English speakers, terms 
such as Zeitgeist and Schadenfreude can be used in many contexts without offering a 
translation. 
 
The interrelation of vocabulary and concepts, then, should not be taken as evidence 
that languages form different cultural worldviews, but should be seen rather along the 
lines of perceptual skills that develop as part of a speaker's overall initiation into a 
form of life. Traditionally, such forms of life would largely have mapped onto 
particular linguistic and cultural communities, yet the point just as equally applies to 
different subgroups within linguistic communities; skiers have at least as many terms 
for snow as Eskimos, and surfers as many terms for waves as Polynesian mariners. 
The verbal diversity within languages increases as societies become more and more 
specialised. To take Western philosophy as a particularly salient example– it takes 
many years of intensive study and training in order to fluently employ such concepts 
as apperception, externalism, intention, intension, or modular, to say nothing of 
eidos, res cogitans, Zuhandenheit, or différance. As Wittgenstein said, to understand 
a word is to know how to use it, and so while many languages contain words that do 
not have ready equivalents in other languages, there is nevertheless no reason in 
principle why non-speakers could not come to learn how to use such words.158 
                                                 
155 Ibid, pp. 615-6. 
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7.3.5.3 – Post-conceptual language use 
in which I argue that, since acquiring verbal concepts means that we  
can cope with them post-conceptually, individuals’ second nature ‘worlds’  
will diverge along the lines of the concepts they have acquired. 
 
I have been arguing that the words we speak populate the cultural worlds we inhabit, 
since by Naming a concept, and attaching a word, we experience it as something. Thus 
our worlds can contain entities such as 'love' and 'Sehnsucht,' 'traffic lights' and 
'shakshuka,' 'spring' and 'Lughnassadh.' Such conceptual worlds are shared, and the 
entities therein are dependent to greater and lesser degrees on the network of 
overlapping concepts that are encoded in the language. Yet I have argued that this 
implies at most a very weak Whorfian effect, firstly because cultural concepts are 
always in principle translatable– although they may take some work– and secondly 
because the cultural entities available to a speaker show a similarly great divergence 
within languages as between them– and often just as equally require some hard work 
before we truly 'know how to use them.' 
 
I will close this Section with some brief thoughts on how these conclusions relate to 
my thesis overall. I will argue that, just as we noetically come to experience words as 
things, so when we fully understand them, we are able to cope with them– that is, we 
can use them post-conceptually, no longer as things, but as tools or equipment (Zeug) 
towards further goals. Thus, language and concepts facilitate an exponential capacity 
to move within our developed, cultural 'worlds'– to think, abstract, and create. 
 
In Part One, for example, I argued that embodying a skill frees up our conceptual or 
noetic attention to focus on new elements. Learning to ride a bike, I must concentrate 
on the different elements of the task– on balancing, pedalling, steering, and so on– 
with the result that my performance is often clumsy, and I cannot think of anything 
else. Once I have mastered riding the bike, however, I can turn my attention to 
navigating the city– I have embodied the physical act of bike-balancing, but I must 
now devote my noetic attention to negotiating the traffic, the road-signs, and finding 
my way about town. However, I can likewise come to 'embody' (post-conceptually) 
this skill set as well– I can know the road rules and my route so well that I follow them 
'automatically,' and can devote my noetic attention to another task altogether– 
thinking about my thesis on the way to work, for example. 
 
However, as I have argued in this and the previous Chapter, the fluid use of language 
and the act of thinking are themselves tasks that can be approached either 
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conceptually or post-conceptually. In the previous Chapter, I argued that the parole 
parlée describes the fluent use of language circumspectively towards another goal– 
that is, post-conceptually. While language does not lose its ability to ultimately point 
back noetically to something as something, we can nevertheless also use it in the 
service of a different goal. One way we achieve this, I have argued in this Chapter, is 
through the broadening of our vocabulary. When Naming a new concept and 
subsuming it under a word, we create a shorthand that allows us to condense and 
organise more complex concepts more efficiently. Thus, language itself acts as a 
scaffold to more abstract forms of thought. 
 
This is partially achieved, I have argued, through the surface grammatical structure 
of our languages. Indeed, Lakoff posits that it is the surface grammatical structure of 
linguistic thought itself that enables us to think smoothly and 'automatically,' or as I 
would put it, post-conceptually. 159  His description of the differences between 
grammatical and ungrammatical thought line up significantly with both Dreyfus' non-
conceptual/conceptual and Merleau-Ponty’s parole parlée and parole parlant 
distinctions. Where our grammatical articulation of concepts is 'automatic, 
unconscious, effortless, fixed, and conventional,' Lakoff argues, our ungrammatical 
expression is 'pondered, controlled, conscious, effortful, novel, and personal.'160 As in 
the phenomenological accounts, there is no judgement here– it is not 'better' to think 
or speak effortlessly or consciously. The point is that these two modes of using 
language– reflexively coping, or reflectively thinking– each enable the other, with our 
post-conceptual automatic fluency freeing up our conscious attention to noetically 
tease apart (synthesis and diairesis) more unfamiliar or difficult concepts. 
 
Thus, thinking can also be viewed as a skill that we acquire and practice. The 
techniques of formal logic, for example, can become second nature (literally, in the 
McDowellian sense). The experienced thinker need not break down their objects of 
thought for analysis, but can– analogously to the experienced mechanic– directly see 
where the problem lies, and what needs to be done. Like the phronimos, such a thinker 
no longer thinks in explicit rules, as they are able to draw on their experience to 
recognise the solution to the problem– perhaps without being immediately able to 
explicitly articulate why. 
 
In this Section and its three subsections, I have looked at the effects of cultural 
                                                 





concepts on human thought by discussing my thesis in relation to the Whorfian 
hypothesis. I have argued that, although differences in surface grammars do force 
speakers of different languages to emphasise different aspects of experience, such 
aspects are not invisible to non-speakers, and so do not imply a 'strong' Whorfian 
thesis of radical cultural incommensurability. On the issue of grammar, my argument 
that fluent language-use actually hides surface grammatical features from conscious 
awareness offers a potential argument against even a weak Whorfian conclusion, 
although a different interpretation means that this remains an open empirical 
question. However, my argument in the second subsection did suggest a weak 
Whorfian conclusion to the extent that, insofar as our second nature 'worlds' are 
populated by conceptual entities like 'love' and 'politics,' such entities are only 
available to those who have acquired them. Since acquiring such concepts, as I argued 
in the previous Sections, involves being initiated into a shared, cultural community, it 
is therefore plausible that different cultural worlds will contain different concepts. 
However, the relative ease of translating such concepts from one language to another– 
combined with the occasional difficulty of acquiring new concepts within one's own 
language– speaks against any strong Whorfian conclusions, even while allowing for a 
weak one, albeit one based more on the lexicon and history of concepts than on the 
surface grammar of a language. 
 
Finally, I argued that the process of acquiring concepts and hence more distinct 
second natural worlds is facilitated by complementary processes in both our 
conceptual/noetic and post-conceptual awareness. We acquire and employ languages 
and concepts as we acquire skills, and as we become proficient at thinking and 




In this Chapter I have argued that noûs structures our experience grammatically, in 
the sense of synthesis and diairesis, and that language is grounded in this capacity to 
separate and reorganise the elements of experience. I first described how for 
Heidegger, noûs – vernehmen– is a ‘taking-together-that-takes-apart,’ a capacity to 
separate objects from their properties and to perceive those properties as entities that 
can likewise be recombined. I then argued that this process is described by Chomsky’s 
theory of Universal Grammar. Universal Grammar develops with the infant, and I 
argued that noesis describes the logically-prior perceptual faculty which underlies the 
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possibility of natural language and that enables us to Move and Merge the basic items 
of linguistic expression. I defended the evolutionary plausibility of this account by 
emphasising that it co-evolves together with natural language, both in the 
evolutionary species, but also in the individual. The innateness of Universal Grammar 
and noûs implies only that we are born with a latent capacity to develop this mode of 
perception. Its development is prompted by our social interaction, and in a similar 
way, our cultural interactions provide us with the first elements of natural language, 
which helps develop our noetic faculty, which itself in turn facilitates full language 
acquisition. This account requires that we rethink our conception of the human being 
and its relation to language. The human cannot be seen as an isolated individual mind, 
but must be understood as an embodied being existing in a community. Thus, my 
account of language’s co-evolution with noesis cannot be dismissed as circular or 
internalist, for an individual’s acquisition of language marks their initiation into the 
shared, conceptual world of their community. 
 
However, I finally noted that this initiation into a second natural ‘world,’ dependent 
for its existence on a cultural community, may seem to imply linguistic or cultural 
relativity. I concluded the Chapter, then, with a discussion of the Whorfian 
hypothesis, and argued that the strong version of the hypothesis is untenable, since 
we not only share bodily forms with members of different speech communities, but 
also because linguistic and grammatical differences– while they might emphasise 
different aspects of experience– do not close off experience, and so the possibility of 
translation across vastly different languages always remains a possibility. 
Nevertheless, I did argue that because a community’s shared second nature is 
populated through the process of Naming, and that such a process can also create 
distinctive cultural entities, there is a sense in which a weak Whorfian hypothesis 
applies not only across languages, but within them too, as sub-communities develop 
their own vocabularies to deal with specific concerns. This capacity to Name, I finally 
suggested, and to experience concepts as entities, also allows us to cope with such 
conceptual entities post-conceptually, and hence to refine our vocabularies to speak 
and think of more and more abstract entities. In a weak sense, therefore, the ‘worlds’ 
of different communities and sub-cultures differ from one another, although never 
incommensurably, as they ultimately derive from a shared embodied experience. 
Nevertheless, in an important way, at the superficial level this process of abstraction 









We are arriving at the end of our enquiry into the logos, the essence of the zoon logon 
echon or ‘rational animal.’ Beginning with an exploration the logos as it has been 
discussed in the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, I have sought to distil an understanding 
of concepts and rationality that can help us better understand the differences as well 
as the similarities between humans and other animals. My principal concern in this 
thesis has been to argue that humans are differentiated from other animals through a 
faculty of linguistically-structured perception– vernehmen or noûs– through which 
we directly perceive things conceptually. This conceptual form of perception– noesis–  
develops in tandem with our initiation into a second-natural 'world,' and gives us a 
direct perception of entities disconnected from our practical involvements. We 
thereby understand these entities as being entities. Yet I have also argued that we 
retain a non-conceptual form of awareness that we share with non-human animals, 
albeit an awareness that is open to the influence of conceptual experience, and is 
hence better thought of as post-conceptual. The difference between our two forms of 
awareness suggests that there is a discordance between our different experiences of 
the world which, together with the intimate connection between noûs and self-
consciousness, raises questions about our knowledge of reality. 
 
I arrived at this picture by showing how McDowell and Dreyfus broadly agree on two 
modes through which humans experience entities. These layers or modes of 
experience, I argued, are interdependent and feed back into one another. The 
disagreement between Dreyfus and McDowell can, I therefore maintained, be 
explained as stemming from their respective emphasis of different elements of this 
broad structure of experience. Understanding the ways these layers interact, then, 
became the key step toward resolving the debate, as well as understanding human 
experience. 
 
I argued that we share the bottom layer with non-human animals. I agreed with 
Dreyfus that this mode of experience should be considered non-conceptual, since it 
does not involve the experience of an entity as an entity, and that it thus requires a 
translation of content if it is to become the content of reflective thought. I argued that 
a transition is enacted by Naming something as 'this,' taking it as an object isolated 
and independent from our absorbed involvement in a task. Yet importantly, the 
content-translation of Naming is not a one-way process. For while I argued that 




are richer than theirs because our capacity to experience entities conceptually also 
feeds back into our pragmatic coping. Through the acquisition of skills, and the 
accompanying 'absorption' of norms, we come to navigate our second-nature worlds 
post-conceptually. That is to say, entities which are first encountered noetically can 
be experienced in a direct, ready-to-hand way. In this way, we directly live with 
concepts as things. There is, therefore, no sharp dichotomy between 'mental' concepts 
that we think and 'physical' things we bodily cope with. We cope with the logos post-
conceptually, just as we directly perceive entities as entities. Nevertheless, I later 
argued that the influence of culture in delineating conceptual entities results in a gap 
that casts doubt on whether our conceptual perception captures the world as it truly 
is. 
 
I identified the capacity to Name with what Heidegger called vernehmen, 
'apprehension,' a capacity that he argued is restricted to human beings. I argued for 
two movements in the Naming process. I argued that vernehmen’s intimate 
connection to language is not primarily rooted in our communicative ability, but 
rather in how conceptual experience is organised along the structural lines of 
Universal Grammar. This, I argued, enables the human capacity for abstract, creative 
thought, since the process of synthesis and diairesis allows us to detach the experience 
of a thing from its involved experience in a specific context in a particular time and 
place. However, I also suggested that this capacity for abstraction is a double-edged 
sword. Since the noetic structure allows us to think beyond our situation-specific 
experience, as well to cope with the resulting abstract entity post-conceptually, we live 
with the constant possibility of a discordance between the second-natural world of our 
everyday experience, and the source of that experience. I will discuss some 
implications of this discordance below, but before doing so, it will be useful to review 
how we got here. 
 
I began in Chapter One by interrogating the Dreyfus-McDowell debate over the extent 
of our conceptual capacities. I identified as a major problem in that debate a lack of 
agreement on what the term 'concept' actually refers to. Despite this, I argued that the 
thinkers agreed in several important respects. Both were committed to extending the 
idea of cognition beyond linguistic thought; furthermore, I argued that despite 
McDowell's assertions to the contrary, both acknowledged a change in the content of 
an experience following the act of reflection. I argued that McDowell’s resistance to 
the idea of such a change, and thus a major source of disagreement, arose from his 
insistence that an experience's potential to become the object of reflection indicates 
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that it is already available in a conceptually-structured form. I argued that this 
assertion is a form of what Carman calls the 'Scholastic Fallacy'– the “illicit projection 
of the structure and content of reflection into unreflective experience”– and suggested 
that McDowell's account actually allows space for the type of experience Dreyfus calls 
'non-conceptual coping.' I therefore proposed leaving aside the task of precisely 
defining 'conceptual' to focus on articulating the three modes of awareness that 
McDowell and Dreyfus acknowledged– a 'ground floor' of unreflective, situated-
responsiveness, a first floor of situation-specific awareness of something as 'this,' and 
an upper floor of detached, abstract reasoning. Although Dreyfus and McDowell 
disagreed on which of and whether these layers should be labelled as conceptual or 
non-conceptual, as well as exactly where the transition takes place, we nevertheless at 
that early stage provisionally identified two broad ways of encountering entities. 
 
In Chapter Two, I began to clarify and provide independent support for these layers 
by undertaking a phenomenology of expert performance, which I argued 
demonstrated the translation of content that I posited in Chapter One. Engaging with 
Collins and Evans' account of expertise, I showed that the different forms of expertise 
they identify– ubiquitous or 'everyday' expertise as well as 'esoteric' expertise, and the 
expertise of bodily skills as well as cognitive expertises– are united by a dependence 
on 'tacit knowledge.' This tacit knowledge, I argued, corresponds phenomenologically 
to the ground floor layer identified in the previous Chapter. The interdependence of 
this with explicit, verbalised thought revealed a translation of content that supported 
my account in the previous Chapter of multiple, yet interacting, modes of experience. 
I then defended this account against Montero's contention that esoteric expertise 
requires explicit, conceptual thought. I argued that her account only reveals that such 
thought takes place in 'gaps' between non-conceptual coping, and is therefore better 
taken as evidence for multiple layers of experience operating in tandem. However, 
expanding on the distinction between 'everyday' and 'esoteric' expertise with 
reference to Heidegger's concept of Eigentlichkeit, I made a distinction between 
authentic or 'owned' and inauthentic, 'unowned' coping. Unowned coping is 
characterised by a kind of automaticity that allows explicit thought over the top of it, 
demonstrating that the two modes of experience operate side-by-side. Owned coping, 
on the other hand, experienced as flow, is focused only in the moment of the task, and 
involves a more integrated form of experience that does not involve the abstracted 
logos. 
 




was now beginning to define as conceptual and non-conceptual, with the non-
conceptual, ground floor layer describing the unreflective enactment of tacit 
knowledge, and the conceptual upper storey explicit, reflective thought. The debate 
thus seemed to centre over the middle, first-floor layer, and in Chapter Three I began 
to focus on the transition that occurs at this level. I started by unpacking McDowell's 
claim that human coping differs from animal behaviour because humans employ 
rational capacities. I argued that the important sense of 'rational' in this case is that 
captured by the German Vernunft, 'faculty of rationality,' as opposed to the Grund or 
reason 'for' an action. I therefore interpreted McDowell's central claim– that the 
content of an experience is always suitable for being exploited by rational capacities– 
as holding that such content is immediately experienced as an objective 'this.' I 
argued, however, that McDowell’s focus overlooked what Heidegger described as a 
more primordial 'as-structure,' the 'hermeneutic,' which articulates entities within the 
context of performing a task. Answering objections that the hermeneutic-'this' 
requires a cultural world, I argued that we share this more basic as-structure with 
other animals, although not the 'apophantic' as-structure to which McDowell restricts 
his discussion. I therefore laid the groundwork for understanding how we are 
continuous with non-human animals, and also where we diverge. 
 
Having now defined 'conceptual' as taking something as an apophantic-'this,' I moved 
on, in Chapter Four, to refine my picture of human coping. I noted that it was an 
oversimplification to equate human coping with animal behaviour since, as we had 
already seen, much of our coping involves skills that we acquire through explicit 
reflection on concepts. Taking phronesis as an exemplification of 'authentic practical 
understanding,' I brought together Dreyfus' account of skill acquisition with 
McDowell's account of Bildung to argue that our initiation into a conceptually-borne 
'second nature' involves coming to experience the apophantic logoi therein 
hermeneutically-as equipment or Zeug– that is, to experience them non-conceptually, 
or– to use Taylor's more apt term– post-conceptually. That is to say, human coping 
involves navigating our second-nature worlds in the same, direct way that animals 
navigate their first nature environments, responding immediately to the solicitations 
called for by specific situations. 
 
By the end of Part One, then, I had argued that human cognition is comprised of two 
broad layers– a post-conceptual layer where entities are encountered hermeneutically 
in the enactment of a task, and a conceptual layer where they are experienced 
apophantically-as a context-independent object. In Part Two, I turned my attention 
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to the conceptual layer, and in particular its interconnection with language. 
 
In Chapter Five, I again followed Heidegger to argue that we perceive entities 
apophantically as being entities through the faculty of noûs or vernehmen. Heidegger 
argues that vernehmen– noesis– should not be identified with explicit thinking, but 
as a direct perception of entities as objects, that could thus form the content of 
conceptual capacities. I argued that the faculty of noûs creates a space where in we 
directly perceive entities apophantically, without the need for the breakdown in 
coping. More precisely, perception (vernehmen as Wahrnehmung) itself ‘breaks’ the 
entity out of its ready-to-hand invisibility. Importantly, such entities are experienced 
as wholes in the way they are ‘taken to heart,’ with no metaphysical claims. We can 
‘break’ an experience into a noetic perception of something as a ‘book,’ a ‘pile of 
books,’ or a ‘cover,’ but we can only hold one experience as a single thing in each noetic 
moment. 
 
I provided support for this contention in Chapter Six by exploring two complementary 
empirical examples. Firstly, I discussed Tomasello's finding that apes are incapable of 
declarative pointing, something which becomes even more significant in light of the 
fact that human infants develop that capacity spontaneously as they begin to acquire 
language. I then expanded on Merleau-Ponty's analysis of Schneider's visual agnosia 
to argue that Schneider suffered an impairment in his capacity to vernehmen. I argued 
that Schneider, having lost his capacity to 'point' even while retaining his ability to 
'grasp,' was able to respond only hermeneutically to the pragmatic entities of his post-
conceptual experience. Taken together, I argued, these two cases thereby 
demonstrated the deep interconnection of noûs, grammatical language, and the 
capacity to take an entity apophantically as being an independent object. 
 
In Chapter Seven, I argued that we should understand noetic perception as 
fundamentally linguistic, in that such experiences are grammatically structured. 
Heidegger calls vernehmen a 'taking-together-that-takes-apart,' arguing that it is 
grounded in what Aristotle called synthesis and diairesis, the process of pointing out 
entities and recontextualising them. I made sense of this by relating it to Chomsky's 
Universal Grammar, wherein elements of an experience are organised such that they 
can be expressed as the moveable elements of natural language. Coupled together with 
my argument that we can noetically carve up the world or take entities ‘to heart’ in 
different ways, all the while experiencing them as things, my account therefore 




its underlying source in non-conceptual experience. However, I argued that such a 
conclusion does not lead to the kind of deeply sceptical internalist or coherentist 
arguments that worried McDowell. Firstly, our embodiment and shared first nature 
means that ultimately many of our concepts are grounded in a shared bodily 
experience of coping. Secondly, the more abstract concepts we acquire are the result 
of our initiation into a shared, second-natural cultural world, which forms the niche 
in which our language and culture develops. However, there nevertheless remains a 
degree of contingency in the way different cultures carve up their conceptual worlds, 
although I argued that this does not imply a strong Whorfian claim of 
incommensurability, since translation and conceptual acquisition remains a 
possibility both between linguistic communities, and between different communities 
within a single language. The process of the post-conceptual embodiment of concepts 
thus forms a scaffold by which we can carve up the world in increasingly rich and 
diverse ways, although greater divergences require greater efforts to translate them. 
Even so, the potential for cultural variation in forming conceptual entities, together 
with the noetic capacity to carve out entities in terms of what they are not, means that 
our ‘world’ of conceptual experience is peculiarly human. 
 
* * * 
 
Through noesis we directly perceive something as being a thing, an entity. Heidegger 
considered only vernehmen to be really Perception or Wahrnehmung– that is, 'true-
taking,' taking as true. We should recall that truth (Wahrheit), for Heidegger, should 
be understood as aletheia, as revealing or unconcealing. In the enactment of noesis, 
we own an experience of ourselves as selves taking an entity as an entity, brought into 
the light of aletheia from the shadowy totality of its equipmentality (Zeugkeit).1 In this 
moment of Perception, between absorbed coping and abstract thought, we have a 
direct contact with entities as entities, of the kind that McDowell argues for in Mind 
and World. Here we find the 'friction' that keeps our conceptual ‘space of reasons’ in 
contact with the source of the logos, a contact that is a direct appearance that things 
are ‘thus and so.’ In the moment, therefore, we are truly in touch with the world. 
 
Aletheia is enacted by the roaming eye of vernehmen, with entities revealed from one 
angle as this and simultaneously concealed in their other aspects. But at the level of 
                                                 
1 Graham Harman (2002) reads a similar thought into Heidegger in his book on Zuhandenheit, to which 
I owe some early inspiration, although our final conclusions differ in important ways. 
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the logos, ‘truth’ also becomes a matter of whether an experience conforms to the 
generalised concept. As we think beyond the moment, the situation-specific point of 
view is taken as general and the revealed entity is experienced as timeless, placeless, 
and unchanging. The grammatical structure wherein we think an entity beyond the 
moment, and which allows us to think expansively and creatively, also freezes those 
entities into the particular angle of their encounter. Thus, even if we see the thing, we 
take it as the logos– an abstracted image.  
 
By focusing on the logos, the potential arises for a discordance between our thought 
and our experience. Thinking solely within a ‘space of reasons,’ populated by logoi, we 
take the world as a collection of fixed, homogenous entities– ‘forgetting' the 
differences, as Nietzsche put it, in the process of conceptualisation.2 This tree is the 
same as that tree, this friend is the same person as last year, this thought is a 'wrong 
thought'; we take processes as entities, which are separated in time and space and 
interact in a dance of cause and effect. Through noesis– grammatical perception– we 
create a world of things. 
 
Yet this discordance is kept in check in the moment in which our two modes of 
experience intersect, where our self-awareness is co-extensive with coping, as we find 
in the eigentlich performance of tasks in the flow. The capacity to own our experience 
separates us on the one hand from other animals– who, while they cope smoothly in 
their environments, never own their experience but always act as 'das Tier'– and on 
the other, from the distanced, abstract thinking that connects logoi to other logoi. Yet 
such a moment is fragile. We slip easily and frequently in either direction, into 
habitual responsiveness or into explicit thinking. Therefore, while we always have the 
possibility of connecting directly to experience, we slip easily out of such a connection, 
instead taking the abstract logoi as things. We then exist in a world of language, 
distanced from the entities themselves. 
 
* * * 
 
I hope in this thesis to have offered a convincing theory of the interrelation of 
language, thought, and human experience. Yet at the end, this work comprises only a 
beginning. In order to establish the central thesis, I have neglected several fertile 
paths, and many new questions arise as further implications from this work. 
                                                 




There are several potential interdisciplinary connections that I have been unable to 
explore in this thesis. There is, for example, a rapidly growing literature in philosophy 
and cognitive science that is investigating the neural correlates of conscious 
perception, action, and experience. While I am cautiously sceptical of neuro-
reductionism, I find it significant that the functions associated with what I have called 
the noetic– including the ‘pointing’ mode, episodic memory, and grammatical 
processing– are centred around parts of the brain– the cortex and especially the pre-
frontal cortex– that are almost peculiarly human. The inhibition of these brain areas 
also produces states of awareness that are radically different from our 'ordinary' 
modes of cognition, and which bear more than a passing phenomenal resemblance to 
flow states. While these correlations are not conclusive– and without a specialism in 
neuroscience, I cannot alone pursue them further– the consistency of my thesis with 
current knowledge of the brain is encouraging, and suggests an angle for future, 
interdisciplinary work. Furthermore, the idea of multiple cognitive systems working 
in tandem supports my assertion that our conceptual and non-conceptual forms of 
awareness rarely, if ever, function in isolation from one another. 
 
These correlations also have the potential to inform our thinking on what it means to 
be a self. I noted in Chapter One Sartre's observation that he 'can't help finding 
himself' in reflective thought.3 Since then, we have also seen the entanglement of 
noesis and self-consciousness manifest, such as in the above-mentioned activities of 
'pointing' and episodic memory or envisioning the future. Thus, there remains a 
longer story to tell about the links between our sense of self-as-ego and the linguistic-
grammatical structure I have argued characterises noûs, for my account seems to 
imply that a sense of self is inextricable from experiencing the world linguistically. 
Indeed, one traditional translation of noûs is ‘mind’ or ‘intellect,’ and the features I 
have ascribed to it conform to a traditional picture of the mind that conceives it as a 
faculty that takes objects as what Kant called an apperceptive synthesis, with content 
expressed in the judgements of a self-conscious knower. There remains much more 
work that can be done connecting these two pictures and exploring the entanglement 
of self-consciousness with the consciousness of objects as objects. This itself also 
opens further questions about the form of self-awareness present in beings lacking 
noetic awareness, be they instances of our own experience, or pre-linguistic humans, 
or other creatures.  
 
                                                 
3 Supra, p. 26. 
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My thesis has suggested not only an ‘abyss’ between humans and animals, however, 
but also a gap between our own modes of experiencing something either post-
conceptually (that is, hermeneutically-as something) or conceptually (or 
apophantically-as being something). Dreyfus has long argued that classical artificial 
intelligence programmes were doomed to failure because they could not build 
machines that could deal with non-conceptual knowledge, being typically designed to 
function by explicitly representing the world. Dreyfus’ once controversial view has 
now arguably been vindicated both by the abandonment of classical AI, and the initial 
successes of embodied AI systems which seem to replicate animal-like flexible 
responsiveness. One further consequence of my thesis, however, would provide a 
basis for criticising this approach. I would argue that while such a strategy, focusing 
on hermeneutic experience, could thereby instantiate smooth-coping in a machine, it 
would at best replicate a very intelligent animal. Human intelligence, on my view, 
requires the capacity to take something apophantically. The link between the 
apophantic and specifically grammatical language offers a clue towards building such 
an intelligence. 
 
In the purely philosophical sphere, several paths extending from the conclusions I 
have reached here remain open to follow. For example, there is potential to enter 
debates on consciousness by exploring the parallels between noesis and access-
consciousness– between vernehmen and attention– and contrasting these with the 
form of awareness involved in circumspectively taking something hermeneutically. I 
have also mentioned parallels between my account of deictic triangulation and 
Davidson’s account of triangulation. While Davidson and I agree on the external 
nature of concepts and the intersubjective origin of language, my focus on perception 
and particularly my distinction between conceptual and non-/post-conceptual 
perception gives a role to the subject that thinkers such as Malpas have argued that 
Davidson rejects.4 This position offers an alternative criticism of McDowell to the one 
I have put forth here, with quite different epistemological consequences. While I have 
not had the space to explore it in this work, an engagement and comparison of 
Davidson’s intersubjective approach with my own could prove a fruitful path for 
future research. 
 
Finally, while I have drawn extensively on Heidegger throughout this work, I have 
used his thought primarily as a source of concepts to better understand the issues at 
                                                 




stake in debates over the relation of language and thought to action. In dialogue with 
Dreyfus, Haugeland, McNeill, and Merleau-Ponty, among others, I have revised and 
extended some of Heidegger’s arguments in order to apply them to the contexts I have 
discussed. In so doing, I have diverged, to greater or lesser degrees, from many 
orthodox interpretations of his work, especially those of English-speaking Continental 
philosophers. Having nevertheless found fruitful applications of his philosophy, I 
have thereby laid foundations for an immanent critique of Heidegger’s work. While I 
believe my reading has been sufficiently rigorous to support the task of this thesis, a 
more explicit confrontation with orthodox readings of Heidegger remains a project I 
have yet to attempt.  
 
* * * 
 
Language creates our world. We live within a second nature that we acquire as we 
develop the ability to perceive the world grammatically, via our initiation into a 
language and culture. As humans, we are inseparable from the world we develop (die 
Welt, die wir bilden) and that we navigate both conceptually and post-conceptually. 
It is in this sense that we are the zoon logon echon, having a logos which extends from 
our abstract thought into our practical coping. And in this sense, we find an abyss 
between ourselves and other animals. Through the capacity to Perceive– to 
vernehmen objects as objects– we understand ourselves as subjects, as selves. Taking 
the world as world, we are confronted by the possibility of being beyond it. With this 
comes the imperative to own our actions, to merge with the world, and experience our 
actions beyond subject and object. The linguistic consciousness that forms our 
separation is also our way back to ourselves, as we aim towards the fusion of the 
moment. 
 
Geschrieben steht: »Im Anfang war das Wort!« 
Hier stock ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort? 
Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich schätzen, 
Ich muß es anders übersetzen, 
Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin. 
Geschrieben steht: Im Anfang war der Sinn. 
Bedenke wohl die erste Zeile, 
Daß deine Feder sich nicht übereile! 
Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt und schafft? 
Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die Kraft! 
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Doch, auch indem ich dieses niederschreibe, 
Schon warnt mich was, daß ich dabei nicht bleibe. 
Mir hilft der Geist! Auf einmal seh ich Rat 
Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die Tat! 
 
~ Goethe, Faust, Erster Teil, Kap. III ~ 
 
It is written: 'In the beginning was the Word!' 
Already I have to stop! Who'll help me on? 
It's impossible to put such trust in the Word! 
I must translate it some other way 
If I am truly enlightened by the spirit. 
It is written: 'In the beginning was the Thought!' 
Think hard of that first line, 
Make sure your pen does not outrun itself! 
Is it the Thought that moves and creates everything? 
It should be: 'In the beginning was the Power!' 
Yet even as I write it down, 
Already something warns me not to keep it. 
 The spirit helps me! All at once I see the answer 
And write confidently: 'In the beginning was the Deed!' 
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